can fleet in the HAWAIIAN area. Owing to this, the Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff had been for years compiling material by carefully collecting, making into statistics, and analyzing bits of information obtained from Naval officers at WASHINGTON, newspapers and magazines published in AMERICA, American radio broadcasts, signal intelligence, passengers and crews of ships stopping over at HONOLULU, other foreign diplomatic establishments, commercial firms, and the like.

The foregoing statistical method of estimation had been in use for a considerable length of time. Publications with information on important moorings within PEARL HARBOR had already been compiled.

Furthermore, if we were to go into the facts mentioned above more minutely, and if two or three examples which made a relatively strong impression were given, they would appear as follows:

A. American radio broadcasts 5 December 1941 (or 6 December 1941) (American time).

The UNITED STATES broadcast of the number of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and others entering (or anchored) in PEARL HARBOR was overheard.

B. Signal intelligence.

According to the signals of the American ships, the number of ships and small craft of the UNITED STATES fleet anchored in PEARL HARBOR or out on training was deduced. Again by combining the flying time (judged according to signal situations) of airplanes shuttling between bases and aircraft carriers out on training missions, and the location of UNITED STATES fleet units as seen by passengers and crews of ships stopping over at HONOLULU, the training areas of the UNITED STATES fleet were determined. The zone, time, etc., of airplane patrols at HAWAII were deduced in the same way.

C. Newspapers and magazines published in the UNITED STATES

Material was obtained for deduction of AMERICA'S war preparation, progress and expansion of military installations, location and capabilities of warships and airplanes, army strength at HAWAII, PANAMA, PHILIPPINES and other places, etc.

D. Observation submarines

With an observation submarine operating at a lurking distance outside the Islands, the sphere of observation of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS was gradually made smaller (It reached outside of PEARL HARBOR on 6 December—American time). Thus, the ships out at sea, ships at LAHAINA, the airplane patrols, etc., were ascertained.

The above submarine, while out at sea, did not discover an American fleet at sea or at LAHAINA, but met aircraft carriers and patrol planes.

II. The gist of ". . . and other general intelligence" contained in the last items of the answer with reference to question No. 14, dated 17 October, was the reports for foreign diplomatic establishments, commercial firms in [3] foreign countries, etc., to the Foreign Ministry, the main store of the commercial firm, etc., chiefly on the general political and economic situation (some military matters included) of the country where the establishment or firm was located. These reports were not important enough from the standpoint of intelligence to have a special write-up, and were considered on their own merits.

## EXHIBIT NO. 8–D

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (13 Dec 45) BG 13 DECEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
(Attention: A. C. of S., G–2.)

1. Reference Par 3 of our communication, same file number and subject dated 4 December 1945, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec., 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl

Harbor on 7 December 1941, copies of three (3) interrogations of Japanese Navy and Civil Officers are forwarded herewith.

2. These interrogations, obtained by Naval sources, are believed to provide further amplification of data previously forwarded.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/ E. D. Law, Jr.,
E. D. Law, Jr.
*Major, AGD, Asst. Adj. Gen.*

3 Incls:
Incl 1—Interrogation Capt. Genda.
Incl 2—Interrogation Mr. Kase.
Incl 3—Interrogation Mr. Tanomogi.

[*1*]

[Copy]

NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION

Date: 28 Nov. 1945. Place: FLTLOSCAP
*Interrogation No. 10*

Subject: Pearl Harbor Attack.

Personnel Interrogated: Captain Minoru Genda; Air Operations officer on staff of Admiral Nagumo during attack on Pearl Harbor. He was with Admiral Nagumo aboard his Flagship Akagi. Captain Genda was given the responsibility of planning the attack.

Interrogators: Captain Robinson and Captain Payton Harrison, USNR.

Interpretor: Douglas Wada.

Summary:

The idea of the surprise attack originated with Admiral Yamamoto during a conversation with Admiral Omishi of the 11th Carrier Division about February 1, 1941. Captain Genda was present at this meeting and remembers Yamamoto saying, "If we have war with the United States we will have no hope of winning unless the U. S. Fleet in Hawaiian waters can be destroyed." After some further discussion Yamamoto directed Onishi to draw up a plan for a surprise attack. Captain Genda was later called in by Onishi to draw up broad outlines for such a plan and determine its feasibility and possibility of success.

About September 1st map games were begun at the War College in Tokyo, to test the plan on the game board and work out all details connected therewith. The following Naval officers were the only ones who had knowledge of the plan and who worked on it at the War College at this time; Admirals Yamamoto, Ugiki, Naguno, Yamagushi, Okusaka; Captains Onishi, Genda, Kuroshima; Commanders Sasaki, Ono; following members of the Navy General staff: Admiral Fukudome, Captains Sanagi and Tonioka, Commander Miyo.

On about November 15th Admiral Yamamoto finally approved the plan and gave it to Admiral Naguno with orders covering the manner of its final execution. On November 22nd the striking force rendezvoused at Etorofu and departed on its mission at 0600 hours Nov 26th. A speed of from 12 to 14 knots was maintained and the Task Force fueled at sea whenever the weather permitted, in order to keep full tanks. The weather was stormy and refueling difficult. It was, however, because of the weather conditions prevailing in this part of the Pacific at this time of year that the northern route was chosen. They didn't expect to meet any shipping, and fog and stormy weather would impair visibility conditions, anyway. Twice after departure information was received from Naval General Headquarters in Tokyo giving the dispositions of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor. The second despatch on this subject was received three days before the attack, or December 5th.

[2] The green light to execute the attack was sent by Admiral Yamamoto from his Flagship the Yamato on December 2nd. The message was "NIITA KAYAMA NOBORE" and menas climb mount NIITAKA. This was the code phrase meaning "proceed with attack". There was an additional part to the message specifying X-Day as December 8th at the time this message was received, the striking force was near the 180th meridian at latitude 42.

In the early morning of December 7th the Force was 700 miles north of Lanai, at which time it turned south and commenced the dash in at a speed of 26 knots.

The following was the composition of the striking force:

6 Carriers with Akagi Flagship of Admiral Naguno.
2 Battleships; Hiei and Kiroshima.
2 Heavy Cruisers; Tone and Chikuma.
9 Destroyers with light cruiser Abukuma as flagship.
3 Submarines; I-19, I-21, and I-23.

Following is the number and type of planes used in the attack:

| | |
|---|---|
| Fighters | 81 |
| Dive bombers | 145 |
| Horizontal bombers | 104 |
| Torpedo planes | 40 |
| Total | 370 |

Of the fighters, 39 were kept around the Carriers as intercepters, in case the U. S. planes got in the air and made an attack. They went out in two waves about one half hour apart. At time of launching position of striking force was about 200 miles north of western tip of Lanai.

Several planes were sent early which got over Pearl about daylight and reported that the Fleet was in.

Surprise was expected, but if the U. S. Forces were on the alert and the attacked discovered, all attacking planes were to drive home the attack regardless.

A very close watch was kept on Hawaiian broadcasts by Commander Ono, Staff Communication officer. Admiral Naguno and his staff felt that they could sense from these broadcasts whether or not the Forces on Oahu had an inkling of the impending attack. They felt they could judge the tenseness of the situation by these broadcasts. Since KGU and KGMB were going along in their normal manner, Nagumo felt that our forces were still oblivious to developments.

For several days prior to the attack the Jap Force had been intercepting messages from our patrol planes. They had not broken the code, but they had been able to plot in their positions with radio bearings and knew the number of our patrol planes in the air at all times and that they were patrolling entirely in the south western sector from Oahu.

[*3*] The three submarines were placed in a line 100 miles ahead of the carriers for the final dash southward. Surface speed of these submarines was 23 knots. If they sighted any planes or shipping they were to submerge, get clear and radio the striking force as soon as it was safe to surface.

Everything went off according to plan. Total Japanese losses were 29 planes.

[*1*] (Incl 2)

[Copy]

NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION

*Interrogation No. 9.*

Subject: Information received by Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Japanese Consul General in Honolulu.

Personnel Interrogated: Mr. Toshikazu Kase, in charge of North American Section of Foreign Office at time of attack on Pearl Harbor. Undergrad work Amherst; graduate study at Harvard in international law, and relations 1928. Member of Foreign Office since late 1940. Became Chief of Section 1 (dealing with North America, i. e. U. S. and Canada) in October 1941. Held this post for about a year.

Where Interrogated: Office of the Fleet Liaison Officer with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Interrogator: Captain Peyton HARRISON, USNR.

Interpretor: Lt. (jg) S. E. SPRAGUE.

Summary:

Mr. Kase stated that he was personnally acquainted with Mr. Kita, former Consul-General in Hawaii. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor Mr. Kita sent

messages to the foreign office every few days informing it of the presence of units of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor. Although the Foreign Office received these wires, they paid little attention to them. Instead, they passed them right along to the Navy Ministry. Mr. Kase believes that all these despatches have been destroyed. At the time of receipt these despatches were not considered of any significance by the foreign office, but were considered just a matter of routine. However, "in the light of after events", Mr. Kase "can look back and see that Kita's telegrams had some significance". The foreign office was very busy with its negotiations with accredited representatives in Washington, and matters concerning the whereabouts and activities of the U. S. Fleet were not a matter of interest. Mr. Kase was busy sending despatches to Nomura and Kurusu and trying to improve the tense situation. The Navy department was not cognizant of these messages being sent to the foreign office representatives in Washington. The foreign ministry deliberately kept things from the Navy Department and vice versa. "Every Ministry had its own secrets". Mr. Kase had no recollection of the presence of a certain Mr. Morimura who arrived at the Consul-General Office Honolulu, in the spring of 1941. Mr. Kase "could not speak with authority" on the question as to whether or not Mr. Morimura could have been sent by the war or Navy Departments with special and secret instructions to Consul-General Kita.

[2] Q. What instructions were given Mr. Kita, Japanese consul at Honolulu, regarding transmission of information about U. S. fleet or military installations in Hawaii?

A. I don't recall any specific instructions he had. He may have had general instructions to be followed in case of disturbances because of the presence in Hawaii of many "hyphenated" citizens. After I became Chief of Section in October 1941 I don't recall any specific instructions being given him.

Q. We know that Kita sent messages to Japan before the outbreak of war concerning the U. S. Fleet. To whom were messages sent? Did you see them?

A. They came through the Foreign Office and I saw them, perhaps without knowing their significance. As far as I am aware, the Foreign Office gave him no specific instructions about sending such information. He made reports as a routine matter. Messages were addressed to the Foreign Minister.

Q. Those messages sent about the whereabouts of the U. S. Fleet; are any copies of these messages now in the Foreign Office?

A. No, I don't think so. When I left my section, I take it for granted my section had these telegrams. There were two successors to me since I left my office. Department buildings were destroyed in May. I doubt if copies of messages are there.

Q. Did Kita state every two or three days what ships were in Pearl Harbor?

A. I remember there were a few telegrams of that sort. I would put them aside. We were more interested in the course of negotiations. At that time we were intensely absorbed in negotiations proper between Tokyo and Washington. Such affairs as Kita's telegrams did not get much of our attention.

Q. Who was most interested in these telegrams?

A. I suppose the Navy Minister.

Q. Who would know whether such telegrams are available?

A. The chances are they have all been destroyed, don't you think so? Very short telegrams, usually, not even occupying a full page. These telegrams were not considered important at all from our point of view. Very likely they have been burned. The Foreign Office served as a channel—we just had a look at them. We thought they were just matters of routine. In the light of after-events, I can look back and see that Kita's telegrams had some significance. But we did not know at the time.

Q. Do you recall any trouble Kudo got into involving shipment of scrap iron?

A. No. I don't recall him.

Q. Interrogator recounted l'affaire Kudo and its expose in newspapers.

A. Rather crude practice, wasn't it? I don't like to impugn his honor, but I don't think Mr. Kudo is one of our career men. I don't think that was done with knowledge of the Foreign Office.

Q. Boxes were addressed to Foreign Office in Tokyo.

A. Oh?

Q. Can you find out where Mr. Kudo is?

A. We can find out for you. I shall have his whereabouts found out.

[3] Q. You say you were absorbed in negotiations at the time. You were sending despatches to Nomura?

A. Yes, we were primarily interested in that. I was engaged in clerical work of the negotiations.

Q. Did Navy Ministry have knowledge of these despatches?

A. No, I don't think so. Some were kept secret from Navy Department. Every ministry has its own official secrets. The majority of telegrams were not given to the fighting services. They were not in a position to request that just as we were not in a position to request their despatches. The gist of negotiations and their progress were sometimes discussed at joint conferences.

Q. We know Kita was sending telegrams. Who would have given him such instruction?

A. I don't know who would have given him such instructions.

Q. Couldn't someone in Navy Department have given him instructions without your knowing it? Wouldn't that have been possible?

A. (Hesitation.) It might have been possible. But not through Foreign Office by telegram. Every telegram to Kita had to pass through Foreign Office and be approved. I don't recall any specific instructions transmitted to Kita through Foreign Office.

Q. In the spring of 1941, Mr. Morimura arrived in Honolulu to assist Mr. Kita. Do you know Mr. Morimura?

A. I was not aware of his existence. I became Chief of Section in October 1941 and was deeply absorbed in the Tokyo-Washington negotiations. I really did not have time to learn about minor officials in all the consulates.

Q. Well, who would know of his existence and his work? Whose place did you take?

A. Mr. Yuki, who accompanied Mr. Kurusu to Washington. I don't know exactly how long he was there before me. He is now councillor of embassy at Bangkok.

(At some point about here, interrogator described Morimura's activities.)

Q. Would it have been possible for the Navy Department to send Mr. Morimura to Honolulu?

A. I don't know. I can't speak with any authority. That was before my time.

Q. Who was Foreign Minister and Vice-Minister?

A. Togo was Foreign Minister and Nishi was Vice-Minister. They assumed office in October 1941.

Q. Would it have been possible for Morimura to have had instructions from Navy Department to give to Kita?

A. I'm not qualified to answer that question. I don't know anything about this affair. I can't even say whether it was possible.



SOURCE DOCUMENTS USED BY NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #1
"JAPANESE COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER #1"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

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COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER 1

Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI BAY 5 Nov 41

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
Commander in Chief
Combined Fleet

145 of 700 copies

COMBINED FLEET ORDER

Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS will be conducted in accordance with the Separate Volume.

Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order 1

Separate Volume

Page 2/2 Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS

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I. COMBINED FLEET OPERATIONS IN CASE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS BEGINS DURING THE CHINA OPERATIONS

A. Outline of Operations

1. In the east the American Fleet will be destroyed and American lines of operation and supply lines to the ORIENT will be cut.

2. In the west British MALAYA will be occupied and British lines of operation and supply lines to the ORIENT, as well as the BURMA Road, will be cut.

3. Enemy forces in the ORIENT will be destroyed, bases of operations will be seized, and areas with natural resources will be occupied.

4. Strategic areas will be seized and developed; defenses will be strengthened in order to establish a durable basis for operations.

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5. Enemy forces will be intercepted and annihilated.

6. Victories will be exploited to break the enemy will to fight.

B. Preparations for War and the Outbreak of War

1. Preparations for the outbreak of war

a. The empire is expecting war to break out with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS. When the decision is made to complete over-all preparations for operations, orders will be issued establishing the approximate date (Y Day) for commencement of operations and announcing "First Preparations for War". The various forces will act as follows:

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(1) All fleets and forces, without special orders, will organize and complete battle preparations in accordance with the allocation of forces for First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations. When directed by the commanding officers of the various forces, they will proceed at the proper time to the pre-operation rendezvous and wait in readiness.

(2) All forces will be on strict lookout for unexpected attacks by the American, British and Netherlands forces.

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(3) The commanding officers of the various forces may carry out such secret reconnaissance as is especially necessary to the operation.

(4) Pursuant to defense plans, 4th Fleet will begin mining the NAMPO GUNTŌ.

b. When the advance forces necessary for carrying out
Page 2/10 the operation have been dispatched to the area of operations, the order "Second Preparations for War" will be issued, and each force will act in accordance with the following:

(1) Submarine forces attached to the Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI), Striking Force, Commerce Destruction Unit, Southern Area Force and South Seas Force, on orders from the commanding officers of the various forces, will proceed at the proper time to the area of operations.

(2) Remaining forces, on orders from the commanding officers of the various forces, will proceed so as to be in position for the outbreak of war.

c. After the required preparations for war have been made, if the situation changes significantly, specified forces may be returned from "Second Preparations for War" to "First Preparations for War".

Page 2/11 2. The outbreak of war and the use of arms theretofore

a. The time for the outbreak of war (X Day) will be given in an Imperial General Headquarters order. The order will be given several days in advance. After 0000 hours, X Day, a state of war will exist. Each force will commence operations according to plan.

b. If a serious enemy attack is received before X Day, the following measures will be taken:

(1) Forces which are attacked will counterattack immediately. Before the X Day orders are issued, counterattacks by base air forces will depend on Imperial General Headquarters Orders.

Page 2/12 (2) After the X Day order is issued, all forces will enter into a state of war and begin operations without waiting for special orders.

(3) Prior to the issuance of the X Day order, the outbreak of war will depend on Imperial General Headquarters orders.

c. After "Second Preparations for War" has been ordered, military force may be used in unavoidable cases such as the following:

(1) If American, British or Netherlands ships or airplanes approach the vicinity of our territorial waters and such action seems to create a danger.

(2) If our forces, while on the move outside our territorial waters, are involved in positive actions which appear to endanger them by forces of these countries.

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6. First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations

1. Operation policy

a. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) (TN "6th Fleet" in pencil.), Striking Force (TN "1st Air Fleet" in blue pencil.), South Seas Force (TN "4th Fleet" in blue pencil.), Northern Force (TN "5th Fleet" in indelible pencil.) and Main Body (TN "Combined Fleet" in blue pencil.) will operate against the American fleet.

(TN Portion of page cut out and "Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) ...." and "Striking Force ...." inserted in blue pencil. Along with "South Seas Force" they are presumably subjects of the following sentence.) The South Seas Force will occupy and destroy important areas in the vicinity and will be ready for the enemy fleet in the AUSTRALIA Area. The Northern Area Force will be responsible for patrols against SOVIET RUSSIA.

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b. While maintaining local superiority, the Southern Area Force (TN "2nd Fleet, 3rd Fleet, Southern Expeditionary Fleets and 11th Air Fleet" in indelible pencil.) will annihilate enemy fleets in the PHILIPPINES, British MALAYA and NETHERLANDS INDIES Area. At the same time it will co-operate with the Army as follows:

(1) The operations against British MALAYA and the PHILIPPINES will be commenced simultaneously, and the enemy air forces and fleets in these areas will be repeatedly battered by air attacks. Army advance expeditionary groups (SENKEN HEIDAN) will be landed in strategic areas of MALAYA, the PHILIPPINES and British BORNEO as quickly as possible. Air Forces will be sent to reinforce air operations.

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(2) The results of the operations will be exploited, and the main body of Army invasion groups (HEIDAN) will be landed in the PHILIPPINES and then MALAYA in order to occupy their respective areas quickly.

(3) During the early stages of the operations the strategic areas of the CELEBES, DUTCH BORNEO and Southern SUMATRA will be occupied in the order named. The strategic areas of MOLUCCAS and TIMOR also will be occupied. Necessary air bases will be prepared in these areas.

(4) As these air bases are completed, air forces gradually will be sent forward, and enemy air strength in the JAVA Area will be crushed. When this is accomplished, the main body of the Army invasion group (HEIDAN) will be landed in JAVA to occupy it.

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(5) After the fall of SINGAPORE the strategic areas of northern SUMATRA will be occupied. Operations against BURMA will be carried out at the appropriate time to cut off the enemy supply route to CHINA.

c. If the American fleet attacks, 3rd Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Fleet will carry out Southern Area operations temporarily. The bulk of combat strength will meet the attack.

d. An element (TN "24S" written in blue pencil.) of the Combined Fleet will destroy enemy sea traffic in the PACIFIC and INDIAN Ocean Areas.

e. In order not to arouse the hostility of THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA, every effort will be made to secure their voluntary co-operation. But in the event of hostility, obstructions to our operations will be eliminated by force.

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2. Outline of operations against the American fleet

The classification of operations and the outline of operations are established in the following table. Each force will operate in accordance with the classification of operations indicated.

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| SITUATION | CLASSIFICATION OF OPERATIONS | OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS |
|---|---|---|
| At Outbreak of War | (TN This portion cut out.) | |
| At Outbreak of War (Situation complicated by using task force for attack) | Method 2 for operations against American fleet | 1. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) will reconnoiter and make a surprise attack on the American fleet. If conditions warrant, air bases at HOWLAND, TUTUILA, FIJI, etc., will be attacked with appropriate forces. 2. The Striking Force will prepare for the American fleet. |
| In Case American Fleet Operates | Method 3 for operations against American fleet | 1. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI), Striking Force, South Seas Force and Northern Area Force will operate against the American task force. 2. If necessary, the Main Body will give support. 3. If conditions warrant, an element of 11th Air Fleet may be temporarily diverted to the east. |
| In Case American Fleet Proceeds to Attack. | Method 4 for operations against American fleet | 1. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI), Striking Force, South Seas Force, Northern Area Force and Main Body, deployed for interception, will operate against the American fleet. The decisive battle strength of Southern Area Force will join immediately to meet the attack. 2. Southern Area operations will be continued by 3rd Fleet, Southern Expeditionary Fleet and fighters of 11th Air Fleet. |

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3. Outline of Southern Area Operations

Southern Area Operations will be based on the operation policy and on the agreement between Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet and Commander in Chief, Southern Area Army. The Southern Area Force Commander will direct the operations unless otherwise ordered.

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4. Operation periods

First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations will be classified as follows. Changes will be by special order.

a. First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations: This period will cover operations from the outbreak of war until the main body of the invasion army has been landed in the PHILIPPINES.

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b. Second Period (DAI NI KI) Operations: In general, operations from the First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations until the main body of the invasion army has been landed in British MALAYA.

c. Third Period (DAI SAN KI) Operations: Operations from the end of the Second (DAI NI KI) Period Operations to the completion of the occupation of the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.

5. Allocation of forces

Allocation of forces during the First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations will be as follows.

a. Allocation of forces for First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations - Separate Table 1

b. Allocation of forces for Second Period (DAI NI KI) Operations - Separate Table 2

c. Allocation of forces for Third Period (DAI SAN KI) Operations - Separate Table 3

d. Allocation of forces for interception operations - Separate Table 4

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D. Second Phase (DAI NI DAN) Operations

1. Operation policy

a. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) will continue to make reconnaissance raids on the American and British fleets. These fleets will be attacked by base air forces, carrier air forces, etc, at opportune times.

b. American and British lines of operation and supply lines to the ORIENT will be cut in order to strengthen the defenses of strategic areas.

c. Enemy forces in the waters under our control and remnants of the enemy in occupied areas will be mopped up in order to secure resources and protect sea traffic.

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d. If the American and British fleets attack, they will be destroyed individually by taking advantage of inner lines of defense.

e. Operations to destroy American and British sea traffic will be intensified.

2. Important points which must be defended and advance bases in occupied territory

a. Important points in occupied territory which must be defended are as follows:

MANILA, DAVAO, SINGAPORE, BATAVIA, SOERABAJA, TARAKAN, BALIKPAPAN, MENADO, MAKASSAR, AMBON, PENANG, RABAUL. (IN DAVAO and MENADO emphasized by blue pencil circles.)

b. Advance bases in occupied territory are expected to be as follows:

MANILA, SINGAPORE, SOERABAJA

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3. Areas expected to be occupied or destroyed

The following are areas expected to be occupied or destroyed as quickly as operational conditions permit:

a. Eastern NEW GUINEA, NEW BRITAIN, FIJI and SAMOA

b. ALEUTIANS and MIDWAY

c. ANDAMAN Islands

d. Strategic points in the AUSTRALIA Area

4. Allocation of forces

The allocation of forces for Second Phase (DAI NI DAN) Operations is established in Separate Table 5.

The allocation of forces for interception operations will be based on Separate Table 4.

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B. Protection of Sea Traffic, Destruction of Enemy Sea Traffic and Mine Warfare.

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1. Operations to protect sea traffic

Sea traffic will be protected as prescribed by force commanders, in accordance with the Plan for Protection of Wartime Commerce (1941), in addition to the following:

| SECTORS OF RESPONSIBILITY | | PRINCIPAL DUTIES |
|---|---|---|
| Philippines and Netherlands East Indies Force | West of Long 136°02'E (TN Add "excluding the defense area of 3 Base Force.")[1]<br>South of Lat 20°N<br>South of a line passing through the northern edge of BRITISH BORNEO at an angle of 315° | 1. Control of ship movements within assigned sectors<br>2. Matters related to escort of ships within assigned sectors<br>3. Gathering and disseminating information<br>4. Control of communications of ships navigating within assigned sectors<br>5. Issuing and cancelling alarms within assigned sectors |
| Page 2/26<br>Malay Force | South of a line passing through the northern edge of BRITISH BORNEO at an angle of 315° | |
| South Seas Force | East of Long 136°02'E (TN Add "plus defense area of 3 Base Force.")[1]<br>Sea area south of Lat 24°N | |
| Northern Force | Sea area north of Lat 24°N<br>Sea area south of Lat 29°N | |
| Other Operational Forces | All sectors of operation | Co-operation in the following matters:<br>1. Destruction of enemy forces in all sectors of operations<br>2. Escort (Chiefly direct escort, depending on the situation or indirect escort)<br>3. Communications |

[1] Editor's Note: Revised by "errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Serial, Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the NAGATO, SANKI WAN.

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2. Operations to destroy sea traffic

a. Policy

Page 2/27 The immediate destruction of vital points in the sea traffic of the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS, combined with a checking of enemy forces, will aid our principal operations. We will endeavor to crush the enemy will to fight by gradually strengthening our efforts and by realizing our aims over a long period of time.

b. Outline for execution

(1) Seizure of enemy ships at the outbreak of war: Enemy ships will be seized, provided that our principal operations are not thereby impaired. Close liaison will be maintained with Imperial General Headquarters and with homeland combat forces (NAISEN BUTAI). Sectors of responsibility for each unit, in observation and seizure of enemy ships, will correspond in general to sectors of responsibility in 1, "Operations to protect sea traffic".

Page 2/28 (2) The Commerce Destruction Unit, as prescribed by its commanding officer and as opportunities arise in the South Seas Area after the outbreak of war, willoperate between CENTRAL and SOUTH AMERICA and AUSTRALIA. Depending on the situation on the west coast of SOUTH AMERICA, one element will proceed to the INDIAN Ocean Area and will operate between AUSTRALIA and AFRICA.

(3) According to the progress of operations and to what is prescribed by the Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) commander, expeditionary forces not exceeding one submarine division will operate off the coasts of CENTRAL and NORTH AMERICA to the extent that the principal operations are not thereby hindered. The Hawaiian Area Force will endeavor to cut rear lines of supply at every opportunity.

(4) One element of DesRons 4, 5, 6, and 7 at the end of First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations of First Phase (DAI ICHI Page 2/29 DAN) Operations, will be assigned as directed by Southern Force Commander to destruction of sea traffic off the south coast of JAVA and at the western entrance to the MALACCA Straits. When southern First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations are completed, they will carry out a vigorous campaign of destruction of sea traffic in the INDIAN Ocean and AUSTRALIA Areas.

(5) In the pause after First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations or when opportunities arise during operations, forces for destroying sea traffic will be strengthened and will operate vigorously with surface ships and airplanes.

3. Mine warfare

Combined Fleet mine warfare will be directed by individual force commanders, in addition to conformance with the following:

Page 2/30 a. Southern area of operations

(1) Standard practices in offensive mine warfare - Appended Table 1

(2) (Standard) Summary of bases to be protected by mines and antisubmarine nets - Appended Table 2

(3) Summary of mine and antisubmarine supplies - Appended Table 3

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(4) Outline for establishing mine barriers at the end of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations - Appended Table 4

b. South Seas Area

The 4th Fleet defense plan will be followed and offensive mine warfare will be carried on as directed by the South Seas Force Commander.

Page ~/31 c. When mines are laid or swept, the force commander in each case will report positions of mines, navigable sectors, etc., to the proper authorities.

d. Declarations concerning the laying of mines

Declarations will be issued by Imperial General Headquarters, after being routed through Combined Fleet Headquarters; they will be issued chiefly as a threat to the enemy.

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Appended Table 1

STANDARD PRACTICES IN OFFENSIVE MINE WARFARE IN THE SOUTHERN AREA OF OPERATIONS

a. First Period (DAI ICHI) Operations of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations.

| | SEA AREAS TO BE MINED | TIME | FORCES TO BE USED | NUMBER OF MINES TO BE LAID | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PHILIPPINES Area | Area outside MANILA Bay | X-1 - X<br>X+6 - X+8 | One submarine from SubRon 6 (first stage)<br>(second stage) | Approximately 80 | To hinder passage of enemy vessels. |
| | BALABAC Straits | X-2 - X-1<br>X+6 - X+10 | One submarine from SubRon 6 (first stage)<br>One submarine from SubRon 6 (second stage) | More than 80 | To hinder passage of enemy vessels. |
| | SAN BERNADINO Straits | X+3 - X+6 | Sec 1 of Mine Layer Div 17 | 300 to 500 | 1. To hinder passage of enemy cruisers, destroyers, or submarines.<br>2. Mooring cables will be strengthened to withstand strong tidal currents. |
| | SURIGAO Straits | X+3 - X+6 | Sec 1 of Mine Layer Div 17 | 300 to 500 | To hinder passage of enemy cruisers, destroyers or submarines. |
| | SULU Sea SIPIT Straits | X+10 | Sec 1 of Mine Layer Div 17 | Approximately 300 | Mines will be laid according to the enemy situation and as decided by Southern Force Commander. |
| | SULU Sea PANLAAN Straits | X+10 | | Approximately 300 | |
| MALAY Area | SINGAPORE Straits | X-1 - X<br>about X+12 | Two submarines of SubRon 6 (first stage)<br>One submarine of SubRon 6 (second stage) | Approximately 130 | To hinder passage of enemy cruisers, destroyers or submarines. |
| | Waters south-east of MALAYA (between TIOMAN and DJIMAJA) | X-1 - X<br>about X+10 | One mine layer of 9 Base Force | Approximately 600 | To hinder passage of enemy cruisers, destroyers or submarines. |
| BORNEO Area | MATUNA Channel JESSELTON COTIVAS | X-1 - X<br>about X+11 | Ship No 3 of Mine Layer Div 17 | Approximately 650 | To hinder passage of enemy cruisers, destroyers or submarines. |

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Appendix Table 1 (Continued)

STANDARD PRACTICES IN OFFENSIVE MINE WARFARE IN THE SOUTHERN AREA OF OPERATIONS

b. Second Period (DAI NI KI) Operations of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations

| | SEA AREAS TO BE MINED | TIME | FORCES TO BE USED | NUMBER OF MINES TO BE LAID | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NETHERLANDS INDIES Area | North entrance to BONARAJA | About X+25 | Submarines from SubRon 6 | Approximately 40 | Aimed at light cruisers and other vessels of similar and shallower draughts. |
| MALAI Area | Entrance to SINGAPORE Straits and sea areas south of MALAYA | | One mine layer of 9 Base Force<br>Ship No 3 of Mine Layer Div 17 | Approximately 500 | 1. To prevent enemy passage.<br>2. To intensify mine warfare of First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations. |

c. During and after Third Period (DAI IKKI) Operations of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations

| | SEA AREAS TO BE MINED | TIME | FORCES TO BE USED | NUMBER OF MINES TO BE LAID | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRALIAN Coast | PORT DARWIN | As quickly as possible | Mine Layers of Mine Layer Div 17 | 300 | To hinder passage by the enemy. |
| | Important points in AUSTRALIA | As soon as opportunities present themselves | One or two submarines from SubRon 6<br>One mine layer from Mine Layer Div 17 | Suitable numbers | 1. To hinder passage by the enemy.<br>2. Type 88 mines will be laid. |
| INDIAN OCEAN | RANGOON<br>COLOMBO<br>BOMBAY | As soon as possible after occupation of SINGAPORE | One or two submarines from SubRon 6 | Suitable numbers | 1. To hinder passage by the enemy.<br>2. Type 88 mines will be laid. |

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Amended Table 2

(STANDARD) SUMMARY OF BASES TO BE PROTECTED BY MINES AND ANTISUBMARINE NETS

| AREAS TO BE MINED | | OBJECT | TIME | FORCES TO BE USED | NUMBER OF MINES TO BE LAID | ANTISUBMARINE NETS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PHILIPPINES Area | LINGAYEN GULF | To prevent entry by enemy submarines | At time of landing | 2 Base Force | Approximately 900 | As suitable |
| | RAMON GULF | " | " | 1 Base Force | Approximately 320 | " |
| | DAVAO (DUMANQUILAS Bay as conditions require) | " | As quickly as possible | | Approximately 500 | " |
| | MANILA Bay | " | " | One element of 2 Base Force | Approximately 900 | " |
| FRENCH INDO-CHINA Area | CAMRANH Bay | " | To be completed before outbreak of war | 9 Base Force | 680 | |
| NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES Area | TARAKAN | " | Immediately after invasion | 1 Base Force and Sec 1 of Mine Layer Div 17 | 200 | |
| | BALIKPAPAN | " | " | | 300 | |
| | MACASSAR | To prevent entry by enemy ships | " | | 300 | As suitable |
| | SOERABAJA | " | " | | 1,000 | |
| | AMBOIN and KUPANG | " | " | | 300 | |
| | BATAVIA | " | " | 2 Base Force | 600 | |
| | SUNDA Straits | To hinder passage by the enemy | " | Sec 2 of Mine Layer Div 17 | 750 | |
| MALAY Area | Area outside SINGAPORE Bay | To prevent entry by enemy submarines | Immediately after landing | 9 Base Force and Ship No 3 of Mine Layer Div 17 | 900 | As suitable |
| | MALACCA Straits | To hinder passage by the enemy | " | | 400 | |

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Appended Table 3

SUMMARY OF MINE AND ANTISUBMARINE SUPPLIES

| SUPPLY BASES | SUPPLIES |
|---|---|
| MAKO | Type 93 Mines - approximately 4,000<br>Type 88 Mines - approximately 220 (an additional 120 until about March 1942)<br>Antisubmarine nets for 2 Base Unit (KONKYOCHI) - one set |
| PALAU | Type 93 Mines - approximately 4,000<br>Antisubmarine nets for 1 Base Unit (KONKYOCHI) - one set |

Appended Table 4

OUTLINE FOR ESTABLISHING MINE BARRIERS AT THE END OF SOUTHERN FIRST PHASE (ICHI DAN) OPERATIONS

When the southern First Phase (ICHI DAN) Operations end, mine barriers will be laid, as shown below. By making the SOUTH CHINA Sea safe, surface patrol will be facilitated. These operations will depend on special orders.

| SEA AREAS TO BE MINED | NUMBER OF MINES TO BE LAID | FORCES TO BE USED | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|
| CARIMATA and CASPAR Straits | 5,000 | 9 Base Force<br>One element of Mine Layer Div 17 | To prevent penetration by enemy submarines |
| SUNDA Straits | 600 | 2 Base Force | To prevent penetration by enemy submarines<br>First stage mine warfare will be intensified. |
| MALACCA Straits | 1,000 | 9 Base Force | " |

Page 2/41 F. Communications

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Combined Fleet operational communications are based on Combined Fleet Wireless Communications Regulations and on the Joint Army-Navy Agreement Concerning Communications in Southern Operations. In addition, they will conform to the following provisions.

2. Dispositions for communications

a. Dispositions at the outbreak of war

Page 2/42 Ship, submarine and airplane communications - Appended Table 1 (base) communications - Appended Table 2 (refer to appended chart)

These dispositions will be changed in the future to meet battle conditions. The respective force commanders will change the dispositions for submarine and airplane communications as needs arise.

b. Times for taking up assignments at the outbreak of war are as follows:

| CLASSIFICATION | TIME | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|
| Communications Unit Communications | 2400 hrs, X-8 | After 2400 hrs, X-2 and until specially designated, 2nd China Expeditionary Fleet and Hainan Guard District will be in the ship communications system. |
| Ship Communications | 2400 hrs, X-6 | |
| Submarine Communications | | |
| Airplane Communications | 2400 hrs, X-3 | |
| Communications for Specially Designated Forces | By special orders | |

Notes:

1. For forces which must take up their assignments before the times set forth in this table, the respective force commanders will determine the time and report it to the proper authorities.

2. In some cases, one element will take up its assignment at a time differing from that of the remainder of the force.

3. Communications procedure

Page 2/43 a. Broadcasting will be the principal means of communication within an operational force. Acknowledgment will be required when there is uncertainty concerning receipt of the message or when confirmation is required because the message is especially important.

Page 2/44 b. Each force, at the direction of its commanding officer, will come into the short-range communications system of the nearest communications unit (TN Add "and into its broadcast communications system.")[1] (In cases of special necessity, it will come into the long-range communications system.) Communications dealing with transportation, supply, personnel and other communications not urgent from the standpoint of operations usually will come under this

[1]Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Top Secret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the NAGATO, SAEKI WAN.

communications system. The Striking Force, Commerce Destruction Unit and other forces operating on special missions at great distances, when they set out from their rendezvous, will come under specially designated communications systems centered around the Tokyo Communications Unit (TOTSU).

Page 2/45 c. All communications units will relay to the proper authorities communications of operational forces within their respective areas. Relay usually will be by broadcast, and acknowledgments will be required when confirmation of receipt is especially needed. Relays of messages classified urgent or higher will be broadcast immediately, other important messages at the times indicated in Paragraph d, below.

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| COMMUNICATIONS UNIT | COMMUNICATIONS TO BE RELAYED |
|---|---|
| Tokyo Communications Unit | Communications of Striking Force, Commerce Destruction Unit and other forces under specially designated communications systems |
| Takao Communications Unit | Communications of submarine and airplanes under Southern Force |
| 3rd Communications Unit | Communications of SubRon 5 and of airplanes based in PALAU within Southern Force |
| 81st Communications Unit | Communications of airplanes and submarines operating in the SOUTH CHINA Sea Area |
| 5th Communications Unit | Communications of submarines and airplanes under South Seas Force |
| 6th Communications Unit | Communications of Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) submarines |

Note:

Frequencies to be used in broadcasts will be as shown in d. When there is no danger of interferring with the operational communications of forces, frequencies of ships may be used.

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d. All communications units will broadcast important dispatches dealing with operations in accordance with the following table. Force commanders will use the broadcast facilities of the communications units for communicating within their respective areas. Each force will receive messages as prescribed by the force commanders.

| COMMUNICATIONS UNITS | TIMING OF BROADCAST | | BROADCAST FREQUENCIES | MESSAGES |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tokyo Communications Unit (TOTSU) | Constant | | 4,175 Kc (TO-14)<br>8,330 Kc (TO-15)<br>16,700 Kc (TO-16) | Directed to all operating forces:<br>1. Important communications originating with the flagship of CinC Combined Fleet<br>2. Important communications originating with central (TN Presumably Central Communications Unit:)<br>1. General situation |
| | 0,100-1,600 | 30 minute intervals beginning at 30 minutes past each odd hour | 1,744 Kc | Communications, as above, directed to advanced expeditionary (SENKEN) submarines |
| | 0,600-1,800 | 30 minute intervals beginning at 30 minutes past each even hour | | Communications, as above, directed to SubRon 4 and SubRon 5 |
| Takao Communications Unit (TAKATSU) | Constant | | 7,155 Kc (HA-27)<br>14,310 Kc (HA-28) | Important communications dealing with operations directed to Southern Force |
| | 20 minute intervals beginning at 45 minutes past each hour | | Frequencies used by SubRon 5 and SubRon 6 | Important communications directed to submarine forces of Southern Force |
| 3rd Communications Unit (TSU) | Beginning at 30 minutes past each hour | | 7,280 Kc (HA-31)<br>14,560 Kc (HA-32) | Important communications dealing with operations directed to Western Area Force of Southern Force |
| 51st Communications Unit (TSU) | Beginning at 15 minutes past each hour | | 7,315 Kc (HE- 73)<br>14,630 Kc (HE- 74) | Important communications dealing with operations directed to South China Sea Area Force |
| | 20 minute intervals beginning at 45 minutes past each hour | | Frequencies used by SubRon 4 | Important communications directed to submarines of SubRon 4 |
| 5th Communications Unit (TSU) | Beginning at 15 minutes past each hour | | 4,860 Kc (HA-61)<br>9,720 Kc (HA- 62) | Important communications directed to South Seas Force and to forces operating in the KAMAI SHOTO |
| 6th Communications Unit (TSU) | Beginning at 45 minutes past each hour | | 5,950 Kc (HA-11)<br>11,900 Kc (HA-12) | Important communications directed to South Seas Force and to Advanced Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) |

Notes:

1. All communications units will relay broadcast Tokyo Communications Unit shortwave broadcast communications.
2. After X-2 broadcast communications will be given permanent numbers.
3. Acknowledgment will be sent in cases of special necessity. (In these cases, acknowledgments will be sent 15 minutes after transmission has been completed and by the method used for exchange of strategic information.)
4. Tokyo Communications Unit (TOTSU) and Takao Communications Unit (TAKATSU) will transmit on prescribed frequencies. Other units will transmit on one frequency at night, and between 1000 and 1600 hours, depending on circumstances, they will make combined use of their daytime frequencies.
5. As the situation demands, times of broadcast may be changed in accordance with requests or as directed by the commanding officers of the forces operating in the respective areas.
6. Suitable changes in broadcasting frequencies may be made by the communications units in accordance with needs. (In such cases the proper authorities will be notified in advance.)

Note: The symbol * indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

Page 2/49 e. When the Main Body is in the homeland area, transmission from the flagship of Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet will control the transmission facilities of the Tokyo and Kure Communications Units (TŌTSŪ, KURETSŪ), or the Tokyo Communications Unit (TŌTSŪ) will be assigned this work.

f. Communications outside the fleets

Except in cases of special urgency, communications will be effected by means of the communications system through the nearest communications unit.

Page 2/50 4. Safeguarding communications

a. Safeguarding frequencies

Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 177, Standard Control of Frequencies Used During Operations, will be applied.

b. Safeguarding messages

(1) Code tables and call signs to be used are given as follows: Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 171, Use of Codes; Combined Fleet Top Secret Standing Order 52, Table of Combined Fleet Special Wartime Call Signs; Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 169, Abbreviated Call Signs for Exchange of Strategic Information; Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 179, Table of Symbols Indicating Emergency Classifications for Special Combined Fleet Communications.

Page 2/51 (2) Methods of safeguarding and distinguishing deceptive dispatches: Combined Fleet Top Secret Standing Order 49, Methods of Safeguarding and Distinguishing Deceptive Dispatches.

(3) Method of indicating dates: Combined Fleet Standing Order 51, Table of Combined Fleet Special Abbreviations for Dates.

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(4) Methods for indicating place names are as follows:

| NAMING METHOD | ABBREVIATED NAMES | REFERENCES | USE |
|---|---|---|---|
| Method 1 for indicating places | CHIKE* 1 | Navy Ministry Military Most Secret Serial 167, Naval Aviation Military Place Code Tables will be used in accordance with what is prescribed in Abbreviated Codes for Operational Communications and in Code Book G. | Used for urgent ship and airplane communications |
| Method 2 for indicating places | CHIKE* 2 | Those prescribed in KU and OTSU abbreviated codes for naval operational abbreviations and in Code Book G. | |
| Method 3 for indicating places | CHIKE* 3 | | |
| Method 4 for indicating places | CHIKE* 4 | | |
| Method 5 for indicating places | CHIKE* 5 | Navy Military Top Secret Serial 585, Regulations for the Use of Pacific Ocean Military Place Maps; and Navy Military Top Secret Serial 147, Pacific Ocean Military Place Maps. | Used in general operations and in ship communications |
| Method 6 for indicating places | CHIKE* 6 | Navy Ministry Military Most Secret Serial 167, Naval Aviation Military Place Code Tables (The use of code tables will be as shown in the notes.) | Used in airplane communications |
| Method 7 for indicating places | CHIKE* 7 | In accordance with Naval General Staff Military Top Secret Serial 123, Regulations for the Use of Pacific Ocean Special Military Place Map and Special Military Maps. | 1. Used in joint Army-Navy operations<br>2. Used in inshore engagements |
| Method 8 for indicating places | CHIKE* 8 | Navy Ministry Military Most Secret Serial 165, Chart Indicating Protected Commerce Sectors. | Used in protecting commerce |
| Method 9 for indicating places | CHIKE* 9 | Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 175, Combined Fleet Emergency Wartime Method for Indicating Places. | Emergency use of CHIKE* 5; used on special orders |
| Method 10 for indicating places | CHIKE* 10 | Naval General Staff Military Most Secret Serial 144, Abbreviated Code Table for Specially Designated Places. | Used to indicate places in messages |
| Method 11 for indicating places | CHIKE* 11 | Combined Fleet Abbreviated Code Table for Emergency Military Place Names. | Emergency use of CHIKE* 10; used on special orders |

Note: Use of Navy Ministry Military Most Secret Serial 167, Naval Aviation Military Place Code Tables

| Devices Used | |
|---|---|
| A | From the 1st to the 15th of odd-numbered months |
| B | From the 16th to the end of odd-numbered months |
| C | From the 1st to the 15th of even-numbered months |
| D | From the 16th to the end of even-numbered months |
| E | Reserve (Depending on special orders) |

Note: The symbol * indicates an exact ROMAJI transaliteration of the original KANA.

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5. Utilising and interfering with enemy communications

a. Utilising enemy communications

(1) Intercept squads attached to each fleet will utilize enemy communications as directed by the commanders in chief of the respective fleets.

(2) Intercept squads attached to communications units will be assigned to utilization of enemy communications in accordance with the following:

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| COMMUNICATIONS UNIT | OUTLINE |
|---|---|
| Tokyo Communications Unit | The unit will obtain information chiefly on movements of the American home fleet and airplanes; also on movements of Russian forces.<br><br>Details to be prescribed by Commanding Officer, 1 Combined Communications Unit. |
| Takao Communications Unit | 1. The unit will obtain information chiefly on movements of American, British and Dutch fleets and airplanes in the FAR EAST.<br><br>Details to be prescribed by Commanding Officer, 1 Combined Communications Unit.<br><br>2. Depending on conditions, one element will come under the command of Commander in Chief, 11th Air Fleet.<br><br>3. As the southern operations progress, it will proceed to occupied sectors whenever suitable. |
| Other Communications Units | Under direction of Commanding Officer, 1 Combined Communications Unit, they will gather operational information. |

b. Interference with enemy communications will be directed by the force commanders, except in cases of special orders. Each force commander (Commanding officer, 1 Combined Communications Unit), whenever conditions are favorable, will direct communications units in the area (subordinate communications units) to obstruct enemy communications.

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Appended Table 1

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SHIP, AIRPLANE AND SUBMARINE COMMUNICATIONS

| COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM | COMMUNICATIONS DISPOSITION | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|
| Ship Communications | Strategic Communications 2 (2 SETSUHA*)<br>Frequency System 3 (DEMPA SOSHIKI) (3 TEN*)<br>Communication Classification 2 (2 KUN*) (Fleet or force co-ordinated communications) | 1. Flagship communications system frequencies used mainly by the flagship of the commander in chief of each fleet and by the flagship of specially established squadrons.<br>2. Ordinary short wave is used by the flagship of the commanding officer of a squadron and when especially needed by ordinary vessels.<br>3. Frequencies used in ship communications are mainly employed by Southern Force and those forces closely connected with it. Other forces use them for urgent communications. However, when the Combined Fleet is taking up interception (YŌGEKI) dispositions, their main use will no longer be restricted to the Southern Force.<br>4. Southern Force communication classification is Classification 3. |
| Page 2/58<br>Airplane Communications | Frequency System 4 (DEMPA SOSHIKI) (4 TEN*) | |
| Submarine Communications | Frequency System 3 (DEMPA SOSHIKI) (3 TEN*) | The communications of Advanced Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) submarines will be determined by the commanding officers of the Advanced Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI). |

Note:

The use of day and night frequencies will conform with Combined Fleet Wireless Regulations, as well as with the following:

In the main, night frequencies will be used. If reliability of communications cannot be expected of night frequencies only, day frequencies also will be used.

Note: The symbol * indicated the exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

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Appended Table 2

COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (BASE) COMMUNICATIONS

| COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM | ATTACHED SHIPS AND STATIONS | COMMUNICATIONS FREQUENCIES (KC) DISPOSITION 1 ORDINARY | DISPOSITION 1 SUPPLEMENTARY | DISPOSITION 2 ORDINARY | DISPOSITION 2 SUPPLEMENTARY | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Communications System 1 | Takao Communications Unit (TAKATSŪ)<br>Tokyo Communications Unit (TŌTSŪ)<br>5th Communications Unit | 6,505 (NA*56)<br>3,010 (NA*57) | 5,550 (RE*51)<br>11,100 (RE*52)<br>7,590 (RE*75)<br>15,180 (RE*76) | 6,505 (NA*56)<br>13,010 (NA*57)<br>5,550 (RE*51)<br>11,100 (RE*52) | 7,590 (RE*75)<br>15,180 (RE*76) | |
| Communications System 2 | 3rd Communications Unit<br>Takao Communications Unit (TAKATSŪ)<br>81st Communications Unit | 6,760 (TA*25)<br>13,520 (TA*26) | 7,155 (TA*27)<br>14,310 (TA*28)<br>7,750 (RE*77)<br>15,500 (RE*78) | 6,760 (TA*25)<br>13,520 (TA*26)<br>7,155 (TA*27)<br>14,310 (TA*28) | 7,750 (RE*77)<br>15,500 (RE*78) | |
| Communications System 3 | 3rd Communications Unit<br>Tokyo Communications Unit (TAKATSŪ)<br>81st Communications Unit | 4,745 (TO*17)<br>18,980 (TO*19) | 7,855 (NA*33)<br>15,710 (NA*34)<br>7,315 (RE*73)<br>14,630 (RE*74) | 4,745 (TO*17)<br>15,710 (NA*34)<br>8,610 (RE*81)<br>17,220 (RE*82) | 7,315 (RE*73)<br>14,630 (RE*74) | 6th Communications Unit will enter this communications system in accordance with special orders. |
| Communications System 4 | 3rd Communications Unit<br>4th Communications Unit<br>5th Communications Unit<br>6th Communications Unit | 5,180 (NA*31)<br>10,360 (NA*15) | 7,290 (NA*31)<br>14,580 (NA*32)<br>7,655 (NA*18)<br>15,310 (NA*19) | 5,180 (NA*14)<br>10,360 (NA*15)<br>7,290 (NA*31)<br>14,580 (NA*32) | 7,655 (NA*18)<br>15,310 (NA*19) | |
| Communications System 5[1] | Hainan Communications Unit (HAINANTSŪ)<br>Takao Communications Unit (TAKATSŪ)<br>81st Communications Unit | 7,010 (RE*71)<br>14,020 (RE*72) | 6,260 (RE*61)<br>12,520 (RE*62) | 7,010 (RE*71)<br>14,020 (RE*72) | 6,260 (RE*61)<br>12,520 (RE*62) | |
| Communications System 6 | Chichi Jima Communications Unit (CHICHITSŪ)<br>5th Communications Unit<br>Marcus Island | 5,725 (RI*14)<br>11,450 (RI*15) | 4,925 (RE*41)<br>9,850 (RE*42) | 5,725 (RI*14)<br>11,450 (RI*15) | 4,925 (RE*41)<br>9,850 (RE*42) | |
| Communications System 7 | Ōminato Communications Unit (ŌTSŪ)<br>Tokyo Communications Unit (TŌTSŪ)<br>(PARAMUSHIRO)<br>(Yokosuka Communications Unit) (YOKOTSŪ)<br>Chichi Jima Communications Unit (CHICHITSŪ) | 5,925 (YO*17)<br>11,850 (YO*18) | 6,300 (TAN*23)<br>12,600 (TAN*223) | 5,925 (YO*17)<br>11,850 (YO*18) | 6,300 (TAN*23)<br>12,600 (TAN*223) | |
| Communications System 8 | Ōminato Communications Unit (ŌTSŪ)<br>Tokyo Communications Unit (TŌTSŪ)<br>Maizuru Communications Unit (MAITSŪ)<br>Chinkai Communications Unit (CHINTSŪ) | 4,320 (MA*11)<br>8,640 (MA*12) | 6,695 (O*25)<br>13,390 (O*26) | | | These systems are established in accordance with special orders. |
| Communications System 9 | Wakkanai Communications Unit (WAKATSŪ)<br>Ōminato Communications Unit (ŌTSŪ)<br>Tokyo Communications Unit (TŌTSŪ)<br>Seshin Communications Unit (RATSŪ)<br>Maizuru Communications Unit (MAITSŪ) | 4,175 (O*11)<br>8,350 (O*12)<br>10,700 (O*13)<br>(TN Above figures corrected, tn read:)[2]<br>4015 (O*11)<br>8030 (O*12)<br>16060 (O*13) | 4717.5 (TAN*21)<br>9,435 (TAN*221) | | | |

[1] Editor's Note: The frequencies for Communications System 5 have been corrected in accordance with changes given in "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary. Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Top Secret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the NAGATO, SAEKI WAN.

[2] Editor's Note: Correction derived from same source.

Note: The symbol * indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

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Appended Table 2 (Continued)

Notes:

1. The times of communications will be as usual unless specially determined.

2. When sending and receiving conditions between ships and stations in the same system are poor, an intermediate communications unit will be responsible for relay.

3. Unless otherwise ordered, Disposition 1 will be used. Subsequent alterations in dispositions or frequencies will be as prescribed by the Commanding Officer, 1st Combined Communication Unit.

4. Communications unit (base) communications in occupied territories, except where specially determined, will be as prescribed by the commanding officer of each force.

5. Reserve frequencies

| | |
|---|---|
| 5,085 | (TA*14) |
| 10,170 | (TA*15) |
| 5,325 | (TO*23) |
| 10,650 | (TO*24) |
| 5,225 | (SA*25) |
| 10,450 | (SA*26) |
| 4,205 | (HO*71) |
| 8,410 | (HO*72) |
| 16,820 | (HO*73) |
| 4,030 | (RE*11) |
| 8,060 | (RE*12) |
| 16,120 | (RE*13) |
| 6,820 | (TO*51) |
| 13,040 | (TO*48) |
| 4,665 | (SA*14) |
| 9,330 | (SA*15) |
| 18,660 | (SA*16) |
| 6,150 | (TO*43) |
| 12,360 | (TO*44) |

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Note: The symbol * indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

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Amended Short

CONVERTED FLEET COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (BASE) COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS




(TN Exact tracing from the original document.)

(TN Translation of conventional signs and abbreviations.)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| CinC 1 Air Fleet | CinC 4 Fleet | CinC 11 Air Fleet | CinC 1 Fleet |
| Combat Zone | CinC 5 Fleet | CinC 3 Fleet | CinC 2 China Expeditionary Fleet |
| | One Grp Div 5 | | |
| CinC 6 Fleet | CinC 2 Fleet | CinC Combined Fleet | CinC Southern Expeditionary Fleet |

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G. Supply

1. Supply policy

a. Generally, each ship will replenish its fuel when it falls below 60% of capacity. If battle is anticipated, however, every effort will be made to maintain capacity.

b. Ordnance, ammunition, bombs, rations and stores will be replenished to capacity at every opportunity.

2. Outline of supply

a. The allotment of bases of operations for the initial period of operations is established generally as follows:

4th Fleet, 5th Fleet, 6th Fleet - YOKOSUKA

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1st Fleet, 2nd Fleet, 1st Air Fleet, forces attached to Combined Fleet - KURE

11th Air Fleet, Southern Expeditionary Fleet, 3rd Fleet - SASEBO

b. The allotment of bases of operations and supply points to the supply vessels attached to each force is established generally as follows:

Main Body, Striking Force, Advanced Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI), South Seas Force - YOKOSUKA, KURE and vicinity

Southern Force - MAKO, TAKAO, SASEBO and vicinity

Northern Force - YOKOSUKA, CHINATO and vicinity

Commerce Destruction Unit - any suitable place

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c. The allotment of supply bases is established generally as follows:

Northern Force - PARAMUSHIRO, AKKESHI, WAKKANAI, CHICHI JIMA, MARCUS Island

South Seas Force ) Advanced Expeditionary ) Force (SENKEN BUTAI) ) SAIPAN, KWAJALEIN, WOTJE, JALUIT, TARQA, TRUK, POMAPE, PALAU (Second Period (DAI NI KI) Operations and thereafter)

Southern Force - PALAU (until First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations have ended), SAIGON, CAMRANH

The initial full allowance for supply bases and special supply points is as determined in Appended Table 1.

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d. As the operation develops, special supply points (special stores department and special air depot) will be set up in occupied areas. They will be under the direction of the commanding officer of the forces in such areas. The following

locations have been chosen:

(1) DAVAO
(2) TARAKAN
(3) BALIKPAPAN
(4) MANILA
(5) MAKASSAR
(6) SOERABAJA
(7) SINGAPORE
(8) BATAVIA
(9) PENANG

Page 2/69 e. The various forces will be supplied by supply ships attached to them.

f. If possible, supply bases will not be used to supply other than airplanes and small vessels. In particular, except in unavoidable cases, supply bases will not be used to replenish stocks of supply ships.

g. Supplies and stores for forces which have advanced into captured areas will be unloaded and transported by base forces (KONKYOCHI) (IN "Base forces" changed to "special stores department.")[1] in cooperation with forces in the area.

Page 2/70 h. When several forces are to be supplied at the same time, the senior commanding officer present will determine priority.

i. The assignment of supply ships is given in Appended Table 2.

j. The rendezvous and subsequent movements of supply ships attached to the Combined Fleet are given in Appended Table 3.

3. Important supply matters

a. As shown in Appended Table 5, the Combined Fleet Supply Dept will direct the over-all planning of supply for the Combined Fleet and will keep in contact with Imperial General Headquarters and each base of operations.

Page 2/71 b. The organization of the supply departments of the various forces (fleets) will be determined by the respective force (or fleet) commander. The supply departments of the various forces (fleets) will supply the various forces (fleets) and will maintain contact with Combined Fleet Supply Dept, each base of operations and supply points.

c. When a force is supplied by a supply ship attached to another force (fleet) or by a supply base, a report will be sent to the commanding officer of the force to which the ship is attached or to the commanding officer of the supply base.

d. When the commanding officer of the supply base furnishes considerable quantities and supplies to surface forces other than those for which he is responsible, he will submit a report on current stocks to Imperial General Headquarters, the commanding officer of the base of operations and Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet.

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[1] Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the NAGATO, SAEKI WAN.

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e. When the force commander concerned finds it necessary to change the initial full allowance of the supply base or special supply point, he will make a report to Imperial General Headquarters and Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet and will notify the commanding officer of the base of operations. Each month reports and notices will be submitted in this manner concerning quantities necessary to replenish stocks.

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f. Commanding officers of supply bases and officers in charge of special supply points will maintain a current inventory of stocks and requisition necessary items from the base of operations, taking into consideration stocks carried by the latter.

g. Force commanders (or commanders in chief of fleets) will indicate the quantities and types of military stores which must be carried on the supply ships. When supply ships are directed to a base of operations or to a supply point in order to restock, they will notify the commanding officer of the base (TN Add "or supply point.")[1] regarding time of arrival and quantities and types of materiel required.

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h. When stores on supply ships have to be replenished or supplemented, the force commander (or fleet commander in chief) concerned will submit a report immediately to Imperial General Headquarters and to Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet.

i. Each force commander (or fleet commander in chief) will secure from the commanding officer of the base of operations the necessary information about the movements of and the types and quantities of materiel carried by supply ships which are dispatched as replacements or additions from the base of operations or supply base to the force (or fleet).

4. Replenishment of supply ships and supply bases

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a. Supply will be carried out in such a manner that the various supply ships will not have to be restocked at one time. Supply ships will be restocked one at a time at a supply base or base of operations.

b. Supply bases and special supply points usually will be restocked by Imperial General Headquarters or the commanding officer of the base of operations.

Special orders will be issued to effect co-operation of supply ships of a force (or fleet).

The monthly replenishment allowances for supply bases and special supply points are given in Appended Table 4.

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5. Protection of ships

When supply ships are to be dispatched, the force commander (fleet commander in chief) concerned will furnish suitable protection by forming a convoy, charting the course and providing escort. Supply ships attached to the base of operations will be protected in like manner.

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[1]Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the NAGATO, SAEKI WAN.

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Appended Table 1 (Substituted for previous page)

INITIAL FUEL ALLOWANCES FOR SUPPLY BASES AND SPECIAL SUPPLY POINTS

| SUPPLY BASES AND SPECIAL SUPPLY POINTS | HEAVY OIL (METRIC TONS) | | COAL (METRIC TONS) | AVIATION FUEL (KIL)LITERS) | | ORDINARY BOMBS | | | LAND BOMBS | | | MACHINE GUN AMMUNITION | | PROVISIONS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | BOILER OIL | NO 1 HEAVY OIL | | 92 | 87 | 80,50 | 25 | 6 | 80,50 | 25 | 6 | 27 | 20 | |
| PARAMUSHIRO | | | | 300 | 250 | | | | | | | | | |
| AKKESHI | 5,000 | 5,000 | | 1,100 | 1,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| WAKKANAI | 3,000 | 3,000 | 2,000 | 100 | 100 | | | | | | | | | |
| CHICHI JIMA | | 200 | 2,000 | | 100 | | | | | | | | | |
| MARCUS ISLAND | | | | | 500 | | | | | | | | | |
| SAIPAN | 10,000 | 2,000 | 10,000 | 4,000 | 3,500 | 30 | 200 | 150 | 0 | 100 | 680 | 30,000 | 7,000 | |
| KWAJALEIN (KUOTTO*) | | | | 2,500 | 100 | 27 | 140 | 1,200 | 54 | 70 | 430 | | | |
| WOTJE | | | | 3,000 | 1,500 | 167 | 140 | 1,300 | 70 | 70 | 650 | | | |
| JALUIT (LIEJI*) | | 5,000 | | 2,000 | 500 | 140 | | 440 | 70 | | 220 | | | |
| TAROA | | | | 500 | 800 | | | | | | | | | |
| TRUK | | 2,000 | 5,000 | 1,500 | 1,200 | | 250 | 1,000 | | 500 | 1,500 | 1,000,000 | | |
| PONAPE | | 2,000 | 3,000 | 800 | 100 | | | | | | | | | |
| PALAU | 10,000 | 1,500 | 6,000 | 4,000 | 2,000 | 126 | 240 | 1,080 | 120 | 350 | 2,300 | 550,000 | | 3 months' supply of rations |
| SAMA | | | | 1,000 | 2,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| SAIGON and vicinity | | | | 6,000 | 4,000 | 200 | | | 120 | 6,000 | 42,000 | 1,000,000 | 104,000 | |
| CAMRANH | | | | 1,000 | 1,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| X (MANILA) | | | | 500 | 500 | Part of the necessary replenishments for Southern Force air forces | | | | | | | | |
| X (DAVAO) | | | | 1,000 | 1,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| X (TARAKAN) | | | | 1,000 | 1,000 | | | | | | | | | |
| O MAKU | 62,000 | 6,000 | 70,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | Necessary replenishments for Southern Force | | | | | | | | |
| O TAKAO | 10,000 | 1,000 | 20,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | | | | | | | | | |

Notes:

1. Ammunition and torpedoes are to be loaded on munition ships.
2. Mines will be handled as set for in Mining Operations, Appended Table 3 (TN Above.).
3. X indicates places where special supply points are to be established.
   O indicates supply points whose capacity must be increased.
4. Expendable supplies like fuel (heavy oil, coal, aviation fuel) will be prepared.
5. At MAKU and KWAJALEIN one month's supply of air purifying material and oxygen will be prepared (MAKU - air purifying material 18,000, oxygen 1,800; KWAJALEIN - air purifying material 30,000, oxygen 3,000).

Note: The symbol * indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

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Amended Table 1

INITIAL FUEL ALLOWANCES FOR SUPPLY BASES AND SPECIAL SUPPLY POINTS

| SUPPLY BASES AND SPECIAL SUPPLY POINTS | HEAVY OIL (METRIC TONS) | | AVIATION FUEL (KILOLITERS) | | COAL (METRIC TONS) | AMMUNITION (ROUNDS) | BOMBS (ROUNDS) | TORPEDOES | MINES | PROVISIONS (RATIONS FOR ... PERSONS PER MONTH) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | BOILER OIL | NO 1 HEAVY OIL | 92 | 87 | | | | | | |
| PARAMUSHIRO | | | | 1,500 | | | | | | 2,000 |
| ARIKOKI | 5,000 | 5,000 | | 2,000 | 5,000 | | | | | 2,000 |
| WAKKANAI | 3,000 | 3,000 | | 500 | 2,000 | | | | | 2,000 |
| CHICHI JIMA | 7,000 | 3,000 | | 100 | 2,000 | | | | | 1,000 |
| HAHOUS ISLAND | | | | 100 | | | | | | 1,000 |
| SAIPAN | 10,000 | 2,000 | 2,500 | 3,000 | 5,000 | 2,000<br>MG-20,000 | Ze 6 1,000<br>Ze 25 700<br>Ze 50 650 | | | 5,000 |
| KWAJALEIN (MOTTO") | | | 2,000 | 1,500 | | 2,000<br>MG-20,000 | 2,000 | Air 100 | | 5,000 |
| WOTJE | | | 2,500 | 800 | | 2,000<br>MG-20,000 | 1,000 | | | 3,000 |
| JALEIT (IMIEJI") | 5.000 | 2,000 | 1,500 | 500 | 5,000 | 2,000<br>MG-20,000 | 1,000 | | | 3,000 |
| TARCA | | | 1,000 | 300 | | | 500 | | | 1,000 |
| TRUK | 20,000 | 1,000 | 2,500 | 1,000 | 15,000 | 3,000<br>MG-50,000 | Ze 6 3,000<br>Ze 25 2,000<br>Ze 50 2,500 | Air 100<br>Ship 30 | | 8,000 |
| PONAPE | 1,500 | 1,000 | 500 | 500 | 2,000 | | 500 | | | 1,000 |
| PALAU | 10,000 | 2,000 | 2,500 | 1,500 | 10,000 | 5,000<br>MG-50,000 | 4,600 | Air 50<br>Ship 50 | | 10,000 |
| SAMA | | | 2,000 | 2,000 | | | 1,000 | | | 1,000 |
| SAIGON and vicinity | | | 6,000 | 5,000 | | | 45,000 | | | 5,000 |
| CAMRANH and vicinity | | | 1,000 | 2,000 | | 3,000<br>MG-20,000 | 3,000 | Ship 30 | | 5,000 |
| X (MANILA) | | | 1,000 | 1,000 | | 1,000<br>MG-10,000 | 1,000 | | | 5,000 |
| X (BATAG) | | | 3,000 | 3,000 | | 2,000<br>MG-15,000 | 3,000 | Air 50<br>Ship 50 | | 10,000 |
| X (TARAKAN) | | | 3,000 | 3,000 | | 5,000<br>MG-15,000 | 3,000 | | | 10,000 |
| O MARO | 60.000 | 10,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 100,000 | 10,000<br>MG-100,000 | 10,000 | Air 100<br>Ship 100 | 4,000 | 10,000 |
| -O- YAKIO or KMELOBS | 10,000 | 1,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 80,000 | 5,000<br>MG-50,000 | 5,000 | | | 120,000 |

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2/76 Appendix Table 1 (Continued)

Notes:

1. 30% of the ammunition will be 12.7-cm dual purpose gun shells. The rest will be shells for all types of medium and small caliber guns.

2. 3% of the bombs will be No 80, 25% No 25 and 72% No 6. At KWAJALEIN approximately equal quantities of No 80, No 25 and No 6 Bombs will be held.

3. X indicates supply points for which supplies must be prepared beforehand so that they can be immediately forwarded to them.

4. O indicates supply points whose initially prepared allowance must be increased.

5. At each base expendable supplies used for movement like fuel (heavy oil, coal, aviation fuel) will be prepared.

6. Air matériel will be replenished initially by reserve airplanes.

7. Submarine air purifying material will be prepared at GAMBIER (4,000) (SH Unit not stated.) and at KWAJALEIN (10,000). Oxygen up to 10% of these amounts will also be prepared.

8. 4,000 mines will be distributed in SOUTH SEAS Area (will be carried by each ship).

9. No depth charges will be included in the land stores in the SOUTH SEAS Area, but 1,000 can be furnished monthly.

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Note: The symbol * indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

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Page 2/79 2/80 Appended Table 7, Part 1

DISPOSITION OF SUPPLY SHIPS FOR FIRST PERIOD (DAI IKKI) OPERATIONS

| FORCE | Striking Force | Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) | South Seas Force | Southern Force | Northern Force | Supply Force | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MUNITIONS SHIPS | NICHIRŌ MARU | ARATAMA MARU<br>[HITACHI MARU] | [TATSUTAKE MARU] | KOGYŌ MARU<br>ONOE MARU<br>TATSUKAMI MARU<br>[NISSHIN MARU] | | KIZAN MARU<br>[NICHII MARU] | 10 |
| WATER TANKERS | | | TATE YAMA MARU<br>No 1 AMAKASU MARU<br>DAINOSAN MARU<br>[WAYO MARU] | KOAN MARU<br>GORYU MARU<br>[ASAYAMA MARU]<br>[KISOGAWA MARU] | | | 6 |
| STORES SHIPS | HOKŌ MARU | No 2 TENYŌ MARU | KOA MARU<br>CHIGHIBU MARU<br>ONIYO MARU<br>HOKKAI MARU<br>HANUWA MARU | KOSHI MARU, SURUGA MARU, HAKUREI MARU, KITAGAMI MARU, No 2 BANSHU MARU, No 5 BANSHU MARU (OI MARU), [MINATO MARU], SENDAI MARU | CHŌKŌ MARU | MANIYA MARU<br>No 3 BANSHU MARU | 19 |
| OILERS | SHIRIYA MARU<br>KYOKUTO MARU<br>KENYO MARU<br>NIPPON MARU<br>SHINKOKU MARU<br>KOKUJO MARU<br>TOHO MARU<br>AKEBONO MARU<br>No 2 KYOEI MARU | INTO MARU<br>TOA MARU<br>[FUJISAN MARU] | SEKIRO MARU<br>HOYO MARU<br>[KAIJO MARU]<br>♦ KYOEI MARU | HAYATOMO<br>KRIMO<br>SAN CLEMENTE MARU<br>[TEIYO MARU]<br>[GENYO MARU]<br>[NICHIEI MARU]<br>♦ AMAGISAN MARU<br>♦ HANA MARU<br>♦[NICHIKOKU MARU]<br>♦ KORYO MARU<br>♦[No 5 HINO MARU] | | HARUTA<br>TSUKUMI<br>♦HISHI MARU<br>♦ No 2 HISHI MARU | 22 (including nine AO) (TN presumably nine carrying aviation gasoline.) |
| COLLIER-OILERS | | | SHIRETOKO<br>No 6 SHINSEI MARU<br>SANKIANG MARU<br>[INASHIRO MARU]<br>[SANKIZAN MARU] | ICHIGAWA MARU<br>ASAKAZE MARU<br>[KOSEI MARU]<br>[KORYŪ MARU] | NISSAN MARU | SOYO MARU | 11 |
| MISCELLANEOUS AUXILIARIES | | | HEITŌ MARU<br>YAMAKAZE MARU | SENKŌ MARU<br>[KASUGA MARU] | AKASHISAN MARU | OKITSU MARU | 6 |
| TOTAL | 12 | 6 | 21 | 34 | 3 | 10 | 86 |

Note: ♦ denotes ships which transport aviation gasoline. (TN Brackets were parentheses in original.)

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Amended Table 2, Part 2

SECOND PERIOD (DAI NI KI) OPERATIONS AND THEREAFTER

| FORCE | Striking Force | Advanced Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) | South Seas Force | Southern Force | Northern Force | Supply Force | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MUNITIONS SHIPS | HIGMIRŌ MARU | ARATAMA MARU<br>HITACHI MARU | TATSUTAKE MARU | KŌGYŌ MARU, ONOE MARU, TATSUKAMI MARU<br>HISHEN MARU | | HIDE MARU<br>HICHII MARU | 10 |
| WATER TANKERS | | | TATEYAMA MARU<br>No 1 AMAKASU MARU<br>DAINOGAN MARU<br>WAYO MARU | KŌAN MARU<br>GORYU MARU<br>ARATAMA MARU<br>KISOGAWA MARU | | | 8 |
| STORES SHIPS | NŌKO MARU | No 2 TENYŌ MARU | KŌA MARU<br>CHICHIBU MARU<br>CHIYŌ MARU<br>HOKKAI MARU<br>HARUNA MARU | KŌSEI MARU, SUEGOA MARU, HAKUREI MARU, KITAGAMI MARU, SENDAI MARU, No 2 BANSHU, No 5 BANSHU MARU, OI MARU, MINATO MARU | CHOKŌ MARU | MAMIYA MARU<br>No 3 BANSHU MARU | 19 |
| OILERS | KYOKUTŌ MARU<br>KENYO MARU<br>NIPPON MARU<br>ϕNo 2 KYOEI MARU | IETO MARU<br>TOA MARU<br>FUJISAN MARU | SEKIRO MARU<br>HOYO MARU<br>KAIJO MARU<br>TOHO MARU<br>ϕKYOEI MARU | HAYATOMO, ERIMO, SAN CLEMENTE MARU, AKEBONO MARU, TEIYO MARU, GENYO MARU<br>NICHIEI MARU, KOKUYŌ MARU, ϕAMAGISAN MARU, ϕHANA MARU, ϕNICHIKOKU MARU, ϕNo 5 HINO MARU, ϕKOEIYO MARU | | NANYO<br>TSURUMI<br>SHIRIYA<br>SHINKOKU MARU<br>TORI MARU<br>ϕHISHI MARU<br>ϕNo 2 HISHI MARU | 32 (including nine AG) (TN Presumably nine carrying aviation gasoline.) |
| COLLIER-OILERS | | | SHIRETOKO<br>No 6 SHINSEI MARU<br>SANKIANO MARU<br>IWASHIRO MARU<br>SANKIZAN MARU | YODOGAWA MARU<br>ARAKAZE MARU<br>KOSEI MARU<br>KOMYŌ MARU | NISSAN MARU | SŌYŌ MARU | 11 |
| MISCELLANEOUS AUXILIARIES | | | HEITŌ MARU<br>YAMAKAZE MARU | SENKŌ MARU<br>KASUGA MARU | AKASHISAN MARU | OKITSU MARU | 6 |
| TOTAL | 6 | 6 | 22 | 36 | 3 | 13 | 86 |

Note: ϕ denotes ships which transport aviation gasoline.



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Appended Table 5

DESCRIPTION OF SUPPLY SHIPS FOR FIRST PERIOD (DAI ICHI) OPERATIONS

| FORCE | Striking Force | Advanced Expeditionary Force (SENGIN BUTAI) | South Seas Force | Southern Area Force | Northern Force | Genzaiko Southwestern Unit | Supply Force | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMMUNITION SHIPS | NICHIRO MARU | ARASAMA MARU<br>NITAGHI MARU | TAMATSAKE MARU | KOGYO MARU<br>OMUR MARU<br>TAGONKAMI MARU<br>NIGOSHIN MARU<br>[SHEKIO MARU, additional data] | [AKAGISAN MARU, additional data] | | NIGHIZI MARU<br>KIBE MARU | 10 |
| WATER TANKERS | | | TAMEYAMA MARU<br>No 1 AMAKASU MARU<br>DAIHORAN MARU<br>WAYO MARU | KOAN MARU<br>GORYU MARU<br>ARAYAMA MARU<br>KINGORAMA MARU | | | | 6 |
| STORES SHIPS | SHIO MARU | No 2 TONTO MARU | KOA MARU<br>OKICHIBU MARU<br>OKIYO MARU<br>MONKAI MARU<br>MANSHU MARU | SUNGURA MARU, SOGEI MARU, HAYUSHI MARU, KITAGAMI MARU, SHUNDAI MARU, OI MARU, NIKAYO MARU, No 2 RAFUKU MARU, No 5 RAFUKU MARU | OKIKO MARU | | MAMIYA, No 3 RAFUKU MARU | 19 |
| OILERS | KYOAIYO MARU<br>KENYO MARU<br>NIPPON MARU<br>(TN Add SHIRIYA MARU.)[1], SHINKOKU MARU, KUROSHIO MARU, KOKUYO MARU, TOKO MARU, TOYO MARU, ϕNo.2 KYOKI MARU | INYO<br>TOA MARU<br>FUJISAN MARU | SEIKIKO<br>SEIYO MARU<br>KAIJO MARU<br>ϕKYOEI MARU | HAYASUGO, GENYO MARU, SHINNO, SEIYO MARU, SAN CLEMENTE MARU, NICHIEI MARU, ϕAMAGISAN MARU, ϕNANA MARU, ϕMAGISAN MARU (TN Subsequently deleted.)[1], ϕSEIKO MARU (TN Add NICHIEKU MARU and ϕNo 5 HIRO MARU.)[1] | | HAMUTO (with Combined Fleet at beginning of first period (DAI ICHI) Operations) | [HAMUTO] (at beginning of First Period (DAI ICHI) Operations), SHIRIYA MARU, (TN Subsequently deleted.)[1], TSURUMI, ϕKISHI MARU, ϕNo 2 KISHI MARU | 31, including eight AO (TN Presumably eight ships carrying aviation gasoline.) (TN Changed to 32, including nine AO.)[1] |
| COLLIER-OILERS | | | IWASHIRO MARU, HAKKISAN MARU, SHINSEIKO, No 6 SHINSEI MARU, HAKKIAMO MARU | KOGEI MARU, TODOGAWA MARU, ASAKAZE MARU (TN Add KOKYU MARU.)[1] | HIGSAN MARU | | SOYO MARU<br>KOKYU MARU<br>(TN Subsequently deleted.)[1] | 11 |
| MISCELLANEOUS AUXILIARIES | | | TAMAKAKE MARU<br>EHITO MARU | SHEKO MARU (double purpose), NICHIKOKU MARU and No 5 HIRO MARU (TN Subsequently deleted.)[1], KASUGA MARU | [AKAGISAN MARU, additional data] | | OKITSU MARU | 8 (TN Changed to 6.)[1] |
| TOTAL | 11 (TN Changed to 12.)[1] | 6 | 21 | 34 | 3 | 1 | 11 (TN Changed to 9.)[1] | 87 (TN Changed to 86.)[1] |
| REPAIR SHIPS | | | SHOGI MARU | AKASHI<br>ASAHI<br>YAMAMIZO MARU | | | | 4 |

Note: ϕ denotes ships which transport aviation gasoline. (TN Brackets were parentheses in original.)

[1]Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Secretary to Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Top Secret Serial, Part 93, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the NAGATO, SAIKI WAN.

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Appendix Note 6

RENDEZVOUS AND SUBSEQUENT MOVEMENTS OF SUPPLY SHIPS ATTACHED TO COMBINED FLEET

| SHIP | PRINCIPAL DUTY | MOVEMENT | RENDEZVOUS |
|---|---|---|---|
| NICHII MARU | Munitions supply for Main Body | Special orders | Western part of INLAND Sea |
| HIDE MARU | Reserve munitions supply for Southern Force and South Seas Force | " | " |
| MAMIYA | Stores supply for Main Body. Reserve stores supply for Southern Force and South Seas Force. | " | " |
| No 3 RAMSHU MARU | Stores supply for Main Body. Reserve stores supply for Southern Force and South Seas Force | " | " |
| NARUTO | Reserve oiler for 1st Air Fleet until X plus 4. Afterward will be attached to Commerce Destruction Unit. | At the outbreak of hostilities will wait in readiness at the place designated by CinC 1st Air Fleet. After X plus 4 day will move as ordered by commanding officer of Commerce Destruction Unit. | South Seas Area; as directed by CinC 1st Air Fleet |
| TSURUMI | Reserve oiler for 1st Air Fleet until X plus 4 Day. Subsequently reserve oiler in PALAU Area. | At the outbreak of war will wait in readiness at the point designated by CinC 1st Air Fleet. After X plus 4 will operate in the PALAU Area on special orders. | " |
| SHIRIYA (TN Subsequently deleted.)[1] | Assigned to Midway Destruction Unit. Subsequently oiler for Main Body. | Will operate as directed by CinC 1st Air Fleet in First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations. Thereafter, will operate in western part of INLAND Sea on special orders. | As directed by CinC 1st Air Fleet |
| NISHI MARU | Reserve oil supply (aviation gasoline) for South Seas Force | Special orders | YOKOSUKA |
| No 2 NISHI MARU | Reserve oil supply (aviation gasoline) for South Seas Force | " | SASEBO |
| SOYO MARU | Reserve oil and coal supply for Southern Force | " | " |
| KURYU MARU (TN Subsequently deleted.)[1] | Reserve oil and coal supply for South Seas Force | " | Western part of INLAND Sea |
| OKITSU MARU | Reserve miscellaneous use by Southern Force | " | " |

1 Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Top Secret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the NAGATO, SA KI ARA.

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Second period (DAI NI KI) Operations and thereafter will be the same as First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations, except for the following:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Striking Force | Oil Supply | KYOKUTO MARU<br>KENYU MARU<br>NIPPON MARU<br>No. 2 KYUEI MARU | Total 6 |
| South Seas Force | " | Will add TOHO MARU | Total 22 |
| Southern Force | " | Will add KUROSHIO MARU<br>KOKUYU MARU | Total 35 (TN Changed to 36)[1] |
| Supply Force | " | Will add SHINKOKU MARU, TOKI MARU (TN Insert SHIRIYA MARU.)[1] | Total 13 (TN Changed to 12.)[1] |

[1] Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard NAGATO, SABEI WAN.

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MONTHLY REPLENISHMENT ALLOWANCES FOR SUPPLY BASES AND SPECIAL SUPPLY POINTS

| SUPPLY BASES AND SPECIAL SUPPLY POINTS | HEAVY OIL (METRIC TONS) BOILER OIL | HEAVY OIL (METRIC TONS) No 1 HEAVY OIL | COAL (METRIC TONS) | AVIATION FUEL (KILOLITERS) 92 | AVIATION FUEL (KILOLITERS) 87 | AMMUNITION (ROUNDS) | BOMBS (ROUNDS) | TORPEDOES (NUMBER) | MINES (NUMBER) | PROVISIONS (RATIONS FOR . . . . PERSONS PER MONTH) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PARAMUSHIRO | | | | | 200 | Supply amount used | Supply amount used | Supply amount used | Supply amount used | Supply amount used |
| AKKESHI (including BIHORO and CHITOSE) | 1,000 | 1,000 | | | 300 | | | | | |
| MAKKANAI | 1,000 | 1,000 | 500 | | 100 | | | | | |
| CHICHIJIMA | | | 500 | | 200 | | | | | |
| MARCUS Island | | | | | 300 | | | | | |
| SAIPAN | 2,000 | 500 | 1,500 | Supply when needed | | | | | | |
| KWAJALEIN (KWOTTO) * | | | 1,000 | 3,000 | 1,000 | | | | | |
| ROTJE | | * | | | | | | | | |
| JALUIT (IMIEJI) * | | 1,000 | | | | | | | | |
| TARGA | | | | | | | | | | |
| TRUK | | 1,000 | 2,500 | 1,500 | 500 | | | | | |
| PONAPE | | 500 | | | | | | | | |
| PALAU | 2,000 | 1,000 | 1,500 | 1,000 | 1,000 | | | | | |
| SAIGON and vicinity CAMRANH | | | | Supply amount used | | | | | | |
| X (MANILA) | | | | Supply in part | | | | | | |
| X (DAVAO) | | | | | | | | | | |
| X (TARAKAN) | | | | | | | | | | |
| O MAKO | 70,000 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 500 | 500 | Amount Used by Southern Force | Amount Used by Southern Force | Amount Used by Southern Force | Amount Used by Southern Force | Amount Used by Southern Force |
| O TAKAO | 10,000 | 2,000 | 3,000 | 1,500 | 1,500 | | | | | |

Note: One month's supply of air purifying material and oxygen will be sent to KWAJALEIN and MAKO.

Note: The symbol * indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

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[illegible]

| Page 2/6 2/22 2/24 SUPPLY BASES AND SPECIAL SUPPLY POINTS | [illegible] | [illegible] OIL | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | [illegible] | [illegible] | | | | | | |
| PARAMUSHIRO | | | | 500 | | | | | | 1,000 |
| AKESHI | 1,000 | 1,000 | | 500 | 1,000 | 1,000 | | | | 1,000 |
| MAKIAMAI | 1,000 | 1,000 | | 500 | 500 | 500 | | | | 1,000 |
| SHIOKIJIMA | 1,000 | 1,000 | | 700 | 500 | 500 | | | | 500 |
| MAKOUR Island | | | | 500 | | | | | | 500 |
| SAIPAN | 2,000 | 500 | 700 | 300 | 2,000 | 1,000 MS-10,000 | 500 | | | 3,000 |
| KWAJALEIN (KWOTTO*) | | | 1,000 | 500 | | 1,000 MS-10,000 | 500 | Aerial-30 | | 5,000 |
| WOTJE | | | 2,000 | 500 | | 1,000 MS-10,000 | 500 | | | 3,000 |
| JALUIT (IMIEJI) | 1,000 | 500 | 700 | 300 | 2,000 | 1,000 MS-10,000 | 500 | | | 3,000 |
| TAROA | | | 400 | 100 | | | 200 | | | 500 |
| TRUK | 5,000 | 2,000 | 1,500 | 500 | 3,000 | 1,500 MS-20,000 | 3,000 | Aerial-30 Ship-20 | | 8,000 |
| PONAPE | 500 | 500 | 200 | 200 | 1,000 | | 200 | | | 3,500 |
| PALAU | 5,000 | 1,000 | 2,000 | 1,000 | 3,000 | 2,000 MS-20,000 | 1,500 | Aerial-20 Ship-20 | | 10,000 |
| SAMA | | | 500 | 500 | | | | | | 500 |
| SAIPOOR and vicinity | | | 2,000 | 3,000 | | | 10,000 | | | 5,000 |
| CAMRANH and vicinity | | | 500 | 1,000 | | 1,500 MS-10,000 | 2,000 | Ship-20 | | 5,000 |
| X (MANILA) | | | 1,000 | 1,000 | | 500 MS-5,000 | 1,000 | | | 5,000 |
| X (DAVAO) | | | 1,500 | 1,500 | | 1,000 MS-10,000 | 2,000 | Aerial-30 Ship-30 | | 10,000 |
| X (TARAKAN) | | | 1,500 | 1,500 | | 1,000 MS-10,000 | 2,000 | | | 10,000 |
| O MAKO | 70,000 | 10,000 | 500 | 500 | 10,000 | 5,000 MS-30,000 | 5,000 | Aerial-50 Ship-30 | 1,000 | 20,000 |
| O TAKAO | 10,000 | 2,000 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 3,000 | 2,000 MS-20,000 | 3,000 | | | 30,000 |

Notes:

1. 30% of the ammunition will be 12.7 cm dual purpose gun shells. The rest will be shells for all types of medium and small caliber guns.
2. Unless the type of bomb is indicated, 5% will be No 80, 25% No 25 and 75% No 6.
3. X indicates a special supply point which will be put into operation after penetration into forward areas.
4. O indicates a supply point the capacity of which will be particularly increased.
5. All supply points will keep up to prescribed levels their supply of expendable materials such as fuel (heavy oil, coal, aviation fuel).
6. Aircraft material will be replenished at TRUK in the South Seas Area and at TAKAO in the Southern Area.
7. Air purifying material for submarines: 2,000 (TN Unit not stated.) will be supplied to CAMRANH; 6,000 will be supplied to KWAJALEIN. In addition, oxygen, equal to 10% of the above amount, will be supplied.

Note: The symbol * indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

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Appended Table 5

ORGANIZATION OF SUPPLY FORCES OF COMBINED FLEET

Editor's Note:
This table included in portion of document comprising pages 2/125-151 inclusive which otherwise duplicates G, Supply. The duplicate pages are omitted.



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H. Operations Other Than Those of the Combined Fleet

1. Operations of forces at naval stations and auxiliary naval stations

a. These forces will strengthen the defense of strategic points, protect sea traffic and co-operate with the Combined Fleet or China Area Fleet in operations in the area in their charge.

b. Air forces and other necessary forces will be moved to the necessary places as conditions demand. They will be placed under the operational command of the commander in chief of the fleet concerned or of the commanding officer of the force at the naval station or auxiliary naval station in charge of the area concerned.

2. Operations of CHINA Area Fleet

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a. In general, the fleet will continue operations against CHINA with its present strength. It will annihilate land forces and wrest control from them.

b. At the outbreak of war the force of which 2ND CHINA Expeditionary Fleet is the nucleus will co-operate with the Army to occupy HONGKONG and annihilate enemy forces stationed there.

c. The defenses and security measures within the occupied areas will be strengthened and sea traffic along the CHINA coast will be protected. At the same time every effort will be made to deny the use of the CHINA coast to enemy ships and airplanes.

d. It will co-operate, as the occasion demands, with the Combined Fleet and Southern Army in escorting Army surface transports and in defending assembly points.

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II. OPERATIONS OF THE COMBINED FLEET IN CASE WAR WITH RUSSIA BEGINS DURING THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, THE NETHERLANDS AND CHINA

A. Operation Policy

1. The operations against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS will be modeled generally after the operation policy set forth in I.

2. The policy for operations against RUSSIA will be as follows:

a. In the event war breaks out during First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations

(1) For the most part, 5th Fleet and the homeland combat forces (NAISEN BUTAI) will be charged with defense. They will protect vital sea traffic along the coast of JAPAN and will protect strategic areas from air attack.

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(2) Thereafter, as quickly as southern operations and operations against the American Fleet permit, elements of light forces and air forces will be diverted to operations against RUSSIA.

The operations described in the above paragraph thus will be strengthened.

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b. In the event war breaks out after the completion of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations.

The greater part of 5th Fleet and one element of the light forces will be shifted to operations against RUSSIA. The Russian fleet in the ORIENT will be immediately annihilated. Pressure will be brought to bear along the coast of Russian territory in the FAR EAST. In co-operation with the Army, these forces will destroy enemy air strength in the MARITIME Province and USSURI Province, and occupy VLADIVOSTOK and other strategic points in the FAR EAST.

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B. Allocation of Forces.

Separate Table 6 (Will be sent later) (TN Missing.)

C. Operations Other Than Those of the Combined Fleet

1. Operations of forces at naval stations and auxiliary naval stations.

a. The naval stations at YOKOSUKA, KURE, SASEBO and MAIZURU and the auxiliary naval stations at OMINATO, CHINKAI and Port ARTHUR will strengthen security measures against Russian submarines and airplanes and will annihilate them if they appear in areas under their jurisdiction.

b. When the outer combat forces engage in active operations, air forces and other necessary forces will be transferred to the necessary points and will co-operate in these operations.

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2. Operations of the China Area Fleet

The force which has I China Expeditionary Fleet and 3 China Expeditionary Fleet as its nucleus will cover the movements of the Army forces which will be diverted from central and northern CHINA. It will escort these forces during transport at sea and deploy suitably.

III. MISCELLANEOUS REGULATIONS

A. Time to be Used

Central standard time

B. Charts to be Used

Charts (charts of military places) to be used are as follows:

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| CHART (CHART OF MILITARY PLACES) | USE (ON SHIPS) |
|---|---|
| Navy Ultrasecret 347 Chart of Military Places in PACIFIC Ocean | For use in general operations (ships) |
| Special Chart of Military Places | 1. For use in joint Army-Navy operations<br>2. For use in operations in narrow waters |

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Charts for general operations in the MALAY Area will be established separately. (TN This note subsequently has been deleted.)[1]

C. Identification of friendly and enemy forces

The identification of friendly and enemy forces will be based on Combined Fleet Doctrine and the following:

Identification between Navy ships and Japanese merchant shipping (including transports and ships attached to the Army) and between the various Army and Navy land installations (including forces) will be in accordance with Signal Regulations for Identification of Japanese Ships in Wartime.

(TN Insert "but, in odd-numbered months method 1 will be followed, in even-numbered months method 2.")[1] (TN Add "Identification among airplanes will be based on the Joint Army-Navy Agreement Concerning Identification of Friendly Military Airplanes.")[1]

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[1] Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet, as Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the NAGATO, NAKKI WAN.

(Enemy Section)

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ASSIGNMENT OF FORCES FOR FIRST PHASE (ONE HOUR) OPERATIONS OF HOME FORCE (ONE HOUR DAY) OPERATIONS

(Home Fleet preparations for war till the main Army forces invading the PHILIPPINES have landed in the PHILIPPINES - 2 plus 20)

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| FORCE | COMMANDING OFFICER | ASSIGNED | MISSIONS, DUT | OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS | RENDEZVOUS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Main Body | | RedDiv 1<br>1st Fleet (less RedDiv 3, OrdDiv 6, BedRon 1, except two RedDivs, BedRon 3)<br>One destroyer of RedDiv 7 | Will support entire operation | 1. Will remain at shelter under alert in western part of INLAND Sea and then necessary proceed out to give support.<br>2. Under operation Method 1 against American Fleet, will proceed out on X Day and cover withdrawal of the Striking Force. | Western part of Inland Sea. | |
| Striking Force<br>Supply Force | 2nd<br>1st Air Fleet | 1st Air Fleet (less OrdDiv 4 and RedDiv)<br>BedRon 1 (less three BedDivs)<br>One RedDiv of BedRon 4 (TH Changed to BedRon 2)<br>AKIZUKI<br>RedDiv 3 (less the 2)<br>RedDiv 2<br>RedDiv 7 (less one destroyer)<br>One twin vessel (10 twin vessels (TH Changed to 11 twin vessels) | 2. (TH Sig.) Methods 2 and 3 in operation against American Fleet.<br>a. Will support operations of the South Seas Force and the Northern Force.<br>b. Will co-operate with South Seas Force in operations to occupy strategic points.<br>c. If conditions warrant, will support operations of Southern Force. | 2. Under Operation Method 2 and 3 against American fleet.<br>a. Will prepare to make suitable moves against the American Fleet in accordance with the enemy situation and, if necessary, will co-operate with the South Seas Force in the occupation of strategic areas.<br>b. On special orders one element of the force will participate in operations of Southern Force. | TAKAO | |
| Advance Expeditionary Force<br>Supply Unit | 2nd Combined Fleet<br>2nd<br>6th Fleet | 6th Fleet<br>six twin vessels | 1. Will reconnoiter and Attack American fleet in HAWAII Area.<br>2. Will co-operate with the STRIKING Force in operations.<br>3. Will attack air bases between HAWAII and GUAM. | 1. Will observe and attack American Fleet in HAWAII area. Will make a surprise attack on the channel leading into PEARL HARBOR and attempt to close it. If the enemy moves out to fight he will be pursued and attacked.<br>2. Operation Method 1 against American Fleet will be as follows:<br>a. Until X-3, one submarine will reconnoiter each of the following strategic areas: important points in the ALEUTIANS, SAMOA, FIJI, and TUTUILA.<br>In order to increase the damage which can be inflicted by the Striking Force, powerful enemy forces will be observed and reported when their whereabouts is discovered.<br>b. One element will clear the route of the Striking Force. The rest, until X-5, will surround HAWAII at extreme range while one element will approach and reconnoiter without being discovered.<br>c. If the Striking Force operations succeed, one Sub-Div or less will be placed between HAWAII and NORTH AMERICA to destroy sea traffic.<br>3. In Operation Method 2 against American Fleet, one element will attack enemy air bases between HAWAII and GUAM and will co-operate in the destruction of INGLAND by South Seas Force. | As directed by the commanding officer of Advanced Expeditionary Force. | Until the end of the surprise attack on HAWAII by the Striking Force (X plus 3) the Advance Expeditionary Force will be under the command of the Striking Force Commander. |

Separate Table 1 (Continued)

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ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR FIRST PERIOD (DAI ICHI) OPERATIONS OF FIRST PHASE (DAI ICHI DAN) OPERATIONS
(From first preparations for war till the main Army forces invading the PHILLIPPINES have landed in the PHILLIPPINES - X plus 20)

| FORCE | | COMMANDER OFFICER | STRENGTH | PERIODICAL DUTY | OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS | DESTINATION | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| South Seas Force | Wake Invasion Force<br>Guam Invasion Force<br>Supply Unit | CinC 4th Fleet | 4th Fleet (one DesDiv of DesRon 6, two patrol boats, 5th Base Force - less one element)<br>CruDiv 6<br>2nd Unit of 1st Combined Communications Unit<br>DesRon 6 (less one DesDiv)<br>Two patrol boats<br>One company of Special Navy Landing Party<br>5th Base Force (less one element)<br>DesDiv 23<br>CHOKO<br>21 Train vessels | 1. Will defend and patrol area in its charge.<br>2. Will controlling enemy air bases in HOWLAND Area.<br>3. Will invade WAKE and GUAM.<br>4. Will invade RABAUL if conditions warrant it. | 1. Will occupy WAKE and GUAM as quickly as possible, defend and patrol the area in its charge and prepare for waves of the American and British fleets.<br>2. In Operation Method 1 against American Fleet, CruDiv 6 will join the Main Body at a specially designated point and aid in covering withdrawal of the Striking Force.<br>Flying boats will proceed to WAKE as quickly as possible and carry out the necessary patrols.<br>3. In Operation Method 2 against American Fleet, will occupy RABAUL and other strategic points in co-operation with the Striking Force if conditions warrant. | KANTO SHUTO Area<br>One element at CHICHI JIMA | |
| Southern Force | 2nd Fleet<br>Air Force<br>Submarine Force<br>Philippine Force<br>Malay Force<br>Supply Unit | CinC Combined Fleet<br>CinC 2nd Fleet | CruDiv 4<br>Sec 2 of BatDiv 3<br>CarDiv 4 (less Sec 2)<br>One DesDiv of DesRon 1<br>One DesDiv of DesRon 4<br>ASAGI<br>ASAHI MARU<br>Five battalions of Special Navy Landing Party<br>Some fishing boats<br>11th Air Fleet (less AirFlot 22, 36 fighter planes)<br>Two battalions of Special Navy Landing Party<br>SubRon 3<br>SubRon 6 (less one SubDiv)<br>3rd Fleet (less one element)<br>CruDiv 5<br>DesRon 2 (less one DesDiv)<br>DesRon 4 (less one DesDiv)<br>AirFlot 11<br>Eight patrol craft<br>Southern Expeditionary Fleet<br>CruDiv 7<br>DesRon 3<br>SubRon 4<br>One SubDiv of SubRon 6<br>Sec 2 of 17s<br>AirFlot 12<br>AirFlot 22<br>36 fighter planes<br>ASAHI<br>MUROTO<br>34 Train vessels | 1. Will annihilate enemy air strength and ships in the PHILLIPPINES, MALAY and NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES Areas.<br>2. Will provide surface escort for and cover landing of Philippine invasion force.<br>3. Will provide surface escort for and cover landings of forces invading strategic places in British MALAYA and HONGKONG and for Army forces in THAILAND.<br>4. Will prepare for occupation of strategic points in the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES<br>5. Will co-operate in operations at HONGKONG. | 1. A major element of the air force will attack and seize control from enemy air forces and ships in the PHILLIPPINES and MALAY areas. Enemy submarines will be destroyed.<br>2. Before the outbreak of war submarines and mine layers will be secretly dispatched to necessary areas and will make observations, lay mines and supply seaplanes.<br>3. Will occupy BATAN, APARRI, VIGAN (LAGAG), DAVAO, LEGASPI and JOLO, prepare air bases quickly and move one element of the air force to them.<br>4. Will provide surface escort for and cover landing of Army forces occupying the PHILLIPPINES.<br>5. Will provide surface escort for and cover landings of the Advance Expeditionary Group (MEIDAN) occupying MALAY, the force in THAILAND, and the Army forces occupying strategic points in BRITISH HONGKONG. One element of the air force will be moved to the captured air bases.<br>6. At the beginning of the operations two destroyers will come under the operational command of CinC CHINA Area Fleet. | TAIWAN<br>MANSHU SHUTO<br>Southern Area INDO-CHINA<br>HAINAN Island<br>PALAU Area | 1. Air forces and forces making surprise attacks on BATAN and APARRI will complete preparations by about X-5.<br>2. AirFlot 12 will return to its original unit until the landing of the main forces involved in M operation. |

[1]Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Top Secret Serial 1 Part 9, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard NAGATO, off IGAKUNI.

[2]Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Top Secret Serial 1 Part 93, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard NAGATO, SAEKI WAN

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Table 1 (Continued)

ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR FIRST PERIOD (DAI IKKI) OPERATIONS OF FIRST PHASE (DAI ICHI DAN) OPERATIONS
(From first preparations for war till the main Army forces invading the PHILIPPINES have landed in the PHILIPPINES - X plus 20)

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| FORCE | COMMANDING OFFICER | | STRENGTH | PRINCIPAL DUTY | OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS | RENDEZVOUS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Northern Force<br><br>Supply Unit | CinC Combined Fleet | CinC 5th Fleet | 5th Fleet<br>Kisaratsu Airgroup<br>CHICHI JIMA Communications Unit<br>(TN "Nine land attack planes from YOKO KU" added.)<br>Three cargo ships | 1. Will patrol and defend area in its charge.<br>2. Will patrol the route of the Striking Force and cover its withdrawal.<br>3. Will take security measures against RUSSIA. | 1. Will operate in accordance with principal duty.<br>2. In Operation Method 1 against American Fleet, land attack planes from Kisaratsu Airgroup will patrol the route of the Striking Force and cover its withdrawal. (Bases will be HOKKAIDŌ and MARCUS Island.) | As directed by commanding officer. | |
| Commerce Destruction Unit | | CO 24th Squadron (SENTAI) | 24s<br>One cargo ship | Will destroy sea traffic. | Will operate in accordance with the Outline for Sea Traffic Destruction Operations. | NANPŌ GUNTŌ | |
| Communications Force | | CO 1 Combined Communications Unit | 1 Unit (less CHICHI JIMA) of 1 Combined Communications Unit | Operational communications. Communications intelligence. | Will operate according to F, "Communications." | The various places where stationed. | |
| Attached Forces | | | Sec 2 of CarDiv 4<br>CHIYODA<br>SETTSU<br>YAKAZE | Will be specially ordered. | Will be established separately. | Western part of INLAND SEA. | |
| | | | 11 transports (TN Changed to 11 transports.) | Will furnish supplies for operational forces. | Will operate according to G, "Supply." | | |

Notes:
1. The assignment of supply ships will be based on Appended Table 2 of G, "Supply."
2. The patrol boundary line between Northern Force and South Seas Force will run east-west through MARCUS Island (which will be included in Northern Force area).
3. The operational boundary line between Southern Force and South Seas Force will be the boundary of BRITISH and DUTCH NEW GUINEA.
4. KI KU (TN Add "and nine land attack planes from YOKO KŪ".) will be under the operational command of CinC Combined Fleet after X-Day.
5. The division of strength within the various forces may be changed appropriately.

Separate Table 2

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ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR SECOND PERIOD (DAI NI KI) OPERATIONS OF FIRST PHASE (DAI ICHI DAN) OPERATIONS
(Up to about X plus 40 when the landing of the main BRITISH MALAY invasion forces has been completed)

| FORCE | COMMANDING OFFICER | | STRENGTH | PRINCIPAL DUTY | OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Main Body | Combined Fleet | | BatDiv 1<br>1st Fleet (less BatDiv 3 CruDiv 6, DesRon 1 except two DesDivs)<br>One destroyer of DesDiv 7 | Continuation of First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations | (DAI IKKI) Operations | |
| Task Force<br>Supply Unit | CinC 1st Air Fleet | | 1 Air Fleet (less 4 CarDiv, destroyer division)<br>DesRon 1 (less three DesDivs)<br>BatDiv 3 (less Sec 2)<br>CruDiv 8<br>One DesDiv of DesRon 2, AKIGUMO<br>Six train vessels | | | |
| Advanced Expeditionary Force<br>Supply Unit | CinC 6th Fleet | | 6 Fleet<br>Six train vessels | | | |
| South Seas Force<br>Supply Unit | CinC 4th Fleet | | 4th Fleet<br>CruDiv 6<br>2nd Unit of 1st Combined Communications Unit<br>DesDiv 23<br>OSORO<br>SETTSU/(TN Crossed out in pencil.)<br>22 train vessels | | | |
| | CinC 2nd Fleet | | CruDiv 4<br>Sec 2 of BatDiv 3<br>CarDiv 4 (less Sec 2)<br>One DesDiv of DesRon 1<br>One DesDiv of DesRon 4<br>AKASHI, ASAHI MARU<br>Five battalions of Special naval landing party<br>Some fishing boats | 1. Continuation of First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations, exploiting battle successes<br>2. Convoying at sea and landing of main Malay invasion forces.<br>3. Invasion of key points in NETHERLANDS INDIES<br>4. Defense of occupied key points in the PHILIPPINES | 1. Philippines operations forces will be reorganized and dispositions for the invasion of the NETHERLANDS INDIES assumed. The destruction of enemy air strength and vessels in the MALAY and NETHERLANDS INDIES Area will be intensified.<br>2. Elements of the submarine and mine layer force will advance to the area off south JAVA to observe and attack enemy ships, disrupt sea traffic and lay mines.<br>3. Key points in the NETHERLANDS INDIES will be subject to air attacks in the following order: (a) MENADO, TARAKAN; (b) BALIKPAPAN, KENDARI; (c) BANDJERMASIN, MAKASSAR; and if the situation requires, SORANG, AMBOK and KOEPAN.<br>4. The air forces will proceed to the KUCHING Area by the time of the landing of the main MALAY invasion forces. | Air Flot 12 will be added to MALAY Force before the landing of the main MALAY invasion forces. |
| Air Force | CinC 2nd Fleet | | 11 Air Fleet (less AirFlot 22) and 36 attack planes)<br>Two battalions of special naval landing party | | | |
| Submarine Force | | | SubRon 5<br>SubRon 6 (less one SubDiv) | | | |
| Netherlands Indies Force | | | 3rd Fleet (less one element)<br>CruDiv 5<br>DesRon 2 (less one destroyer division)<br>DesRon 4 (less one destroyer division)<br>AirFlot 11<br>Eight patrol craft | | | |
| Philippines Force | | | One element of 3rd Fleet (TN Crossed out in pencil)<br>3rd Southern Expeditionary Fleet (TN Inserted in pencil.) | | | |
| Malay Force | | | 1st Southern Expeditionary Fleet<br>CruDiv 7 DesRon 3<br>AirFlot 12 Sec 2 of 17S (TN Crossed out in pencil.)<br>TAKSUMIYA MARU (TN Inserted in pencil.) | | | |

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Separate Table 2

ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR SECOND PERIOD (DAI NI KI) OPERATIONS OF FIRST PHASE (DAI ICHI DAN) OPERATIONS
(Up to about X 40 when the landing of the main BRITISH MALAY invasion forces has been completed)

| FORCE | COMMANDING OFFICER | STRENGTH | PRINCIPAL DUTY | OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | DesRon 5<br>SubRon 4<br>One SubDiv of SubRon 6<br>AirFlot 22<br>36 attack planes<br>ARAHI<br>MUROTO | | | |
| Supply Unit | | 35 train vessels | | | |
| Northern Force | CinC 5 Fleet | 5 Fleet<br>KISARATSU Air Group<br>CHICHI JIMA Communications Unit (CHICHITSU)<br>Five train vessels | | | |
| Supply Unit | | | | | |
| Commerce Destruction Unit | CO 24 Squadron (SENTAI) | 24 gee<br>One train vessel | | | |
| Communications Force | CO 1 Combined Communication Unit | 1 Unit (less CHICHI JIMA Communications Unit) of 1 Combined Communications Unit | Continuation of First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations | | |
| Attached Forces | | Sec 2 of CarDiv 4<br>CHIYODA<br>SETTSU (TN Inserted in ink.)<br>YAKAZE<br>13 transports | | | |
| Note | Same as for First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations | | | | |

Note: The symbol * indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

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Exhibit Table 1

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ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR THIRD PERIOD (DAI SAN KI) OPERATIONS OF PI SAT PHASE (DAI ICHI DAN) OPERATIONS

(Up to end of Southern First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations)

| FORCE | COMMANDING OFFICER | | STRENGTH | PRINCIPAL DUTY | OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Main Body | Combined Fleet | | BatDiv<br>1 Fleet (less BatDiv 3, CruDiv 6, DesRon 1 except two DesDivs, DesRon 3) | Continuation of Second Period (DAI NIKI) Operations | | |
| Striking Force | | CinC<br>1 Air Fleet | 1 Air Fleet (less CarDiv 4)<br>BatDiv 3 (less Sec 2)<br>CruDiv 8, DesRon 1 (less two DesDivs)<br>Six train vessels | | | |
| Supply Unit | | | | | | |
| Advanced Expeditionary Force | | CinC 6 Fleet | 6 Fleet<br>Six transports | | | |
| Supply Unit | | | | | | |
| South Seas Force | | CinC 4 Fleet | 4th Fleet<br>CruDiv 6<br>JINTSU (TN Crossed out.)<br>2 Unit of 1 Combined Communications Unit<br>22 train vessels | | | |
| Supply Unit | | | | | | |
| Southern Force | | CinC 2nd Fleet | CruDiv 4<br>Two DesDivs of DesRon 4<br>CarDiv 4 (less Sec 2)<br>2 Sec of BatDiv 3<br>AKAGI<br>ASAHI MARU<br>Five battalions of special naval landing party<br>Some fishing boats | 1. Continuation of Second Period (DAI NIKI) Operations, exploiting battle successes<br>2. Conveying at sea and landing of the main Java and Sumatra invasion forces<br>3. Disruption of traffic in the Straits of MALACCA and the areas south of JAVA and SUMATRA | | |
| Air Force | | | 11 Air Fleet (less AirFleet 22 and 36 attack planes)<br>Two battalions of special naval landing party | | | |
| Submarine Force | | | SubRon 4<br>SubRon 5<br>SubRon 6 | | | |
| Netherlands Indies Force | | | 3 Fleet (less one element)<br>CruDiv 5<br>DesRon 2<br>DesRon 4 (less two destroyer divisions)<br>AirFleet 11<br>Eight patrol craft | | | |
| Philippines Force | | | One element of 3 Fleet | | | |
| Malay Force | | | Southern Expeditionary Fleet<br>CruDiv 7<br>DesRon 3<br>AirFleet 22<br>36 attack planes<br>ASAKI<br>MEIKYO | | | |
| Supply Unit | | | 35 train vessels | | | |



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Seperate Table 3 (Continued)

ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR THIRD PERIOD (DAI SAN KI) OPERATIONS OF FIRST PHASE (DAI ICHI DAN) OPERATIONS

(Up to and of Southern First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations)

| FORCE | COMMANDING OFFICER | | STRENGTH | PRINCIPAL DUTY | OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Northern Force | CinC Combined Fleet | CinC 5th Fleet | 5th Fleet<br>KISARATSU Air Group<br>CHICHI JIMA Communications Unit (CHICHITSU)<br>Five transports | Continuation of Second Period (DAI NI KI) Operations | | |
| Supply Unit | | | | | | |
| Commerce Destruction Unit | | CO 24 Squadron (SENTAI) | 24 s** One train vessel | | | |
| Communications Force | | CO 1 Combined Communications Unit | 1 Unit (less CHICHI JIMA Communications Unit.) of 1 Combined Communications Unit | | | |
| Attached Forces | | | Sec 2 of CarDiv 4<br>SETTSU<br>CHIYODA<br>YAKAZE<br>13 train vessels | | | |
| Notes | Combined with First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations | | | | | |

Note: The symbol ** after a conventional sign or abbreviation indicates that this is an exact reproduction of that appearing in the original document.

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ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR INTERCEPTION (YŌGEKI)

Separate Table 4

| Page | FORCE | COMMANDING OFFICER | PRINCIPAL DUTY | ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR DECISIVE ACTION - 1 (Other matters will be as prescribed by doctrine.) | | ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR DECISIVE ACTION - 2 (Other matters will be as prescribed by Doctrine.) | | ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR DECISIVE ACTION - 3 (Other matters will be as prescribed by doctrine.) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Strength | Outline of Operations | Strength | Outline of Operations | Strength | Outline of Operations |
| 2/114<br>2/115<br>2/116<br>2/117 | Main Body | CinC Combined Fleet | 1. Support of entire operations.<br><br>2. Decisive action. | BatDiv 1<br><br>1st Fleet (less BatDiv 3)<br><br>CHIYODA<br><br>AirFlot 11 | Strict security will be maintained in the western part of the INLAND Sea and the entire operation supported. Depending on the situation, a sortie will be made at an appropriate time. | BatDiv 1<br><br>1st Fleet (less BatDiv 3)<br><br>CHIYODA<br><br>AirFlot 11 | Support will be given the Striking Force or Advance Force by making a sortie at an appropriate time. | BatDiv 1<br><br>1st Fleet (less BatDiv 3)<br><br>CHIYODA<br><br>AirFlot 11 | 1. Cover will be provided for the Striking Force or Advance Force. The force will try to respond instantly to given situations and maneuver as guide for all forces.<br><br>2. When destruction of enemy air forces has not proved complete, the greater part of the fighter planes will be concentrated on aircraft carriers accompanying the fleet. |
| | Advance Force | CinC 2nd Fleet | 1. Locating and destroying enemy task (invasion) forces.<br><br>2. Decisive action. | 2nd Fleet<br><br>BatDiv 3<br><br>CarDiv 4 | Support will be rendered the operations of South Seas Force and the air forces by an advance at the appropriate time into the enemy area of main operations. Except where necessary, maneuvers will be kept outside the effective range of enemy base airplanes. | 2nd Fleet<br><br>BatDiv 3<br><br>CarDiv 4 | Same as Allocation in Preparation for Decisive Action - 1 | 2nd Fleet<br><br>BatDiv 3<br><br>CarDiv 4 | The force will maneuver out of range of strong enemy air attacks and wait the approach of the enemy invasion force into the vicinity of one of our key points. It will then move out, locate and destroy the enemy invasion force. It will maneuver so as to decoy the enemy fleet into the area where the main Body is located. |
| | South Seas Force | CinC 4th Fleet | 1 Defense and patrol of key sections of sea areas in its charge.<br><br>2. Locating and destroying enemy task (invasion) force.<br><br>3. Decisive action. | 4th Fleet<br><br>SubRon 4<br><br>SubRon 5 | 1. Patrol and defense will be strictly carried out. Using submarines, reconnaissance seaplanes, light vessels, etc, the forces will co-operate with Advanced Expeditionary Force, the air forces, etc, in smashing enemy plans for seizing advance bases and building installations<br><br>2. The rear area forces will patrol with airplanes and subchasers, etc, the areas in which the Advance Force (Main Body) is maneuvering. They will also be responsible for neutralizing attacks of enemy submarines and when necessary they will establish and secure patrol lines for air defense between enemy advance air bases and these forces.<br><br>3. The patrol forces of other areas will concentrate all strength not required for their areas in the zone of main operations. | 4th Fleet<br><br>SubRon 4<br><br>SubRon 5 | 1. One element will co-operate in the base air forces operations and be responsible for the security and protection of Advance Force and main Body. It will also prepare against the attacks of enemy invasion force, and counter-attack and destroy it.<br><br>2. Otherwise same as Allocation - 1. | 4th Fleet | I. The enemy will be intercepted in the vicinity of a key point and a counter-attack delivered. In addition, patrol planes will be used to co-operate with the Advanced Expeditionary Force and contact with the enemy fleet maintained.<br><br>2. When it is no longer necessary to consider the enemy invasion force, raids will be made on the enemy fleet with the full strength of submarine and other forces<br><br>3. When the enemy base air forces are very active, an element of the submarines and reconnaissance seaplanes will co-operate in the action of the base air forces.<br><br>4. Otherwise same as Allocation - 2. |
| | Northern Force | CinC 5th Fleet | 1. Defense and patrol of key sections of sea areas in its charge.<br><br>2. Locating and destroying enemy task (invasion) force.<br><br>3. Decisive action. | 5th Fleet (KISARATSU Air Group) | | 5th Fleet (KISARATSU Air Group) | | 5th Fleet (KISARATSU Air Group) | |

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Appendix Table 1 (Continued)

ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR INTERDICTION (TENTATIVE)

| FORCES | COMMANDING OFFICER | PRINCIPAL DUTY | ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR DECISIVE ACTION-1 (Other matters will be as prescribed by doctrine.) | | ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR DECISIVE ACTION-2 (Other matters will be as prescribed by doctrine.) | | ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR DECISIVE ACTION-3 (Other matters will be as prescribed by doctrine.) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Strength | Outline of Operations | Strength | Outline of Operations | Strength | Outline of Operations |
| Advanced Expeditionary Force | CinC 6th Fleet | 1. Observation of and attack on enemy fleet<br>2. Co-operation in base air force operations<br>3. Decisive action | 6th Fleet | An element will observe the enemy fleet. The major element will be responsible for preventing enemy deployment by raids advance air bases and build installations. | 6th Fleet | An element will be responsible for observation of and attack on enemy air bases. The major element will be responsible for observing, locating and attacking the enemy fleet and invasion force. | 6th Fleet | An element will endeavor to locate the enemy fleet into the area where the decisive battle has been planned. The major element will make repeated attacks. When destruction of the enemy air forces has not proved complete, an element of the submarines will co-operate in the base air force action. |
| Carrier Air Force | CinC 1st Air Fleet | 1. Support of South Seas Force or Northern Force<br>2. Seizure of air superiority<br>3. Decisive action | 1st Air Fleet (less CarDiv 4) | An advance will be made at the appropriate time into the enemy main operations area. Raids will be made on key air points on the outer flanks of the enemy and on aircraft carriers. The force will be responsible for reinforcing the fighter planes operating against the advance attack bases of the enemy forces striving to seize key points. | 1st Air Fleet (less CarDiv 4) | Maneuvers will be conducted outside the effective range of enemy air power. The enemy invasion force will be attacked in narrow waters the enemy fleet will be attacked at an opportune time. | 1st Air Fleet (less CarDiv 4) | 1. Maneuvers will be made outside the effective range of enemy air attack. The force will await the approach of the enemy carrier air force. An advance will be made at the appropriate time. The force will participate in the operations of Advanced Expeditionary Force and base air force, and attack and destroy the enemy.<br>2. Enemy carrier air power will be attacked and destroyed before the enemy is engaged. |
| Base Air Forces | CinC 11th Air Fleet | 1. Patrol<br>2. Support of South Seas Force or Northern Force<br>3. Seizure of air superiority<br>4. Decisive action | 11th Air Fleet (less an element) | 1. Co-operation will be effected with Advanced Expeditionary Force, South Seas Force, etc, and attacks made on deploying enemy base air forces and on enemy forces attacking key points. In addition, counterattacks to the enemy air attacks will be made.<br>2. The rear base air forces will patrol the areas in which the Advance Force (Main Body) is operating. | 11th Air Fleet (less an element) | In addition to continuing the duties shown in Allocation in Preparation for Decisive Action-1, the forces are responsible for scouting, tracking and attacking the enemy fleet and invasion force. | 11th Air Fleet (less an element) | 1. The forces will be responsible for attacking enemy base air forces, the invasion force, etc. When the enemy fleet has come within attacking range, they will repeatedly attack it in co-operation with Advanced Expeditionary Force.<br>2. Enemy carrier air power will be attacked and destroyed before the enemy is engaged |
| Southern Force | CinC 3rd Fleet | Southern Area operations | 3rd Fleet 1st and 3rd Southern Expeditionary Fleets (TN Entered in pencil.) ASAKI ASAKI MARU MUROTO Seven battalions of special naval landing party | Continuation of Southern Area operations | 3rd Fleet 1st and 3rd Southern Expeditionary Fleets (TN Entered in pencil.) ASAKI ASAKI MARU MUROTO Seven battalions of special naval landing party | Continuation of Southern Area operations | 3rd Fleet 1st and 3rd Southern Expeditionary Fleets (TN Entered in pencil.) ASAKI ASAKI MARU MUROTO Seven battalions of special naval landing party | Continuation of Southern Area operations |

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Separate Table 4 (Continued)

ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR INTERCEPTION (YOGEKI)

| FORCE | COMMANDING OFFICER | PRINCIPAL DUTY | ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR DECISIVE ACTION-1 (Other matters will be as prescribed by doctrine.) | | ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR DECISIVE ACTION-2 (Other matters will be as prescribed by doctrine.) | | ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR DECISIVE ACTION-3 (Other matters will be as prescribed by doctrine.) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Strength | Outline of Operations | Strength | Outline of Operations | Strength | Outline of Operations |
| | | | Eight patrol craft Element of 11 Air Fleet | | Eight patrol craft One element of 11 Air Fleet | | Eight patrol craft One element of 11 Air Fleet | |
| Commerce Destruction Unit | CO 24 Squadron (SENTAI) | Disruption of sea traffic | 24 s** | In accordance with Outline for Sea Traffic Destruction Operations | 24 s** | Same as Allocation-1 | 24 s** | Same as Allocation-2 |
| Communications Forces | CO 1 Combined Communications Unit | Operational communications and communications intelligence (TSUSHIN CHOHO) | 1 Combined Communications Unit | | 1 Combined Communications Unit | Same as Allocation-1 | 1 Combined Communications Unit | Same as Allocation-2 |
| Supply Forces | Under Direct Command | Supply | Train | | Train | Same as Allocation-1 | Transport | Same as Allocation-2 |

Notes:

1. When changing to these allocations during First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations, the formation of the Striking Force will be revised by special order.

2. Outline of deployment for the base air force:

   a. Deployment areas as follows:

      (1) When the enemy is attacking in the MARSHALLS Area: the major element - the MARSHALLS Area; one element-MARCUS Island, SAIPAN and TRUK Areas.
      (2) When the enemy is attacking in the RABAUL Area: the major element - SAIPAN Area; one element - TRUK and MARSHALLS Areas.
      (3) When the enemy is attacking in waters east of JAPAN: the major element - TŌKYŌ Area; one element - MARCUS Island, SAIPAN and ŌMINATO Areas.

   b. Deployment depends on the swift shift of the HIKOKITAI. However aircraft carriers are used to shift fighter plane units.

3. The assignment of supply ships is the same as in the allocation of forces in First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations.

4. Special orders will be issued for other forces not listed above.

Note: The symbol ** after a conventional sign or abbreviation indicates that this is an exact reproduction of that appearing in the original document.

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Separate Table 5

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ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR SECOND PHASE (DAI NI DAI) OPERATIONS
(From the conclusion of southern First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations on)

| FORCES | COMMANDING OFFICER | | STRENGTH | PRINCIPAL DUTY | OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Main Body | CinC Combined Fleet | | BatDiv 1<br>1 Fleet (less BatDiv 3 and CruDiv 6) | Support of entire operations. | | |
| Advance Force | | CinC 2 Fleet | 2 Fleet<br>BatDiv 3<br>CarDiv 4 | 1. Support of operations of Northern, South Seas and Southern Forces.<br>2. Destruction of enemy task force. | | |
| Carrier Air Force | | CinC 1 Air Fleet | 1 Air Fleet (less CarDiv 4) | | | |
| Advanced Expeditionary Force | | CinC 6 Fleet | 6 Fleet | Continuation of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations. | | |
| Base Air Forces | | CinC 11 Air Fleet | 11 Air Fleet (less one element)<br>Two battalions of special naval landing party. | Patrol of necessary areas; base air combat. | | |
| Southern Force | | CinC 3 Fleet | 3 Fleet<br>1 Southern Expeditionary Fleet (TN Entered in pencil.)<br>3 Southern Expeditionary Fleet<br>SubRon 4<br>SubRon 5<br>AKAISHI<br>ASAHI MARU<br>Eight patrol planes<br>Five battalions of special naval landing party<br>ASAHI<br>MUROTO<br>One element of 11 Air Fleet | 1. Mopping up of enemy remnants in occupied key areas; checking of enemy penetration; defense and stabilization of key points.<br>2. Disruption of enemy sea traffic off northeast coast of AUSTRALIA and in INDIAN Ocean.<br>3. Depending on the situation, attacks on enemy air bases in northern AUSTRALIA. | | |
| South Seas Force | | CinC 4 Fleet | 4 Fleet<br>CruDiv 6<br>AirFlot 11<br>2 Unit of 1 Combined Communications Unit | 1. Patrolling and strengthening of defenses in South Seas Area; securing and garrisoning of occupied key points.<br>2. Attacks on key points in the BISMARCK Archipelago and BRITISH NEW GUINEA. | | |
| Northern Force | | CinC 5 Fleet | 5 Fleet<br>(KIKU)<br>CHICHI JIMA<br>Communications Unit<br>(CHIOMITSU) | 1. Patrolling and strengthening defenses in Northern Area.<br>2. Observation of and attacks on key points in ALEUTIAN Islands.<br>3. Security measures against RUSSIA. | | |
| Commerce Destruction Unit | | CO 24 Squadron (SENTAI) | 24 3** | Same as First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations | | |
| Communications Force | | CO 1 Combined Communications Unit | 1 Unit (less CHICHI JIMA Communication Unit) of 1 Combined Communications Unit | | | |
| Attached Forces | | | CHIYODA<br>SETTSU<br>TAKAZE | | | |
| Note | Assignment of supply ships will be determined separately. | | | | | |

Note: The symbol ** after a conventional sign or abbreviation indicates that this is an exact reproduction of that appearing in the original document.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #2
ENTITLED
"JAPANESE COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER #2"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460)

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

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COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER 2

Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI BAY, 7 Nov. 41

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
Commander in Chief,
Combined Fleet

COMBINED FLEET ORDER

First preparations for war

Y Day will be 8 December

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #3
(A NAVY STUDY RE ENEMY SUBMARINES)
ENTITLED
"JAPANESE SUBMARINE OPERATIONS (PEARL HARBOR ATTACK)"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

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JAPANESE SUBMARINE OPERATIONS (PEARL HARBOR ATTACK)

The operations of Japanese submarines, both midget and full-size, was one of the main factors in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The Combined Fleet Secret OpOrder #1, which contained the basic plans for the Pacific-wide attacks which launched the war, contained a paragraph referring to submarine operations at Pearl Harbor. The text of this paragraph, as recalled by a reliable Japanese Chief Yeoman who was attached to the staff of the late Admiral Yamamoto, CinC Combined Fleet, read as follows:

> 7. The Commander of the Surprise Attack Force (Submarine Force), having the 6th Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main element, will have most of the submarines leave the western part of the Inland Sea on X-20 Day to attack Pearl Harbor. Its entire strength will be so disposed so as to command the harbor mouth. It will attack any enemy warship which may have escaped from the harbor. It will also carry out reconnaissance before the attack, and if the opportunity presents itself, will carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships with midget submarines. The time for such attacks will be after the flights of planes have attacked OAHU. Every possible means for recovery of midget submarines should be considered.

The organizations participating in the Pearl Harbor attack, on the basis of POW and documentary evidence, included Subrons 1, 2, and 3 (Minus Subdiv 20). This is a total of 20 submarines, not including the 5 midgets carried on the decks of five of the large submarines. Sixteen of the twenty submarines have been definitely identified as having participated (I-1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,17,16,18,20,22,24, (1)68,(1)69,(1)74). The other four, which are assumed to have participated because they were part of the same Subdivs both before and after December 7th and are not known to have had other assignments, are the I-8,9,15, and (1)75. A fairly reliable POW has suggested that the I-10 was also present, but there is no other evidence to indicate that it was.

All of the submarines participating (with the exception of the 45-ton midgets) were of the I-type; i.e., over 1,000 tons. Sixteen of them were of the Long-Range Cruiser type—over 1900 tons, with a range of above 12,000 nautical miles at 14 knots. Of these, five (I-16,18,20,22,24) were equipped with midget submarines, the five midget submarines which attempted to get into



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Pearl Harbor. The remaining eleven Cruisers were plane-bearing submarines.

Four of the twenty were I (1)68 Class Submarines: 1400 tons, 6 torpedo tubes and a range of 8,000 miles at 16 knots.

The midget submarines used in the Pearl Harbor action (which subsequently were referred to as the "Pearl Harbor Type") were 41' in length, carried two 18" torpedoes, had a range of 175 miles at 5 knots and 18 miles at 20 knots.

When carried by the mother submarine, the midget sub is secured to the pressure hull with four heavy clamps and one auxiliary clamp. An access hatch, telephone and battery-charging leads connect the two submarines. The midget is launched by releasing the four main clamps from the parent ship and the auxiliary clamp from within the midget.

With regard to the anticipated results of the midget-submarines borne by the I-16 Class submarines, it is interesting to note that the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, in clarifying Secret OpOrder #1 is reported by the above-quoted Japanese Chief Yeoman as stating:

> The midget submarine unit has been studying and training at the Kure Navy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, but it is still too much to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. In any case, the crew members are supremely confident. The 6th Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within the harbor.

PHASES OF THE ATTACK

Preliminary. According to the Secret OpOrder #1 schedule, most of the submarines in the attack force were supposed to leave the Inland Sea (presumably Kure, the major submarine base) on X-20 Day (November 18th, Honolulu time). Subron 2, composed of I-1,2,3,4,5,6,7, is reported by a reliable POW to have left YOKOSUKA two days later. The Commander of the Sixth Fleet remained behind at Kure.

Apparently most of the submarines arrived in the Pearl Harbor area a day or two before the attack. The log of the I-1 reports that on December 5th (all dates Honolulu time) it was 600 miles from Pearl Harbor. According to POW's from the I-17, this sub arrive off OAHU on the 6th.

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Before the attack started, the submarines took up scouting positions. The area around Pearl Harbor had been divided into various sectors. Thus, the I-(1)69 cruiser submerged, engaged in surveillance in Scouting Sector D, about 17 miles Southwest of Pearl Harbor, according to the captured report of its skipper. The I-17, according to POW's, took up a scouting position 1° North of Honolulu. There was also an E Inner Scouting Area: a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles, with Pearl Harbor as the center.

One of the features of the submarine attack plan was to send at least two midgets into the harbor prior to the air attack in order to check on the ships present and their position. One midget was detected by the USCG CONDOR at 0350, four hours before the full aerial attack, as it was trailing the USS ANTARES, apparently hoping to slip through the net defenses following the ANTARES. This particular midget was apparently sunk by the USS WARD in 1200 feet of water. Another midget was sunk in the harbor, probably having slipped in through the net-gate which had been opened at 0458 to permit the passage of two minesweepers and not closed until 0840, three-quarters of an hour after the aerial attack. A navigation chart was recovered from a third midget which beached itself and the navigation track which was charted would have taken it all around Ford Island in Pearl Harbor. (See attached chart) The original chart was evidently a U.S. Navy H.O. chart, with detailed navigational data carefully translated into Japanese. Rough notes were scribbled on the chart. On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The sub carried a simple code which would have enabled it to transmit its information to the main force awaiting outside.

The Attack: Prior to the full aerial attack which was launched about 0800, the main function of the submarines, both full-size and midget, was reconnaissance and surveillance. After the opening of the attack the full-size submarines were supposed to exploit the situation by torpedoing the ships which were trying to escape the confinement of the Harbor while the



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midgets were supposed to slip into the harbor during the confusion and contribute to the destruction caused by the carrier-borne aerial bombardment. Simultaneously they were supposed to report the damage inflicted by all Japanese efforts back to the Commander of the Striking Force. This information was gained not only by periscope observation, but also by the aerial reconnaissance of the observation planes carried by eleven of the participating submarines. One of the factors restricting the use of this type of observation was the heavy weather which made launching difficult.

Apparently all five of the midget subs launched were lost without causing any direct damage. The Japanese admitted the loss of five midgets and only five midget-bearing submarines (I-16,18,20,22,24) are known to have participated. There is no known damage by midget submarines and at least three are known to have been sunk before they could do any damage. In addition to the one sunk trying to follow the ANTARES into the Harbor, before the full attack, two were sunk in the harbor. One damaged itself on a reef to the right of the entrance channel, and north of Buoy #1. It was spotted there at 0817 by the USS HELM which opened fire. While being fired upon it slipped off the ledge and submerged. It was apparently this midget which beached itself at OAHU, because the apparatus of the latter had been put out of commission by reef damage.

The conning towers of two midget submarines were sighted in the North Channel, one by the CURTIS. This latter midget was sunk by the USS MONAGHAN, the ready duty destroyer which rammed it and depth-charged it. The fifth midget was presumably sunk in one of several successful A/S attacks which were reported by the BLUE, the RAMSEY and the BREEZE. These attacks presumably accounted for the I-170(which Japanese documents show as being unreported after December 8th) as well as the fifth midget.

Post-Attack Phase: It is clear that one of the principal functions of the submarine attack force was that of remaining in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor to pick off any damaged ships which might try to limp back to the mainland, or any other ships which might bring reinforcements to Pearl Harbor.

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We know that the I-1, which arrived on the eve of the attack did not leave the vicinity of Pearl Harbor until January 9th.

One of the most difficult situations experienced by the Japanese subs was that of the I-(1)69. At 1830 on December 7th it was ordered by the Commander of the Japanese Submarine Forces to shift from Scouting Sector D, about 17 miles Southwest of Pearl Harbor, to surveillance in the central sector of E Inner Scouting Area, a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles with Pearl Harbor as the center. On the way it was forced down before it could complete recharging its batteries and subsequently was caught in an anti-sub net 4.2 miles, 130° off Barber's Point. It was kept down on the bottom below its maximum safe diving depth for 38 hours, but escaped with minor damage.

After December 7th, submarine activity, at least on the part of those submarines which took part in the original attack, tapered off. About December 14th the I-17 left for the Oregon coast. On December 20th the I-174 left the Oahu area for Kwajalein. The I-1 which remained until January 9th, had an eventful cruise, but little success. On December 10th it sighted a CV but couldn't attack. On December 13th it sighted an AO but was prevented from attacking by A/S activity. On 20th of December it sighted an AK but was unable to attack. On December 25th it was depth-charged without damage. On December 30th it shelled the harbor at Hilo. On January 1st it was sighted and attacked twice by U.S. planes without damage.

Results: In summing up the part played by Japanese submarines in the attack on Pearl Harbor it is important to note that the Japenese lost one full-size submarine (the I-(1)70) and five midgets, while American forces suffered no known damage from submarines. Balanced against this is the fact that the submarines served an important scouting function and tied up American naval units.



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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #4
( A NAVY STUDY RE ENEMY SUBMARINES )
ENTITLED
"TIME TABLE OF JAPANESE SUBMARINES OPERATIONS"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

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Japanese
TIMETABLE OF SUBMARINE
OPERATIONS

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 18 Nov. '41 | | Submarines scheduled to leave Western part of Inland Sea for attack on Pearl acc. to Combined Fleet Secret OpOrd #1. |
| 20 Nov. | | The I-1,I-2,I-3,I-4,I-5,I-6,I-7 left Yokosuka for Pearl. |
| 25 Nov. | | Com. 6th Fleet was on Hashira Shima. (KURE) |
| 5 Dec. | | OHATA, PO, says I-174 arrived off OAHU at this time with 15 or 16 others. |
| 5 Dec. | | I-1 was 600 miles from Pearl. |
| 6 Dec. | | I-17 arrived off OAHU, took scouting position 1° North of HONOLULU. |
| 7 Dec. | | I-(1)6°, Flag of Subdiv 12, took up surveillance position 17 miles SW of Pearl, before attack started. |
| 7 Dec. | 0350 | USCG CONDOR sighted the periscope of submerged sub when conducting sweeping operations approx 1-3/4 miles SW of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoy. |
| | 0357 | CONDOR informed the USS WARD by visual signal. WARD, which was patrolling off Pearl Harbor instituted search. |
| | 0458 | Net opened to permit the passage of two minesweepers. Not closed until 0840. |
| | 0633 | Navy patrol plane dropped two smoke pots near midget following ANTARES. |
| | 0637 | WARD sighted the periscope of unidentified sub apparently trailing the USS ANTARES then enroute to Pearl Harbor. |
| | 0640 | WARD commenced attack, which is believed to have been successful. |
| | 0645 | WARD reported to Commandant 14th Naval District, first time this had been reported. |
| | 0732 | Patrol plane sank a hostile sub south of the entrance buoy, according to telephone call of Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO at 0740. This was later revealed to have been in cooperation with DD. Presumably this is the same action in which the WARD participated. |
| | 0751 | The ready duty Destroyer, USS MONOCHAN, received orders to "proceed immediately and contact the WARD in defensive sea area" and also apparently to close the netgate. See above. |
| | 0755 | Navy Yard Signal Tower telephoned Cincpac: "Enemy air raid---not drill." Almost simultaneously Japanese torpedo planes attacked the battleships. |
| | 0817 | The USS HELM spotted the conning tower of a submarine to the right of the entrance channel and northward of Buoy #1. Though immediately submerging, fire was opened when the submarine again surfaced temporarily, no hits were observed. |



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This sub appeared to be touching bottom on ledge of reef and in line of breakers. While still being fired at, it slipped off ledge and submerged. [redacted]

0830 The USS MONOGHAN, ready duty destroyer, which had been ordered to sea at 0751 but had been temporarily delayed by the initiation of the enemy action, got under way.

0836 The conning towers of two midget subs sighted in North Channel; one by CURTIS (AV4).

0837 The MONOGHAN, having observed an enemy submarine under fire of both the CURTIS and the TANGIER, proceeded at flank speed and at about 0843 rammed; thereafter dropped two depth charges. The fire of the CURTIS resulted in two
0843 direct hits on the conning tower. This submarine (midget) was later salvaged for inspection. Before the MONOGHAN dispatched it one midget fired a torp which was apparently aimed at the USS RALEIGH but passed under the bow of the DALE and exploded on Ford Island.

0840 Net closed. Had been opened at 0458 to permit passage of two minesweepers.

0915 USS BLUE dropped four and two DCs in two successive attacks on sound contact approximately four miles bearing 190° from DIAMOND Head Light.

0950 USS BLUE dropped 6 DCs on good sound contact; resulted in large oil slick and air bubbles over a length of 200 feet. 20° 11' 30" N 157° 49' 45" W.

1020 Two DCs dropped on sound contact by USS BLUE 6 miles, 200° from Diamond Head light.

1108 MTB reported a periscope to USS BREEZE, patrolling off Pearl Harbor.

1115 BREEZE dropped two DCs with no results: bearing Barber Point 297° T, Diamond Head 078 T, Hickham Tower 357° T.

1135 BREEZE picked up sound of submarine in same vicinity (see 1115); dropped DCs, which brought up oil and debris. A second attack a few minutes later with four deeper DCs brought no tangible results.

1204 GAMBLE on sound attack dropped 3 DCs 168 T from Diamond Head, 2.5 miles.

1830 Commander of the Japanese Submarine Forces ordered I-(1)69 shift from Scouting Sector D, about 17 miles SW of PEARL HARBOR to surveillance in the central sector of E Inner Scouting Area (a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles with Pearl Harbor as the center.)

2000 I-(1)69 reports sighting five DDs "during night". Received close-range DC attack from them apparently no damage.

8 Dec. 0145 (HONOLULU LOCAL) I-(1)69 surfaced, on course of 300° for Barber's Point, hurriedly charged batteries, while at battle speed. Sighted 2 patrol vessels, about 3 miles away.



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| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | 0536 | I-(1)69 is forced down by the DD; before it had completely recharged; DD attacked it with DCs without result. |
| | 0910 | I-(1)69 Caught in anti-sub net. 4.2 miles off Barber's Point, at 130° |
| | 1205? | A few minutes after noon RAMSEY DCed submarine on excellent sound contact 11 miles due west of Barber's Point, bringing up positive oil bubbles. |
| | 1225? | Ramsey heard sub again and DCed, deepest about 250 ft. getting positive oil indications. |
| 9 Dec. | 1950 | I-(1)69 surfaced after 38 hours submerged. |
| 10 Dec. | | Jap Sub I-1 sighted (US) CV but couldn't attack. |
| 13 Dec. | | I-1 sighted (US) AO but was counter-attacked and couldn't attack. About this time Jap Sub I-17, which had held scouting position 1° North of Oahu, left for the OREGON coast. |
| 19 Dec. | | Jap Sub I-(1)74 left OAHU area for KWAJALEIN, acc. to POW PO OHATA. |
| 20 Dec. | | I-1 sighted (US) AK but couldn't attack. |
| 25 Dec. | | I-1 DCed without damage. |
| 27 Dec. | | I-1 Departed Pearl Area for HILO. |
| 30 Dec. | | I-1 attacked HILO harbor, shelling prob. DD. |
| 31 Dec. | | Jap Sub I-3 reached deployment line; received report of (US) CV and left line to shadow. |
| 1 Jan. | | I-1 sighted by US PLANES, attacked twice; no damage. |
| 2 Jan. | | I-3 returned to deployment line. |
| 4 Jan. | | I-1 proceeded to East of Oahu and resumed patrol. |
| 6 Jan. | | I-1 made unsuccessful attack on US DD.<br>I-3 sighted and attacked group of (US) AKs, unknown result. |
| 9 Jan. | | I-1 headed for KWAJALEIN.<br>Jap Sub I-18 rushed to attack on hearing report of (US) CV but no result. |
| 11 Jan. | | Jap Sub I-6 attacked (US) CV Lexington Class; claimed sinking. |



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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #5
(TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENTS)
ENTITLED
"JAPANESE SUBMARINE SCHOOL NOTES
CONCERNING
EARLY WAR EXPERIENCES OFF HAWAII"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

CAPTURED DOCUMENTS - TRANSLATED BY ICPOA

Original Item #____, ICPOA Item # A72 Transl. by ICPOA Date 10 June 1943

Title of Publication SUBMARINE SCHOOL NOTES CONCERNING EARLY WAR EXPERIENCES OFF HAWAII

IN CASE OF DIARY, RECORD, LOG, etc., GIVE WRITER'S

Organization_____

Initial Date_____ Final Date_____

Jan. 12, 1941 Instructor Maeshima

It is needless to state that combat education in this current emergency is of great necessity, and it is extremely regrettable that there has been no opportunity to gather sufficient material before the graduation of the 11th. period special course students. Since, however, some materials in the category of combat instructions has been obtained with the arrival in port of submarines I-16 and I-68 recently, it has been decided to immediately mimeograph and distribute it as study material to this period's special course students. Although it is difficult to guarantee that among the items heard directly there are no points of difference with actual facts, it is believed that there are no great errors in the instructions obtained.

(2) CONFIDENTIAL

NO. 1. TACTICS

1. Use of submarine carried planes.

A. After the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8, the submarine I-7 received an order to carry out an aerial reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor when the opportunity presented. Although she attempted to send off a plane from the neighborhood of Niihau, it was impossible to do so due to the weather. Hence she proceeded southward until in the neighborhood of Hawaii and carried out the aerial reconnaissance.

B. When on picket station, it may be possible, depending on the weather, the enemy's alert condition, terrain and other conditions, to send off the planes carried from a certain area, but it may be impossible to do so from another area. Consequently, besides the necessity of deploying airplane carrying submarines, there is also the necessity of deploying many airplane carring submarines.

Since urgent execution of the above mentioned reconnaissance was not necessary, we suffered no great disadvantage, but it would be of great disadvantage, when urgency of execution is required.

2. Movement against enemy depth charges.

A. Since America's depth charge setting, for the most part, has been definitely ascertained to be in the neighborhood of 35 meters by previous investigations, submarines attached to the Sixth Fleet have evaded them at depths of 50 to 70 meters. (Some subs have evaded them at a depth of 100 meters). In the case of the I-16 (70 meters depth), she received three charges directly over her, but suffered no damage. (Judging from the opinion that the bursting charge of America's depth charges appeared to be feeble, it is doubtful as to whether the charges were directly overhead.)

B. When the safe submerging depth is thought to be about 20 meters more than the supposed depth setting of depth charges, it is deemed best to assume as far as possible a position of 20 meters or more below the depth charge's depth setting.

If not, it is deemed best to assume a position up high, but impossible to be detected, and as far above as possible from the supposed depth setting of the depth charge.

(A) The I38 primarily used sound listening patrol /chōon shōkai 聴音哨戒/

(2)

to prevent any decrease in the efficiency of the listening gear, the following method was used and no uneasiness was felt because of the sound listening patrol.

3. Observation patrol.

(1) Slowest speed used.

(2) Ventilation stopped.

(3) In steering, mechanical power was used only for the diving rudder, while the rest was all man power.

(4) Although it was stipulated in the operational order that batteries should be charged at night at the outer edge of the patrol zone (about 10 nautical miles from harbor entrance), it was impossible to do so. Hence, batteries were charged at a distance of 40 nautical miles from the harbor entrance and after that we returned to the patrol zone.

B. At night, when picketing by enemy patrol vessels is to be expected, it is deemed best to increase the depth of the patrol zone.

4. Patrol method of American destroyers.

A. It seems as if American destroyers are equipped with accurate and good sound detectors and they, for the most part, are executing stationary or slow speed patrol.

B. Even when an American destroyer is stationary, he on guard.

NO. 2. CONTACT DUTY

1. Identification method of friendly units when returning to friendly harbor.

A. The method carried out by I-16 is as follows:

(1) Hoisted a "Breadth Four" Ensign at the tip of the periscope.

(2) Spread a "Breadth Four" Ensign on the ladder to the bridge.

(3) Notified the time of its arrival within the 300 nautical mile arc, its position and course one or two days previously to the home combat force 「内戦部隊」

When returning to an advanced base, [we] took the system of having the commandant of the advance base force indicate the point of passage into the 300 nautical mile arc.

B. There is an example of submarine I-63 being attacked with depth charges by a friendly destroyer when leaving an advanced base. Closest attention should be paid to the identification of friendly units when entering and leaving a friendly harbor and to being alert.

No. 3. NAVIGATION, WEATHER AND SEA CONDITION

1. Onshore Current.

A. The onshore current in the area of Barber's Point, Oahu, is very strong. Since submarine I-68 paid little attention to this, she sighted the breakers of Barber's Point reef at a very close distance when she raised her periscope up to observe, but she was able to prevent anything from happening by turning immediately.

B. When stationed on observation on the front line, it is necessary to take into proper consideration the onshore current when close to the shore.

NO. 4. MANEUVERING FOR ATTACK

1. Protracted submerged navigation.

A. (1) In regard to submarine I-68, the number of days of submerged navigation was 30 for an average of 14 hours per day. Air purifier chemicals were used only once (20 pieces) and the cooler was not used.

(2) Although $CO^2$ reached 4.6%, $O^2$ reached 16% and the temperature reached 32°C., there seemed to be no great effect upon the men.

(3) Other than being used once when her submerged navigation continued for 36 hours, submarine I-16 did not use the air purifier. Just as in the above case, there seemed to be practically no effect upon the men.

B. (1) Although there is need for the use of air purifiers in a submerged navigation of about 14 hours, there is still a necessity for the gathering of more data for further study.

(2) It is necessary to accelerate the completion of the study "Washing purifier" 「洗浄式」 type air purifying method.

2. Waves in the Hawaiian Area.

A. During the operations of submarines of the Sixth Fleet in the Hawaiian area, waves were high every day and it has been reported that submarine I-16 found it difficult to maintain her depth even at the depth of about 18 meters and had to use her standard speed many times.

Besides, there appeared to be two or three submarines that revealed their conning tower in the presence of the enemy.

B. It is necessary to maintain the accuracy of the sound detector excellently in order to do away with any uneasiness in sound detection patrol.

Also, considering this, the periscope should be made as long as possible.

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(5)

NO. 5. COMMUNICATION

1. Underwater wireless reception ability.

A. According to the experiences of the I-16, it is reported that sensitivity is 4 at a depth of 18 meters and 3 at 20 meters in the Hawaiian area. (Sending station USAMI)

[NO. 6. (IS MISSING)]

NO. 7. HULL

1. Change in working of the machine guns during operations.

A. When I-16 test fired her machine guns without taking the trouble of cleaning, after conducting operations for 30 days, of which 20 days were spent in submerged navigation, one machine gun fired without any trouble, while the other fired only one shot.

2. Damages caused by depth charge attack.

A. While observing in Hawaiian area, submarine I-68 was depth charged. Of about 100 depth charges dropped, 12 exploded within 200 meters and 2 exploded directly above. The depth charge setting was within 35 meters and the sub's depth 45 meters. The damage suffered from this attack, for the most part was as follows:

(1) Of the 172 electric lights, 75 were damaged. (Those that were not lighted were not damaged).

(2) Small amount of leakage from the forward door(s) of the torpedo tube(s).

(3) Two depth indicators began to function incorrectly.

(4) Sensitivity of sound detector became bad.

(5) Became impossible to use the transmitter of the echo range depth finder.

(6) Leakage in the high pressure air valve group and air pressure within ship increased greatly.

(7) Leakage in the Kingston valve of the negative buoyancy tank increased.

(8) Due to the damage to the 50 volt power supply, the rudder order telegraph went out. Because of this, the helmsman mistakenly thought that the rudder had been damaged.

(9) The accuracy of the (---?---) ammeter decreased.

(10) Leakage from the corroded tube(s) of number 1 cooler.

(11) Considerable leakage from the "constant use" and reserve fuel tanks.

B. (1) Disassemble the damaged depth indicator and remove the sea water between the #1 and #2 beaks [嘴]

(2) To have turned off as many electric lights as possible.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #6
(TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENT)
ENTITLED
"PATROL OPERATIONS OF JAPANESE SUBMARINE I-69 OFF PEARL HARBOR"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

"PATROL OPERATIONS OF JAPANESE SUBMARINE I-69 OFF PEARL HARBOR"

N. N. I. 96—1942

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT

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# INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial #47-43 (Start new series each year, i. e. 1-40, 2-40)

Monograph Index Guide No. 907-4400 (To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide. Make separate report for each Main title.)

From Op-16-FE, ONI (Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person) at Washington, D. C. Date April 22, 19

Reference Op-16-FE Serial #41-43 of April 14, 1943. (Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable)

Source (As official, personal observation, publication, press, conversation with—identify when practicable, etc.) Evaluation (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject Japan (Nation reported on) Navy (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitles) Submarines (Make separate report for each title)

BRIEF.—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

CORRECTION

The reference report, a translation of a captured document written by the Commander of Submarine Division No. 12 dealing with patrol operations of the Japanese submarine I-69 off Pearl Harbor, erroneously gives the date of these operations as December 8-10, 1942. This error occurs in the fourth line of the cover sheet, in the heading of the first page of the report, and in the fourth line of page 1. The date in all cases mentioned should read, "December 8-10, 1941".

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Distribution By Originator

Routing space below for use in O.N.I.

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| Op-16 | Gen'l Board | Op-10/11 | List II, less q |
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—16409-1

N. N. I. 96—1942

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OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT

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# INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial #41-43 (Start new series each year, i. e. 1-40, 2-40)

Monograph Index Guide No. 907-4400 (To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide. Make separate report for each main title.)

From Op-16-FE, ONI (Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person) at Washington, D.C. Date April 14, 1944

Reference _____ (Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable)

Source Captured Japanese Document (As official, personal observation, publication, press, conversation with—identify when practicable, etc.) Evaluation RELIABLE (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject Japan (Nation reported on) Navy (Main title as per index guide) Submarines (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

BRIEF.—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

The attached report is an abridged translation of a Japanese captured document written by the Commander of Submarine Division No. 12 dealing with patrol operations of the I-69 off Pearl Harbor, December 8-10, 1941, during which time the I-69 was believed to have been caught in an underwater obstruction.

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Resting space below for use in O. N. I.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Op-16 | Gen'l Board | Op-10/11 | List II, less q |
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| Op-16-1-F | MIS (5) | Op-20 (5) | ~~Aust. Staff Mission (2)~~ |
| Archives | BuOrd (3) | NA Chungking | ~~N.Z. Staff Mission (2)~~ |
| Monograph | BuShips (3) | Com 11 (5) | Aust. Joint Staff (2) |
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—12402-1

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Report of I-69's Operations off Pearl Harbor, Dec. 8-10, 1941

The Japanese submarine I-69, (Flagship of Submarine Division 12), attached to the 3rd Submarine Squadron of the Submarine Force, was caught in an underwater obstruction while conducting surveillance of Pearl Harbor on December 9, 1941 but finally freeing herself, was able to carry on with her specified task.

The following is an abridged translation of the report of the event, submitted with various pertinent conclusions by the Commander of Submarine Division 12, and officially distributed (Japanese 6th Fleet Secret Letter #2, Part 5, Jan. 10, 1942) as reference material of value for training. (Dates are in accordance with Japanese time).

I. Circumstances Before the Event.

During daylight on December 8, the I-69 was cruising submerged, engaged in surveillance in Scouting Sector D (about 17 miles southwest of Pearl Harbor). Immediately after the attack upon the enemy by the Striking Force and the Special Attack Force, we were able to hear easily, by means of submarine sound detectors, explosions of bombs and torpedoes, and upon hearing the sound of depth charges, I judged that the Special Attack Force was engaged in heavy fighting.

At 1400 radio orders from the Commander of Submarine Forces were received, assigning the I-69 to surveillance in the central sector of E Inner Scouting Area (a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles, with Pearl Harbor as the center). The orders further specified the annihilation of the remaining enemy forces.

After sunset we surfaced, in an attempt to assist as much as possible, but during the night we sighted five destroyers. While submerging, we received a close-range depth-charge attack. After that we heard enemy patrol boats continually, and could not surface. I judged that these patrol boats were disposed in all directions at intervals of 3 nautical miles. Just at this time, the waves were from 4 to 5 (sic), and . . . in proceeding awash there was difficulty in maintaining depth control without using standard speed, and battery discharge was comparatively high.

I felt keenly the need of recharging the batteries that night, judging that demands on battery power the next day would be great, and recharging difficult, because of the presence of enemy patrol boats. So, although it involved arriving at the designated patrol area somewhat behind schedule, I set course (300°) for the area southeast of Barker's Point, where I thought the enemy patrol might be comparatively lax. At 0015 on the 9th, we surfaced, making certain that no enemy patrol boats were within close range. On a course obliquely to the west, and at battle speed, we hurriedly recharged batteries.

We sighted 2 patrol vessels on our port quarter and port beam respectively, each about 5 kilometers away, and in about 30 minutes we reversed course. Pearl Harbor shone red in the sky, like a thing afire. It was already dawn, and although we operated with the land as a background, an enemy patrol vessel discovered us and fired what looked like a green Very flare. The time was 0106 and our recharging was not yet finished (73% of used power had been replenished). In that condition we immediately submerged, and although we were depth-charged by the destroyer, the distance was great.

II. Circumstances of Running Afoul of Underwater Obstacle and Measures Taken

At 0440 (December 9) we experienced a strange vibration of the ship, and the navigator ordered the engines stopped. At the time, our course was 80°, 4 meters were running together, and depth was 37 meters. I was in my cabin resting, and upon receiving the report went directly to the conning tower. Upon learning of conditions from the submarine's Commanding Officer, I decided that we had been caught in an anti-submarine net, and ordered the engines put into reverse in order to get clear. However, the needle of the speed-gauge did not move, as if the pit log tube were broken. It being difficult to determine our movement, I began to surface the ship, and increased the angle of trim.

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A slight tremor was felt in the ship, and I stopped headway. Again I backed at full speed, but the ship did not move. The ship's trim and depth were not normal. I ordered "Blow main tank", and "Regain negative buoyancy." During these operations we surfaced, or rose to a point at which we were awash, three times. According to the observations of the Commanding Officer of the Submarine, taken at the time of surfacing, within the limits of observation of the periscope (forward of the forward end of the gun platform) we were not caught in anything. Two enemy destroyers were about 5 kilometers dead ahead. As we had now reached a situation in which we could not continue either submerged or on the surface, I decided to lie submerged and to surface at sunset.

At 0454, I stopped the electric motors, but the ship began to sink. I ordered "Blow main tank". The reading of the depth-gauge in the tower reached the extreme limit (85 meters). (We actually reached 125 meters). Seeing this condition, I thought we must be free of the net, and ordered "Ahead standard" at a depth of 40 meters, but as before there shortly occurred a slight tremor, headway was slowed, and I ordered "Stop". Again we began to sink. I ordered "Blow the main tank", but before we regained buoyancy control, the ship slowed to a stop, almost level, at a depth of 87 meters. It was 0506 when I realized we were resting on the bottom. Our estimated position was 4.2 nautical miles off Barber's Point at 130°.

## III. Situation and Measures Taken After Reaching Bottom

Although the sea bottom was below safe submersible depth, (70 meters for the I-69), our resting on the bottom was an extremely good thing for us in our situation. As soon as we had bottomed we know from sounds similar to those made by the destroyer we had previously sighted, that it was close by; and from other sounds we learned of the approach of other patrol vessels. The enemy would stop occasionally, and if we thought they were attempting sound-detection, we exercised rigid sound control. That is to say, the use of all pumps except the oil-pressure pump, and the movement of all rudders, electric fans, gyro-compass and ventilation blower were suspended. I decided to surface at sunset, but though many hours passed there were continual sounds of patrol vessels coming and going, and since our position six miles from the harbor entrance offered considerable chance of discovery and consequent battle to the death were I to surface at sundown, I decided to wait if possible till dusk of the following night, the 10th.

After bottoming, we recorded every hour the amount of bilge water, the inclination, the air pressure and the depth. The fact that the increase per hour of bilge water was about one and a fraction metric tons, and pressure in the air reservoir was 90 (kilos), convinced me that it would be possible to surface at dusk on the following day.

Anticipating that we would have to submerge after only a short time on the surface, I charged the air reservoir with high pressure air from our (6) reserve torpedoes, and was able to raise its pressure 25 kilograms. Although I thought it impossible to use the high-pressure air compressor, since, on account of our depth, we could not take in sea water for cooling, - the engineer suggested circulating the bilgewater as a cooling medium. After effecting sound control and recharging from the reserve torpedoes, I became concerned, as time passed, over the lowering of pressure in the air reservoir, and although I didn't use the high-pressure air compressor that day, I did use it on the 10th, raising the air reservoir pressure from 105 to 138 kilograms, and reducing the air-pressure inside the ship from 891 mm to 780 mm. The additional air thus obtained subsequently proved most efficacious.

Other measures consequent upon the length of time on the bottom were as follows:

A - Air purification:

To escape detection due to noise of ventilator motors, and to economize on electric power, we used air-purifying chemicals three times when we did not hear the enemy in the vicinity (the amount of air purifier used was 60 units) over a total period of about twelve hours; oxygen was released three times for a total of 45 minutes. At 0800 on the 10th there was a reading of 4.5% carbon dioxide, and just before surfacing we must have reached approximately 5.5%, and the crew had headaches. A state was reached where walking for even a slight distance, or any exertion, caused panting.

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B - Stopping of bilgewater accumulation:

We tightened propellor-shaft packing by stuffing with waste and completely closed all valves to the outside.

C - Meals:

To prevent rise of air temperature in the ship, and to economize on power, we used no heat for cooking, but ate biscuits, canned fruit, improvised rice cakes, etc.

D - Rest:

To check increase of carbon-dioxide, we had everyone not specially employed sleep as much as possible. In anticipation of a battle to the death, and to incite the desire for a hard fight, we served sake to all hands at supper on the 9th, the first time since leaving base.

E - Defecation:

In the absence of facilities for discharging excrement, we made use of empty oil cans.

IV. Situation and Measures Taken Prior to Surfacing

On the 10th we detected the presence of enemy patrol vessels, but not so frequently as on the previous day. Sunset on the 10th being at 1253 and moonrise at 1827, I decided to surface at 1500. My estimate of the situation was as follows:

A - It was possible that there might be no enemy patrol craft in the vicinity, since they knew that the I-69 was caught underwater; and in the event that we might be able to free the ship easily and escape to a place of comparative safety, I decided to withdraw from the area and ascertain by radio the current state of affairs, before continuing the task assigned.

B - In the event that freeing the ship might require some time, and that there might be considerable chance of discovery by the enemy, and a consequent battle to the death, I decided upon preparations to make utmost use of all weapons.

C - The possibilities were that we might be unable to move; that we might have to engage the enemy whether freed or not; that if freed, we might attempt to enter Pearl Harbor, or if unsuccessful in that, to block the channel.

The measures I took with the above estimate of the situation as my basis, were as follows:

A - Preparations for battle:

Made preparations for gun, machine-gun and torpedo action. (Anticipating action against small ships, put 2-meter depth setting on torpedoes)

B - Net Cutting Detail:

Arranged a detail of 3 officers, 2 petty officers and 14 men to take charge of appropriate stations, tools, etc.

C - Preparations for Self-destruction:

Powder from 10 high-angle gun charges was collected and arranged in the magazine with 2 tins of kerosene. Self-destruction was to be carried out if the worst came to the worst, and would follow the broadcasting of the message: "We are unable to communicate".

D - Preparations for Destruction of Secret Books:

Operational orders and special instructions for use of Codebook A

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(trsl. note: Kō, in Japanese), together with other papers of a highly secret character were cut up, and destroyed by being churned and pulped in a receptacle filled with sea water. Such things as secret charts and easily combustible documents were removed to the magazine for burning at the time of explosion. Things hard to burn, and which would have to be thrown into the sea were torn up and weighted, to avoid being picked up by the enemy. The time for throwing these away was to be specially designated before the explosion.

E - Disposal of Bilge Water:

Although we tried as much as possible to prevent accumulation of bilge water, the amount was very great in the motor room. Since a large change in trim was naturally to be expected at the time of surfacing, there was great concern lest the main electric motors be soaked with bilge water. Accordingly, the bilge water in the motor room was pumped into the after torpedo tube compartment, so that, even though the after torpedo tube compartment was flooded with bilge water above the deck plating before surfacing, the main electric engines would be perfectly safe at the time of surfacing and during subsequent dive, in spite of a great inclination. We estimated that, before surfacing, the amount of foul water in the ship totaled 50 metric tons, so prepared to pump it overboard immediately upon surfacing.

## V. Circumstances and Measures Taken at time of Surfacing

Upon completion of all pre-surfacing preparations, I assembled all Warrant and higher officers, prayed for a good battle, and drank toasts with beer. We then went directly to our stations. The man in charge of listening gear reported all quiet in the vicinity. At 1457 we blew main tanks. Although the pressure in the air reservoir dropped from 138 to 85 metric tons (sic) the ship did not seem to be rising. The Senior Officer said, "We don't float". I then ordered "Cut in motors", "Port and starboard motors ahead standard", and immediately we saw that we were free of the bottom. However, the change of trim gradually increased, and although we stopped blowing the forward main tank, this inclination did not change. We then opened vents in the forward main tank, and gradually prevented further change in trim, with a maximum inclination of 25°. At 1520 we surfaced. Our period of submersion had been 38 hours.

As soon as the surfacing preparations had been completed, the net-cutting workers had been assembled, and I had instructed them not to be concerned with enemy fire, but rather to concentrate with calm certainty on cutting the net. As soon as we surfaced, the working party went directly out on deck. The lookout reported no enemy in the vicinity, and immediately the net-cutters reported no entanglement above the water line. Because the pit log tube had been damaged the previous day, it was pushed out through the bottom of the ship.

At this point, although I ordered stand-by on main engine, the oil in the engine room sump tank overflowed, as a result of the previous inclination, and for a short time it was impossible to use the engines. Both motors were ordered ahead standard, but the starboard motor didn't work. I wondered whether or not the starboard propeller were fouled in some obstruction, but when I saw the ship move forward I realized this was not so, and was greatly relieved, inasmuch as we could make out the light of an enemy attempting to challenge us. Our course was 270°. Drawing near to the coast (to starboard), I headed for other areas.

## VI. Circumstances and Measures Taken After Surfacing

As the port engine had been made ready, I ordered port engine cut in, ahead standard, at 1519½. At 1533 we sighted an enemy destroyer on opposite course about 3 kilometers away at 30° to port, and quickly submerged. Immediately after surfacing we had started pumping bilge water and replenishing air, but about 25 metric tons of bilge water still remained. After diving, trim was unsteady, varying from a maximum of 55 degrees (sic) down by the head to a maximum of 35 degrees (sic) down by the stern. We reached a maximum depth of 75 meters. The pressure in the air reservoir fell to 35 kilograms and I realized it would be impossible to continue submerged. I ordered the ship to surface and fight it out, but after surfacing we did not sight the destroyer. The time was 1600.

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Again neither engine would run, because of the overflow of oil in the engine room sump tank. I ordered both motors ahead, and thenceforth proceeded on the basis that if we met the enemy we would fight a surface battle. Our course was generally northwest, with the coast for a background. At 1630, both engines were in shape, and were cut in. We went to ahead standard, ahead full, and finally flank speed. We were able to withdraw from the area without meeting any enemy.

On account of the inclination during the dive mentioned above, the inside of the ship was extremely dirty from bilge water, oil and excrement. In the after torpedo compartment, the torpedo tubes were inundated at time of submersion, then when we tilted back the forward bulkhead was covered with dirty water. Also, the battery fluid from the main storage battery had leaked out, producing a foul odor. Many hours were required for emergency repair measures. When our communications apparatus had been repaired, I radioed a report of our condition.

VII. Damage

Damage was chiefly to electrical equipment, from bilge water; and to outside optical and listening gear, from long submersion at great depth. We were not prevented from continuing our patrol, and were able to carry on our assigned task.

VIII. Views

A. I am profoundly convinced that the I-69's escape from danger was entirely due to Divine Providence, in that:

1) The depth at which we bottomed was such that a ship could remain there for a long time. Just before bottoming we had sunk to 125 meters, and although it might be only by chance that we touched bottom at an 87 meter spot, it is certainly unthinkable that we could have stayed submerged for so long a period at a greater depth.

2) There was no enemy nearby at the time of surfacing, and that we were already free of the underwater obstacle. Had we needed a long time to cut ourselves free, and had there been a very strict enemy patrol in the vicinity, we should certainly have been discovered and ended up with a fight to the death.

3) At the time we sighted the enemy destroyer at 1533, and submerged, we were not sighted by the enemy. We were unable to rig for noiseless running, and were in poor condition for submerged operation; in addition, our bow broke water.

B. More research into and improvement of stoppage of oil-leakage in submarines are needed. We know, from sound detection, that several enemy patrol vessels were directly above us. That we escaped being depth-charged is due entirely to prevention of oil-leakage.

C. Research and improvement in the field of noiseless running are needed. Although we were not depth-charged when bottomed, that was because of an entire absence of sound on our part. At many other times when we were running quiet we were depth-charged. This indicates both that the enemy's sound-detection is superior to ours, and that our being detected was because of the noise of our equipment.

D. The depth at which the overboard discharge pumps (main and auxiliary) and the electric power pump in the head can be used is too limited; it needs to be increased by about 60 meters.

E. There is immediate need of automatic depth-control gear. When entangled and unable to move, it is necessary, in order to remain below surface, to use discharge pumps a good part of the time. The sound of these pumps might easily lead to detection and attack by the enemy.

Furthermore, night-time charging of batteries is extremely difficult in patrol areas. At the outset we were barely able to do 73% of our recharging. I consider the installation of automatic depth-control gear in

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submarines assigned to reconnaissance of enemy harbors an immediate and urgent necessity.

F. Submarines should be equipped with 4 pairs of net-cutting shears of proper design. The army wire-cutters lent to this ship by the Kure Military Supply Department would be practically useless in net-cutting.

G. There should be a supply of explosives for self-destruction. When we reached our crisis, I ordered preparations for blowing up the ship, but when I saw the crew panting in the foul air of the ship, and realized they would have to suffer further while waiting for the flames from the ignition-charge to explode the magazine, I felt that it was an unbearable situation.

H. Morale was excellent.

I. We threw overboard large quantities of waste, sandals, oil, etc., upon surfacing. I am not sure whether the enemy, seeing all this in the daytime, were made to accept it as proof of our sinking. I believe there will be many cases in which there will be difficulty in determining the effects of depth-charges or attacks after a submarine is caught in a net.



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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #7
(TRANSLATION OF A CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENT
TELLING THE EXPERIENCES OF A JAPANESE IN THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)
ENTITLED
"THE SOUTHERN CROSS BY KURAMOTI, Iki"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

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Op-16-FE
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23 July 1945

THE SOUTHERN CROSS

by

KURAMOTI, Iki

An account written in flowery language of the experiences of KURAMOTI, Iki in the attack on Pearl Harbor and in various other operations in the South Seas in 1942. The author has not been identified but was probably an enlisted man. Interspersed in the account will be found information of military interest from an historical point of view.

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THE SOUTHERN CROSS

INTRODUCTION

When, in after years, one looks back on the events of the past, the recollection brings with it a mood of deep and poetic emotion. Even the most unhappy events of former years are touched with beauty by the light of the past, and their unpleasantness forgotten like a dream.

Just as the sun, sinking into the sea, paints the twilight sky with rosy clouds and impresses the eye of the beholder with its beauty as its majestic form sinks moment by moment below the horizon, so the mind of man, loving the beautiful and hating the ugly, instinctively transmutes everything into beauty.

When I look at the moon, I recall an evening in my native village when I watched it together with a tender companion, in an ecstacy of love.

When I look at the clouds, I think of a day in my childhood when, scolded by my mother, I flung myself down forlornly on the bank of a pool and watched the clouds drifting away into the distant sky, until finally my grief subsided to a vague sadness and in the twilight my mother led me home.

When I look at the stars, I remember fondly a night when,out of work and wandering aimlessly, I saw through my tears the weeping Pleiades twinkling in an alien sky.

With the passage of time, all these memories of the past become ever dearer to my heart.

Now, in the midst of this great world conflict of the Twentieth Century, I have taken up arms in the service of my beloved homeland, and have made the daring voyage to the South Seas, where shines the Southern Cross. My heart is joyful. I shall set down here for future years a record of these unforgettable days, so that their recollection may bring me a lifetime of delight.

The Southern Cross!

Whether or not that name is a fitting title for this work, I do not know; but during my voyage to the South Seas that constellation impressed itself, I know not why, unforgettably upon my mind, and its name is indelibly written in my heart. Battles have followed battles, and I believe their dazzling number will remain recorded for posterity in this book, The Southern Cross.

KURAMOTO, Iki[1]

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(1) 倉元生

C-O N F I D E N T I A L

The Great East Asia War! Accursed conflict of nations!

The peoples of this world, seeking to enlarge their countries to gratify their boundless ambition, have rushed like a raging wave into a great war such as has never before been seen in the history of the world.

Epoch-making conflict of nations!

O tragic sight!

The weak become the victims of the strong. Those who have strength are victorious; those who have not strength are defeated. The victors use the natural resources and extensive territories taken from the enemy for the benefit of their own country; and, at the same time, expand their military preparations more and more in order to prevent the lies of enemy nations from ever again gaining a foothold. Like a great tree putting down roots deeply into the ground, they try to build a firm and enduring Paradise on earth.

The vanquished are driven from their country, and as an exiled race, gathered together into forlorn companies of the living dead, drift about aimlessly on a journey without end.

As long as there exist great numbers of people leading a crowded life on the limited surface of the earth, will not their innate passions of self-interest and ambition lead them to seek the means of living a more secure existence, and thus embroil them inevitably in war after war? A study of the past history of the world will immediately make this problem clear.

However, the wars of the past have been conflicts between two nations or at most a few nations only, in which only a part of the world has stood divided. I believe it is no exaggeration to say that they are mere trifling altercations in comparison to the Great East Asia War, which may be truly called a world revolution.

Now that we have been swept into this world conflagration, I shall attempt to set down in this book a record of my part in the Great East Asia War, and the impressions I have received from the many battles in which I have taken part. But first I must express my earnest hope that, by means of the supreme love for humanity which I take as my slogan, this horrible war may soon be ended in mutual understanding among nations, and that the peaceful days of before the war may again return to the earth.

When I write thus solemnly, those who may read this book in later days may think that I am glorifying the second coming of Christ, or such a great love as described in the poems of Goethe. However, as already stated in the beginning of this book, I am an ordinary mortal born in this twentieth century, and a soldier who has taken part in this tragic upheaval out of a fervent love for the land of his ancestors.

Ah! when one thinks of it, this is a century of endless change; he who in the morning is drunk with dreams of glory may, by evening, know the bitterness of affliction. The world is on the brink of a great transformation.

While generally praising the holiness of love and mourning the tumult of the world, I must yet take up arms for the land of my ancestors and fight to the last drop of my blood. Therein lies the bitterness of life.

What a contradiction!

Below I shall attempt to set down, just as I recollect at random, a record of my participation in the war.

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HAWAII Operation (8 December)

At the time of year when green leaves turn suddenly to red in the cool winds of approaching autumn, and one begins to feel the piercing breath of the North Wind - that is to say, on 18 November 1941 - we left KURE harbor and sailed for the distant northern seas. The purpose of this operation was unknown to us.

We had taken on board warm clothing, materials for protecting the guns against the cold, and a great quantity of sea nets, but we understood nothing of this.

Day after day and night after night the ships carried out target practice.

In the newspapers that we had on board it was said that we were to attack DUTCH HARBOR, but we did not believe it.

Why did we not believe it? Consider the moderate course of Japanese diplomacy up to that time. It seemed unlikely that Japan meant at this time to lift up her hand against Britain and America. Indeed, was there not at that moment a conference in progress at Washington between America and Japan?

Our hopes were betrayed. We learned this when we went into port to refuel. Then we learnt for the first time how grave the situation was. Within the bay in that island of the bitterly cold North Pacific the air fleet was gathered. The crews, who every day were busy at conferences and discussions, were in an excited state of mind.

Finally the Navigation Officer, Lieut. Comdr. YANO, told us we were to make a surprise attack on HAWAII. At last Japan could be at war with Britain and the U.S.A.!

An air attack on HAWAII! A dream come true. What will the people at home think when they hear the news? Won't they be excited! I can see them clapping their hands and shouting with joy. These were our feelings. We would teach the arrogant Anglo-Saxon scoundrels a lesson!

We must be inflexible in our course....We could not expect to return alive....Thinking that, for all we knew, we might now be eating and drinking for the last time, we gorged ourselves on wine and cakes from the canteen.

Finally, early in the morning of 26 November, our magnificent air fleet set out through the thick fog and stormy waves. Following a pre-arranged course it continued on its way toward PEARL HARBOR expecting to destroy the enemy's Pacific Fleet.

The weather grows worse, a gale blows, the seas rage, a dense fog descends. In this bitter weather, a show of actual force, a test by the gods, though tossed about in their struggle with the elements, the ships continue on their glorious way.

In the several days of danger when flags were blown away, and men washed overboard, throughout the storm, the target practice went on ceaselessly.

Every man was completely exhausted by continuous watches without sleep, and by the silent struggle with Nature; but our spirits were buoyed up by the thought that we were to strike the very first blow in this greatest of all wars.

Behind us there were a hundred million people, amongst them our own families, who had limitless faith in us. Imagine the joy of these people on the morning when we should successfully carry out this operation!

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Soon the fleet crossed the 180° date-line into the Eastern Hemisphere. About this time we received a report that a steamship was proceeding on the same course as ourselves, from SAN FRANCISCO to RUSSIA.

It was most important now to keep a good watch. There could be no doubt of our success, provided that this operation was not discovered by the enemy. Thereafter the whole crew kept watch for sight or sound of this ship; but fortunately even when near 0 point we had caught no sight of it. Considering the dense fog, we seemed to be under divine protection.

Finally, on the long-awaited X-Day, 8 December 1941, at 0130, we reached a point 300 miles to the north of HAWAII. Then the Imperial decree on the great battle was made public.

On this day there appeared in the clear sky a dense white cloud as if it were blessing our passage. Then from the decks of the aircraft carriers, plane after plane rose, flashing their silver wings in the sunlight, and soon there were a hundred and more aircraft in the sky.

Our Sea Eagles were now moving into a great formation. Our ten years and more of intensive training, during which we had endured many hardships in anticipation of this day -- would they now bear fruit? At this thought a thousand emotions filled our hearts as, close to tears, we watched this magnificent sight. One and all, in our hearts, we sent our pleas to the gods, and putting our hands together, we prayed.

Meanwhile, our Sea Eagles, with the drone of their engines resounding across the heavens like a triumphal song, turned their course toward PEARL HARBOR on the island of OAHU and set forth on their splendid enterprise.

About thirty minutes later the fleet received the first report that the raid had been successful.

The second wave of the air attack force, in a large formation composed of some two hundred planes, took off in the same way an hour later.

Reports come in one after another: "Enemy anti-aircraft fire is becoming more and more intense -- we are now attacking against the main force of the enemy -- we are bombing enemy airfields, the damage is enormous--"

In this moment we are repaid for all our painstaking labors. The gods themselves will bear witness to the glory of our great enterprise!

The deck is now transformed into a whirlpool of excitement. As the glorious battle results are announced one after another by the pipes of the hurrying orderlies, shouts of joy are raised on all sides, and all gloom is completely swept away.

Meanwhile the fleet moves swiftly onward at a high speed of 26 knots.

About 0900 the welcome shapes of the returning raiders begin to appear through the clouds. One by one, like fledglings longing for their nest, they come to rest on the decks of the carriers.

Well done! But have they all come back? At this moment, my most earnest hope is that our losses may be small.

Within an hour, all the planes were brought aboard. We had lost only 29 planes. It was an incredibly small number when compared with our glorious battle results; nevertheless, when their heroic end was announced, the hearts of the crew were filled with sorrow for these men, and for the fate of our special submarines(1)

(1) TOKUSHU SENKOTEI 特種潜行艇

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Suddenly the anti-aircraft defense signal was sounded. An enemy plane, above the clouds, was insolently following in the trail of our aircraft. Intending to shoot it down with one blast from our ship, we manned our battle stations, but in a moment the enemy got away.

It was also reported that the enemy fleet was on our trail; but this was only a false alarm, and all the ships withdrew towards O point.

Thus, having inflicted upon America a loss which cannot be wiped out in a lifetime, we finally set out upon our homeward journey.

On the way, the 2nd ~~Airfleet~~ Cardiv and the 8th ~~CarDiv~~ Cardiv were detached and headed for WAKE Island as an attack force.

On a morning near the end of the year -- 25 December -- we entered the harbor at KURE, which we had long been yearning to see again.

On thinking back, it was a long journey. The heroic men who took part in it, the public excitement at home of which we learned by radio, and the wild waves of the stormy North Pacific, are all etched upon my heart like a vivid dream.

Ah, memorable day - 8 December 1941!

(This concludes my recollections of the

HAWAII Operation)

(NEW GUINEA) RABAUL Operations

I had but a short while, but nevertheless I celebrated a victorious New Year's Day in the homeland and enjoyed to the fullest the taste of my native land. Leaving KURE behind, I set out on the long sea voyage to my second field of operations in the South Seas - to that southern land which I had longed for and dreamed of since my childhood. I stood at my lookout station watching while seas of dancing silver and gold waves and naked natives dancing in the shadow of coconut trees floated before my eyes. At length the fleet passed TAIWAN and entered the Tropical Zone. At TRUK, the land of eternal summer, we changed to our tropical uniforms.

The bright sun sent out blazing rays and it was steaming hot inside the ship. This completely dissipated my cherished illusions about the tropics. Even so, the squalls which occasionally assailed us, accompanied as they were with cool winds and rain, ameliorated the heat. Then at night the gentle evening breeze, blowing drowsily, gave delicious coolness to my hot body. Looking heavenward, stars like scattered gold and silver twinkled here and there in the evening sky. The Southern Cross, which I was seeing for the first time, glittered there among them.

The nights in the South Seas roused vague feelings of longing for home. Giving consolation for our inadequacies, the rippling waves broke against the side of the boat like sparkling scatterings of beautiful pure silver. The South Sea vegetation grew luxuriantly directly down to the beating waves and its beautiful contours were reflected on the surface of the sea. Adding the moon to this, the mid-day heat seemed a dream.

We stopped here for a certain number of days, then when the supplying was completed, finally turned toward the RABAUL theater of operations and went forth to the attack. The gun shields were put up, and lookouts posted as usual.

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Since leaving KURE Harbor, how many times have I longed for a peaceful sleep in a hammock! Exhausted by work during the day, at night I lay among the machine guns on the upper deck, never closing my watchful eyes for an instant. Are the men on the homefront really aware of these hardships?

Finally, on 20 January, we launched our planes from a point 200 miles north of RABAUL and NEW GUINEA. From that time until the 24th, when army units and landing forces carried out a bold landing in the face of the enemy, we sailed back and forth across the equator, moving northward during the day and southward at night. We bombed every day at dawn for about 10 times. Our beloved plane, the ABUKUMA(1) also took part in the bombing, receiving its baptism of fire. We did not see the enemy in this operation. Bitterly disappointed at this, we returned once again to TRUK.

Port DARWIN Operations

On 1 February we received word of the appearance of an enemy striking force on the east end of the MARSHALL Islands. Our striking force, under orders to take and exterminate this enemy immediately, headed straight for the MARSHALL Islands.

However, the hour arrived and the enemy was nowhere about, so there was nothing to do but to sail for the next field of operations, namely PALAU, where we were to carry out joint operations with the Southern Force.

PALAU Island boasts of being the most civilized among the various South Sea Islands. The South Sea Islands Government Office is located here, and both the buildings and the inhabitants are civilized in comparison with TRUK and other islands.

With its stores, perks, shrines, APAI(2), elementary schools, and in the military line the Air Group, Stores Department, etc., it reminded me of country towns at home.

Here I approached two native girls and in exchanging conversation with them on various subjects was amazed at their skill in Japanese, at their simplicity and naivety, and at the intelligence of their profiles.

On a certain day here we were sent out to destroy PORT DARWIN, an important port on the extreme northern tip of hostile AUSTRALIA. The planes took off as in the previous battle from a point 200 miles away, and inflicted tremendous damage on the port.

Our striking force next had to prepare for the JAVA Operations in the Indian Ocean. Giving chase to an enemy submarine, we sailed into STARING BAY in the Dutch-held CELEBES, which were now under occupation by our paratroop forces and landing forces.

Indian Ocean (JAVA) Operations

England and America's ambitious 100-year-old dream of advancing into the South Seas and the Orient was finally shaken to its foundations as defeat followed defeat. In spite of the fact that they were taking their deathbed gasp; still stubborn, they despatched the

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(1) ABUKUMA 阿武隈

(2) APAI アパイ unidentified.

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Combined British, Dutch and American Fleet, which now had no capital ships, and continued their throes in the JAVA area, their last defense. Our striking force, which was to help this enemy across its last river, acting in close cooperation with other South Sea forces, weighed anchor in STARING BAY on 25 February and was on its way to the salty Indian Ocean.

The fleet, keeping a strict anti-submarine patrol in the sea areas where enemy submarines navigate, advanced between the islands which intersperse the OMBAI Straits.

These waters, ripple-free as flowing oil, reminded me of the Inland Sea...(T.N. Remainder of sentence illegible)

Words at such a time fail to express what I feel. Wild ducks flying together, clouds floating majestically, a great school of dolphins -- the very picture of peace. Could it be that a bloody war was being fought on such a sea? It is not surprising that we felt a sense of wonder.

Finally the fleet made its splendid appearance in the Indian Ocean. A few hours later the 4th Cruiser Division(1) separated from the force as a detached force and left for an undisclosed destination. The remainder, 4 aircraft carriers, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and several destroyers arrived in the vicinity of CHRISTMAS ISLAND to try to sink the enemy's fleet. We received reports from the Air Fleet 11 that one enemy carrier and one destroyer were trying to make port at CHRISTMAS ISLAND. We approached this island and sent up a reconnaissance plane, but it was not able finally to locate any trace of them. No doubt the swiftly retreating enemy had learned of our approach, and had escaped under cover of night.

Grumbling over our ill luck in being again cheated out of an engagement, we changed our course and formation and headed for a supply base. Suddenly the alarm was given to man our battle stations. Wondering what had happened, we leaped to our battle stations and saw to our right a cloud of black smoke rising on the distant horizon. The big guns of the TONE(2) opened fire, belching black smoke. The destroyers up ahead also began firing.

Soon the enemy merchant ship broke into flames, and in a few minutes sank to the depths of the Indian Ocean.

From this first bombardment by our striking force, I was able to realize something of the difficulties of artillery warfare; I was surprised to learn that we had fired several hundred shells at a single merchant vessel. Several hours later we were again ordered to man our battle stations. As we took up our posts, full of fighting spirit, the big guns of the TONE in the rear were already firing and shortly thereafter the HIEI(3) also opened fire.

Finally we sighted the two enemy cruisers which were following astern. They at once made a quick 180° turn and fled into the clouds and mist.

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(1) 四戰隊

(2) 利根

(3) 比叡

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Apparently it was considered too much trouble to finish them off with artillery fire; so our Sea Eagles rose with one flap of their wings from the decks of the carriers. In a few moments they sent the enemy to the bottom and came triumphantly back. In a short time the TONE rescued members of the enemy crew from the same ship and returned to its group. In the meantime the destroyer AKIAKE(1) came back with 27 crewmen and other persons from the merchant ship which had previously been sunk.

We, who had not fired a single shot while we watched the artillery fight of the other ships, grieved with vexation beyond description, staring at the sky. In the meantime, off the coast of SOERABAJA and BATAVIA, our destroyer squadrons opened a day and night battle, and brilliant battle results followed in quick succession.

The enemy must have escaped somehow to Australia; not one of them was caught in our net. Finally, as a last resort, we carried out a great bombing attack on a large group of transports that were entering the harbor of EJILATJAP.

About that time the weather began to get worse, belying the reputation of the Indian Ocean as the most peaceful of the seven seas. The wind velocity increased to 20 meters per second, and the ships rolled with a 20-degree list to port and starboard. Finally we gave up taking on oil from alongside and began to take it stern on because of the heavy seas.

Afterwards in the midst of the rough weather, our force resumed its ceaseless reconnaissance, moving east and west in irregular movements in search of the enemy. At that time the statements of the survivors picked up by the TONE were made public.

These men knew nothing of the movements of their own fleet; they did not even know that HAWAII had been attacked. They seemed to believe that our fleet was concentrated only in the CELEBES. From this we could see how America was concealing her crushing defeats in a desperate attempt to prevent a decline in morale.

England and America, sacred countries of disguise, now your last time has come. Enemy of mankind, evil spirit of peace, the harsh blow of heaven has fallen against you.

Heaven will by no means forgive you, who for your own profit have planned an unscrupulous attack on Japan, the nation of righteousness, and on the Oriental people - you, who are trying to subjugate the world and to make the world a paradise for the white race!

Among the races who have been exploited up till now by the English and Americans are the Indians, the Malayans, the Chinese, the Burmese, and countless other ignorant races whom civilization has bypassed. They have become the victims of the characteristic English-American policy of "squeeze and take", while the latter line their purses and nurture their overweening ambition.

They cause GANDHI to cry out for the independence of India and far away they carry on an opium war in the Republic of China.

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(1) 有明

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All this is a cry from the heart of the splendid peoples of the Orient who are trying to escape the pressure which is being brought upon them by England and America.

However, now the blood of the Oriental peoples has returned to the original cherished desire of the Orientals and has been embraced by them. Their feelings are shown by the fact that they have pledged their mutual cooperation and assistance for the great undertaking of Japan, the leading power of the Orient.

Japan, who, as the leader of the Orient has opposed the powerful countries of England and America, really loves Asia and is laboring for the peace of mankind.

Our task group was now passing in the vicinity of ADMIRALTY BAY and on the eleventh we were scheduled to enter the port of KENDARI.

Although scarcely two months had passed since we left the homeland, it seemed like two years.

In the Indian Ocean, where once the German ship EMDEN played a spectacular part in the destruction of trade, there is now not a shadow of the enemy, and an uncanny silence pervades the surface of the sea where there is a faint reflection of the moon.

~~Operations in~~ the Indian Ocean (CEYLON)

With regard to the attack on CEYLON, which must grace the final pages of the history of our striking force, every possible preparation for battle had been completed during the 15 days when we lay at anchor in STARING BAY. Actually it was at the very crack of dawn on 26 March 1942 when once again it sallied forth into the fleecy-capped waves of the Indian Ocean. We saw, just as we did in the Java operation, the porpoises playing near the ocean's surface, as if the quiet, gently-lapping waves of OMBAI Straits were lulling them to sleep.

There is a saying that the Indian Ocean has mountainous waves and that it is the ocean of the devil. But the Indian Ocean, shining before our eyes, was like an extremely quiet bay or a gently-rocking cradle.

Sailing around from place to place like this, a mundanè feeling touched me. I was reminded of the days when I was a young bachelor with my pay envelope containing my monthly 50 ¥ converted into pure happiness, when I was swaggering through the street shops with an air of independence showing on my pimply face.

While I was waiting, so tense with excitement was I that I might easily have sold my dearest possession at bargain prices. As the saying goes, my duties were like heavy weights on my shoulders.

We continued to sail swiftly and uneventfully, loading oil from time to time, standing watch, and keeping anti-submarine lookout. What strength there is in being with speedy airplanes!

At daybreak of the day before the attack, 4 April 1942, 400 miles from CEYLON, an enemy Consolidated Flying Boat ~~met us.~~ The bugle stirringly sounded "aerial attack" and the entire crew took up their posts.

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Happy day! My blood ran fast and my flesh tingled as the enemy planes for which I had been waiting since the outbreak of the war appeared 30° off the port side. The shells were bursting in the air. It was more stirring than I had imagined it would be. The enemy tried to hide himself, using the white clouds as a smoke screen, but to no avail; our ships' fire sought him out, and after a few minutes of aerial warfare he came crashing down, trailing a long tail of smoke against the sky. Ah! They have exhausted all their secret methods! What feelings the enemy must have experienced during those few minutes! What a lamentable way to spend one's last few moments of life!

Early on 5 April, for which we had been waiting, our force reached a point 200 miles south of CEYLON. The weather was excellent for good aerial bombardment.

Before daybreak, a huge formation of planes set out for the enemy's last stronghold, COLOMBO in CEYLON. This attack was timed to take place just at the time of an Anglo-Indian conference. Piercing the morning haze like impetuous falcons, the planes soon disappeared from sight.

In less than an hour we received our first reports. According to these, we obtained brilliant results from aerial attacks on an enemy escorted convoy, on ground installations and airfields, and on an enemy plane on patrol duty. The planes returned to the ships safely.

Meanwhile, shipborne reconnaissance seaplanes went out to search for the enemy, looking to the west and to the south for ships and small craft. Presently, we received a wireless message from a plane of the 8th Cruiser Division to the effect that one carrier and one destroyer had been sighted. A carrier bomber unit was despatched instantly and sank them immediately. (Two enemy cruisers were mistaken for a carrier and destroyer).

The force, going outside its patrol radius, sailed north and then south in irregular movements.

Finally, after our supplying was completed, we turned to our next field of attack, TRINCOMALEE.

We launched the attack from a point 200 miles to the east at dawn on 9 April, in fine weather. Inasmuch as our large flying boats had been shooting down enemy craft for some time, we thought it likely that the enemy was expecting an attack on this occasion. However, our bold and intrepid fliers will turn the tables on the English by using their own strategy of crushing the enemy with a single blow. When we see the enemy, we will shoot him down without fail. The enemy faces the grim prospect of certain death.

The enemy's military installations at TRINCOMALEE were bombed until there were none remaining. Furthermore, our fleet dispatched its reserve forces and in the work of a moment sank the aircraft carrier HERMES and a destroyer which were cruising in neighboring waters. We seemed to be inspired with superhuman powers.

At this point, an enemy heavy bomber unit consisting of 9 planes audaciously attacked our force; but because the bombs fell from an altitude of 6000 meters, they did no more harm than startling the fish in the sea. Our 25 mm. machine guns pursued the planes above the ships and spurting fire in unison, brought down seven of them. This one battle certainly proved how weak the fighting capacity of enemy planes is.

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The face of the braggart Churchill who before the war disdained and scorned Japan, and the face of the miserable Churchill who now stumbles straight to defeat, would bear resemblance to the face of an actor who plays a double role of sorrow and glee.

The striking force in the BAY OF BENGAL and our force hailed each other; the BAY OF BENGAL force said it had been carrying on operations for five days and had obtained great results.

The English sun of military power in India, having finally lost its last vestige of defense, seemed on the point of setting.

The great British Empire has been shaken to its foundations, and its dream of world domination has been turned into a nightmare.

The passage of time has now fulfilled its purpose. Heaven has sent down its blessing upon the righteous, and crushed the wicked with an iron hand. Now this earth, which was made for the general benefit of all mankind, will be wholly transmuted into the paradise that has been the cherished hope of Eastern peoples. Japan, at the head, loudly sounds the knell of tyranny, and Japan, who leads the East to rebirth, is most fitted to bestow the blessing of the gods.

Back to our longed-for mother country! At long last we return to our home port. In frankness I admit that I shed a tear as we bade farewell to the skies of the Southern Seas. The ship, seeming to quiver with joy, passed through the beautiful MALACCA STRAITS on a northerly course.

We were on our way to our distant homeland, our hearts filled with emotion; loaded with honor, the best gift we could take to our native land was our glorious victory and our triumphal song.

Soon, as we were approaching the most northerly extremity of the PHILIPPINES, we received word by radio that an enemy task force had suddenly appeared at a point 750 miles south of Tokyo. Our force was ordered to destroy the enemy immediately. We sped to the attack at a high speed of 20 knots, intending to attack the enemy as long as our fuel held out. By an irony of fate, however, before we were able to reach this point, on the 18th of December several cities in the TOHOKU district of Japan suffered an air attack on a small scale.

We wept bitter tears and were filled with indignation; but although we continued the search for the enemy, we were unable to find him. However, it could not be helped and we followed the pre-arranged course that should have led us to the enemy, until, on the 28th, the whole fleet dispersed in home waters and we hastened to our longed-for home ports.

Friends and comrades of the striking force, for a long time we have suffered and been happy together: together we have rendered a great service to our country. Now the time has come for us to part; but, sooner or later, the day will come when we shall be together again. Until then, enjoy yourselves and be happy! While my heart is grieved at this sad parting, I shall try to write a few lines of feeble verse.

(T.N. The "few lines of feeble verse" (eight pages) have been omitted)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #8
(TRANSLATION OF THREE CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENTS )
ENTITLED
(A)
"JAPANESE SUBMARINE SCHOOL NOTES
CONCERNING
EARLY WAR EXPERIENCES OFF HAWAII"
(same as SOURCE DOCUMENT #5, SUPRA)
(B)
"JAPANESE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE YATSUMAKI BUTAI"
(C)
"JAPANESE PLACES OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE IN THE KURILE ISLANDS"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

INTELLIGENCE CENTER, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
NAVY NUMBER 128 (ONE TWO EIGHT)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francieco, California

FE

ML/jfm

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L11-1/BF37

30 June 1943 Serial AS-300921 Defense

From: Officer in Charge.
To: Distribution List Contained in Paragraph 2.

Subj: ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No. 472 - "Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences Off Hawaii."

ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No. 473 - "Instructions to the Yatsumaki Butai."

ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No. 474 - "Places of Military Importance in the Kurile Islands."

1. The enclosures forwarded herewith need not be reported and when no longer of value should be destroyed. No report of destruction is required.

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1. Subject translations
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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

CAPTURED DOCUMENTS - TRANSLATED BY ICPOA

Original Item #____, ICPOA Item # 472 Transl. by ICPOA Date 10 June 1943

Title of Publication SUBMARINE SCHOOL NOTES CONCERNING EARLY WAR EXPERIENCES OFF HAWAII

IN CASE OF DIARY, RECORD, LOG, etc., GIVE WRITER'S

Organization_____

Initial Date_____ Final Date_____

Jan. 12, 1941 Instructor Maeshima

It is needless to state that combat education in this current emergency is of great necessity, and it is extremely regrettable that there has been no opportunity to gather sufficient material before the graduation of the 11th. period special course students. Since, however, some materials in the category of combat instructions has been obtained with the arrival in port of submarines I-16 and I-68 recently, it has been decided to immediately mimeograph and distribute it as study material to this period's special course students. Although it is difficult to guarantee that among the items heard directly there are no points of difference with actual facts, it is believed that there are no great errors in the instructions obtained.

(1)

(2) CONFIDENTIAL

NO. 1. TACTICS

1. Use of submarine carried planes.

A. After the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8, the submarine I-7 received an order to carry out an aerial reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor when the opportunity presented. Although she attempted to send off a plane from the neighborhood of Niihau, it was impossible to do so due to the weather. Hence she proceeded southward until in the neighborhood of Hawaii and carried out the aerial reconnaissance.

B. When on picket station, it may be possible, depending on the weather, the enemy's alert condition, terrain and other conditions, to send off the planes carried from a certain area, but it may be impossible to do so from another area. Consequently, besides the necessity of deploying airplane carrying submarines, there is also the necessity of deploying many airplane carring submarines.

Since urgent execution of the above mentioned reconnaissance was not necessary, we suffered no great disadvantage, but it would be of great disadvantage, when urgency of execution is required.

2. Movement against enemy depth charges.

A. Since America's depth charge setting, for the most part, has been definitely ascertained to be in the neighborhood of 35 meters by previous investigations, submarines attached to the Sixth Fleet have evaded them at depths of 50 to 70 meters. (Some subs have evaded them at a depth of 100 meters). In the case of the I-16 (70 meters depth), she received three charges directly over her, but suffered no damage. (Judging from the opinion that the bursting charge of America's depth charges appeared to be feeble, it is doubtful as to whether the charges were directly overhead.)

B. When the safe submerging depth is thought to be about 20 meters more than the supposed depth setting of depth charges, it is deemed best to assume as far as possible a position of 20 meters or more below the depth charge's depth setting.

If not, it is deemed best to assume a position up high, but impossible to be detected, and as far above as possible from the supposed depth setting of the depth charge

(A) The I68 primarily used sound listening patrol [choon shokai 聽音哨戒] 了

(2)

to prevent any decrease in the efficiency of the listening gear, the following method was used and no uneasiness was felt because of the sound listening patrol.

3. Observation patrol.

A. (1) Slowest speed used.

(2) Ventilation stopped.

(3) In steering, mechanical power was used only for the diving rudder, while the rest was all man power.

(4) Although it was stipulated in the operational order that batteries should be charged at night at the outer edge of the patrol zone (about 10 nautical miles from harbor entrance), it was impossible to do so. Hence, batteries were charged at a distance of 40 nautical miles from the harbor entrance and after that we returned to the patrol zone.

B. At night, when picketing by enemy patrol vessels is to be expected, it is deemed best to increase the depth of the patrol zone.

4. Patrol method of American destroyers.

A. It seems as if American destroyers are equipped with accurate and good sound detectors and they, for the most part, are executing stationary or slow speed patrol.

B. Even when an American destroyer is stationary, be on guard.

NO. 2, COMBAT DUTY

1. Identification method of friendly units when returning to friendly harbor.

A. The method carried out by I-16 is as follows:

(1) Hoisted a "Breadth Four" Ensign at the tip of the periscope.

(2) Spread a "Breadth Four" Ensign on the ladder to the bridge.

(3) Notified the time of its arrival within the 300 nautical mile arc, its position and course one or two days previously to the home combat force 「内戰部隊」

When returning to an advanced base, [we] took the system of having the commandant of the advance base force indicate the point of passage into the 300 nautical mile arc.

B. There is an example of submarine I-68 being attacked with depth charges by a friendly destroyer when leaving an advanced base. Closest attention should be paid to the identification of friendly units when entering and leaving a friendly harbor and to being alert.

(4) CONFIDENTIAL

No. 3. NAVIGATION, WEATHER AND SEA CONDITION

1. Onshore Current.

A. The onshore current in the area of Barber's Point, Oahu, is very strong. Since submarine I-68 paid little attention to this, she sighted the breakers of Barber's Point reef at a very close distance when she raised her periscope up to observe, but she was able to prevent anything from happening by turning immediately.

B. When stationed on observation on the front line, it is necessary to take into proper consideration the onshore current when close to the shore.

NO. 4. MANEUVERING FOR ATTACK

1. Protracted submerged navigation.

A. (1) In regard to submarine I-68, the number of days of submerged navigation was 30 for an average of 14 hours per day. Air purifier chemicals were used only once (20 pieces) and the cooler was not used.

(2) Although $CO^2$ reached 4.6%, $O^2$ reached 16% and the temperature reached 32°C., there seemed to be no great effect upon the men.

(3) Other than being used once when her submerged navigation continued for 36 hours, submarine I-16 did not use the air purifier. Just as in the above case, there seemed to be practically no effect upon the men.

B. (1) Although there is need for the use of air purifiers in a submerged navigation of about 14 hours, there is still a necessity for the gathering of more data for further study.

(2) It is necessary to accelerate the completion of the study "Washing purifier" 「洗浄式」 type air purifying method.

2. Waves in the Hawaiian Area.

A. During the operations of submarines of the Sixth Fleet in the Hawaiian area, waves were high every day and it has been reported that submarine I-16 found it difficult to maintain her depth even at the depth of about 18 meters and had to use her standard speed many times.

Besides, there appeared to be two or three submarines that revealed their conning tower in the presence of the enemy.

B. It is necessary to maintain the accuracy of the sound detector excellently in order to do away with any uneasiness in sound detection patrol.

Also, considering this, the periscope should be made as long as possible.

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(5)

NO. 5. COMMUNICATION

1. Underwater wireless reception ability.

A. According to the experiences of the I-16, it is reported that sensitivity is 4 at a depth of 18 meters and 3 at 20 meters in the Hawaiian area. (Sending station USAMI)

/NO. 6. (IS MISSING)/

NO. 7. HULL

1. Change in working of the machine guns during operations.

A. When I-16 test fired her machine guns without taking the trouble of cleaning, after conducting operations for 30 days, of which 20 days were spent in submerged navigation, one machine gun fired without any trouble, while the other fired only one shot.

2. Damages caused by depth charge attack.

A. While observing in Hawaiian area, submarine I-68 was depth charged. Of about 100 depth charges dropped, 12 exploded within 200 meters and 2 exploded directly above. The depth charge setting was within 35 meters and the sub's depth 45 meters. The damage suffered from this attack, for the most part was as follows:

(1) Of the 172 electric lights, 75 were amaged. (Those that were not lighted were not damaged).

(2) Small amount of leakage from the forward door(s) of the torpedo tube(s).

(3) Two depth indicators began to function incorrectly.

(4) Sensitivity of sound detector became bad.

(5) Became impossible to use the transmitter of the echo range depth finder.

(6) Leakage in the high pressure air valve group and air pressure within ship increased greatly.

(7) Leakage in the Kingston valve of the negative buoyancy tank increased.

(8) Due to the damage to the 50 volt power supply, the rudder order telegraph went out. Because of this, the helmsman mistakenly thought that the rudder had been damaged.

(9) The accuracy of the (---?---) ammeter decreased.

(10) Leakage from the corroded tube(s) of number 1 cooler.

(11) Considerable leakage from the "constant use" and reserve fuel tanks.

B. (1) Disassemble the damaged depth indicator and remove the sea water between the #1 and #2 beaks [ 嘴 ]

(2) To have turned off as many electric lights as possible.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

CAPTURED DOCUMENTS - TRANSLATED BY ICPOA

Original Item #____, ICPOA Item #473 Transl. by ICPOA Date 6 June 1943

Title of Publication INSTRUCTIONS TO THE YATSUMAKI BUTAI

Originator_____

IN CASE OF DIARY, RECORD, LOG, etc., GIVE WRITER'S

Organization_____

Initial Date 14 October 1942 Final Date_____

The following translation was made from a document recovered from a two-man submarine raised May 7, 1943, by the salvage ship, USS ORTOLAN, under the Command of Lt. Commander A.A. Holland. The sub was located in Visale Bay, N.M. GUADALCANAL. The submarine w s raised, but on account of a storm, broke loose and sank again.

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October 14, 1942 At Sea

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE YATSUMAKI BUTAI

1. On the evening of the 14th. after 2300 the midget subs will be launched West of Savo Island.
2. Each unit will accomplish its mission according to the plan.
3. In order to avoid confusion with the 8th Fleet and the Transport Group tonight, you will proceed submerged at a great depth until 0300 on the 15th.
4. Midget submarines which have fired torpedoes and/or which have insufficient battery power remaining will proceed immediately to the shores of friendly places, if possible, to KAMBO.
5. As there is at present no information for the evaluation of the true worth of the midget submarine, it is expected that each man will, both in the attack and the withdrawal, exert his every effort, and in this way (do his part) in supplying this information.
6. Be confident in the August Virtue of His Majesty, in Providential Assistance, and in your ability which you have constantly developed.

Go forth undaunted.

"Heaven helps those who help themselves".

End.

Commanding Officer of the CHIYODA,

HARADA, SATORU (AKIRA?).

CONFIDENTIAL

CAPTURED DOCUMENTS - TRANSLATED BY ICPOA

Original Item # _____, ICPOA Item # 474 Transl. by ICPOA Date June 11, 43

Title of Publication PLACES OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE IN THE KURILE ISLANDS

Originator Technician of the Fisheries Experimental Station

IN CASE OF DIARY, RECORD, LOG, etc., GIVE WRITER'S

Orginization _____

Initial Date _____ Final Date _____

TRANSLATOR'S FOREWORD

The following is a revised translation of a Japanese document captured in the recent ATTU operations. The original translation was made by the Advanced Intelligence Center, North Pacific Area. The ICPOA Revision includes the following points:

1. Addition of positions ( in latitude and longitude) of all geographical points mentioned in the original document.
2. The pronunciations for all geographical points in the following revised translation , are the pronunciations listed in Index of Japanese Place Names, Appearing in Japanese Hydrographic Publications, prepared by Intelligence Section, CinC Pacific Fleet, 1942.
3. Explanatory notes have been added.
4. Minor errors in the original translation have been corrected.

There is disagreement concerning the proper pronunciation of many placenames in the Kurile Islands, even in Japanese reference materials. For the sake of uniformity, and because it is thought to be the most accurate source, the CinCPAC Index has been used to asdertain the correct pronunciation for the place names included in the following translation. The CinPACc Index contains every geographical point mentioned in the following translation with one exception. This exception is GYŪKAKU, 47°09'N. 152°18'E., on SHIMUSHIRU Island. The translators have ascertained the position of GYŪKAKU with the help of "Japanese Naval Air Chart," NO.11 ( War Department Map Collection Office reproduction).

Any material in the following which is not a direct translation from the original document is indicated by brackets and the abbreviation "T.N.", meaning "translator's note."

CONFIDENTIAL

PLACES OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE IN THE KURILE ISLANDS

Notes by a technician of the Fisheries Experimental Station

AKATSUKI 6174 Force

INFORMATION BULLETIN

1. This publication contains statements by a technician of the HOKKAIDŌ Government.

2. By Mr. _____

Time: 1935 - 1940

Season: June to August

Place: Kurile Islands [T.N. - Chishima Islands]

A general investigation of aquatic fauna has been made (salmon, salmon-trout, shark, shellfish).

The vessel used was a 26.76 ton, 60 HP, semi-diesel.

PROTECTED HARBORS IN THE KURILE ISLANDS

1. The Kuriles:

The Kurile Islands are divided into the Southern Kuriles, Central Kuriles, and Northern Kuriles.

A. Southern Kuriles: KUNISHIRI Island [T.N. KUNASHIRI Island 44°16' N, 146°00' E.], ETOROFU Island [T.N. 45°04' N., 147°48' E.]. (These are populated.)

B. Central Kuriles: URUPPU Island [T.N. 45°56' N., 150°00' E.], CHIRIHOI Islands [T.N. North CHIRIHOI, 46°32' N., 150°53' E.; South CHIRIHOI, 46°28' N., 150°49' E.], SHINCHI Island [T.N. SHIMUSHIRU Island, 46°58' N., 152°02' E.], KEITOI Island [T.N. KETOI Island, 47°20' N., 152°30' E.] USHISHIRU Island [T.N. 47°32' N, 152°49' E.], RASHŌWA Island [T.N. RASHŌWA Island, 47°45' N., 153°01' E.], MATSUWA Island [T.N. 48°05' N. 153°13' E.], SHASHIKOTAN Island [T.N. SHASUKOTAN Island 48°49' N., 154°06' E.], HARUMEKOTAN Island [T.N. 49°07' N., 154°31' E.], ONNEKOTAN Island [T.N. ONEKOTAN Island, 49°25' N., 154°45' E.].

C. Northern Kuriles: HOROMUSHIRO Island [T.N. PARAMUSHIRU ISLAND, 50°20' N. 155°50' E.], SHUMUSHU Island [T.N. SHIMUSHU Island. 50°45' N., 156°20' E.], ARAITO Island, [T.N. ARAIDO Island, 50°52' N., 155°34' E.], (Populated during the summer for fishing.)

(3) CONFIDENTIAL

2. Animals to be Found in the Kuriles

Walrus, sea-otters, and seals are native. Foxes are bred by the Department of Agriculture and Forestry only in the Central Kuriles. Near the shore, ABUTAMI, SOMI [T.N. Translation for these fish unknown], salmon and salmon-trout (returning up the rivers) and BOTAN Shrimp are found. Cod and TARABA Crabs are to be found off-shore.

3. Plants to be Found in the Kuriles:

There are forests as far north as URUPPU Island; but on the islands north of CHIRIHOI Island, only creeping pines and black alders, no taller than 6 feet, and weeds exist. There is a type of sea-weed known as KAIROPPA, about 15 meters in length, which has its leaf sections floating on the surface. Also there is sea-weed and sea-moss. [T.N. The Japanese term NORI has been translated as "sea-moss". NORI, or ASAKUSA NORI, is an ediblo red sea-weed. Its leaves are about 10 cm. wide and 20 cm. long. It grows best in winter. The weed is made into dried NORI, and is largely cultivated in estuaries where the water is brackish. It grows on sticks which are stuck into the sand at low tide. The mature leaves are dried. Yearly production of NORI is valuod at 15,000,000 YEN, ranking next after sardines and herring as a fisheries product.]

4. Sea Routes from OTARU [T.N. Position of port is 43°12' N., 141°01' E.], HOKKAIDŌ to the Northern Kuriles.

A. OTARU to the SŌYA Straits [T.N. 45°45' N., 142°00' E.]; heading in a southerly direction along KITAMI Coast [T.N. The area known as the KITAMI Coast extends along the northern coast of HOKKAIDŌ from about 142°10' E. to 145°23'E.]; going from ABASHIRI [T.N. 44°01' N., 144°17'E.] toward IKABANOTSU Point [T.N. 45°26'N., 147°56' E..] on ETOROFU Island; heading in a Northerly direction along the archipelago; passing through the ONEKOTAN Channel [T.N. 49°50' N., 155°05' E.]; and coming out on the Pacific side. Distance: 860 nautical miles.

B. OTARU to SŌYA Straits and direct to the Northern Kuriles. Distance: 800 nautical miles.

5. Protected Harbors.

Harbors suitable for small vessels ("*" indicates harbors suitable for large vessels also).

(1) ETOROFU Island:

* SHANA area: [T.N. Position of port of SHANA is 45°14' N., 147°53'E.]

Offers good shelter even from north-westerly winds. There is a waterfall suitable for drinking water purposes. There is a salmon-trout canning factory. Practical Importance: It is a natural harbor; there are fishing establishments.

Remarks: On the Pacific shore, there is the harbor of HITOKAPPU [T.N. 44°58' N., 147°41'E.] which is suitable for large vessels.

(2) URUPPU Island:

FUTAGOSHIMA [T.N. Small island near S.W. tip of URUPPU, position of island is 45°38' N., 149°27' E.]: There are shoals between FUTAGOSHIMA and URUPPU which reduce the force of the breakers. There is no water suitable for drinking.

* MISHIMA Bay [T.N. 46°14' N., 150°20' E.]; a sheltered harbor with a sandy bottom. Water from the KAIMEN River [T.N. 46°13' N., 150° 20' E. (position of mouth)] is suitable for drinking. Salmon and Salmon-trout ascend the KAIMEN River in the fall.

Remarks: KOBUNE Bay [T.N. Position of KOBUNE port is 45°56' N., 150°12' E.] is on the Pacific side. Off the mouth of the Bay, is TOGARI IWA, 28 meters high, which serves as a good landmark for entering the Bay. [T.N. TOGARI IWA is a pointed rock, 45°55' N., 150° 12' E.]. There is water suitable for drinking.

(3) CHIRIHOI Islands:

* SURA Bay [T.N. 46°32' N., 150°56' E.] on Northern CHIRIHOI Island. Has sandy bottom. No drinking water.

(4) SHIMUSHIRU Island:

SHIMUSHIRU Bay [T.N. 46°52' N., 151° 51'E.]: It is not a good harbor, but has a sandy bottom. Nearby is UMEURA [T.N. probably an inlet; position is 46°52' N., 151°48' E.] where there is drinking water. BUROTON Bay [T.N. 47°09'N., 152°13' E.]: A harbor suitable for small ships. Water has entered the crater; and the depth of the water and quality of the bottom is suitable for mooring in the area on the eastern side of a line running from the mouth of the bay to the Agriculture and Forestry Department's fox farm.

The mouth of the bay is narrow and shallow, and therefore it is easier to enter the harbor by having small boats indicate the shallowest areas, and having the ship pass in between them.

(5) CONFIDENTIAL

* GYŪKAKU [T.N. Pronunciation not confirmed. Position is 47°09' N., 152°18' E.; Do not confuse with GYŪKAKU on PARAMUSHIRU Island.]: Although the bottom is not good, it offers good shelter from N.W. winds. There is a road connecting with BUROTON Bay.

(5) MATSUWA Island

There is shelter between YAMATO Bay [T.N. 48°05' N., 153°16' E.] and BANJŌ Island [T.N. 43°05' N., 153°17' E.]. Although the bottom is rocky, the area is bounded by the two islands, and the wind and waves can be avoided. Drinking water is available. There is a naval air-field.

(6) SHASUKOTAN Island:

OTOME Bay [T.N. 48°48' N., 154°04' E.]. A semicircular bay with sandy bottom. It is not a good harbor because of the wide mouth. Drinking water is available.

(7) ONEKOTAN Island:

KEMO Bay [T.N. 49°37' N., 154°49' E.]: It is not a good harbor, but is suitable as shelter from south-easterly winds. There is drinking water. In respect to the north-westerly winds, the Pacific side is of value.

KUROISHI Bay [T.N. 49°26' N., 154°49' E.]: Since KUROISHI Bay is on the Pacific side, it is of value when prevailing winds are from the west.

(8) PARAMUSHIRU Island:

KAKUMAESTSU [T.N. Position of port is 50°22' N., 155°36' W.]: There are harbor facilities and a fine breakwater.

PARAMUSHIRU Straits [T.N. 50°43' N., 156°10' E.] are the straits between PARAMUSHIRU and SHIMUSHU Islands, and constitute the most valuable area in the Northern Kuriles. KATAOKA Bay [T.N. 50°44' N., 156°11' E.], MURAKAMI Bay [T.N. 50°44' N., 156°09' E.], KASHIWABARA Bay [T.N. 50°41' N., 156°09' E.] and canning factories are located along the straits. There are turbot [T.N. flatfish] in KASHIWABARA Bay. The fishing industry flourishes on PARAMUSHIRU and SHIMUSHU during the summer, and fishery installations are located at various points along the seacoast.

KATAOKA Bay is a naval base and KASHIWABARA Bay is an army base.

[T.N. The original document was not classified]*

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #9
(TRANSLATION OF A CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT
DEALING WITH EVENTS IN THE JAPANESE WAR
COMMENCING THREE WEEKS BEFORE THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
AND CONTINUING THROUGH MANY JAPANESE-UNITED STATES ACTIONS
INCLUDING THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR,
GUAM, WAKE ISLAND, THE BISMARCK SEA OPERATIONS, RABAUL,
THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA, THE FIRST, SECOND AND
THIRD SEA BATTLES OF THE SOLOMONS ISLANDS,
THE JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS IN ATTU AND KISKA ISLANDS
IN THE ALEUTIANS, ETC., TO 20 SEPTEMBER 1943)
ENTITLED
"PROFESSIONAL NOTEBOOK OF AN ENSIGN IN THE JAPANESE NAVY"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPLILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
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Source: Captured TARAWA 24 November 1943.

1. Subject translation, forwarded herewith, need not be reported and when no longer of value should be destroyed. No report of destruction is necessary.

M. LEGENDRE,
By direction.

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TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENT

Captured TARAWA 24 November 1943

Received JICPOA 6 December 1943

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TRANSLATOR'S FOREWORD

JICPOA Items #4986 and #4986-A represent a complete translation of the professional notebook of Ensign NAKAMURA, Toshio (中村敏雄), IJN. Although the material in the notebook is of uneven value, it was felt that a complete translation would be of interest inasmuch as it represents the activities of an officer from the time he first boarded ship until shortly before the GILBERTS operation.

Part of the material in the book seems to have been examined by some higher ranking officer, and, in some cases, the notation "Not Permitted" accompanied by a series of blue pencil marks, is found over passages which were thought censorable. However, the notebook itself bears the classification "MILITARY - VERY-SECRET"(GUNGOKUHI) on the cover, which seemed protection enough to the writer of the book for including material of a highly confidential nature.

Nothing is known of the circumstances of capture of the notebook or of the fate of the writer. Since no torpedo boat unit was at TARAWA at the time of the American landing, it is entirely possible that the author escaped and is still alive.

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CHRONOLOGY OF PERSONAL HISTORY

| | |
|---|---|
| 15 November 1941 | Received commission as Passed Midshipman from the Navy Department. |
| 15 November | Received orders from the Navy Department assigning me to the KAKO (CA). Junior Division Officer, 2nd Division, and Machine Gun Fire Control Officer. |
| 1 December | Received orders from Navy Department assigning me to the AOBA (CA). Staff Officer and Look-Out Officer. |
| 1 April 1942 | Received orders from the AOBA relieving me of duties as Look-Out Officer and appointing me to Navigation Department, and as Junior Division Officer 7th Division. |
| 15 April | Received orders from the AOBA relieving me of duties to Navigation Department and as Junior Division Officer 7th Division and appointing me Coding Officer and Junior Division Officer 6th Division. |
| 25 April | Received orders from the AOBA relieving me of duties as Coding Officer and appointing me Communications Officer. |
| 1 June | Commissioned Ensign by the Cabinet. |
| 1 June | Notified by the Navy Department of my assignment to the AOBA. |
| 15 July | Assignment to AOBA confirmed by Navy Department. |
| 15 August | Attached to the DesDiv 9 by the Navy Department. |
| 5 September | Notified by AOBA to leave the ship and to take up position on NOWAKI (DD). |
| 9 September | Assigned to the MINEGUMO (DD) by the Com DesDiv 9. |
| 23 September (?) | Assigned to the ASAGUMO as Navigating Officer by the Co DesDiv 9. |

DIARY

| | |
|---|---|
| 15 November 1941 | Graduated from the Naval College at ETAJIMA. Made a midshipman in the Navy. |
| November | Ordered aboard the KAKO (CA) at KURE as Junior Officer, 2nd Division and Machine Gun Fire Control Officer. |
| 19 November | KAKO entered drydock #3 at KURE. |
| 21 November | Granted leave and returned home. |
| 23 November | Returned to my ship. |
| 24 November | KAKO left drydock. |
| 25 November | KAKO left KURE; anchored in HASHIRA SHIMA Channel. |
| 26 November | Paid our respects to the Commander-in-Chief, 6th Fleet, on HASHIRA SHIMA. |
| 29 November | Left HASHIRA SHIMA Channel. |
| 2 December | Anchored at HAHA SHIMA. |
| 4 December | Ordered aboard the AOBA (CA) as lookout officer (MIHARISHI). |
| December | Left HAHA SHIMA (to assist the GUAM Occupation Force). |
| 7 December | Imperial Rescript to the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet: (rendered elsewhere).<br>The Reply of the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet: (rendered elsewhere).<br>The Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, to the Combined Fleet, (rendered elsewhere). |
| 8 December | The Emperor has proclaimed war on the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND. Imperial rescripts sent to the Ministers of the Army and Navy. Our striking force has delivered a successful surprise attack on HAWAII. |

Results:

| Sunk: | Heavily Damaged: |
|---|---|
| 1 CALIFORNIA Class BB | 1 CALIFORNIA Class BB |
| 1 MARYLAND Class BB | 1 MARYLAND Class BB |
| 1 ARIZONA Class BB | 1 NEVADA Class BB |
| 1 UTAH Class BB | 1 Cruiser |
| 1 Unidentified Ship | |
| 2 Heavy Cruisers | |
| 1 Oiler | |

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| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 8 December 1941 (continued) | Moderately Damaged:<br>1 NEVADA Class BB<br>4 Cruisers<br><br>Shot Down:<br>450 planes | Our Losses:<br>9 Fighter Planes<br>15 Bombers<br>5 Reconnaissance Planes |
| | Landings were made by our southern forces at KOTA BHARU, SINGORA, BATAAN, BANGKOK, and AMBOINA Bay; BASCO was occupied. Our troops entered the International Settlement at SHANGHAI. The British Gunboat, PENGUIN, was sunk there. A detachment of American Marines at PEKING laid down their arms. SINGAPORE, MIDWAY, WAKE, CLARK FIELD, GUAM, HONGKONG, DAVAO were bombed. | |
| 9 December | The American sea-plane carrier LANGLEY was sunk (off DAVAO). | |
| 10 December | The Emperor was overjoyed with the results of the HAWAII operation, sending another rescript to the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet.<br>Offensive and defensive alliance with THAILAND signed. WAKE attacked. The destroyers HAYATE and KISARAGI were sunk by shell-fire.<br>Landings effected at VIGAN. One sub-chaser sunk. GUAM, APARRI, MAKIN, TARAWA occupied.<br>Minesweeper #19 wrecked off the mouth of the CAGAYAN River.<br>The 11th Air Fleet participated in a naval battle of the MALAY PENINSULA. PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE sunk. | |
| 11 December | Tripartite Pact signed. WAKE attacked. Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, the recipient of another imperial rescript declaring the Emperor's pleasure over the naval battle off the MALAY PENINSULA. GERMANY and ITALY declare war on the UNITED STATES. Landings effected at LEGASPI. | |
| 12 December | Our ship, the AOBA, anchored at TRUK. | |
| 13 December | Left TRUK. | |
| December | The main naval force has arrived at HASHIRA SHIMA. | |
| 16 December | AOBA anchored at ROI. | |
| 17 December | SHINONOME (DD) wrecked 15 kms. north of BARAM Point while on patrol duty off MIRI. The RO-66 collided with the RO-62 and sank. | |
| 20 December | PANAMA, COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA, HONDURAS, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, GUATEMALA, CUBA and HAITI all declared war on our Empire. | |
| 21 December | AOBA left ROI (to assist the WAKE Occupation Force). | |
| 22 December | Landings effected at LINGAYEN. | |
| 23 December | Occupation of WAKE completed.<br>The (TW: HAWAII) Striking Force has arrived at HASHIRA SHIMA. | |
| 25 December | AOBA returned to ROI and anchored.<br>HONGKONG surrenders.<br>Landings effected at JOLO in a surprise attack.<br>Two enemy subs sunk off LINGAYEN Bay (by the destroyers ASAKAZE and SATSUKI). | |
| 26 December | KUCHING occupied. The SAGIRI (DD) sunk by an enemy torpedo. Minesweeper #6 and the #2 UNYO Maru (ARS) were bombed and sunk. The MURASAME (DD) collided with Minesweeper #20 at TAKAO. MANILA bombed. One enemy destroyer, two subs, and ten merchantmen sunk. The ASAKAZE sank a sub off LINGAYEN. | |
| 27 December | The American Army commander in the PHILIPPINES declared MANILA an open city. MANILA was bombed and ten merchantmen sunk. The NOJIMA (AF) was torpedoed and ran aground. | |
| 29 December | The RO-60 ran aground south of ROI. | |
| 31 December | The YAMAGUMO (DD) hit a mine off LINGAYEN Bay.<br>An enemy sub sank off LAOAG. | |
| 1 January 1942 | LABUAN and BRUNEI occupied. | |
| 3 January | MANILA surrendered. | |
| 4 January | The MYOKO (CA) was bombed off MALALAG in DAVAO Bay. Has returned to SASEBO, damaged and with casualties. | |
| 5 January | AOBA left ROI at 0000, returned at 1000. (A report had been received that an enemy carrier and two cruisers had left HAWAII for WAKE. We were ordered to leave at night on search and guard duty.) | |

| | |
|---|---|
| 6 January 1942 | Left ROI at 0200, returned at 1030 on same mission. |
| 7 January | Left ROI for TRUK. |
| 9 January | The KANKO Maru (感興丸) was torpedoed and sunk in the DUTCH EAST INDIES. |
| | Two more enemy subs have been sunk. |
| 10 January | Anchored at TRUK. |
| 12 January | The LEXINGTON sunk by the I-6. |
| | TARAKAN surrendered. |
| | Minesweepers #13 and #14 sunk off LINKAS. |
| | The minelayer, PRINS VAN ORANJE, sunk. |
| 13 January | MENGACHU FORT on LINKAS Island captured. |
| 18 January | Left TRUK. |
| | The I-131 sank a 10,000 merchantman north of TIMOR. |
| | The BANSHU ~~Maru~~ (播州丸) hit a mine and sank. |
| | The ASO Maru (阿蘇丸) (AP-AK) was severely damaged. |
| 20 January | At 1800 crossed the equator at 148°37' E. Long. going south. (Fighter planes from the ZUIKAKU shot down an enemy flying boat that was approaching us. We spotted five of its crew floating on the water, and picked them up as prisoners.) |
| | One special duty ship and several of our merchantmen have been sunk at SINGAPORE. |
| 21 January | Our forces attacked an enemy force concentrating at CEBU and sank several merchantmen. |
| | The ~~NANA Maru~~ (那珂丸) (AP-AK) was sunk (in the south). |
| | The ASAGUMO (DD) collided with the OI Maru (大井丸). |
| | Landings effected at the mouth of the SAMUPARA River and the mouth of KENDARI Bay. |
| | One of our destroyers has damaged six enemy merchantmen in the INDIAN OCEAN. |
| 22 January | Have reached the southernmost point on our course (4°9' S., 150°55'30" E.) |
| 23 January | BANAKA (?) Airfield on GERIIN (?) Island occupied. As the result of an enemy torpedo attack, the TATSUKAMI Maru (辰神丸) (AK), TSURUGA Maru (敦賀丸) (AK), and the KURETAKE Maru (呉竹丸) were sunk; the SUMANOURA Maru (須磨浦丸) and Patrol Boat #37 were heavily damaged. |
| | RABAUL occupied. |
| 24 January | Crossed the equator at 150°E. going north at 0555. Recrossed it going south at 150°5' E. at 1240. The MYOKEN Maru (妙見丸) (AK) was sunk off GILI JANG. Landings effected at KENDARI and BALIKPAPAN. |
| 25 January | The TONEGAWA Maru (利根川丸) was grounded. |
| 26 January | Reached the southernmost point on our course at 1430 (4°45' S., 149°52'E.). |
| 27 January | The British destroyer, THANET, was sunk. |
| | Landings made on PAMANGKAT. SANBASU (?) occupied. |
| 30 January | AOBA anchored in RABAUL Harbor at 0800. (Handed over our prisoners.) Left RABAUL at 1730. |
| | KULI occupied. |
| 31 January | Anchored in YSABEL PASSAGE. |
| | Our forces have progressed towards SINGAPORE. |
| | Landings effected at AMBON, ROTAN, and [illegible]. |
| 29 January | MINKAWAN (?) and PONTIANAK occupied. |
| 1 February | Left YSABEL PASSAGE. An enemy striking force appeared in the MARSHALLS Area and we have received reports that they are attacking there. We left immediately for KWAJALEIN. The enemy force is composed of 2 carriers, five heavy (?) cruisers, and five destroyers. |
| 3 February | The Submarine I-62 sank a 10,000 ton tanker off COLOMBO. |
| 4 February | JAVA SEA Battle. |
| | Enemy Losses: |

1 Dutch Cruiser (JAVA Class) sunk.
1 Dutch Cruiser (DE RUYTER Class) sunk.
1 Dutch Cruiser (JAVA Class) medium damage.
1 American Cruiser (MARBLEHEAD Class) medium damage.

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|---|---|
| 5 February 1942 | The Submarine RO-34 sank a destroyer in the SUNDA STRAITS. |
| 2 February | 0116. Crossed the equator bearing north, 153°50' E. |
| 4 February | KWAJALEIN. Entered the Harbor at ROI. |
| 5 February | KWAJALEIN. Left ROI. Anchored at the main island at KWAJALEIN. |
| 6 February | KWAJALEIN. Departed from the main island. |
| 7 February | The HOYO (宝洋丸) Maru ran aground outside KEBIN Bay. The Submarine I-124 had a gunnery engagement with an English destroyer and was sunk. |
| 8 February | The NATSUSHIO (DD) was sunk by torpedoes. |
| 9 February | The KISOGAWA (木曾川丸) Maru was sunk off SAIGON by an enemy submarine. Successful landings were carried out at MAKASSAR, AENBATO-BATO, SURUMI, and GASMATA. |
| 10 February | TRUK. Entered the harbor at TRUK. |
| 12 February | The YAMATO (BB) became the flagship of the Combined Fleet. |
| 15 February | SINGAPORE fell. |
| 16 February | A message from the throne on the occasion of the fall of SINGAPORE. |
| 19 February | The MYOKO (妙高丸) Maru was sunk off NOMO SAKI by an enemy submarine. |
| 20 February | TRUK. Departed from TRUK. An enemy task force composed of 1 BB, 2 carriers, 2 cruisers and 9 destroyers has appeared at a bearing of 75°46' off RABAUL and our force has set out to capture or annihilate it. It seems that the enemy is planning to carry out a surprise attack on TRUK. Successful landings were carried out at DELI and KOEPANG. BALI Island has been occupied. The Submarine I-60 was sunk, in a naval battle off BATAAN. 4 destroyers were sunk and 2 cruisers and 1 destroyer were badly damaged. The MICHISHIO (DD) and OSHIO (DD) were badly damaged. |
| 23 February | TRUK. Entered the harbor at TRUK. RAHATO (?) has been occupied. |
| 24 February | 2 enemy cruisers and 2 destroyers have carried out an attack in the vicinity of WAKE Island. |
| 25 & 26 February | A submarine shelled the American mainland. The submarine RO-63 met with an accident in the vicinity of [illegible] Island. |
| 27 February | In a naval battle off SOERABAYA, 5 cruisers and 6 destroyers were sunk. Their force consisted of 5 cruisers and 9 destroyers. |
| 28 February | The Submarine I-58 sank a 15,000 ton fueling ship in the SUNDA STRAITS. The Submarine I-4 sunk a freighter south of JAVA. |
| 2 March | TRUK. Departed at 1000. Engaging in the Fourth Campaign (SR Operations). |
| 4 March | Crossed the equator at 0015 bearing southward, 150°54' E. An enemy carrier attacked MARCUS Island. The enemy force was composed of the ENTERPRISE, SALT LAKE CITY, NORTHAMPTON, and a number of destroyers. The ERIMO (襟裳) (AO) was sunk by torpedoes. |
| 5 March | At 0600 entered the harbor at RABAUL. Took on provisions. Departed at 1700. |
| 8 March | Successful landing carried out in MENATEI [illegible] |
| 9 March | Swept the sea around KUINKARORA (?) and anchored there. |
| 10 March | The SNLF has landed and are cleaning out the enemy along the coast. Departed at 1615. |
| 11 March | Entered the harbor at RABAUL. Fueled. |
| 14 March | Departed from RABAUL. |
| 15 March | Entered the harbor at KUINKARORA and stood by. |
| 17 March | Departed from KUINKARORA. |
| 18 March | Anchored in MELLE CHANNEL (メレーチャンネル). |
| 26 March | Departed from MELLE CHANNEL. |
| 27 March | Entered the harbor at RABAUL. Fueled. |

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| 28 March 1942 | Departed from RABAUL. Engaging in the Fifth Campaign. |
| 30 March | Landing at SHORTLAND successful. |
| 1 April | Entered harbor of RABAUL. Left the same day. |
| 2 April | Anchored in MELLE CHANNEL. |
| 7 April | Departed from MELLE CHANNEL. |
| 8 April | Crossed the equator bearing north, 148°13' E. |
| 10 April | Entered the harbor at TRUK. |
| 30 April | Departed from TRUK to engage in the Fifth Campaign. |
| 5 May | Entered the harbor at SHORTLAND. |
| 6 May | Departed from SHORTLAND. |
| 7 May | Attacked by enemy planes. The SHOHO (CV) was sunk at a bearing of 56°, 52 miles off DEBOYNE Island. |
| 9 May | Entered the harbor at SHORTLAND. Took on provisions and departed the same day. |
| 11 May | The OKINOSHIMA (沖ノ島 ) (CM) was sunk by torpedoes. |
| 12 May | Entered the harbor at KIETA, The SNLF landed. There was no sign of the enemy. |
| 13 May | Anchored at SHORTLAND. Took on provisions and departed the same day bound for TRUK, our destroyer alone. |
| 16 May | Entered the harbor at TRUK. |
| 17 May | Departed from TRUK, bound for KURE. |
| 22 May | Entered the harbor of KURE at 1300. |
| 25 May | Entered No. 3 Dock at KURE. |
| 26-31 May | Had leave. Returned to ship. |
| 29 May | Left the Dock. Moored to land at A Anchorage. |
| 8 June | Changed mooring to No. 18 Buoy. |
| 10 June | Departed from the harbor on a trial cruise. Returned the same day. Practiced avoiding torpedoes while cruising. Tested our speed over a measured course. |
| 16 June ? | Departed at 0900. At 1745 entered the harbor at NAGAHAMA. |
| 17 June | Departed from NAGAHAMA at 0900. At 1745 entered the harbor of KITSUKI. |
| 18 June | Departed from KITSUKI bound for TRUK. |
| 23 June | Entered the harbor at TRUK. |
| 30 June | Departed from TRUK. |
| 2 July | Crossed the equator (the 9th time) bearing south. Time - 0230. The HOYO (宝洋丸 ) Maru drew alongside our port side and we refueled in tow. |
| 5 July | Entered the harbor at KIETA. |
| 6 July | Drew alongside the HOYO Maru (宝洋丸) and refueled. When we had finished, we left the harbor. |
| 7 July | Anchored in REKATA LAGOON. |
| 10 July | 2 destroyers dropped anchor. |
| 14 July | Departed at 1200. |
| 16 July | Entered MELLE Channel. |
| 18 July | Set out for KUINKARORA. |
| 19 July | Entered the harbor at KUINKARORA. |
| 21 July | Departed from KUINKARORA bound for RABAUL (our destroyer alone). Refueled and left port the same day bound for YSABEL PASSAGE. |
| 22 July | Anchored in YSABEL PASSAGE. There were 2 destroyers and we remained there until the 26th. |
| 26 July | Departed from YSABEL PASSAGE and anchored in MELLE CHANNEL. |
| 1 August | RABAUL. Departed from RABAUL. Anchored in MELLE CHANNEL. |
| 7 August | Departed from MELLE CHANNEL. Received news that an enemy task force was attacking TULAGI, we made a forced run to RABAUL. The enemy had started to land at TULAGI. We joined the CHOKAI (CA). |
| 8 August | We made a night attack on TULAGI. |
| 10 August | The KAKO (CA) was struck by torpedoes from an enemy submarine and sank. (30,500 metres out from MARWIU Island at a bearing of 48°; at about 2°28' S., 152°11' E.) Anchored in MELLE CHANNEL. |
| 17 August | Left MELLE CHANNEL. |
| 19 August | Anchored in REKATA BAY. |
| 20 August | Left REKATA BAY. |

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| 21 August 1942 | Joined the CHŌKAI (CA). |
| 22 August | Separated from the CHŌKAI and the 2 DD's, anchoring at SHORTLAND for supplies. When finished here, left. |
| 24 August | Spotted a convoy. Rejoined the CHŌKAI and the 2 DD's. |
| 26 August | Anchored at KIETA. |
| 27 August | Left KIETA. Anchored temporarily at SHORTLAND. |
| 28 August | Left SHORTLAND for the south. |
| 4 September | Anchored at KIETA. |
| 5 September | Left KIETA. Anchored temporarily at SHORTLAND. Left ship after supper and reported on board the NOWAKI (DD) for duty. |
| 6 September | Left SHORTLAND. Headed for TRUK, escorting the TOA Maru (東亜丸) (XAO or AK?). |
| 9 September | Anchored in TRUK Harbor at 1400. Was transferred aboard the MINEGUMO (DD) after supper. |
| 10 September | Left TRUK for the south, escorting the KENYŌ Maru (XAO). (健洋丸). |
| 23 September | Anchored at TRUK. Left the MINEGUMO and reported on board the ASAGUMO (DD) for duty. |
| 26 September | Left TRUK for SHORTLAND (Apart from being in DesDiv 9, the ASAGUMO had also been made a part of the SOUTH SEAS Force (NANYŌ BUTAI). |
| 29 September | Anchored at SHORTLAND. |
| 2 October | Took on board materiel to be landed at GUADALCANAL and left SHORTLAND. Began unloading at 2058, completed it successfully at 2230. |
| 3 October | Returned to SHORTLAND for supplies. |
| 5 October | Enemy carrier-based bombers attacked us (one bomb dropped very close: 200 metres on our port beam), but no damage. We repulsed them. Left SHORTLAND for the second time on the "ferry service" to GUADALCANAL. Were attacked by enemy planes. The NATSUGUMO (DD), MINEGUMO, and MURASAME turned back. |

(Reinforcement Butai)

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| 26 September | | The DesDiv 9 (TN: dg) was attached to the Outer South Seas Force and set out from TRUK. |
| 29 September | | Entered the harbor at SHORTLAND. |
| 2 October | 0800 | Departed from SHORTLAND on a southerly course. Our force was composed of the DesDiv 9 (TN: dg) and the DesDiv 2 (TN: dg) (minus the YUDACHI and the SAMIDARE). Had as passengers 250 soldiers who were to be put ashore; also carried provisions and 15 rear-cars which were to be put ashore. |
| | 2048 | Arrived at KAMIMBO and commenced unloading operations. |
| | 2230 | Work was completed. |
| | 2246 | Departed from KAMIMBO, following a southerly course. |
| 3 October | 1036 | Anchored at SHORTLAND. |
| 5 October | 0630 | Departed from SHORTLAND, following a southerly course. Our force was composed of the DesDivs 9 and 2 (TN: dg). Carried as passengers 650 soldiers who were to be put ashore. As cargo carried 2 mountain guns, telegraph apparatus, and tools for laborers, which were to be put ashore. |
| | 1505 | Were attacked by 10 enemy planes. The MINEGUMO (DD) was damaged by a near hit forward, sprang a leak and returned to SHORTLAND escorted by the NATSUGUMO (DD). |
| | 1552 | Were attacked by nine enemy planes. Our ship was attacked by 3 carrier-based bombers. Bombs landed 100° to starboard, distance 50 meters, 50 meters off the bow, and 150° to starboard, distance 100 meters. Sustained no damage. |
| | 1705 | The MURASAME (DD), having sprung a leak, because of a near hit by a bomb, returned to SHORTLAND. |
| | 1924 | Enemy planes on patrol dropped flares. |
| | 2116 | Arrived at TASSAFARONGA and commenced unloading operations. |
| | 2254 | Unloading completed. |
| | 2257 | Departed from TASSAFARONGA, following a central course. |

6 October 1019 Dropped anchor at SHORTLAND, having entered the harbor through the North Channel.

8 October 0551 Set out from SHORTLAND, heading down the "Slot". (TN: CHUO-KORO 中央航路). Our force was composed of the Desdiv 9 (minus the MINEGUMO) and the Desdiv 2 (minus the MURASAME and the SAMIDARE). Carried as passengers 560 men who were to be put ashore. As cargo, carried 18 trench mortars. Also carried a MAIZURU 4th Special Naval Landing Force Communications Unit and Work Unit.

1607 Were attacked by 11 enemy planes and our escort planes joined battle with them.

2056 Reached TASSAFARONGA and commenced disembarking operations.

2219 Operations concluded.

2224 Departed from TASSAFARONGA proceeding along the "Slot".

9 October 0453 Were attached by 11 enemy carrier-based bombers and our escort planes joined battle with them.

0506 The enemy's carrier-based bombers attacked us and bombs landed 90° to port, distance 50 meters, 110° to starboard, distance 100 meters, and 80° to starboard; distance 50 meters. Shot down one of the enemy planes.

1120 Dropped anchor at SHORTLAND.

11 October 0558 Departed from SHORTLAND. Our force was composed of the NISSHIN (CVS), CHITOSE (CVS), AKITSUKI (DD), the Desdiv 9 and the Desdiv 11 (TN: dg) (minus two destroyers). Carried as passengers 728 men who were to be put ashore. Also carried 4 15 cm. howitzers, 4 tractors, 2 field guns, 16 cases (?) of ammunition, 1 antiaircraft gun, 1 fixed radio (HÔTEI-MUSEN). The above materials were aboard the NISSHIN and CHITOSE. The ASAGUMO (DD) and the Desdiv 11 (minus 2 destroyers) carried 1 regimental gun, 2 battalion guns, 2 rapid-fire guns, 1 trench mortar, and ten tons of provisions.

2023 Arrived at TASSAFARONGA and commenced disembarking operations.

2123 Operations completed.

2130 Departed from TASSAFARONGA.

2135 Sighted our forces engaged in battle with the enemy a little north of SAVO Island. (The losses sustained by our 6th Fleet were: FURUTAKA (CA), sunk; AOBA (CA), badly damaged, and FUBUKI (DD), sunk).

2236 Returned to our anchorage. The NISSHIN and CHITOSE had not completed the disembarkation of the materials she carried.

2304 Operations were completed, and we changed our course to the south.

12 October 0655 Joined the SENDAI (CL).

0850 The MURAKUMO was hit by bombs from enemy planes and was unable to proceed and the Desdiv 9 went to her assistance.

1105 Arrived at our destination where we were assigned to patrol duty. Tried to tow the SHIRAYUKI (DD).

1258 Sighted 2 enemy carrier-based bombers.

1323 Sighted the two planes again.

1343 Attacked by 11 carrier-based bombers and 8 fighters.

1348 The NATSUGUMO was damaged by a bomb and was unable to proceed, and gradually began to list.

1415 The MURAKUMO was struck by a torpedo which exploded

1427 The NATSUGUMO sank but the crew was saved.

1445 Made our escape from this place.

1538 Joined the Desron 3 (sd).

1640 Proceeded to tow the MURAKUMO

1850 Arrived at this place.

1850 The SHIRAYUKI was disposed of with torpedoes. (RAIGEKI SHOBUNSU).

1909 Started back.

13 October 0630 Put in at SHORTLAND.

14 October 0353 Set out from SHORTLAND via the North Channel.

2021 Arrived at TASSAFARONGA where we changed our anchorage and established patrols.

2350 The CHOKAI (CA) and the KINUGASA shelled the airfield.

15 October 0400 A transport fleet (SENDAI (CL), YURA (CL), and TATSUTA (CL), ) completed disembarking operations.

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| 15 October 1942 (Continued) | 0355 | Started back, following a course north. |
| | 1604 | Put in at SHORTLAND. |
| 17 October | 0316 | Departed from SHORTLAND, following the northern route. |
| | 2029 | Arrived at ESPERANCE where we commenced disembarking operations. |
| | 2205 | Finished the operations. |
| | 2216 | Departed from ESPERANCE going down the "Slot". |
| 18 October | 0446 | The SENDAI was struck by a torpedo from an enemy submarine but sustained no damage. Three depth charges were dropped with unknown results. |
| | 0930 | Put in at SHORTLAND where we were attached to the main Fleet (?) (TN: SHUTAI 主隊 ). |
| 24 October | 1616 | Departed from SHORTLAND in order to carry out an all-out attack against GUADALCANAL. |
| 25 October | | Though we occupied one corner of the airfield on GUADALCANAL, we did not seize the airfield. Our forces stood by to the west. |
| 26 October | 1325 | Put in at SHORTLAND. |
| 30 October | 0100 | Enemy planes dropped bombs and 3 landed 50 meters off the bow. |
| | 0123 | Enemy planes dropped bombs and 6 landed 40° to port, distance, 30 meters. UCHIDA, Seaman, 3rd Class, was killed. |
| 1 November | 0800 | The flag of the CinC of the DesRon 4 (4 sd) was run up on the ASAGUMO (DD). |
| | 2230 | Set out from SHORTLAND, following the northern route. |
| 2 November | 2020 | Left our companion ships and proceeded to the anchorage of a transport fleet. Maintained patrol outside (the anchorage). |
| | 2330 | Stopped disembarkation work and started back, following a course north. |
| 3 November | 1540 | Put in at SHORTLAND. |
| 4 November | 2330 | Set out from SHORTLAND, following the northern route. |
| | 2357 | Enemy planes dropped some bombs 90° to port, distance, about 1000 meters. |
| 5 November | 2010 | Parted ways with the transport fleet and continued on to the anchorage where we took up patrol. |
| | 2101 | The MURASAME sighted a torpedo-boat which it illuminated and shelled. |
| | 2227 | Disembarking operations were finished and we started back. |
| 6 November | | The SHIGURE (DD) sighted a periscope (proceeding along a central course) and dropped depth charges. |
| | 0941 | Dropped anchor at SHORTLAND. |
| 7 November | 0800 | The Command Flag was transferred to the TENRYŪ (CL) where it was run up. |
| | 2300 | Departed from SHORTLAND, following the northern route. |
| 8 November | 1926 | Separated and proceeded to our patrol station. Went to the anchorage of the transport fleet. |
| 8 November | 1937 | The MOCHZUKI (DD) sighted a torpedo-boat and illuminated it. |
| | 2220 | The SHIGURE, YUGURE (DD), and MOCHIZUKI went on ahead, starting back. |
| | 2245 | The transport fleet completed the disembarkation work and started back. |
| 9 November | 0554 | Torpedoes were fired at us by an enemy submarine, which was proceeding along the "Slot". The SHIRATSUYU (DD) and YUDACHI proceeded to attack the submarine and sink it. |
| | 0850 | Put in at SHORTLAND. |
| | 1500 | The DesRon Flag of the CinC of the DesRon 4 (4 sd) was transferred to the ASAGUMO and run up. |
| 11 November | | Returned to the Des'on 4, our original unit. |
| | 1520 | Set out from SHORTLAND (departing by the North Channel). |
| 12 November | 1330 | Joined the Des'ivs 10 and 11 and set off for the south where a battle developed off LUNGA. |

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| 13 November 1942 | 0000 | Torpedoes were fired from starboard but we continued on our way. We illuminated and shelled an enemy destroyer and inflicted great damage. |
| | 0052 | The YUDACHI was hit by a bomb and was unable to keep under way. |
| | 0126 | It withdrew. |
| | 0906 | Met up with the KIRISHIMA (BB). |
| | 0935 | Set out to do rescue work at the HIEI (BB). |
| | 1414 | Stopped rescue work and tried to join the Main Force. |
| | 2010 | Met up with the Advance Force. |
| 14 November | 0355 | Were fueled by the HARUNA (BB). |
| | 1435 | Three torpedoes passed underneath our ship. We dropped depth charges. A battle broke out off SAVO Island. |
| | 2200 | Sighted 3 enemy battleships. A battle in which both torpedoes and guns were used broke out. |
| | 2205 | Launched a torpedo with unknown results. Our main batteries were very effective. The KIRISHIMA was hit with bombs and was unable to keep under way. |
| | 2355 | Put in alongside the KIRISHIMA. The entire crew abandoned ship (TN: the KIRISHIMA). |
| 15 November | 0123 | The KIRISHIMA sank. |
| | 0233 | Ceased rescue operations and withdrew. |
| | 1110 | Joined the SENDAI (CL) and at 2100 joined the CruDiv 8 (8S). |
| 16 November | 0600 | Were supplied (with fuel) by the NICHIEI (日榮丸) Maru (XAO). |
| 18 November | 0719 | Put in at TRUK, entering by the North Channel. |
| 21 November | 1000 | The Command Flag was transferred to the NAGARA (CL) and run up. |
| 26 November | 0800 | Entered the dock. |
| 5 December | 0730 | Left the dock. |
| 6 December | 0630 | Left the harbor and carried out patrol to the north. |
| 7 December | 1513 | Entered the harbor. |
| 8 December | 0600 | Departed from the harbor and carried out patrol while the SHIGURE had firing practice. |
| | 1540 | Entered the harbor. |
| 9 December | 1706 | Departed from the harbor and carried out patrol to the north. |
| 13 December | 1530 | Departed by the north entrance and proceeded to escort the CHŪYŌ (ACV). |
| 15 December | 1420 | The CHŪYŌ sighted the UZUKI (DD) off the bow. |
| | 1445 | Caught up with her. She turned around and we proceeded on to TRUK. |
| 17 December | 2335 | Sighted a submarine on the surface and dropped 6 depth charges but were unable to determine results. |
| 18 December | 0627 | Put in at TRUK by the North Channel. |
| 20 December | 1200 | Departed from the harbor to carry out maneuvers. |
| | 1908 | Returned. |
| 21 December | 1015 | Left the harbor, escorting the CHŪYŌ and bound for YOKOSUKA. |
| 26 December | 0715 | Sighted FUJIYAMA. |
| | 1415 | Entered the harbor where we were given leave. |
| 27 December | | Went to TŌKYŌ where I paid my respects to the Imperial Palace, and worshipped at the shrine of MEIJI, and YASUKUNI-JINJA. |
| 2 January 1943 | 1545 | Departed from YOKOSUKA bound for TRUK escorting the CHŪYŌ. |
| | 1700 | Left TŌKYŌ Bay. |
| 8 January | 0700 | Arrived at TRUK via the North Channel. |
| 11 January | | Were attached to the Southeast Area Fleet and were placed under the CinC of the CarDiv 2. |
| 15 January | 1200 | Departed from TRUK with a patrol unit for an air-craft carrier force, CarDiv 2 (minus the HIYŌ) in order to carry out "C" (HEI) transport operations. |
| 17 January | 1140 | Proceeded to a place about 200 miles north of WEWAK. 25 fighters and 6 attack-bombers took off from the JUNYŌ. We headed for TRUK. |

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| 19 January 1943 | 0712 | Put in at TRUK via the South Channel and our escort task was concluded. Set out to finish off an enemy submarine which a float reconnaissance plane from the TAKAO (CA) had sighted and attacked at a place 25 kilometres from the South Channel at a bearing of 155°. |
| 20 January | | #6C (?) Convoy was attacked by a submarine 286 nautical miles (TN: " ' " denotes a nautical mile) from TRUK at a bearing of 145°. The SURABAYA Maru (スラバヤ丸) was sunk and the MEIU Maru (明洋丸) severely damaged. |
| | 2323 | Proceeded to the rescue. |
| 21 January | 1115 | Arrived at our destination. |
| | 1915 | The MEIU Maru sank. Then turned back for TRUK. Picked up, however, 13 Army officers (warrant and above) and 419 enlisted men; 146 members from the crews of the two ships; and two Navy men. |
| 22 January | 0840 | Returned to TRUK. |
| 25 January | | The KUNIKAWA Maru (XCVS) had engine trouble and halted in her course 300 nautical miles from TRUK at a bearing of 132°. |
| | 0523 | Left TRUK to stand by her. |
| | 2130 | Contact was made with the ship and we took charge of escorting her. |
| 26 January | 1200 | The repairs on the KUNIKAWA Maru having been completed, proceeded to return. |
| 27 January | 1200 | Arrived at TRUK. |
| 31 January | 0642 | We left TRUK, as the screening unit for the advance force (AdB) and main force which were to assist in the "ke" (ケ) Campaign. (TN: "ke" Campaign seems to be a general Japanese term for an evacuation operation.) |
| 1 February | | Our ship has been assigned to the Reinforcing Force (ZOB) of the Outer South Seas Force (SNB). Consequently, we detached ourselves from the advance force (AdB). |
| 4 February | 0700 | Arrived at SHORTLAND. |
| | 1000 | Left there (for our second transport duty at GUADALCANAL). |
| 5 February | | Returned to SHORTLAND. |
| 7 February | | Left SHORTLAND (for our third transport duty at GUADALCANAL). |
| 8 February | | Returned to SHORTLAND. Campaign "ke" (ケ) is finished. |
| 11 February | | Left SHORTLAND to escort the SENDAI (CL). |
| 12 February | 0130 | Joined the SENDAI and returned to SHORTLAND. Left there for PALAU (with the SAMIDARE of Desdiv 10). |
| | 1814 | Spotted an enemy submarine. Dropped depth charges but results were undetermined. Left the SAMIDARE and headed back to RABAUL to relieve our commander (SHIREI). |
| 13 February | 0900 | Capt. KONISHI relieved our commander and assumed his new duties. |
| 14 February | | Capt. SATŌ left the ship. |
| | 1340 | Left RABAUL for PALAU. |
| 17 February | 1400 | Arrived at PALAU. |
| 19 February | 0900 | Left PALAU for WEWAK, escorting the KIYOSUMI Maru (清澄丸), the AIKOKU Maru (XCL), and the GOKOKU Maru (愛国丸), engaged in Operation #81. |
| 22 February | 1800 | Entered WEWAK Anchorage. Kept a mobile guard. |
| 23 February | 0530 | Unloading completed. Left the convoy and headed back to RABAUL. |
| 24 February | 1450 | Arrived at RABAUL. |
| 27 February | 1250 | Took on supplies (at KOKOPO) for the Army. |
| 28 February | 2255 | Left RABAUL (in a transport operation to LAE). |
| 1 March | | Came in contact with enemy planes in the evening. |
| 2 March | 0630 | Fought several enemy planes (PBY's and B-17's). The KYOKUSEI Maru (極星丸) was so damaged by bombs that she sank. Rescued those aboard, however. |
| | 1420 | Raided again by several B-17's. Together with the YUKIKAZE (DD) went on ahead to LAE. Supplies were unloaded for our troops. |

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| 3 March 1943 | | Rejoined the convoy. |
| | 0700 | Fought off a 100-odd enemy fighters, bombers, and torpedo bombers, 10 or so of our own planes came to our defense. The convoy was destroyed. Rescued survivors, but discontinued this at 1300 and withdrew, changing our course southward and scouting. Able to detect nothing, however. |
| 4 March | 1640 | Arrived at KAVIENG. Came alongside the SENDAI and got some supplies. |
| | 2200 | Left KAVIENG for RABAUL. |
| 5 March | 0600 | Arrived at RABAUL. |
| 7 March | 1700 | Left RABAUL for SHORTLAND (with the YUKIKAZE, SHIKINAMI (DD), and URANAMI (DD) ). |
| 8 March | 1043 | Arrived at SHORTLAND. |
| | 1700 | Left there through the south entrance (in the KOLOMBANGARA ferry service). Completed our unloading there and proceeded to return. |
| 9 March | | We separated from the SHIKINAMI and URANAMI. |
| | 1642 | Arrived at RABAUL. |
| 12 March | 1700 | Left RABAUL for SHORTLAND (with the YUKIKAZE and MINATSUKI (DD) ). |
| 13 March | 1700 | Left SHORTLAND through the south entrance (in the KOLOMBANGARA ferry service). Completed our unloading there and proceeded to return. |
| 14 March | 0600 | Arrived at SHORTLAND. Moved supplies, then left again. |
| | 1839 | Arrived at RABAUL. |
| 30 March | | Left RABAUL for SHORTLAND (with the SAMIDARE, YŪGUMO (DD), KAZEGUMO (DD), and AKIGUMO (DD) ). |
| 31 March | | Arrived at SHORTLAND, then left through the south entrance (in the KOLOMBANGARA ferry service). Were in continual contact with enemy planes, making it difficult to unload. Abandoned all thought of unloading finally and proceeded to return. |
| 1 April | 1700 | Left again through the south entrance (in the KOLOMBANGARA ferry service). Completed our unloading there and proceeded to return. |
| 2 April | | Arrived SHORTLAND, leaving again for BUKA. Arrived at BUKA and picked up fuel. |
| 3 April | 0500 | Left BUKA for SHORTLAND. Arrived there and found the KAZEGUMO and a merchantm damaged by a mine. (We suspect magnetic mines had been laid in the harbor.) |
| 5 April | 1700 | Left through the south entrance (in the KOLOMBANGARA ferry service). Completed our unloading and proceeded to return. |
| 6 April | | Returned to SHORTLAND, leaving again for TRUK. One B-25 attacked us, but its bombs went wide of their mark. |
| 9 April | 0800 | Arrived at TRUK. |
| 10 April | 0600 | Left TRUK for YOKOSUKA. |
| 13 April | 1000 | Arrived there, mooring to Buoy Y-17. |
| 20 April | | Received a furlough and returned to my home at 1030 (until the 24th). |
| 26 April | 1130 | Left for the (ATAMI) Health Resort. |
| 28 April | 1000 | Returned (M.: To YO[illegible]) I was now to be stationed aboard the USUGUMO (DD). |
| 29 April | | Left my old ship after lunch. |
| 30 April | 0954 | Arrived at ŌMINATO (by train). Went aboard my new ship the USUGUMO. |
| 12 May | | The situation in the northern area having changed suddenly, stopped our present work. |
| | 2345 | Left ŌMINATO for PARAMUSHIRO. |
| 15 May | 0415 | Arrived at the PARAMUSHIRO Straits. |
| 20 May | 0725 | Moving through the north entrance to PARAMUSHIRO, we went on patrol duty. |
| 21 May | 0520 | Returned to PARAMUSHIRO. |
| 25 May | 1630 | Left PARAMUSHIRO for ATTU. (We were to attack the enemy fleet by surprise, transport urgently needed materiel, and pick up liaison men.) |

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| 30 May 1943 | 0240 | Ceased our operations and proceeded to return. |
| 31 May | 0825 | Returned to PARAMUSHIRO. |
| 2 June | 0612 | Left to clean out enemy subs operating south of ARAIDO Island. |
| 3 June | 1100 | Ceased this work and returned to PARAMUSHIRO. |
| 5 June | | Today was the occasion of the national funeral of YAMAMOTO, Admiral of the Fleet. |
| | 0700 | Observed his passing with a half-mast ceremony. |
| 7 June | | The SHIRAKUMO (DD) collided with the NUMAKAZE (DD) 12 nautical miles off CAPE LOPATKA at a bearing of 122°. |
| | 0115 | Headed in that direction to lend assistance. |
| | 0355 | Joined the SHIRAKUMO. |
| | | Returned to PARAMUSHIRO, escorting her. |
| | 0950 | Entered the harbor there. |
| 19 June | 1125 | Left to determine the calibration of our direction finder. |
| | 1455 | Having done this, returned again. |
| 23 June | 0320 | Left PARAMUSHIRO Harbor escorting the IKUSHIMA Maru (いくしまる). |
| | 1530 | Ceased escorting and left the other ship. |
| | 2025 | Joined the NITTEI Maru (日帝丸) and escorted it. |
| 24 June | 0648 | Ceased escorting and entered the harbor (M : ..t ..MA MUSHIRO ?) |
| | 1000 | Came alongside the HAKKAI Maru (八海丸). Equipped her with counter-radar (GYAKUTAN) and loaded landing barges on her. |
| 26 June | 1155 | Left the side of the HAKKAI Maru. |
| 30 June | 1700 | Received warning to go on watch duty. |
| | 1950 | Weighed anchor and left port (headed for a spot 23 nautical miles out of BETTOBU NUMA at a bearing of 350° where a submarine attack had been reported). |
| 1 July | 0930 | Entered PARAMUSHIRO Harbor. |
| 5 July | 1930 | Left (to participate in the "ke" Campaign at KISKA). |
| 10 July | 0205 | Planned to make a dash for KISKA, but the weather was not favorable for it, so at 2030 we changed our course and withdrew. |
| 11 July | 0550 | Joined the NIPPON Maru (XAO) and received oil. |
| 12 July | 0735 | Made a second attempt to dash into KISKA, but reversed our course again at 1520 because of unfavorable conditions. |
| 13 July | 0240 | Made our third attempt. |
| | 1703 | Gave up again. |
| | 2145 | Made our fourth attempt. |
| 14 July | 0156 | Gave up once more. |
| | 1500 | Tried for the fifth time. |
| 15 July | 0430 | Gave up again. |
| | 0820 | Ceased our operations and returned to PARAMUSHIRO. |
| 18 July | 0830 | Entered PARAMUSHIRO Harbor. |
| 19 July | 0630 | Received an air raid warning for the northern KURILES. |
| | 0645 | Five B-24's bombed us but there was no damage. |
| 22 July | 2000 | Left for the second phase of our participation in the "ko" Campaign. |
| 26 July | 1750 | The KUNIJIRI (CM) and the ABUKUMA (CL) collided (due to this, there was some confusion produced in the rear of the formation, and the WAKABA (DD), HATSUSHIMO (DD), and NAGANAMI (DD) also collided). |
| 29 July | 1105 | Sighted the outline of an island. |
| | 1316 | The ABUKUMA sighted the enemy and fired some torpedoes. It developed that we had mistaken LITTLE KISKA for the enemy. |
| | 1321 | The SHIMAKAZE fired its guns. |
| | 1350 | Dropped anchor in KISKA Harbor. |
| | 1405 | Had finished taking aboard the men. |
| | 1420 | The 2nd Transport Unit had finished. |
| | 1427 | Departed. |
| 31 July | 0604 | The weather cleared up. |
| | 1530 | We entered the harbor at PARAMUSHIRO. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 August 1943 | 1000 | The 1st Transport Unit arrived. |
| 3 August | 1700 | Departed from PARAMUSHIRO bound for ŌMINATO. |
| 6 August | 0600 | Put in at ŌTARU. |
| 7 August | 0730 | Went ashore at YOKOSUKA Naval Base. |
| 8 August | 1400 | Arrived at YOKOSUKA having received orders to report to the Commandant of the Naval Torpedo School for duty. |
| 16 August | | Started courses for torpedo-boat captain. |
| 15 September | | Concluding my courses. |
| 20 September | | Received orders assigning me to the YOKOSUKA Guard Unit (SHŪBITAI) and placing me in command of the Number 10 Torpedo-Boat. |

AN ACCOUNT OF THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

7 December 1941 Imperial Rescript to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet:

"We, by ordering this despatch, delegate you to have the responsibility of commanding the Combined Fleet. The responsibilites of the Combined Fleet will be extremely heavy and success or failure of the matter concerns the fate of the country. You have made progress by urging the achievements of Fleet-drill for many years, and you must be determined to meet our expectations by exalting our force and authority throughout the world by annihilating the enemy."

Reply to the Emperor by the C-in-C of the Combined Fleet:

"I was overwhelmingly impressed by the gracious Imperial Rescript, at the outbreak of the war, and I shall carry out his great orders with reverence. The officers and men of the Combined Fleet have sworn to do their utmost and they will accomplish the aim of the despatch. They are determined to accept and carry out the Emperor's Commands."

Orders from the C-in-C to the Combined Fleet:

"The fate of our empire hangs on this war. Each man must do his utmost to fulfill his obligations."

8 December 1941 The Imperial Edict declaring War against the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND was issued.
Imperial Rescript to the Ministers of the Army and Navy was received.
Acceptance by the Minister of the Navy.
Orders to the Minister of the Navy and his department in general.
Success of the surprise attack on HAWAII by our striking force:

| Surface Craft | |
|---|---|
| Sunk: | 4 BB's, 2 Cruisers, 1 Oiler |
| Seriously Damaged: | 2 BB's, 2 Cruisers, 2 DD's. |
| Moderately Damaged: | 2 BB's, 4 Cruisers. |

| Aircraft | |
|---|---|
| Seriously Damaged: | 157 Planes |
| Razed: | (some) Hangars |
| Our Losses: | 39 Planes |

At this time our southern forces started to make landings. Successful ones were made at KOTA BHARU, SINGORA, BATAAN, BANGKOK, and AMBOINA. The wireless station and airfield at BASCO in the BATAAN Islands north of LUZON were occupied. At SHANGHAI, the British gunboat PENGUIN was sunk. The International Settlement was entered. At PEKING, the American Marines laid down their arms. SINGAPORE was bombed. MIDWAY and WAKE Islands were bombed. CLARK Field and IBA on LUZON were attacked. We have taken over British and American rights and privileges in the southern islands. GUAM was bombed. HONGKONG and DAVAO were bombed.

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9 December 1941 WAKE and GUAM were bombed. The American seaplane carrier LANGLEY was sunk (in DAVAO BAY). An enemy sub appeared off TAKAO Harbor.

10 December The results of our HAWAII Operation were the occasion for joy; an Imperial Rescript was presented to the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet. A THAI-JAPANESE offensive and defensive alliance has been signed. WAKE Island was attacked. The HAYATE (DD) and KISARAGI (DD) were shelled and sunk. Successful landings were made at VIGAN on LUZON; we suffered the loss of one sub-chaser. Occupation of GUAM completed. APARRI on LUZON also captured. MAKIN and TARAWA occupied. Minesweeper #19 wrecked off the mouth of the CAGAYAN River on LUZON. An English fleet was attacked off the MALAY coast, and two of the latest British battleships, the PRINCE OF WALES and the REPULSE, were sunk.

Imperial Rescript:
"At the very outbreak of this war, our Combined Fleet has displayed a brilliant strategy and fought bravely. At HAWAII it has heavily crushed the enemy's fleet and air strength. We have received the report of this signal achievement ourself. Moreover, we extend our deepest praise to our fighting forces, officers and men alike. If they should strive harder and harder, we foresee a magnificent future for our Empire.

11 December Establishment of the ROME-BERLIN-TOKYO Tri-partite Pact.
Attack on WAKE. The results of the naval action off MALAYA were the occasion for joy; an Imperial Rescript was presented to the C-in-C, Combined Fleet.
"The Air Force of the Combined Fleet has crushed the main force of the English Asiatic Fleet in the SOUTH CHINA SEA and has enhanced our power and prestige throughout the area. We are deeply pleased."
Answer of C-in-C.
Declaration of war against AMERICA by ITALY and GERMANY.
Success of landing at LEGASPE.

15 December 1 Enemy Sub off TŌKYŌ Bay
1 Enemy Sub in the BUNGO CHANNEL
3 Enemy Subs near CHICHIJIMA

16 December WAKE attacked.
10 Enemy subs near CHICHIJIMA
1 Enemy sub near TRUK
3 Enemy subs at SHIO SAKI (汐岬 )

17 December The SHINONOME was lost 15 km north of BARAM POINT while on patrol off MIRI. The RO-66 collided with the RO-62 twenty-five miles west of WAKE and sank instantly. The RO-62 suffered practically no damage.

19 December WAKE bombed. A Dutch submarine near PALAU.

20 December PANAMA, COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA, HONDURAS, GUATEMALA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, CUBA, HAITI have declared war on JAPAN. MEXICO has broken off relations with JAPAN.
Enemy Submarines:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Near TŌKYŌ Bay | 2-4 | BUNGŌ Channel | 2-4 |
| " KII | 2-4 | BONIN Islands | 3-4 |
| " MARCUS Islands | 1-2 | TAIWAN STRAIT | 2-4 |
| " HAINAN Island | 2 | PALAU | 4-5 |
| " MARIANA Islands | 1-2 | | |

22 December Successfully landed at LINGAYEN.

23 December Complete occupation of WAKE. Striking Force arrived at HASHIRA SHIMA (near KURE).

| | |
|---|---|
| 25 December 1941 | Surrender of HONG KONG.<br>A successful surprise landing was made at JOLO on MINDANAO. |
| 26 December | The SAGIRI (DD) received a submarine torpedo attack north of KUCHING (SARAWAK) and sank. KUCHING occupied.<br>The #6 Minesweeper and the UNYŌ #2 Maru (第二運洋丸) were sunk by air bombing.<br>The MURASAME (DD) collided with the #20 Minesweeper at TAKAO. |
| -- December | Air attack at MANILA.<br>1 DD, 2 SS, 10 merchant ships sunk.<br>The ASAKAZE sank 1 SS at LINGAYEN. |
| 27 December | The C-in-C of the American Army of the PHILIPPINES declared MANILA an open city. MANILA was heavily bombed. |

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF GUAM (ŌMIYAJIMA)

(12 December 1941)

Installations:

There are facilities for 1 Naval Station.
There is one land air-base. There is also a seaplane base and dredging facilities. There is a PAA flying boat base whichis used as a seaplane base. Submarine base facilities are being expanded. There are shore batteries.
Naval Personnel - about 500 men.
Army Personnel - about 1600 men.

Supplies:

Coal - about 6,000 tons.
Heavy oil - there are 6 heavy oil tanks but their capacity is not known.
There are ammunition storehouses.
Fresh water and provisions - small quantities.

Others:

APRA Harbor is suitable for protection from the wind all year around.
8 or 9 large warships can put in here. There are no suitable anchorages for other vessels.

GUAM OCCUPATION FORCE BATTLE REPORT

The GUAM Island Occupation Forces protected the Southern Detachment (TN: NAN SHI TAI 南支隊 ) and began landing at 0500 on the tenth. While they continued mopping up activities and this force (TN: the GUAM Occupation Force) and the SNLF advanced to the important positions surrounding APRA Harbor (TN: 沖港 ) and occupied it completely. The enemy lost his fighting spirit because of the attacks of several days previously our air forces.

Results of the Battle:

A. We took prisoner the governor and many government employees, and about 200 Marines, including their commander.
B. There was fighting in the streets of AGANA (TN: 阿賀 ). 50 were killed.
C. It was estimated that APRA harbor would be cleared of mines and ships able to anchor within ten days. One oil tank, the gun batteries and powder magazines had been blown up, however, the oil was still burning after 3 days.
D. A 3,000 ton merchantman was seized. 100 kilolitres of airplane fuel was taken, as was much construction material (steel, bombs, too).
E. The wireless and cable stations were both severely damaged and unfit for use.

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SKETCH MAP OF HAHA SHIMA - 2 December 1941




Eleven transports were in the harbor (part of the GUAM Occupation Force)



My Opinions:

For about 6 months before it was attacked, construction was in progress on GUAM: plans had been made on a large scale to make the island a sub base. Looking at the condition of the project after our occupation, I would venture to say that by strengthening these installations, the enemy will be unable to avoid damage by our(TN: submarine) forces a few months later on.

I think the success of our occupation here was primarily due to the enemy's utterly deficient (defense), and then, too, the bold way in which we carried out our surprise attack. But I realize that, our next operation must, at all costs, be begun as soon as possible.

## SUMMARY OF WAKE ISLAND

27 December 1941

Military Installations

There is a base for the Pan-American Airways flying boats. Planes draw up alongside docks. As a base for flying boats, its value is greater than that of MIDWAY. There is a wireless station.

Supplies

There are some facilities. On PEALE Island are the facilities of the Pan-American Airways. There is an air-craft beacon, a powerplant, a hotel, and a wireless station. It is on the supply line which runs to MIDWAY and HAWAII and (going southwest) to GUAM.

Harbors

As a haven from wind and waves its value is greater than that of MIDWAY. Work had been proceeding on a channel which was to be 300 feet wide. At the entrance to the channel, the coral reef was to be cut to a depth of 35 feet and on the inner side, to a depth of 30 feet (TN: This refers to the channel under construction at the outbreak of the war. The outer channel was to be 35 feet deep, the turning basin 30 feet deep, and the width of the channel, 300 feet.)

There are no anchorages in the vicinity and vessels tie up to buoys.

## OPERATIONAL SUMMARY OF THE WAKE ISLAND OCCUPATION

28 December 1941

1. Occupation scheduled for X + 4 day. (Occupation forces began operations after $\frac{N}{X}$.) (TN: Noon on X Day; X Day = December 23 ?).
2. Reconnaissance carried out 4 December($\frac{4}{12}$) by 6 flying boats (from 22nd squadron (CHŪTAI) headquarters) and 12 land-based aircraft ( f" x 12 ).
3. 8 December 1000
   30 land-attack planes (f" ) carried out a bombing attack. (2 land planes ( f" ) out of 9 were probably destroyed, one tank at the seaplane base ( ) was destroyed by fire; 3 fighter planes ( fc ) were sighted, but they did not engage our aircraft.) (Japanese casualties: 1 Petty Officer killed, several planes damaged by shell-fire.)
4. 9 December 0940
   A bombing attack was carried out by 26 land attack aircraft (TN: flo) (5 fighter planes were shot down, the north wing of the barracks was destroyed by fire, part of the airfield ( ) was demolished, the seaplane base ( ) radio station was bombed. No flying boats (fd) were sighted. Radio communications were disrupted from 1005 to 2145.) (Japanese casualties: 1 Air Warrant Officer killed, 1 man slightly wounded, 14 planes damaged by shell fire.)
5. 10 December 2230
   A convoy of eleven merchant ships approached the south coast in a heavy swell. Landing operations were postponed, waiting for an improvement in weather conditions.

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MAP OF WAKE ISLAND
25 Dec. 1941



6. 11 December 0645 The WAKE radio began transmitting to PEARL HARBOR (TN: "NPM").

7. 11 December Jap casualties: The HAYAKAZE (DD) exploded and sank at 0452.
The KISARAGI (DD) exploded and sank at 0531.
The KONGŌ Maru (XCL) was damaged by a hold fire. Rough weather still prevailed in the afternoon and (the landing force) decided to withdraw to KWAJALEIN to make further plans. At 0715, 11 December, 17 land attack planes (TN: flo) attacked the PEALE Island shore batteries and MG positions, and were engaged by fighters for 30 minutes. One fighter was shot down. (Japanese losses: 2 land planes destroyed, 1 reserve 1st Lieutenant, 9 petty officers, and 5 enlisted men killed, 11 aircraft damaged by shell-fire, 1 man slightly wounded.)

8. 11 December 2330 The positions of two naval craft were fixed by RDF in the vicinity of WAKE Island (the ships were thought to be patrol craft, seaplane tenders or oilers).

9. 11 December 2050 [illegible] 27 has withdrawn from the WAKE (attack) force and is joining the submarine force. Most of the submarine force is engaged in patrolling WAKE.

10. 11 December 1100 The TSUGARU (CM) and the MAIZURU 2nd SNLF are standing by for the occupation of WAKE. At 0900 12 December (the attack group) secured from readiness and the SNLF units returned.

11. 12 December The HOYŌ Maru (XAO) returned to RUOTTO for supplies.

12. 12 December 1000 CruDiv 6 (TN: 6S) is to return before 16 December to RUOTTO in order to aid in the operation of the area.

13. 12 December 0840 26 land planes ([illegible] by Lieut. Commander MATSUDA) bombed WAKE. (A warehouse and the western sector AA gun were demolished. Two fighter planes engaged the attack group.) (Japanese casualties: 1 plane exploded, 6 petty officers and 2 enlisted men killed, 4 planes damaged by shell-fire.)

14. An (American) naval vessel appearing at WAKE radioed COM 14th Naval District at 0552, 0721, and 0937, 12 December.

15. 12 December 1145 The position of the American naval vessel which was transmitting is --- nautical miles from WAKE at a bearing of 115° 60'.

16. 13 December 0530 The WAKE occupation force has arrived at RUOTTO.

17. 12 December 0100 Fifteen land planes bombed WAKE with undetermined results. Two 5 place flying boats (TN: ? $f^d$ x 2/5) bombed the airfield (?). There was an air battle. (Japanese casualties: 1 flying boat failed to return.)

18. 13 December 0130 COM CruDiv 6 requested of Chief of Staff, 4th Fleet to include the MAIZURU 2nd SNLF and the KIYOKAWA Maru (APV) in the WAKE occupation force.

19. 13 December 1010 A fighter-reconnaissance plane attached to Airflot 24 (at 5000 meters altitude) observing through a hole in the clouds (reported the following): One or two fighter planes in the revetments at the west side of the runway; no flying boats; one merchant ship carrying out unloading operations.

20. 13 December 1800 Cooperated with Striking Force (TN: KB).

21. 13 December 2320 The gunboat (TN: G) group has been disbanded. The WAKE (occupation) force has been reinforced (TENYŌ Maru (APV), KIYOKAWA Maru (APV), one company of the MAIZURU SNLF, 2 DD of Des iv 24.)

22. 14 December Three 10 place flying boats (TN: $f^d$ x 3/10) (under Lieut. Commander TASHIRO) at 0137 and 30 land-based planes at 0855 under Commander UCHINO bombed WAKE. (Direct hits were scored on the runway, revetments and one fighter plane set afire; the warehouse was set on fire. (Japanese casualties: 11 fighters damaged by shell-fire.)

23. 15 December 1610 8 flying boats (under the command of Lieut. Commander KOIZUMI) effectively bombed the barracks area in the northern part of the main island.

24. 16 December 32 land-attack planes (commanded by Lieut. WATANABE) and one fighter (at 7000 altitude) (reported the following): About 20 AA mobile guns, and a number of high-speed torpedo boats have appeared. ( A heavy oil tank, an ammunition magazine and a warehouse were set on fire, and the base on PEALE Island effectively bombed.) (Jap. casualties: 3 land-attack planes were damaged by shell-fire.)

25. 17 December 1555 8 flying boats bombed the southeast section of PEALE Island. (Causing explosions at the AA gun, the hotel, and wireless station.)

26. 18 December 0940 Land-attack bombers (Type I) carried out reconnaissance. The southeast channel was blocked up.

27. 19 December 0845 27 land-based attack bombers bombed the airfield [5] on WILKES Island. 1 fighter engaged them. The anti-aircraft guns on the airfield on WILKES Island and one MG Unit were destroyed. (Japanese losses: One man killed aboard plane. 12 attack bombers (TN: here fld) were hit by shells.

28. 20 December 1330 A flight of enemy patrol planes arrived (TN: SHOKAIKI).

CONDITION OF THE ENEMY

(Based upon aerial reconnaissance and sundry intelligence reports)

1. Marines — 300
2. Civilians employed by the Military — 1000
3. Dual purpose guns — 12 (part with mobile emplacements).
4. Coast defense batteries, machine gun positions — a great number.
5. Fighters — several
6. Submarines and torpedo-boats are lurking in the vicinity

OUR FORCES

1. Air Forces of the South Seas Force are carrying out bombing attacks day after day.
2. A Submarine force (RO-60, 61, 62) — is carrying out patrols around the island.
3. Reinforcement Butai (SORYŪ and HIRYŪ) on the 20th cooperated in landing operations by sending their planes in to attack.
4. Attacking Force —
   (Flagship) YUBARI (CL), SubRon 6 (6SS). Destroy.
   Landing Force - KONGO Maru, KINRYU Maru, Patrol Boats Nos. 32 and 33;
   Combined SNLF.
   SNLF Headquarters.
   1st Company (Company commanded by UCHIDA, MAIZURU SNLF)
   2nd Company (Company commanded by TAKANO, 6th Base Force)
   3rd Company (Company commanded by ITAYA, MAIZURU SNLF)
5. Covering Force —
   TENRYU (CL) and TATSUTA (CL).
6. Supporting Force —
   Cru iv 6 (6S).

PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED SHOULD ENEMY (SHIP) BE ENCOUNTERED

1. The ships which sight the enemy shall expend every effort to conceal our force by laying smoke screens and by other means.
2. In the event that enemy surface naval vessels approach, in accordance with orders, the KINRYU Maru and the patrol boats shall avail themselves of every opportunity to retire from the disputed area.
   The SubRon 6 (6SS) and the Cru iv 18 (18S) are to annihilate the enemy.
   Destroy.

MAINTENANCE OF SECRECY

1. Limited use of radio.
2. Light control
3. Localized use of lights for signalling at night and, as demanded by the situation, proper control of illuminating strength. May be used to determine bearing.
4. Throwing overboard things which will float in the water is strictly forbidden.
5. Disposal of bilge water which contains oily matter.

OPERATIONS OF THE SUPPORTING FORCE

1. On the 21st at 0800 the Force will leave MELLU Channel. The landing force will carry out a landing at 0200 on the same day. The Force will proceed to a point about 50 miles to the east of WAKE Island and thereafter, shall act as the enemy situation may warrant.
2. When the attack on WAKE gets under way, the Force shall proceed to a point about 50 miles to the southeast of the island and patrol in support (TN: of the attack).

23 December 1030 The occupation of WAKE Island has been completed.

SUMMARY OF THE BATTLE

1. Enemy prisoners: Lt.-Colonel and his command --- 430
   Skilled laborers --- 1100

   In addition to this, many were killed and we acquired many installations, gun emplacements, and ammunition.
2. Our Losses:
   Killed --- UCHIDA Company --- 9
   Seriously Wounded --- 19 Men on Patrol Boat No. 32
   Slightly Wounded --- 34

   In addition to these losses, 2 patrol boats were heavily damaged and 1 plane was shot down.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BATTLE

1. When we think about the lessons that may be leaned from a battle, we must view it with the eyes of a critic and to the end maintain the point of view of the other side.
2. Strive to the utmost to learn about the state of affairs of the enemy; though you may have exhausted every means to learn this, and you may believe that you know enough about it, you never know enough. However, after you have learned about the enemy and have made thorough preparations, there remains only the necessity for resolute action.
3. When it comes time to carry out the operation, look at the situation as the enemy does and try to discover his weak points.
4. Always take into account obstacles that may result from the weather (wind and waves, and range of vision).
5. Do not be defeated by a multiplicity of plans. Assemble similar plans into one whole.
6. In the light of the battle, it is foolish to refrain from delivering an all-out attack.
7. The distribution of military strength should be considered principally with regard to the main strategy. The decision as to the time of commencement of action must be made carefully.
8. It is essential in an operation that the various types of aircraft be brought together.
9. The fact that damage from accidental explosions (YŪBAKU) of torpedoes and depth charges was very great should be borne in mind.
10. In war, the chances of success are three to seven. Out of 81 men 50 were killed. However, several hundred prisoners were taken and we captured the whole island. The side that fights well the last five minutes is the one that wins.
11. When battle is undertaken, the leadership of the commanding officers should be firm. By no means, may there be any faltering, or hesitation. When preparations have been made, action should follow.

12. Though it is easy to throw away one's life by being impetuous, when once it is realized that death is pleasant, to live and do one's duty is difficult.
13. The idealist and the materialist are complimentary. The fallacy of AMERICA which worships materialism has been exposed.
14. Leadership in battle: Inform even the engine-room hands who cannot see the enemy of the situation. Exhaust all one's knowledge and ability when he is in a fatal position.
15. Acquisition of air supremacy is necessary. However, naval vessels still fulfill their peculiar purpose.
16. In glorious battle, the function of the supporting force is a thankless task.
17. Orders must be carefully considered. Once, however, they have been given, they should be carried out to the letter.
18. Inventiveness and originality. The most profitable use of new weapons is the responsibility fo the strategist. (Believe earnestly in certain victory.)
19. Since the advancement of AA weapons is very slow we must fight planes with planes, and also we must destroy the base before the enemy can rise.
20. Importance of air bases (Bases for action). Planes must inevitably have bases.
21. The capture of the isolated island by occupation operations will be comparatively difficult as the whole island is a fortress; and, in addition to this, operating freely will be extremely difficult.
22. There are opportunities in battle. Seizing these opportunities wins victories; when one misses these opportunities he cannot win a victory no matter what he does.
23. Occupation operations and submarines. The enemy can only prove a threat by means of its submarines. It must be said that if the enemy were to conceal even one or two submarines in the vicinity of WAKE Island, they would be a great menace to our operations.
24. Operational Directions.
    (A) Combined operations (KYŌDŌ SAKUSEN) are not feasible, as a rule. If there were a Naval Special Landing Force of 20,000 men, landing operations would be easy. In combined operations there are many occasions where opportunities are missed for striking at weak points with force. (JITSU WO MOTTE, KYO WO UTSU)
    (B) Insufficient military strength causes unforeseen failure. It is said that the lion exhausts his entire strength even to catch one rabbit.
    (C) A force without a central unit (SHŪTAI) is not possible. There is a need for operational leaders to amass (information).

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THE BISMARCK SEA OPERATIONS
28 January, 1942

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BISMARCK SEA OPERATIONS:

1. POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE (FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC):

Foreign: In our war with ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES we are bringing to bear, as might have been expected, economic pressure and we are dispatching against ENGLAND in the Orient armies of deliverance. We shall deliver a fatal blow against AUSTRALIA and shall carry out such attacks as will uproot the foundations of the British Colonial Empire which even now is in the process of disintegration.

Domestic: In reading the history of the sea-girt Island Empire of JAPAN, as is natural, traces of those peerless men who ventured upon the seas and embarked upon adventures abroad are not lacking. Though it may be said that it was the WAKO (TN: A band of pirates who roamed the seas of CHINA and KOREA during the ASHIKAGA period) who revealed the spirit of the Japanese nation by hoisting the ancient flag inscribed "HACHIMAN, GREAT BODDHI-SATVA" (TN: HACHIMAN is the God of War in the Japanese pantology; BODDHI-SATVA is the BUDDHA-ELECT) and crossing the seas, the TOKUGAWA's closed the country for the long period of three hundred years (TN: 1638-1867) and the overseas expansion dissolved into nothingness like a dream. The delusion of national isolation was finally destroyed. Though it may be said that great strides forward were made during the period of MEIJI, it was a period of self-examination and development. During the TAISHO era we saw the nation carried away by the tide of international liberalism and effiminate ideals of peace. Retrenchment was a mistake.

The present invasion, however, will awaken a billion people. Our confidence is unshaken and we proceed with the conviction that we shall smash through the strong points of the enemy by this southern advance and that we shall bring the campaign to a most successful conclusion. We shall spare not the slightest effort.

2. ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE:

The resources of NEW GUINEA have not yet been exploited. The mining industry, especially in the production of gold, is well-known. There are fisheries. Being an intermediate trading place, its future possibilities as a relay base for transportation and communications are enormous.

3. MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE:

a. A stronghold from which aggressive offensives may be launched.

It cuts the most advantageous South Pacific line of the American offensive strategy against JAPAN—HAWAII, HOWLAND ISLAND, SAMOA, FIJI, SOLOMON ISLANDS, and BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

b. From the standpoint of defense, it is a buttress against invasion.

It presents a powerful defensive front against the south.

c. A base from which to carry out blockade:

The sea routes which bind AUSTRALIA to ASIA will lie within bombing range of our planes. The shipping lanes, bays and ports which lie beyond bombing range may be threatened by our submarines based in [illegible].

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STRENGTH OF THE ATTACKING FORCES:

1. NAVY:

a. Striking and Holding Fleet (TN: KAKUCYO KANTAI):

Main Units:

MineDiv 19 (OKINOSHIMA Flagship, TSUGARU, TENYŌ MARU, MOGAMIGAWA MARU);

SubRon 6 (YŪBARI Flagship);

DesDiv 29 (OITE Flagship, ASANAGI and YŪNAGI);

DesDiv 30 (MUTSUKI Flagship, YAYOI and MOCHIZUKI);

KIYOKAWA (聖") 丸 ) ,KONGŌ [illegible],5th Gunboat Squadron, 14th Minesweeper Squadron, and Submarine-chaser Div 56.

Supporting Units:

CruDiv 18 (TENRYŪ Flagship, TATSUTA);

DesDiv 23 (KIKUTSUKI Flagship, UZUKI and YUZUKI).

KINRYŪ [illegible] (TN: 金龍丸 )

MAIZURU 2nd SNLF

HIROSHIMA Naval Landing Force, one company.

b. Air Forces at TRUK:

YOKOHAMA Naval Air Group (14 flying boats);

CHITOSE Naval Air Group (9 fighters and 18 medium attack bombers).

c. Indirect Guard Forces:

Supporting Force----6th Fleet;

TRUK Area Guard Force;

SAIPAN Area Guard Force;

Cooperating Forces:

CarDiv 1

~~CarDiv~~ Battlin 3 (half)

2. ARMY:

Commander-in-Chief of South Seas Detachment: Major-General MORII Tomitaro,

Infantry--------144th Regiment;

Cavalry---------3rd Company;

Mountain Gun Troops--------1st Battalion;

Engineers--------1st Company;

Commissary--------2nd Company;

Mobile Field AA---1st Company;

(The above all from the 55th Infantry Division).

(TN: In the original, this to "Navy and Army", is ruled through and marked "not permissible".)

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY IN THE BISMARCK AREA:

1. Surface Vessels:

   a. Australian Fleet;

      2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, a few other ships.

      Location not clearly known.

   b. Anglo-American Fleet;

      5 battleships, 2 carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, unknown number of destroyers. It is not known whether or not they will engage in battle (TN: RAIKŌ 來攻 ).

2. Aircraft:

   Several flying boats; several torpedo-bombers. Airfield.

   Total planes, all types: about 50 (British and Australian).

   Total flying boats: under 50 (American).

3. Submarines :

   There is as yet no information concerning the situation of enemy submarines. There is a great possibility that American submarines have gradually made their way west. We assume, too, that British and Dutch submarines have made an appearance in the BISMARCK Sea Area.

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IMPORTANT POINTS ABOUT RABAUL

29 January 1942

I. MILITARY AFFAIRS:

1. Air Fields (TN: 区 ): RABAUL and VUNAKANAU

2. Defenses: Volunteer Defense Army (1 rifle company; 1 MG platoon), Roving Patrols (JUNKEITAI 巡警隊 ) about 172.
Australian soldiers: About 500
Batteries: Under construction at 3 places.

3. Security: 20 miles outside the harbor guard by planes. Outsiders forbidden to approach the air field and at night the movements of the Japanese are watched.

II. ESSENTIALS OF GOVERNMENT:

"Territory of NEW GUINEA" Government Offices, Customs House, Law Courts Post Office, Wireless Station, Prison, Hospital.

III. POPULATION:

Urban Areas ---------- about 4,000
If nearby villages are included: about 12,500

Of which are:

| | |
|---|---|
| Natives | 10,300 (majority MICRONESIAN) |
| Whites | 1,000 |
| Chinese | 1,200 |
| Japanese | 25 |

IV. CONDITIONS OF THE HARBOR:

1. It is easy for a formation to enter the harbor.

2. The body of water which lies north of an east-west line drawn through DAWAPIA Rocks has a length of approximately 2 miles and a maximum breadth of 1.5 miles. Mud bottom. Depth of the water is from 84.1 — 100 metres, but the northern half is 47 metres or less in depth. The anchorage for warships is, for the most part, between 10.9 and 31.5 metres in depth while the anchorage for merchant shipping is 36.5 metres deep.

3. Berthing capacity for the harbor is 5 CruDivs.

4. It affords excellent shelter.

5. Whenever there is a steady south-east wind blowing strongly, the southern half is bound to be rough.

6. Sea-defense is easy.

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METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE RABAUL AREA

(31 January 1942)

1. GENERAL

Two periods are distinguished -- that of the northwest seasonal wind which extends from December to April and that of the southeast seasonal wind which extends from April to November.

In the winter, the northeast tradewinds of the northern hemisphere are constantly blowing, part of which cross the equator and penetrate into the southern hemisphere. When the northwest seasonal winds begin, the southeast seasonal wind gradually recedes with the fall of the southern hemispheric high pressure. It is believed that, about January, the area of variable winds at the ends of the north and south air fronts (TN: doldrum area) passes over the RABAUL region. As a consequence, the weather in this area is generally uncertain.

2. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WEATHER

(a) Land and sea breezes are conspicuous.
However, they rarely exceed an altitude of 500 metres and their area are generally restricted to about 10 miles including inland and sea.

(b) Windless Nights.
It is said that this phenomenon is more conspicuous during clear weather than during cloudy weather.

(c) Daily change of atmospheric pressure.
The atmospheric pressure, as in the case of the inner South Seas shows a regular daily change. Maximum highs are at 0900 and 2200 while maximum lows are at 0400 and 1600.

(d) Amount of Rainfall.
January has the heaviest rainfall of the year. An average amount of over 400 mm. of rain fall.

(e) Wind.
In January, southerly winds are slightly more numerous, 35% while northerly winds are somewhat fewer - 30%.
However, in February, the southerly winds are reduced to 20% while northerly winds are increased to 40%. Judging from this in January, the winds alternate north and south with this area as the center of the doldrums region while in February the doldrums line has moved south.

3. WEATHER FORECASTING

Judging from various conditions:

(a) In the case of a northwesterly wind, heavy rains accompanying sudden squalls. Weather generally bad and continuing for several days.

(b) In the case of a southeasterly wind:
Winds are generally light. Weather in this region probably good.

(c) In the case of the doldrums line same as paragraph (a).
Weather bad and uncertain.

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RESULTS OF THE "R" CAMPAIGN
(At the beginning of the landings - 0000 on 23 January 1942)

0025 Succeeded in unloading at KAVIENG without mishap. Met no resistance.
0415 Occupied the airfield in the town. The city streets were razed by the fires the enemy had started. The telegraph office and all its installations were smashed. Completed sweeping the anchorage for mines.
1400 Occupied VANAKANAU; enemy resistance there. Captured 17 foreigners at NEW HANOVER; many heavy and light machine guns, rifles, ammunition and weapons were also confiscated. No defense installations at GASMATA. The mopping up on CREDNER Island is finished.
0250 Town of RABAUL has been completely occupied. There was a counter-attack by enemy planes. We have surrounded and are attacking the enemy in the WALAUR Sector. The inhabitants of (RABAUL) have all fled. Apparently all the Japanese residents there had been transported to SIDNEY on the 14th. 100 prisoners taken. 6000 bombs and 60 drums of plane fuel were also captured. Our losses were one carrier-based torpedo bomber and one carrier-based bomber; The Army lost 14 dead and 15 wounded.

OUTLINE OF THE S.N.L.F. LANDING

31 January 1942

at YSABEL PASSAGE

Flag signals from the commander (SHIREIKAN);

Clean out the area along the shore near the anchorage.

I. The objects of the operation.

A. Hostile persons (deserters, recalcitrant white men, etc.)
B. Enemy installations (wireless, gun, rifle installations, etc.)

II. Area to be cleaned out.

The North shore of NEW HANOVER Island is to be covered from 150°20' E. Long. eastward to 150°28' E. Long. in sectors of two minutes longitude each. Our ships are to cover these sectors in reverse numerical order.

III. The dispatched SNLF

Four platoons commanded by a company commander aboard each ship (1 WO or above, 10 rated and non-rated men in each platoon); one command platoon; total personnel, 60 or less.

IV. Landing Boats (HAKENTEI)

They shall be armed, shall move along shore in pace with the progress of the SNLF, and shall stand ready to do signalling and any sudden mustering.

V. Dress

The usual SNLF battle outfit will be worn.

VI. Unless there are special orders to the contrary, the landing boats will leave their ships at 0700 on 1 February. They shall have returned by 1500.

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CONDITION OF THE SHORES AND ANCHORAGES OF ISABEL PASSAGE

4 February 1942

From what we saw with our glasses, the entire island (NEW HANOVER) was one large, dense jungle, upon which no axe had made its mark since time began. Here and there along the shore, however, were human habitations. The mode of living was not altogether strange; indeed, the general aspect was Occidental. I was surprised at the blackness of the natives. Only a piece of cloth was wrapped about their loins. In general, they were resting in an absent-minded fashion, as if they didn't know the meaning of work. There was one man among them scratching his head just like a monkey. They would crawl about when changing their positions. Their behavior approached that of an animal.

At TSOI KOTO we spotted about twenty natives gathered together. Two or three persons stood in the center, surrounded by the others. They all seemed to be discussing something. Or else they were surprised at our anchoring and had called a meeting.

Living things were everywhere. We saw only drooping trees spreading out their leafy branches. If we could have penetrated to the depths of the jungle, we would surely have seen many strange things.

At TSOI KOTO an Australian managed a plantation. He had a western-style house.

The natives used a "canoe" in moving about on the water.

The water's depth at our anchorage was about 15 metres. There was a shallow spot 10 metres deep, however. The bottom was sandy.

The island had yet to be exploited at all; but with the coming of our countrymen in the future, I believe it will be greatly developed.

SALAMOA-LAE OPERATIONS:

10 February 1942

"LAE"

Although there is no place which can be called a natural harbor, buildings and air field installations have been set up; there are docks where sea-going vessels can tie up, and on calm days liners can put in there. Moreover, this harbor is equipped with 10-ton cranes and lighters with a capacity of 4000 tons and these transport and unload cargoes on ships which are bound for (TN: or are coming from) the SOLOMON Islands.

"SALAMOA"

Because this harbor is the port of entry to MOROBE and "GOLDFIELD" (TN: ?) it is also called NEW GOLDFIELD HARBOR. As a result of the harbor construction of 1926 there is a good harbor which affords shelter of various depths of water. Ships anchor about 550 metres off-shore; although small-type vessels can approach the shore inside the harbor and drop anchor there is nothing of particular importance at present in the way of harbor facilities.

(TN: The next few lines were marked "Not Permitted" in original document.)

1. Forces occupying the SR Area:
   Flag DesRon 6; DesRon 6; Minesweeper Division 14; KIYOKAWA Maru (AFW); TSUGARU (CM); TENYO Maru; KINRYU Maru (XCL); KONGO Maru (XCL); KOKAI Maru (黄海丸); 8th Base Force (TN: Bg) SNLF.

2. Supporting Forces (SHIEN BUTAI)
   Flag CruDiv 6; CruDiv 6; CruDiv 18; DesRon 23; TŌHŌ Maru (XAO).

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3. Submarine Forces
   Flag SubRon 7; SubRon 7.

4. Land Based Air Forces
   Flag Airflot 24; Airflot 24; OBORO

5. Carrier-based Air Forces
   Captain, SHOHO (CV); SHŌHŌ (CV); HOKAZE (DD).

Conditions of the Enemy:

1. The Volunteer Defence Forces of the enemy in this area consist of 2 rifle companies and 1 machine gun platoon.
2. The enemy air forces are based at LAE and SALAMOA and they are in close communication with PORT MORESBY and TOWNESVILLE while operating in the RABAUL Area (TN: "R" Area).
   There are less than 10 planes for each base and their activity is not very lively; they fly in mobile deployment in each place, however, and it will be difficult to wipe them out.
3. We doubt that the American striking force will restore its operations in the SOUTH SEAS Area and there is only a possibility that they will strike in this area.

PORT MORESBY (TN: MO)

Operations and Disposition of Strength 15 May 1942

(TN: In the original document the following lines were crossed out and labeled "Not Permissible".)

Central Unit (SHŪTAI)

Flag 4 Fleet KASHIMA (CL) TOKIWA (CM) YUNAGI (DD) SEISEN Maru (AV)

MORESBY Striking Force

Flag CruDiv 5 (TN: 5S) (Minus the NACHI) CarDiv 5 (Sf) DesDiv 27
DesDiv 7 (dg) (minus 1 DD) TOHO Maru (XAO or APV)

MO Occupation Forces:

Flag CruDiv 6; CruDiv 6; DesRon 6 (minus the 1 DD of DesDiv 23); SHŌHŌ; DesDiv 7 (only 1 DD); SubDiv 21; Minesweeper 20; CruDiv 18; TSUGARU (CM); KAMIKAWA Maru (XCVS); KIYOKAWA Air Group; KOEI Maru (高栄丸); AZUMASAN Maru (東亜山丸); GOYO Maru (五洋丸); OSHIMA (XR) (硫島); HOYO Maru (宝洋丸); IRO (AO) (石廊);

TULAGI Occupation Operations

Flag MinDiv 19; MinDiv 19 (TSUGARU) and TOKIWA (CM) ); DesDiv 23 1 DD; SHŌEI Maru (勝永丸).

Submarine Forces:

Flag SubRon 7; SubRon 7 (minus SubDiv 21).
Surface Escort Unit 2 (TAI).
Flag Escort Unit 23 Surface Escort Unit (TAI) 2.

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Conditions of the Enemy:

1. American Air Forces in the Australian Area --- presumably 200 planes (1st line).
2. It appears that considerable strength is concentrated in the PORT DARWIN and TOWNSVILLE sectors.
3. There is no information about the American Striking Force since (TN: their arrival), but there is a great possiblility that they are becoming stronger in this area.
4. Moreover it appears that the British Navy has dispatched a force composed of 2-3 cruisers and some destroyers with a battleship as main strength to the Australian area.
5. Although submarine activities have not been very lively, submarines still exist in the RABAUL area.
6. Transportation of materiel for AUSTRALIA. Transportation by plane is becoming gradually more active.
7. Since the activity of enemy reconnaissance planes has increased, it has become difficult to conceal our plans from them; security precautions are particularly important.
8. It has become necessary to take especially strict AA precautions.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORAL SEA BATTLE

Outline of Battle of 4th Fleet.

On 4 May information concerning the enemy striking force (TN: KB) which had attacked TULAGI was not very clear. On 6 May at 0830 a YOKOHAMA Air Group (TN: HAMAKU) search plane discovered an enemy force composed of 1 CV, 1 BB, 2 cruisers and 5 DD at S15° 55' E158° 35' proceeding south. This was outside our radius of attack and about 0900 contact with the enemy was lost. As a result while the MORESBY (MO) Striking Force (KB) was preparing for enemy operations, the MORESBY (MO) Occupation force acted in accordance with established plans (A shipping group left RABAUL (RR) at 1600 on 4 May).

On 7 May at 0600 5 enemy carrier-based planes and at 0622 35 carrier-based planes, attacked in the area assigned to the MORESBY occupation force. Reconnaissance planes of the CruDiv 6 at 0640 sighted 1 BB, 1 CV, 2 cruisers and 7 DD proceeding north at a point S12° 15' E154° 30'. Later, at 0830 it was announced that there were 2 CV. At 0558 patrol-attack planes of the MORESBY Striking Force sighted a force which included a ship resembling an aircraft carrier at at a point S15° 55' E157° 50'. The planes went to destroy the enemy force with its entire strength. However, a tanker was recognized to the right (this ship was bombed by part of the planes; heavily damaged and sunk). The MORESBY Striking Force (MOKB) hurried toward the enemy in the west.

0700: The MORESBY Occupation Force (TN: "MO" - KŌRYAKU BUTAI) has withdrawn its shipping group (TN: SENDAN) to the northwest and it is continuing strict AA precautionary measures.

0920: 52 miles bearing 59° from DEBOYNE approximately 60 enemy carrier-based bombers and fighters attacked us. They concentrated a torpedo and bombing attack on the SHOHO(CV). CruDiv 6 (6S) mustered all available force and tried to protect the SHOHO but she had been hit by more than 3 torpedoes and 6 bombs. She fought bravely until the very last and at 0935 she sank.

The Occupation Forces prepared for a second attack by the enemy and withdrew to the north for a while. The main force (TN: SHUTAI) retired to the north to avoid an air attack.

1500: The SAZANAMI (DD) while preparing for a counter attack at night picked up survivors of the SHOHO.

1244: Land-based attack-planes from the Base Air Force attacked the enemy Striking Force (TN: Enemy "KB"), sank 1 battleship, and heavily damaged 1 battleship.

The MORESBY Striking Force planned to attack at dusk and at 1420 15 carrier based attack and bombing planes were sent out, but we did not locate the enemy because of a sudden squall over the target area. While searching for the enemy in that vicinity we were attacked by enemy carrier-based fighters which came from the clouds and we engaged in an air battle with them. On the way back (TN: to the base) one group(ICHI BU) of carrier-based bombers discovered the enemy Striking Force (TN: "KB") in a squall at 13° South 154° 14' East at 1700, but it could not attack them on account of the squall and darkness. At 2010 the planes returned and landed. 7 planes failed to return. At about 1800 tracking planes lost contact with the enemy and the enemy's movements became unknown to us. The distance between us and the enemy was about 300 miles and the night battle stopped. At dawn on the 8th the attack was resumed and the day for the occupation of PORT MORESBY was postponed until X plus 2 days.

CruDiv 6 (TN: 6S) and 2 DD (TN: 2 D) were added to the MORESBY Striking Forces.

On the 8th at 0622 reconnaissance planes from the SHŌKAKU (CV) sighted an enemy striking force composed of 1 battleship, 2 carriers, 3 cruisers, and 6 destroyers at 14° 30' South 154° 40' East. The MORESBY Striking Force dispatched an attack unit at 0730. At this time CruDiv 6 (TN: 6S) 100 nautical miles southwest of SHORTLAND Islands, was attempting to refuel from the IRO (AO) when patrol planes of the 11 Air Fleet (TN: 11 AF) reported that their and our striking forces were fighting. The ships stopped refuelling immediately and were ordered to join the CruDiv 18 and the DesRon 6 (TN: 6 Sd) and advance southward at full speed in order to cooperate with our striking force (TN: KB).

At 0930 we attacked the enemy carriers of the SARATOGA Class and YORKTOWN Class. We hit the SARATOGA Class ship with more than 9 torpedoes and 10 bombs and we hit the YORKTOWN Class ship with more than 3 torpedoes and 8 bombs. Definitely sunk. In addition we scored torpedo hits on 1 battleship.

From 0856 to 1020 more than 60 enemy carrier-based planes attacked the MORESBY Striking Unit 3 times. They scored 3 bomb hits on the SHŌKAKU (CV) and 8 near misses. It was impossible to take off or land because fires broke out. It left the battle area.

At 0830 land-based search-attack planes sighted 1 BB, 2 cruisers and 4 DD of the enemy at 13° South and 149° East. Although we contacted them we could not dispatch an attack unit with the Base Air Force because of rain the the VUNAKANAU Area.

At this point we had to take into consideration the condition of the enemy surface forces and the difficulties of protecting transport groups with carriers against enemy land-based planes. We have postponed the occupation of PORT MORESBY. The group (TN: transport group) will return to RABAUL.

Moreover, in consideration of the fuel situation, etc., the Striking Force was ordered at 1300 to stop the attack and to go north. The MORESBY main force (SHUTAI) also reversed its course and went to fuel. Thus, while the MORESBY operational force (SAKUSEN BUTAI) was preparing for the enemy striking force (KB) the order was issued to fall into position to help the occupation of the NAURU and OCEAN Areas. At 2045 the C-in-C of the Combined Fleet issued an order to strike to the utmost to annihilate remaining units of the enemy force.

The MORESBY Striking Force (MOKB), the CruDiv 6, 1 DD, DesRon 6, and the seaplane scouting squadron (SUITEITAI) were ordered to expedite fueling and to make attack preparations.

On the 9th most of the float reconnaissance planes from the DEBOYNE base, acting in concert with the Base Air Force in reconnoitering the enemy searched in the region to the south. The MORESBY Occupation Force also set out to search for and pursue the remaining enemy forces but was unable to follow the movements of the enemy.

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Results of the Engagement

1. Enemy Strength
   (a) 2 BB, 2 cruisers, 4 DD
   (b) 1 BB, 2 CV, 3 cruisers, 6 DD
   (c) 1 AO, 1 DD

2. Sunk and Damaged
   7 May: 1 large type tanker (about 20000 tons), 1 DD sunk almost certainly.
   8 May: 1 CV, SARATOGA Class. Sinking confirmed.
   1 CV, YORKTOWN Class. Sinking confirmed.
   1 BB (Class not certain). Set afire and made to release heavy oil by a torpedo.
   1 Cruiser (Class not certain). After receiving a torpedo from a carrier-based attack plane, exploded, caught afire and listed.
   (The above results were obtained by CarDiv 5 and an air group (fg).
   7 May: 1 BB of CALIFORNIA Class sunk.
   1 BB of WARSPITE Class. Heavily damaged.
   1 CA of CANBERRA Class. Heavily damaged.
   (The above results were obtained by the Base Air Force.)

3. Planes Shot Down (7 May - 8 May)

   Ship-board fighters - 58 planes
   Type unknown - 8
   Shipboard bombers and attack planes - 32
   TOTAL - 98 (10 not positive)

4. Remaining Strength

   (a) 1 BB (heavily damaged); 2 Cruisers (1 heavily damaged); 4 DD.
   (b) 1 BB (medium damage); 3 Cruisers (1 medium damage); 6 DD.

COMBAT LESSONS FROM THE WAR FOR GREATER EAST ASIA

SECTION I - AN OUTLINE OF IMPORTANT BATTLES

CHAPTER I. First Sea Battle of the SOLOMON Islands.

1. (A) Forces which participated:

   Flagship (TN: P ): CHŌKAI (CA); CruDiv 6
   (Flagship (TN: F ): AOBA (CA), KAKO (CA), KINUGASA (CA), FURUTAKA (
   Flagship (TN: F ): TENRYŪ (CL), YŪBARI (CL), YŪKAZE (DD).

   (B) Enemy Forces:

   9 CA; 1 CL (TN: CXL); 8 DD's.

2. Developments:

   (A) On the 7th at 0435 the TULAGI Communications Base reported that an enemy striking force accompanied by an occupation force had begun landing operations at TULAGI and at GUADALCANAL. Our forces have therefore decided to penetrate their anchorage and annihilate them
   (B) On the 8th at 2100 a search-attack plane with flares took off from the ships.
   (C) 2120: Commanding Officer formed a single column with his ship at the head and moved to the attack.
   (D) At 2246 and at 2250: Sighted enemy destroyers sailing individual courses away from us but in order to conceal our plans we avoided being seen by the enemy and so passed them without action.

(E) 2331: "All forces, Attack", was ordered; Course 120°, Speed: 26 knots.

(F) 2337: Sighted ACHILLES type enemy ship to the Northeast. CHOKAI fired torpedoes.

(G) Thenceforth, each ship made a surprise torpedo attack on the enemy ships which were making a rendezvous. By 2350 we had blown up and sunk (or attacked and sunk) 3 cruisers (TN: CX 3) and 1 destroyer.

(H) After the FURUTAKA torpedoed and sank a large type enemy destroyer at 2346 she was dangerously close to colliding with a large damaged enemy cruiser but she changed her course by porting her rudder and torpedoed and sank said large cruiser. She became separated from the ship next ahead and proceeded with the YŪBARI and the TENRYŪ.

(I) After we split to the East and West the CHŌKAI (CA) and CruDiv 6 (minus the FURUTAKA), which made up the Eastern Unit, shelled and torpedoed the enemy 4 cruisers and 5 DD's newly sighted to the North. The FURUTAKA, TENRYŪ, and YŪBARI, which made up the Western Unit, shelled the enemy. The two groups, cooperating, attacked from both sides and by 0012 they had completely destroyed the enemy.

(J) YŪNAGI (DD) torpedoed and sank an enemy cruiser at 2355. Considering the movements of the YŪBARI she executed a turn at a very great angle. Because she was exceptionally far removed from the main force she reversed (TN: made a complete turn), and continuing to battle with one enemy destroyer, withdrew by herself.

(K) On the 9th at 0200: In order to withdraw from the sphere of enemy bombing, the whole force received orders to withdraw.

3. Results of the Battle:

| | |
|---|---|
| Blown up and sunk: | 2 CA, 1 CL (TN: LCxl), 1 DD. |
| Attacked and sunk: | 1 CA (by torpedo), 2 CA (by torpedo and gunfire), 2 CA, 6 DD. |
| Damaged: | 1 CA (by torpedo), 2 DD. |

CHAPTER II. 12 November. The Third (sic) Sea Battle of the SOLOMONS Islands.

1. Forces which participated:

1 BatDiv (TN: "11S") (Flagship (TN: 11S) HIEI (BB) and the KIRISHIMA (BB) bombarded the airfield on GUADALCANAL.
CruDiv 10 (TN: "10S) (TN: written a second time and crossed out) (Flagship (TN: ) NAGARA. DesDiv 61 (TN: 61 dg) (TERUTSUKI) DesDiv 16 (TN: 16 dg) Divisional Command (TN: ? ) YUKIKAZE and the AMATSUKAZE DesDiv 6 (TN: 6 dg) (AKATSUKI, IKAZUCHI and the INAZUMA) screened the firing units (SHAGEKITAI).
DesRon 4 (TN: 4Sd) DesDiv 9 (TN: 9 dg) (Flagship: [TN: ] ASAGUMO) DesDiv 2 (TN: 2dg) Divisional Command (TN: ? ) MURASAME, SAMIDARE, YUDACHI, HARUSAME.
Minesweeping and protection for the advance.
DesDiv 27 (TN: 27dg) (Division Command (TN: ) SHIGURE, SHIRATSUYU, and the YŪGURE.) Protecting GUADALCANAL and the RUSSELL Islands.

Enemy forces:

| | |
|---|---|
| LUNGA Area: | 4 CA |
| | 2 CL |
| | 7 DD |
| | 6 Torpedo Boats (TN: Tx¢). |
| TULAGI Area: | 3 CA |
| | 2 DD |
| | 1 Torpedo Boat (TN: GYŌRAITEI X 1) |

2. Developments:

(A) 0830. A B-17 flying from the south came in contact with BatDiv 11 but was driven off by fighters of CarDiv 2 (TN: fc/2sf).

(B) At about sunset a Type Zero float reconnaissance plane from the HIEI (BB) sighted some 10 enemy vessels anchored at GUADALCANAL.

(C) 2312: Unable to find the enemy even by taking a firing course of 130°.

(D) 2343: The YŪDACHI and the HIEI sighted the silhouettes of severa enemy ships and charged with full force and began to battl

(E) The Screening Force (CHOKUEI TAI) and the Firing Force (SHAGEKI TA fired guns and torpedoes at the enemy from his west flank. The YŪDACHI (DD) conformed with this and doubled the attack from the east and one after another we blew up and sank the enemy.
On account of this the enemy gradually retreated to the north; par of the Screening Force (CHOKUEI TAI) and the Firing Force (SHAGEKI TAI) swept the enemy from the seas firing torpedoes and guns in succession.

(F) The mopping-up unit, before going ahead, fell behind (KŌRAKU) when the main force had maneuvered to retire to the north of SAVO Islan It came up almost abreast with the main force but passed astern of the main force at the south side of SAVO Island and went to the north side of the island. It cooperated with the Screening Force and part of the Firing Force causing the annihilation of the enemy forces remaining.

(G) From 2350 to 0034 we destroyed the major part of the enemy power in the area and we then withdrew to the North.

3. Results of the Battle:

| | |
|---|---|
| Sunk (by torpedoes): | 3 Heavy Cruisers (TN: Ca x 3) |
| | 1 Light Cruiser (TN: Ca x 1) |
| Sunk (by gunfire): | 2 Heavy Cruisers (TN: Ca x 2) |
| | 1 Light Cruiser (TN: Ca x 1) |
| | 3 Destroyers (TN: d x 3) |
| Severely Damaged: | 2 Heavy Cruisers (TN: Ca x 2) |
| | 5 Destroyers (TN: d x 5)(sank later) |
| | 1 Torpedo Boat (TN: t x 1) (sank later) |
| Medium Damage: | 2 Destroyers (TN: d x 2) (sank later) |
| | 1 Destroyer (TN: d x 1) |

CHAPTER III. 14 November. The Third Sea Battle of the SOLOMON Islands.

1. Forces which participated:

CruDiv 4 (TN: 4S) (Flagship (TN: ) ATAGO, TAKAO, KIRISHIMA; bombarded the airfield on GUADALCANAL.
CruDiv 10 (Flagship (TN: ) NAGARA and the Squadron Command (?) (TN: SHIRAYUKI, HATSUYUKI, SAMIDARE, INAZUMA.
DesRon 4 (Flagship and Squadron Command (TN: ) the ASAGUMO.
DesDiv 61 (TN: 61 dg) (division command (TN: ) TERUTSUKI, Protection (TN: screen) for the Firing Forces.
DesRon 3 (TN: 3 sd): (Flagship ( TN: ) SENDAI (CL) )
DesDiv 19 (TN: 19 dg) Division Command (TN: ) the URANAMI, the AYANAM and the SHIKINAMI. Clearing the course for other ships.

Enemy Strength:

4 BB, 2 CA; and 4 DD.

2. Developments:

(A) According to various intelligence reports from the planes of the SANYŌ Maru (XCVS) and other sources we expected to encounter a strn enemy force. At 1940 we withdrew our screen (CHOKUEI WO TESSURU) and moved it forward on the course ahead. At 2010 all forces were ordered to annihilate the enemy.

(B) At 2010 the Mopping-up Unit sighted silhouettes of ships to the northeast of SAVO Island and gave chase. At about 2116 they engaged in battle. The AYANAMI was ordered to separate (from the main force) and to proceed to the LUNGA Point Area via the south side of SAVO Island. While proceeding there she blew up and sank one enemy cruiser which she met at the south side of SAVO Island.

(C) The Mopping-up Unit (minus the ASAGUMO and the TERUTSUKI) went ahead of the main force at 2120 and sailed 6-7 kilometres astern of the AYANAMI. While proceeding, it met 1 enemy cruiser and 3 enemy destroyers. It destroyed these and then at 2145 it sighted 2 battleships northwest of ESPERANCE. While reporting this to the entire force it tried to attack them, but the destroyers did not have their guns loaded in time to fire (JIHATSU SOTEN MANIAWAZU). After that the enemy withdrew to the south and we pursued them with all our effort. At about 2340 we overtook them and carried out our second attack on them.

(D) Just before 2200 CruDiv 4 (TN: 4S), KIRISHIMA, ASAGUMO, TERUTSUKI sighted 4 Battleships in succession and attacked and sank 2 of them by torpedo and gunfire.

(E) At 2325 the C-in-C of the Second Fleet (TN: $\frac{2}{2f}$ ) took into consideration the present situation, their and our condition and the time of day and ordered our withdrawal to the north after carrying out an attack on enemy forces which had been contacted.

3. Results of the Battle:

2 BB's attacked and sunk; 1 BB considerably damaged; 2 CA's blown up and sunk.
1 DD blown up and sunk.
3 DD's attacked and sunk.

(End of Extracts)

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ACCOUNT OF THE NORTHERN CAMPAIGN (May-August 1943)

I. CHRONOLOGICAL DIVISIONS

1. ATTU Campaign.
From 25 May to 1 June; campaign ("ke"ヶ ) against ATTU.

2. KISKA Campaign.
From 2 June to 26 June; first part of campaign ("ke"ヶ ) against KISKA (by submarine).
From 27 June to 18 July; first phase in second part of campaign ("ke" against KISKA (by destroyer forces).
From 19 July to 1 August; second phase in second part of campaign ("ke"ヶ ) against KISKA (by destroyer forces).

II. SITUATION AT ATTU BEFORE THE ENEMY ATTACK

On 8 May the enemy issued an official communique on AMCHITKA (monitored by the radio of the 51st Communications Unit (Cg) ). In view of this intelligence, therefore, we were certain that the American army and navy had completed an air base and other installations there. On the 9th BIGEYATTO Island in the MALOELAP Group was bombarded at 1615, PAGAN Island (in the MARIANAS) at 1910, and HOROBETSU Village, 15 kilometres northeast of MURORAN, at 2350. Were these bombardments meant to be made in concert with the TUNISIAN Campaign as propaganda for an aggressive American offensive in the PACIFIC? Or, they might have been judged as the heralding of a campaign in the NORTH or SOUTH (PACIFIC) . Be that as it may, it should have been considered in connection with the recent prominence given to an enemy offensive in the PACIFIC, particularly in the ALEUTIANS; and our forces should have been very much on guard against an enemy counter-attack. Hence, at 2335 on the 10th, there was the following order from the (HQ), Combined Fleet (GF):-

"(1) In view of communications intelligence (from 6th Communications Unit?) and the appearance of enemy submarines, there is suspicion of an operation by an enemy task force.
(2) Maintain a vigilant watch for an enemy occupation (force) and air attack."

At this time the airfield installations on ATTU were expected to be almost finished by the end of May. But the air-raid trenches, fuel storehouses, shell and powder magazines, and other projects had yet to be started, while their completion had been scheduled for the first of June. Furthermore, DesRon 1 (CL KISO, DD SHIRAKUMO, DD WAKABA) convoyed the KIMIKAWA Maru (XCVS bringing float planes for ATTU. The ships left PARAMUSHIRO at 1200 on the 11th. Meanwhile, the MACHI (CA) and the HATSUSHIMO (DD) had left YOKOSUKA at 0014 on the 11th, bound for PARAMUSHIRO. Both groups were at sea then, when the American attack was made. Each of the Submarines I-31, I-34, and I-35 was engaged in transporting materiel for KISKA.

III. SITUATION AT ATTU FOLLOWING THE ENEMY ATTACK

At 0449 on the 12th the 51st Communications Unit detected the call signal "BOU", making its first appearance on a frequency of 4385 K.C.; reception was extremly good. In the KISKA Area, enemy planes delivered a hour-long attack at about 0700. Enemy reconnissance planes were also very active. From 0200 until 0900 attacking enemy planes invaded the mists of ATTU, soaring over the island ceaselessly, relentlessly, as they strafed and bombed it. At this time absurd leaflets urging surrender were dropped in the CHICHAGOF Harbor sector. At 1000 the observation crew at HOLTZ Point spotted enemy boats headed for WEST ARM Point. The Shipping Engineers were sent out immediately to investigate from the sea. From them it was confirmed that the enemy was landing at WEST ARM Point and along the northwest coast. The forces in this sector at once entered upon Condition One as they determined to prevent the enemy landing even a part of his forces. At 1030 another enemy landing was announced in MASSACRE Bay. The enemy strength here was about 2000 men; but it seemed as if there were many more in reserve. In the meantime, enemy ships bombarded our forces with a threatening fire. At the report of an attack by a large enemy force, the ATTU Dispatched Force immediately set about burning all its documents save those in Cipher B (OTSU).

The strength of the attacking forces remained unknown because of the poor visibility at the time. However, judging from the noise of the guns, it was thought that there was a support force composed of several cruisers and smaller ships, and having seen the attacks delivered by carrier-based planes, the presence of carriers in the vicinity was suspected. By 1520 the following was known about the strength of the enemy force: There were 29 ships in HOLTZ Bay and at WEST ARM Point, 27 in MASSACRE Bay, and 6 in WEST ARM Bay. Furthermore, more troops were continuing to land, and poor visibility prevented our forces from determining their number. According to communications intelligence at the time, a strong enemy force was operating in the southern ALEUTIANS.

IV. ORDERS OF THE 5TH FLEET AND STATE OF OUR FORCES FOLLOWING THE ENEMY ATTACK

(1) Submarines I-31, I-34, and I-35 will cease their transport activities, and proceed at once to ATTU to attack the enemy transports.
(2) The USUGUMO (DD) will cease its work and hasten to PARAMUSHIRO to supply our forces.
(3) The commander of the escort force will attack enemy shipping in the MASSACRE Bay Area with planes from the KINIKAWA Maru.
(4) The ASAKA Maru (浅香丸) will sail to AOMORI and pick up for transport to PARAMUSHIRO some army reinforcements.
(5) The AWATA Maru (粟田丸) will stand ready at YOKOSUKA (to transport naval reinforcements).
The Commander-in-Chief of the 5th Fleet, commanding the MAYA (CA), left PARAMUSHIRO to join the escort force.

At this time, the TAMA (CL) (at MAIZURU) also stopped its work and was able to leave on the 20th; the ASAGUMO (DD) (at YOKOSUKA) was able to leave on the 21st. The ABUKUMA (CL) (at SASEBO), however, was able to set out on the 16th.
Thus, the strength with which we could counterattack the enemy's assault was merely one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, and three destroyers. Moreover, an air force was ordered to go to PARAMUSHIRO; but was delayed because of unfavorable weather.

Summary of the Operations of the Combined Fleet:

A. Northern Forces
   1. Submarines concentrated in the ATTU Area to destroy enemy shipping.
   2. Land-based air forces carried out patrols and attacks.
   3. Surface units awaited a favorable opportunity to destroy enemy fleet units in the ATTU Area.
   4. As it proceeded, our task force kept patrols on the enemy task force (by observation craft, fishing boats, submarines, and float reconnaissance planes).
   5. An army of reinforcements was being transported to ATTU.
B. Task Force.
   Proceeded from YOKOSUKA on the 22nd. Went through the waters east of the KURILES during the last of the month. Its purpose was to crush enemy fleet units and task forces and to assist our northern forces.
C. Combined Fleet.
   Left TRUK on the 17th for YOKOSUKA.

V. EVENTS UNTIL THE FALL OF ATTU

The composition of the enemy fleet as seen from the land on the 13th was as follows:

In HOLTZ Bay - One CV (no bridge), one CHICAGO Class cruiser, one OMAHA Class cruiser, three DD's.

In MASSACRE Bay - One BB, two cruisers, five DD's, ten transports.

About 1318 our submarines attacked the enemy fleet, causing the main body to withdraw eastward temporarily. About 1900 lights were lit on ships anchored in MASSACRE Bay, apparently for something important which had happened. A destroyer ran aground near shore.

The enemy forces that had landed by 1300 on the 14th totalled not less than a division. Before long the enemy had put his carriers and battleships out to sea. However, the destroyers audaciously dropped anchor in the bay despite the attacks of our submarines, and observed us. (Thus, the enemy knew the weakness of our forces from previous reconnaissance.)
An enemy battleship was greatly damaged in an attack by our submarines on the 14th. In general, however, our ships were checked by the enemy destroy By the 24th they had only inflicted severe damage on a cruiser and some dam on two unidentified warships.
19 Medium bombers (CHUKO) made the first attack by our planes on the 14th. They returned because of unfavorable weather, however. Thereafter, on consecutive days, our planes were unable to attack due to unfavorable weather. Finally, on the 23rd, they attacked, destroying a cruiser and a destroyer, and setting fire to another ship. But on the following day, the enemy (fleet) had generally withdrawn an hour before our attack force arrived. Hence, no results could be gained at sea, and our planes had to confine themselves to bombing land targets. At this time, the destroyer force which had at last completed the assembling of a force planned to evacuate our forces on ATTU Island, but though it put out from PARAMUSHIRO on the 25th, its efforts were of no avail because of continuous bad weather. In the meantime the Guard Unit on ATTU Island, although out-numbered, valiantly withstood the fierce attacks of the enemy, even at times carrying out night attacks an other operations which were doomed from the start. They waged bitter battle but, in the end, having received no reinforcements and having exhausted every last artifice (to the last man), they met their deaths calmly. Finally, on the 29th ATTU Island fell in honor.

VI. FIRST PART OF KISKA CAMPAIGN

KISKA, of course, was placed in a helpless position by the fall of ATTU. Therefore, it was decided to evacuate the island. We were entrusted with the task of evacuating the troops from the island by means of 10 submarines runni back and forth. Since there were over 7000 men to evacuate and submarines have very limited capacity, it was not known how long it would take to finish the evacuation. In addition to this, the patrols around KISKA had finally become most strict and damage to our ship had increased. Finally, the I-7 was lost. No matter how enshrouded by the fog we would be, we would instant be bombarded, for the effeciency of the enemy's radar was far superior to wh we had expected.

VII. FIRST PHASE OF SECOND PART OF KISKA CAMPAIGN

To meet this situation, as a last resort we carried out "ke" (TN: ケ ) plan of operations by which we employed a force of destroyer forces (SUIRAIBUTAI). In order to do this we installed as quickly as possible, on the destroyers counter-radar equipment (TEKI-DENTAN NI TAISURU GYAKUTAN) and equipment to take aboard the landing barges to be used in the evacuation. On 6 July this work was, for the most part, completed. Because, however, there was uncertainty about the frequency of the enemy's radar there was some uneasiness about our counter-radar.
On 7 July at 1930 we set out from PARAMUSHIRO. Our force was composed of 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers. At that time the state of affairs, as seen by the Grand Fleet (TN: GF), was as follows:

> "Regarding the situation, it may be said that the possibility of the enemy attacking us in the vicinity of KISKA is great."

But, on the other hand, it was felt that though the enemy had isolated KISKA he was hoping to starve out the garrison. Only patrols around the island were strictly maintained. It was felt that an aggressive offensive and landing were not to be expected. According to intelligence reports up to the 7th, about the 26th a fleet of transports had departed from the west coast of NORTH AMERICA and about the 3rd had reached the DUTCH HARBOR Area. Still more, we had received intelligence reports that transports had arrived at ATTU frequently during June. Furthermore, there was information that a powerful force had set out from DUTCH HARBOR on 1 July and had arrived at AMCHITKA on the 4th. The enemy's northern submarine force had been making preparations for battle since the 14th, or so, and having completed these preparations about the 30th, had assembled at DUTCH HARBOR.

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A squadron (TAI) of submarines, reinforcements for the submarine force, had reached DUTCH HARBOR from the American mainland about June 20th. Again there was intelligence that at the end of June, transports had arrived at ADAK and ATTU several times. On the 21st the air strength at AMCHITKA had been somewhat increased and the base for land planes at ATTU was nearing completion. Atmospheric conditions in the KISKA Area up to the time we set out were as follows:

On the 2nd and 3rd visibility was good, from 30 to 40 kilometres; on the 4th and 5th visibility was bad, from 2 to 3 kilometres. On the 6th it was about 30 kilometres.

In the meantime, a number of enemy planes -- B-17's, B-24's, B-25's, PBY's, and others, in formations, singly, or in pairs were carrying out day after day bombing and reconnaissance missions. Patrol about the island was maintained by a number of cruisers and destroyers.

On the 7th, the destroyer force (SUIRAI BUTAI) set out as scheduled. After they had set out, a thick fog rolled up and discovery and destruction by enemy submarines was rendered improbable. Thereafter, until we returned to PARAMUSHIRO the percentage of fog was constantly about 85. On the 7th, visibility around KISKA was about 7 kilometres. Enemy planes, (each time a reconnaissance plane), approached at 0350, 0724, and 0835, and at 1140. 6 cruisers and 4 destroyers bearing from the NW approached to a point 15 miles south of GERTRUDE COVE and shelled it. At 1455 3 enemy ships were sighted about 30 kilometres from SHIROZAKI (TN:白崎).

The above ships, judging from shell splinters, duds, and shell holes, were PENSACOLA class, 1 ship, HONOLULU class, 2 ships, a new class, 1 ship, and 4 Destroyers. On the 8th, there was a thick fog from the morning on and during the day visibility was from 1 to 3 kilometres; in the evening about 6 kilometres. On this day no enemy planes came.

On the 9th, visibility to the SE was from 30 to 40 kilometres and from the afternoon on clouds covered the entire sky without a break. Though the clouds were 200 metres high and a thick fog hung upon the sea, visibility was from 8 to 10 kilometres. One enemy warship was sighted at 0833 forty kilometres, 220°, from SOUTH HEAD. At 1057 a ship was sighted at 340° off TAKAZAKI (TN:高崎). From 2050 to 2230 GERTRUDE COVE was shelled by destroyers on patrol with guns of about 12cm.

On the 10th at 0205 we speeded along our course and though we proceeded along our way until 2030, the fog was thin enough to allow airplane flights and since this was to our disadvantage, we turned back. The weather forecast from the Headquarters of the Division 1 was as follows:

"On the 12th there will be fog rolling up from the SE at 8 metres per second with occasional breaks. On the 13th there will be prevailingly east winds flowing from 8 to 12 metres per second and thick fog."

We prepared to make a dash for it on the 13th. Today (10th) there was fog around KISKA at the end of the day and visibility was from 1 to 2 kilometres. Enemy planes and also 2 single planes (TN:單機 TANKI) came two or three times on reconnaissance flights.

11 July: About 0200 visibility was about 20 kilometres and though the sky was covered with clouds, the fog was light. Generally, visibility was from 8 to 10 kilometres. At 2006 GERTRUDE COVE and at 2217 LITTLE KISKA were bombarded. Moreover, according to intelligence reports, the Army Air Base on ATTU and the airfield for Army heavy bombers at AMCHITKA and AGATTU were almost completed. Our observation boats (KANSHI-TEI) based at PARAMUSHIRO had discovered that patrols by the enemy to the west were becoming stricter and they were certain that along with the near completion of the land-plane base on ATTU patrols by the enemy carried out by aircraft, naval vessels, and submarines would be even stricter.

12 July: At 0735 we sped along our course but the fog was light and at 1520 we turned back. We expect to dash forward on the 14th. Today in the morning visibility around KISKA was from 6 to 8 kilometres, and though about noon it was 15 kilometres, the barometer fell. From 1300 on there was thick fog. Enemy planes, P-40's, B-25's, PBY's, all on reconnaissance missions came during the morning and about 1245 a small type naval vessel was sighted about 20 kilometres off TAKAZAKI at 330°.

13 July: Having taken in consideration weather around KISKA, at 0240 we hastened along our course. Patrol planes could not take off because of bad weather at AMCHITKA and ATTU. No enemy planes were seen around the island. Only a small type naval vessel was carrying out patrol. However, because the visibility in the morning was from 8 to 10 kilometres we broke off our course and at 1703 turned back. Though we made the dash again at 2145, we turned back at 0156 on the 14th. The following is the weather forecast given out by headquarters on the 13th:

"1. Tomorrow the weather around KISKA will not differ much from today' There will be a light fog and it is expected that visibility will be fair.

2. The high atmospheric pressure which prevails in these waters is slowly shifting to NE or ENE. Thus, should we proceed along our course, there is a possibility that the present state of weather and visibility will prevail as far as KISKA in the same general direction as the aforementioned high atmospheric pressure.

3. At the same time as this high atmospheric pressure progresses, the possibility of flights from ADAK is great.

4. We may conclude from the above that the possibility of success in our advance is extremely slight and that we shall have to turn back and wait. We may look forward to proceeding on our mission on the day after tomorrow."

(Insert)

According to the communications intelligence report of 13 July new call signals appeared on the 9th from the places we had presumed to be naval air bases; these were presumed to be at ATTU or the island neighboring. New call signals also appeared from the places we had presumed to be army air bases; we had figured two to be on ATTU and one in the neighboring islands. On the 11th, 6 army planes flew to ATTU. The total number of army and navy planes permanently based in the ALEUTIANS has grown rapidly since the 9th; 173 planes were in the ALEUTIANS by the 10th.

Enemy planes have been active on the 9th and 10th. Our patrols in the PARAMUSHIRO Area are vigilant.

And we have great numbers of powerful fleet units operating in the CENTRAL PACIFIC.

According to the communications intelligence report of 15 July, a powerful enemy force has been under radio silence for several days. The number of enemy ships operating around KISKA is very large. According to the communications intelligence report of 16 July, one part of the enemy fleet is apparently operating in the ALEUTIAN Area. Liaison activities between AMCHITKA and KULUK Bay have been great. The enemy seems to be concentrating all his efforts in equipping and strengthening AMCHITKA.

14 July: In the morning the weather changed for the worse. The velocity of the wind was 14 metres per second; atmospheric pressure was 757mm. Visibility was about 6 kilometres. In the afternoon conditions improved and the wind velocity was from 5 to 8 metres per second and visibility was 5 kilometres. Today 3 or 4 enemy naval vessels were patrolling around the island. At 1500 we started out but there was a statement from headquarters:

"The weather in the vicinity of KISKA and along the course we shall follow has had a change for the better. For the present, there is no prospect of meeting a favorable fog from the sea. We shall turn back now and return to PARAMUSHIRO where we shall plan a second operation."

15 July: At 0430 we turned back. Today visibility around KISKA was 10 kilometres and in the morning reconnaissance was carried out by a B-25, a P-38, and a PBY; and a formation of 7 B-24's and 5 B-25's bombed (KISKA). At 2202 enemy warships shelled GERTRUDE COVE.

16 July: Visibility -- 10 to 15 kilometres.

17 July: There was thick fog in the morning and visibility was 1.5 kilometres. In the afternoon it was 8 kilometres at times Enemy planes were carrying out reconnaissance and naval vessels were maintaining patrols.

18 July: At 0830 we entered the harbor at PARAMUSHIRO.

VIII. SECOND PHASE OF SECOND PART OF KISKA CAMPAIGN

At 2000 on the 22nd we entered upon the second phase.
On the 19th and 20th the visibility in the KISKA Area was 15 to 20 kilometres; on the 21st, it was 3 to 4 kilometres. To generalize the enemy's plans to the situation: There have been seven days out of 21 on which the enemy did not come over. Since the 9th enemy ships had bombarded KISKA five times.
Our sorties recently have been an hour later than planned because of the thick fog. Moreover, it has been difficult to maintain our formation.
In our first change (of position) the relative positions were totally unknown. Communication by telephone is poor. On the 24th, while it was clear and only slightly misty, we looked about and adjusted our formation. The TAMA, NIPPON Maru (XAO), and KUNIJIRI (CM) were not to be seen. (The Commander-in-Chief 5th Fleet, was aboard the TAMA.)
At 0800 on the 24th, a patrol plane made a forced landing in Sector #10 on the ATTU patrol line, and dispatched a special urgent operational message. Indeed, there were several urgent messages to that effect.
A dispatch from the 51st communications unit had arrived, saying that it was doubtful that the aviator had been located by the destroyer force.
For 30 minutes after 0945 on the 23rd enemy ships bombarded from the northeast and south. And, as the skies were clear, formations of enemy planes strafed and bombed several times. The number of participating planes was over 96. The enemy employed delayed action bombs, incendiary bombs, and parachute bombs. The delayed action bombs were set at 30 minutes, one hour, 15 hours, 24 hours, etc.
On the 25th, it was clear, and formations of from three to nine P-40's raided KISKA seven times from AMCHITKA; all formations bombed only the landing field. The enemy bombers at AMCHITKA and KULUK Bay on ADAK, 51 all told, stood ready, their operating wave-frequencies lengths adjusted. The activity of enemy patrol planes at both bases was great.
About 1700 the KAZEGUMO (DD) detected an enemy submarine transmitting a message.
In view of our poor radio interception control, it is doubtful whether the sub was located.
About 1500 on the 26th we made contact with all the ships save the KUNIJIRI, and the locations to which our formation had been adjusted again were visible. Suddenly, at 1750 the KUNIJIRI collided into the starboard side of the ABUKUMA. Damage to both ships was slight, but because of the accident some confusion was produced in the rear units. The WAKABA, HATSUSHIMO, and NAGANAMI (DD) collided, the latter receiving only slight damage. However, the WAKABA and NAGANAMI were now handicapped for operational cruising.
The WAKABA returned to PARAMUSHIRO; the HATSUSHIMO entered the Naval Supply Unit.
On the 27th we set our course south and tried to pick up the lost trail of an enemy submarine.
We decided to make a dash for KISKA on the 28th. Conditions there had been (none too good) up to now.
The visibility had been excellent on the 26th and hence a handicap to our operating units; for a total of 46 planes raided KUKA that day. On the 25th a similar formation of P-40's had attacked seven times. Enemy bombers were generally in readiness at every base, their operating wave-frequencies lengths adjusted.
Patrol planes were active, and a vigilant watch was kept in the north.
Several enemy ships were operating in the waters south and west of KISKA.
At 1925 there was a night bombing.
On the 27th, it was clear in the morning; visibility 20-30 kilometres, cloud ceiling at 3000 metres. But the fog appeared around 1800. On this day a total of 87 planes attacked. 8 B-24's bombed twice; afterwards, KISKA was subjected to reconnaissance for about three hours. At night single planes bombed three times; afterwards they dropped flares, which seemed strange and purposeless.
The barometer fell gradually during the morning of the 28th; the mist thickened, and the visibility was only 8-10 kilometres. Perhaps because the weather changed for the worse enemy planes did not fly over KISKA after 0340. By afternoon the fog had taken in the whole sky; the visibility was 6-8 kilometres.

On the 29th, too, a heavy fog hung over our route. We pressed forward to KISKA, plotting our course from its radio waves. We only awaited the grace and aid of our gods. At 1105, while it cleared, for a bit, we recognized the outline of the island. Then the inevitable fog again. We sailed around to the north of KISKA, but saw no sign of enemy ships. At 1316 the ABUKUMA sighted an enemy vessel and launched several torpedoes, but it had mistaken LITTLE KISKA Island for the enemy.
Again, at 1321, the SHIMAKAZE (DD) mistook the island for the enemy and opened fire with her guns. At 1325 we set our course to enter the harbor. Only within the bay, strangely enough, was the mist completely absent, and the visibility was extremely good. The clouds were at about 100 metres, and dense. We anchored at 1350. Immediately the landing barges which had been in readiness came alongside our ship and loaded the men aboard; in two trips, they had completed their work. The 500-odd men that came aboard did so in an orderly fashion and in fine spirits. By 1420 each of the ships in the 2nd Transport Unit(YUSOTAI) had completed its loading. We left then at once. The 1st Transport Unit left the harbor a little later. After that the mist gradually became thicker in the bay. Thereafter, the 2nd Transport Unit did not see anything whatsoever of the enemy. We left and went on ahead at a speed of 30 knots. The 1st Transport Unit, with the ABUKUMA, spotted a periscope, northeast of KISKA, but the submarine immediately disappeared beneath the waves and thereafter wasn't seen again.
At 0600 on the 31st the mist had completely cleared, and at 1530 we entered PARAMUSHIRO Harbor. It seemed that the heaven were celebrating our success (in returning safely). At 1000 on the 1st of August the 1st Transport Unit entered the harbor; they had not lost a man. The evacuation of the defense force at KISKA, over 5,000 men, had been a success.
The enemy apparently had not discovered the evacuation of our troops at all. Thereafter, for day after day, they bombed and bombarded KISKA, and on August 15, the landing of American and Canadian troops on the island was announced.
Truly the height of the ridiculous.

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OFFICERS' REGISTER FOR THE KAKO (16 November 1941)

| | |
|---|---|
| Commanding Officer: | Capt. TAKAHASHI, Yūji (高橋雄次) |
| Executive Officer: | Cmdr. TAWARA, Yasuedao (俵安岐夫) |
| First Lieutenant (UNYŌCHŌ) and 8th Division Officer: | Lt Cmdr AKUTAGAWA, Tadatarō (芥河忠太郎) |
| Gunnery Officer: | Lt Cmdr NISHIMURA, Haruyoshi (西村春芳) |
| Navigating Officer and 7th Division Officer: | Lt Cmdr YAMAGUCHI, Tokio (山口時男) |
| Torpedo Officer and 5th Division Officer: | Lt. YONEI, Tsuneo (米井恒雄) |
| Communications Officer and 6th Division Officer: | Lt. KONDŌ, Nobuichi (近藤信一) |
| Aviation Officer and 9th Division Officer: | Lt. SAITŌ, Yasukuni (斉藤安邦) |
| 2nd Division Officer and Officer of the Guard: | Lt. KAGA, Makoto (加賀誠) |
| 1st Division Officer: | S.D. Lt.(jg) MATSUNAGA, Isuke (松永貞助) |
| 3rd and 4th Division Officer: | Lt. (jg) OCHIAI, Otoichi (落合乙市) |
| Deputy Gunnery Officer (SHŌHŌCHŌ): | S.D. Lt.(jg) MIZUNO, Tōru (水野亨) |
| Junior Officer, 1st Division: | S.D. Ens. ŌMURA, Sōtarō (大村惣太郎) |
| Assistant Navigating Officer (KŌKAISHI) and Junior Officer 4th Division: | Ens. KIKUCHI, Giichi (菊地義一) |
| Junior Officer, 2nd Division: | S.D. Ens. DATE, Jirō (伊達二朗) |
| Assistant Gunnery Officer and Junior Officer 3rd Division: | Ens. ŌMURA, Masao (大村正雄) |
| Assistant Communications Officer and Junior Officer, 6th Division: | Ens. ISHIKAWA, Takatoshi (石川孝壽) |

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FACTS ABOUT THE KAKO (17 November 1941)

I. TYPE: Heavy (first-class) cruiser.

| | |
|---|---|
| Where built: | At the KAWASAKI Dockyard in KŌBE |
| Keel laid: | 17 November 1922 |
| Launched: | 10 April 1925 |
| Completed: | 20 July 1926 |
| Modification completed: | 28 December 1937 |

II. PRINCIPAL MEASUREMENTS:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| A. | Overall length: | 185.2 metres |
| B. | Length between perpendiculars: | 176.8 metres |
| C. | Maximum beam: | 16.9 metres |
| D. | Draft: | 4.8 metres |
| E. | Displacement: | 7,100 tons |
| F. | Tonnage displaced per cm. of draft: | 23.3 tons |
| G. | Moment required to change the trim 1 cm.: | 246 metric tons |
| H. | Shaft horsepower: | 103,300 H.P. |
| I. | Speed: | 33 knots |
| J. | Fuel carried: | 1,842 tons |
| K. | Fresh water carried: | 156 tons |
| | Drinking and all-purpose water: | 66 tons |
| | Water, in drums: | 90 tons |
| L. | Water evaporated in a day: | 244 tons |

III. ARMAMENT:

A. Guns:
1. 6 20cm 50 cal. twin-mount guns, 3 year type, Model 2
2. 4 12cm 40 cal. dual-purpose guns, 10 year type
3. MG's: 4 13mm Hotchkiss MG's.
   2 7.7mm Lewis MG's
   8 25mm twin-mount MG's, Type 96
4. 179 Rifles, Type 38
5. 43 pistols, Army type

B. Torpedoes:
1. 2 mounts of Type 92 quadruple torpedo tubes each
2. 6 depth bombs
3. 1 set of paravanes

C. Searchlights:
1. 3 110cm searchlights, Type 92
2. 2 40cm searchlights, Type "SU"

D. Range Finders:
2 6-metre range finders, Type 14
2武 type 6-metre range finders
2武 type 4.5-metre range finders for dual purpose guns
2武 type 1.5-metre range finders
2武 type 3.5-metre range finders (for torpedo work)

E. Planes:
Float reconnaissance planes: 1 in use (1 in reserve)

F. Wireless Equipment:
a. Transmitters:
   1 500-watt transmitter, Type 91 Mark 4 (Special) Modification 1
   1 500-watt transmitter, Type 92 Mark 4 Modification 1
   1 1000-watt short-wave transmitter, Type 95 Mark 3
   1 500-watt transmitter, Type 95 Mark 4
   1 350-watt transmitter, Type 95 Mark 5
b. Receivers:
   3 receivers, Type 91, Model 1
   3 short-wave receivers, Type 91
   16 special receivers, Type 92 Modification 3

c. Wireless telephones:
1 ultra short-wave wireless telephone, Type 93
1 ultra short-wave wireless telephone, Type 90, Modification 2
1 ultra short-wave wireless telephone, Type 90, Modification 4
2 wireless telephone microphones, Mark 2, Modification 3

d. Signal strength indicators (SOKUHAI.I) and Cathode-ray Tube Screens (KANSAKI)
1 Type 92 Electric Wave Cathode-ray Tube Screen, Modification I
1 Type 92 Short Wave Cathode-ray Tube Screen, Modification I
1 Type 92 Short Wave Signal Strength Indicator, Modification I
2 Type 15 No. 2 Cathode-ray Tube Screen, Modification I

e. Wireless:
1 Type TM Light Wireless, Modification I

f. Radio Direction Finders:
1 Type 93 Mark I, Radio Direction Finder

IV. ENGINES:

(1) Main engines "BURANKACHISU" Type Turbine - 4
(screw propellers - 4 )
(cog-wheel speed reduction gear installed)
(2) R.P.M. of screw-propellers - (Maximum 360)
(3) Boilers: Fleet Type - Mark "RO" crude-oil fired boilers exclusively - 0
(4) Auxiliary Engine and Electric Engines
(5) Lewis Type refrigeration machine -
(6) SEGAR (シーガー) double-effect (FUKKO) type carbonic acid gas type ice machine - 1
(7) Type "MU" (TN: 武 ) 8 Watt Type Air Compressing Pump--3
(8) 4 6-pole, compound-wound generators with interpole
4 compound-wound, D.C. electric motors with megapole and interpole:

2 300-K.W., 2 - 135 K.W.

V. BOATS:

| Type | Weight | Length | Beam | Draft | Men Carried |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Motor Boats (2) | 4.4 Tons | 11 Metres | 2.7 Metres | .6 Metres | 30 |
| Launch (1) | 3. " | 9 " | 2.5 " | .6 " | 35 |
| Cutters (4) | 1.5 " | 9 " | 2.45 " | .4 " | 45 |
| Dinghy (1) | .6 " | 6 " | 1.5 " | .2 " | 10 |

VI. LOCATION, TYPE, AND WEIGHT OF ANCHORS:

Bower anchors (2) Stockless bow; both sides each 4.8 tons
Stream anchor (1) With removable stock (?) stern; starboard 1.4 tons
Kedge anchor (1) Navy-type stern; port .5 ton

VII. ANCHOR CABLES:

Bower anchor cables (2); 57mm. diameter; 15 shots on starboard side for 340.5 metres; 16 shots on port side for 351.4 metres; each cable shot is 22.7 metres
Stream anchor cable (1): 35mm. diameter; 182.9 metres long; of steel wire
Kedge anchor cable (1): 48 mm. diameter; 182.9 metres long; of Manila rope

HEADQUARTERS STAFF, 6TH FLEET (1 December 1941)

| | |
|---|---|
| Rear-Admiral | GOTŌ, Zonchi (五十存知); Commanding |
| Engineer Captain | ŌNUKI, Jisaku (大貫治作); Fleet Engineering Officer |
| Commander | KISHIMA, Kikutoku (黄島掬徳); Staff Officer |
| Lt. Comdr. | MINAMI, Iwau (南祝); Staff Officer |
| Lt. Comdr. | SEKINO, Hideo (関野英夫); Staff Officer |
| Eng. Lt. Comdr. | ISHISAKA, Harukichi (石坂治吉); Staff Officer |
| Warrant Officer | IZUMI, Iwao (泉岩雄); Attached to Hdq. Staff |

OFFICERS OF THE AORA

| | |
|---|---|
| Captain | HISAMUNE, Yonejirō (久宗米次郎) Captain |
| Commander | NAKAMURA, Kenji (中村謙治) Executive Officer |
| Eng. Comdr. | MIKI, Kiroku (幸毅六) Engineering Officer |
| Lt. Comdr. | NISHIKŌRI, Yūji (西郡雄次) Navigator |
| Lt. Comdr. | DOI, Yasumi (土井泰三) Gunnery Officer |
| Lt. Comdr. (M.C.) | MIURA, Ontarō (三浦温太郎) Medical Officer |
| Lt. Comdr. | MIYAZAKI, Isamu (宮崎勇) Torpedo Officer |
| Lieutenant (sg) | IMAMURA, Hashi (今村端) Aviation Officer |
| Lieutenant (sg) | IDETA, Hirokuni (出田博國) 1st Lieutenant |
| Lieutenant (sg) | TAKUBO, Tatsuo (田久保龍雄) 2nd Division Officer |
| Lieutenant (sg) | HOSHINO, Seisaburō (星野清三郎) Communications Office |
| Eng. Lt. | SHIBATA, Yoshinori (柴田義則) 10th Division Officer |
| Lt. (sg) (SC) | MATSUNAGA, Seiryū (松永世隆) Supply Officer |
| Special Duty Lt. (jg) | KAJITA, Yoshisaburō (梶田芳三郎) 1st Division Offic |
| Special Duty Eng. Lt. (jg) | IKEDA, Tadamasa (池田忠正) 12th Division Offic |
| Eng. Lt. (jg) | NAKAJIMA, Riichi (中島利一) Division Officer |
| Lt. (jg) | YOSHIMURA, Goro (吉村五郎) Division Officer |
| Eng. Lt. (jg) | NAGASE, Takeshi (長瀬武) Division Officer |
| Lt. (jg) (M.C.) | HOSOKI, Daisaburō (細木大三郎) Ship's Company |
| Lt. (jg) | NONOBU, Sadasuke (野々部定祐) Ship's Company |
| Special Duty Ens. | HASHIOKA, Gihachi (橋岡儀八) Ship's Company |
| Ens. (S.C.) | KITAYA, Yoshikichi (北谷由吉) Ship's Company |
| S.D. Ens. | YAMABAYASHI, Tokuji (山林得次) Ship's Company |
| Eng. Ens. | HAMAYA, Haruo (濱谷春雄) Ship's Company |

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| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Ens. | MAEGAWA, Shinichi (前川信一 ) | Ship's Company |
| Res. Eng. Ens. | OSHIMA, Magane (小島真金 ) | Ship's Company |
| Ens. | SATŌ, Tadashi (佐藤正 ) | Ship's Company |
| Ens. | ŌDERA, Shunsaburō (大寺俊三郎 ) | Ship's Company |
| Eng. Ens. | KOIZUMI, Yasutarō (小泉保太郎 ) | Ship's Company |
| Ens. (S.C.) | WADA, Isamu (和田勇 ) | Ship's Company |

FACTS ABOUT THE AOBA

I. TYPE: Heavy (first-class) cruiser

| | |
|---|---|
| Where built: | MITSUBISHI Dockyard at NAGASAKI |
| Keel laid: | 4 February 1924 |
| Launched: | 25 September 1926 |
| Completed: | 20 September 1927 |
| Modifications finished: | 30 October 1940 |

II. PRINCIPAL MEASUREMENTS:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| A. | Overall length: | 181.36 | metres |
| B. | Maximum beam: | 15.47 | metres |
| C. | Length between perpendiculars: | 176.78 | metres |
| D. | Draft: | 5.66 | metres |
| E. | Displacement: | 11,660. | tons (sic) |
| F. | Tonnage displaced per cm. of draft: | 23.6 | kgs. (sic) (TN:tons?) |
| G. | Moment required to change trim 1 cm: | 246.2 | kgs. (sic) (TN;tons?) |
| H. | Shaft horsepower: | 103,000. | S.H.P. |
| I. | Speed: | 33. | knots |
| J. | Fuel oil carried: | 20,400. | |
| K. | Fresh water carried: | | |
| | Drinking water: | 31.04 | tons |
| | All-purpose water: | 43.28 | tons |
| | Water in drums: | 127. | tons |
| | Water evaporated in a day: | 200. | tons |

III. ARMAMENT, ETC. (same as the KAKO)

FACTS ABOUT GOING ASHORE AT ROI (RUOTTO) (12-15-41)

Flag Signal for the AOBA.

1. While anchored at ROI and up until the 29th, all hands are permitted to go ashore and stroll about for three hours.
2. Extent of our liberty ashore; islands in the vicinity, swimming in the surf, and the wanton picking of fruit are prohibited.
3. For alarms, the AOBA will shoot two flares off in succession, in addition to its use of the regulation signals.
   (1) Liberty ashore every day from 0600 to 0900, and from 1100 to 1400.
   (2) Complement -- about 120.
   (3) Small boats in use: 1 lighter holding 90-100 men
   1 cutter holding 25-30 men
   (4) Place -- EDGIGEN Island (uninhabited island)

Warnings when going ashore.

1. This island is a breeding place for dengue fever, and the mosquitoes are extremely numerous here. When stripping or when you step into a thicket you must not be bitten by any mosquitoes.
2. You must not be naked at any time while ashore. Further, swimming is strictly prohibited.
3. The wanton picking of fruit is forbidden. Nor is it permissible to bring aboard ship fruit that is unnecessary.
4. You must be assembled on the beach 20 minutes before it is time to return to the ship.

SKETCH of ANCHORAGES
AT ROI
(12-17-41)



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5. Concerning Alarms:
All hands will always be mindful of their ship, and must be able to assemble together when the alarm is sounded.
Therefore, at an alarm two flares will be fired in succession three times or more times from our ship. You must take care so that in this eventuality the conduct of our defense is not imperiled.

#12

THE REEFS AT TRUK HARBOR (as observed from a motorboat)
(TN: To accompany #11)

I. Time and Place
12 December 1941, 1430 (one hour before sunset).
Off the south shore of DUBLON Island in the TRUK Island Group.

II. Weather; Sea Conditions.
Clear weather. South wind, velocity of approximately 6 meters (TN: per second).

III. Summary of Activities.
We were unable to transport the official messenger to the Government Branch Office jetty, and the 15 Supply Department workers to the Munitions Section jetty at NEBEKAI, but had accompany us the nine midshipmen on a hydrographic survey. We were familiar with the Government Branch Office jetty from our morning's experience. We were not familiar at all, however, with the location of the Munitions Section jetty. Even the charts we brought with us were not detailed. At the Branch Office jetty we asked people (for details, but without result), and although uneasy, we set out. We proceeded along, seeing marker posts A & B on our right. Then we passed two or three moored large flying boats. From point B we proceeded directly towards an object resembling a jetty. Because of our lack of self-confidence through this channel and of our uneasiness over the depths, we went along at slow speed. When we reached Point C, a rasping sound suddenly rent the air and our boat was jolted. The engine, of course, stopped at once. The boat, too, stopped, its bottom grating on the reef for a while. We felt that the boat was barely being supported near its center. This was 300 meters from the shore (to the right). The wind direction was on the starboard beam. The sun's angle of elevation was 15°.

IV. Measures Taken.
As stated above in describing the position of the bottom of the boat, it was aground on the reef at the center of the boat and to the left, the water was rather deep and the bow of the boat was slowly being rocked to the right by the wind.
Accordingly, I ordered the passengers to draw back onto the stern as far as possible and had four men rock the starboard bow to the right, and, at the same time, the motor was placed in reverse. When they had rocked the boat two or three times, we easily drew away from the reef. After that, we continued in reverse and when we went some distance from the reef, we inspected the engine and gunwale and saw that no damage had been sustained. At that time we received a message by semaphore from the shore which said: "Do not go there".
I immediately asked for the channel used by boats navigating in that area. When we were stranded on the reef and I thought about the impact I believed for sure that we must have sustained some damage. However, when I was told that there was no damage, in answer to my inquiry, we proceeded ahead.

V. Causes and Lessons.
1. First of all, the foremost cause of this incident is the fact that we set out without knowing clearly our mission and without knowing where we were going.
2. The charts which we had taken along werenot clear at all and should not have been used.
3. It will not suffice to guess at the depth of the water by advancing in the direction of the sun and, moreover, one must not fail to keep a sharp lookout at all moments and to pay attention to the large flying boats moored in the vicinity.
4. We did not take soundings.

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

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VI. Measures Taken After Our Return to the Ship.
I reported to the Executive Officer and to the Officer of the Day. As it was sunset I had the launch hoisted aboard. Thus, I was present when the launch was hoisted aboard and when the bottom of the boat was inspected, aside from the fact that the keel plates had separated more or less, the boat was the same as ever. When the coxswain and I inspected the boat two or three times, we could discover no damage. Accordingly, I made a report to that effect to the Executive Officer, the Officer of the Day, and to the Officer-in-Charge of the Division and thereby committed a grave error. By this I mean that when we inspected the boat the following morning there was a concavity of about 100 square centimeters in area on the starboard keel in the center and the bottom of the boat was full of water. The damage, however, had already been repaired with copper plates by the boat's crew. I immediately notified the Executive Officer, the Officer of the Day, and the Division Officer.

VII. Observations.
1. When in command of a boat, take full responsibility for matters affecting the boat, and do not listen to the opinions of others with regard to measures to be taken when stranded on a reef. I should have relied upon my own opinions.
2. Lookouts should have been most strictly posted.
3. When I did not know how deep the water was, I should have proceeded at a reduced speed.
4. The examination of the damaged place should have been done more thoroughly.
"To caution add care".
5. I should have been quick to get in touch with this ship.

(End of narrative)

#10

FACTS ABOUT TRUK (12-13-41)

A. Waters Suitable for Anchorage.
On the west side of MOEN Island (and in the waters between the north side and RUAC).
In the vicinity of TRUK Harbor (i.e., in the waters south of UMAN Island and extending to OTTA Island and FANAN Island).

B. Shelter from Wind and Waves.
Depending on the selection of an anchorage, shelter can be afforded, no matter which direction the wind may come from.

C. Passes.
Northeast Pass.
1. In the center of the pass are reefs 7.1 meters under water. They are floating, crimson, circular markers here.
2. When there is a strong northeasterly wind, there are great swells at the entrance to the pass.
3. Tidal current is 2 knots.

North Pass.
1. Fair sailing with northeast winds.
2. The coconut grove to the northeast makes a good landmark.
3. Channel is sinuous.

South Pass.
1. Navigable by large ships.
2. There is rather deep water at the end of the reefs on both sides of the pass. You cannot, however, distinguish the change in the color of the water.
3. Maintaining your distance abeam of FALEU Island, it is easy to pass through the narrows.

EVERETT (EBARITTE) Pass.
1. Free of obstacles. Navigable by large ships.

D. Supply.
Coal may be had at the naval coaling station on the south shore of DUBLON Island.
Fuel oil (JUYU) may also be had here.
Fresh water is to be had in containers of 260 and 160 tons (one each).
Daily water allowance is 200 tons.
Fresh provisions include egg-plants, small melons, sweet potatoes, taro, all kinds of fish, beef, and pork.

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

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VARIOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING SAILING AND ANCHORAGES IN THE MANDATES

I. INFORMATION FOR NAVIGATION

1. The use of charts showing swept and sounded areas (SŌKAI-SOKURŌ-KAIZU). These island groups are mainly composed of coral atolls. Since the bottom of the sea is very undulating, sweeping and sounding must be carried out even when comparatively detailed sounding charts are available in order to avoid uncharted sunken reefs.
2. The carrying out of soundings.
   When in the open sea and among several atolls, even though you may be carrying out to the best of your ability, sounding of the deep waters and soundings for hidden reefs, when you have not navigated throughout the entire area, it is necessary to continue sounding navigation (SOKUSHINKŌKŌ) most strictly.
3. Post strict look-outs.
   A good part of the sea in these parts has not yet been sounded and in order to learn about changes in depths, it is necessary to post strict lookouts when navigating around these island groups.
   (Note) Though recognition of shallow reefs depends, in the main, upon changes in the color of the water, great care is necessary since conditions of light, climate, and the nature of the sea bottom vary.

| | | Depth of Water |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | Dark purple-indigo ..... | 70 metres & more |
| 2. | Purple-indigo ..... | 40 to 70 metres |
| 3. | Purplish blue ..... | About 30 metres |
| 4. | Blue ..... | About 20 metres |
| 5. | Pale blue ..... | About 15 metres |
| 6. | Bluish green ..... | About 10 metres |
| 7. | Bluish yellow ..... | 2 to 5 metres |
| 8. | Brownish green ..... | Under 2 metres |

4. The southern part of these island groups is the region of equatorial counter currents, generally from the east. However, around both the RALIK and RATAK chains the northern equatorial current (from the west) and the equatorial counter current (from the east) run longitudinally south and north. Hence, the tidal currents and the winds interact with an extreme complexity, and particular caution must be taken in navigation.

II. CAUTIONS WHEN ENTERING AND LEAVING THE PASSES TO LAGOONS

1. When there are large waves on the sea outside the lagoon, and when their direction coincides with that of the pass to the lagoon, the waves at the entrance to the pass will be remarkably high. But you must allow for a sufficient margin in your estimate of depths.
2. In general, the tidal currents running through the passes are strong. You may make it a general rule to head inward at flood tide and outward at ebb tide, but you should also maintain a careful watch in steering your ship, as the tides may be irregular, depending on the topography of the ocean floor.
3. When you are about to enter or leave a long and narrow pass, you must keep a sharp eye on the weather lest a squall, proceeding inward, engulf you. Furthermore, in the event you are beset by a squall, you must have a plan of action ready beforehand.
4. As the markers are, on the whole, inconspicuous, it is necessary that you do take soundings as you enter the pass, so that you may ascertain the positions of the marker and your ship with room to spare.
5. If you should use small scale charts, you must bear in mind that the notations on sweeping and depths have been omitted.

III. CAUTIONS IN DECIDING UPON AN ANCHORAGE

1. Throughout the year northeasterly to easterly winds prevail; the former are generally strong. Aside from the period July to October, when the winds are calmest, you should be careful in the selection of your anchorage.
2. Within an atoll there are several reef spots (TENSHŌ). Hence, in determining upon an anchorage, you should seek a place with an even depth and conspicuous markers nearby. You should also drop your anchor to determine the depth.
3. In selecting an anchorage for fueling, especial consideration must be paid to wind, waves, and tides.

About 1315 on 21 January 1942, a large enemy flying boat was sighted closing in upon us at 2°55' S. Lat., 149°40' E. Long. Immediately we notified the task force by radio. Three Zero fighters left the task force in our direction, but they turned around at our instruction and headed for the enemy plane. Within a few minutes a trail of smoke was seen in the direction they had flown. Then we saw the three fighters circling at low altitude. It was certain now that the enemy plane had been shot down. We changed our course at once and proceeded in the direction of the fight. Shortly we saw the fighters flying toward us. We waved our caps in greeting, whereupon they returned our salute by dipping their wings. When we reached the vicinity of the place where we supposed the plane to have been shot down, sure enough, there was a large oil slick on the sea. We also sighted five of the plane's crew drifting about; we took them aboard as prisoners. Three of the flying boat's regular complement of eight had perished. Of the five we rescued, two were officers and the others rated men.

THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

(23 January 1942)

From Lt. HOSHINO

I. LAWS ON THE SUBJECT

A. Regulations for the Treatment of Naval Prisoners of War
B. Laws for Aerial Warfare (Clauses #36 to #38)
C. Laws for Land Warfare
D. Applicable Precedents

II. WHO SHALL BE A PRISONER OF WAR

A. Combatants, non-combatants (personnel in the Medical Corps are not considered POW's)
B. Those in active service at the front (personnel with the Signal Corps in the field, etc.)
C. Rulers (SHUKENSHA) and similar persons.
D. Responsible government officials, diplomatic envoys, etc.
E. Civilians employed by the military (GUNZOKU).
F. Natives who shall have defended themselves against their captors.
G. The sick and wounded in the military service.
H. Crews of captured ships and aircraft.

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III. TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

A. A General Approach

It is of course essential that prisoners of war not be mistreated. The idea that aside from necessary restrictions, they should be treated as military men who have been taken prisoner, is widely accepted. Even though they are enemy officers and men, if it is considered that they were all doing necessary service, and that they were sacrificing their lives for their country, one must feel respect and sympathy for them.

Such springs from a common essence found in our so-called "BUSHIDŌ" (TN: "The Way of the Warrior"). However the handling of prisoners of war during the first World War was quite harsh and there were many cases of it not being effected in accordance with previously existing rules.

Our "BUSHIDŌ" has as its basis the principle "respect for honor", and the belief that giving a prisoner the opportunity to kill himself is noble treatment.

Respect for the enemy on the field of battle rises above the spirit of combat in response to the enemy's bravery. It is based on the belief that the warrior who views the battlefield as an exercise ground is pleased to have taken an enemy, regarding him as an opponent of exercise ground practice. In order to utilize this general conception concerning prisoners, it is basic that one's attitude should not embrace any individual admiration for the prisoner. It is thought that the differences in Western and Occidental schools of thought regarding "I have done my duty" (TN: In English in original) gives rise to dissimilarities in the concept of prisoners of war.

B. Prisoners of war should be committed to the authority of the Government of the country which has taken them prisoner and they should be treated humanely. The prisoner may keep anything belonging to him other than implements of war, horses, or military documents. Therefore, the prisoner of war must be given suitable treatment by us. (It is necessary to act according to the various articles and provisions in question.)

Almost all confiscated documents and articles will be returned to these persons in view of the fact that they are personal articles.

C. Excerpts from Measures for Treatment of Naval Prisoners of War

1. When you have captured a person who shall be a prisoner of war, immediately inspect the articles he carries with him.

   Confiscate weapons, ammunition, and other military articles (catalogue the articles). If he has any other possessions (it is necessary to catalogue the articles) they should be carried by this person if convenient.

2. Only when it is necessary to recognize the dignity of an officer prisoner, can the naval officer-in-charge wear his sword. (The circumstances and the officer's names are to be reported to the Minister of the Navy).

3. A daily account, a list of names, and a catalogue of belongings should be made concerning the prisoner, including the POW's age, social position, rank, residence, Naval District to which attached (SHOZOKU KANSENCHŌ [illegible] place wounded.

4. Officer prisoners and non-combatant officer prisoners should be distinguished from petty officers and men and they should be treated in accordance with their social position and rank. Make exceptions for infringements of the law or insincerity in answering questions of name and rank.

5. When POW's are disobedient or have plans to escape, etc., the necessary measures for imprisonment or punishment can be carried out. There will be no objection to the use of armed force.

6. In connection with a POW's attempts to escape or misdemeanors apply the Naval Disciplinary Regulations. The disciplinary authority is a senior naval guard officer (GUNEI) who actually takes in the prisoners.

7. The Naval officer in charge shall surrender the POW accompanied by his various documents and articles to the following:
   (a) He shall surrender him to the Guard District of the Naval Base.
   (b) In unavoidable circumstances he may surrender him to another Guard Officer(TN: GUNEI)
   (c) When he finds it advantageous he may confer with the Army or the Line of Communication (TN: HEITAN) Transportation and Communications Officer and he can surrender the prisoners of war to them. (In such instances, the officers, non-combatant officers (SŌTŌKAN 准尉官), and men shall be segregated and their number reported quickly to the Minister.)
8. When the POW's are picked up, a custodian will be appointed who shall look after the prisoners under the supervision of a naval officer.
9. Telegrams and letters will be censored by the supervising officer. Only the harmless ones will be let through. The franking privilege shall apply. (You must consult the POW's last P.O. first, however.)
10. A POW may be permitted to purchase daily necessities or other articles he may like with his own money, only when the supervising officer sees no reason why he should not.
11. When a POW dies, a funeral service befitting his station and rank in life shall be held.
12. The Last Will and Testament of a POW shall be handled as if it were from a member of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

D. Extracts from the General Rules for the Treatment of POW's (as established in the Laws for Land Warfare).

1. POW's are obligated not to leave a certain area and may be detained in a fixed place. POW's may be imprisoned as long as it is necessary, as a measure to preserve the peace of the community, which must come first.
2. The capturing nation may utilize the POW's as laborers, according to their rank and ability.
   Officers may not be employed.
   The POW's duties shall not be excessive.
   The labor shall have no relation whatsoever with the military strategy and actions of the capturing nation. (This is very inexplicit, so that in such matters the capturing nation enjoys a freedom of interpretation and may exercise its discretion.)
   If worked, the POW must be granted a remuneration comensurate with that given Army personnel of his rank in the capturing nation. They say that in this present war GERMANY grants its POW laborers a remuneration 60% of what they are entitled.
3. The government of the capturing nation is obligated to feed and clothe every POW. When there is no special agreement between two warring nations, the capturing state shall treat matters of food, bedding, and clothing on an equal footing with its own troops.
4. The POW shall submit to the rules in force. If he does not, the supervising officer may take stringent measures. If a POW shall escape and be caught again before he has reached his objective, he shall be punished. However, if he shall have reached his objective, but become a prisoner again at a later date, he shall not be punished in the least for the former escape.
5. The capturing nation may permit a POW to take a prescribed oath and set him free; but it may not force the POW to take this oath. Moreover, the government of the capturing nation need not accede to the request of a POW to take the oath and be set free.
6. At the commencement of hostilities between belligerents, a neutral country shall establish a Prisoner of War Information Bureau, to be in operation the moment the first enemy nationals are rounded up on alien soil.
7. POW mail shall be exempted from the local postage regulations; presents and relief society boxes addressed to POW's shall be free of import duties and railroad freight charges.

8. Officer POW's shall receive the same pay that is granted officers of identical rank in the detaining country. This pay shall then be redeemed by the POW's government.
9. With the single stipulation that he shall abide by the rules governing order and discipline, as prescribed by the Army authorities, the POW is granted religious freedom.
10. After peace is restored, the POW shall be returned to his country as rapidly as possible.

IV. MY OWN VIEWS (CONCERNING THE INTERROGATION OF POW's)

Throughout the above stipulations, the freedom to interrogate POW's to further the operations of the capturing nation has not been granted. However, I believe that when there are POW's, as between any warring states, it should properly be the conventional thing to interrogate them for information on their fighting forces. Therefore, I conclude that there is no need to adhere to the rules of international law and to hesitate in conducting interrogations. However, if the POW's feelings are not given consideration, results either cannot be gained from the interrogation or will be meagre indeed.

That is to say:

A. Insofar as possible, POW's should be picked up separately.
B. Conversation and communication between POW's should be restricted.
C. To help elicit testimony from POW's material recognized to be of value (documents, messages, etc.) should be gathered and arranged to the best of one's ability. The principal function of interrogation then, should be the further interpretation of this material.
D. In interrogating, coercion should be the principle. Since in cases when the POW's native language differs from one's own, it is difficult to take advantage of any slip of his tongue, to practice detailed examination or to use indirect questioning (especially at times when one lacks confidence in one's vocabulary), it is easier (TN: for the interrogator) to adopt the formalities of a consultation.
The feeling that the victor is superior, the loser inferior should pervade the interrogation. If necessary, you should demand that questions and answers be made in writing.
E. Until the object of the interrogation has been attained, the POW should be made to feel anxious about his fate, should become haggard physically. Consideration should be given to the POW's quarters, sustenance, surveillance, etc.

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN WARTIME

From Lt. HOSHINO

I. The UNITED STATES declared MANILA an open city (TN: "undefended town" written in English). In answer, our imperial forces continued to bomb it. Finally, on 3 January they entered the city. How shall our action be explained in the light of international law?

We had to consider MANILA a defended city (TN: this term rendered in English), and hence our attacks were lawful.

(Reference Material:)

A. The meaning of an "open city".

The question of what military installations and troops constitute a city's defense is one to be decided on fact; (in practice, the question is whether or not the city is defended). However, there is no explicit authority on the subject.

In general, the following cities are recognized as "defended cities":

1. A city surrounded by fortifications.
2. A city in whose vicinity gun batteries and other positions have been erected.
3. A city in which troops are located and attempt to prevent the entrance of the enemy. (If there be a small number of troops, but recognized to have no "ability to resist", the city shall not be treated as a "defended city".)

4. A city where the waters at the entrance to the harbor have been laid with (automatic) contact mines.

B. What shall be selected as attack objectives?

There is some difference of opinion because of the divergence of operational methods employed in naval, land, and air warfare.

1. Targets in a "defended city":

There is no necessity to limit the objectives in this instance to fortifications and other defensive installations for troops.

In air warfare (bombing) the objectives shall be the same as those listed, in the next section.

2. Targets in an "open city":
   a. Naval vessels (all ships used b the military services)
   b. Troops (if there are many troops located in the city, it shall be considered a defended city).
   c. Constructions with military possibilities:
      (1) Airfields (those which are privately owned but may be given over to military use in the future must be included).
      (2) Forts, trenches, obstructions.
   d. Military, naval, (and airforce) installations (barracks, hangars, arsenals, etc.).
   e. Storage points for arms and other materiel.
   f. Factories and other installations that may be put to military use. (Privately owned plants which will be definitely turned over to the military are included. However, accessory and sub-contract factories are exceptions.)
      Railroads, wireless stations, harbor installations.
      In land warfare, armies must conduct their operations by entering cities which render their attack and bombardment impossible. In naval and air warfare, however, there are no obstacles to an attack.
3. An "open city" not responding to levies on its populace (There are regulations to meet this situation in naval warfare only. However, the same rules should apply in land warfare. In air warfare, the application of such rules would be impossible.)
   a. Should a naval force order a city to supply it with the necessary provisions and stores for its immediate needs in a formal demand and the city resist: (For details of the execution of a levy, consult levying orders and the "Regulations for Levying".)
      A levy should correspond to the resources of the place upon which it is made, and must have the approval of the commander of the naval force.
      Unrestricted levying by a SNLF., etc., and levying done by each ship is wrong.
   b. Should the city officials fail to submit to our orders
      It is permissible to assess all people in the city form of tax, but an "open city" cannot be bombarded because this levy has not been collected.
4. When cities, towns, and villages may be bombed in air warfare as objectives (this included "open cities").
   a. If a large force is in an area immediate to the operation of the opposing land force (including a SNLF) and is concentrating at the city, town, or village in question.
   b. (Civilians may be in danger, but that cannot be avoided. However, in such instances all possible steps shall be taken to reduce the danger to them.)
   c. (Bombing which has as its object the intimidation of civilians, the injury of non-combatants, and the destruction of non-military things is illegal.)

However, there is no objection to destroying individual targets even if the city as a whole may not be made an objective.

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C. Targets which may not be attacked (common to land, naval, and air warfare).
   1. Religious buildings
   2. Buildings used in the learning of arts and crafts
   3. Buildings used by charity orgainizations
   4. Historical monuments
   5. Hospitals, collection stations for the sick and wounded, and hospital ships.

   But if it had been assumed that these things would not be put to military use, and the enemy violated this assumption, there could not be the slightest objection to an attack. However in such an instance, the existence or non-existence of the breach must be made clear and attacks kept to the minimum necessitated.

D. Is an attack without warning lawful? (a step taken at the outset of an attack).

   In general, the city officials should be notified beforehand, regardless of whether the city is defended or not.

   The method of notification is left to the discretion of the attacker. The scattering of leaflets advising evacuation is one way. Especially should an attack on objects within an "open city" be announced, giving its residents a considerable period of grace. (The length of this period will depend on circumstances.)

   If the situation is urgent, it is not necessary to warn the city. It will suffice if as much consideration as possible is given to the reduction of inconvenience to the city's inhabitants.

   When an assault, surprise attack, etc., is an unavoidable military necessity, an attack without warning is not unlawful. And in air attacks, too, it is not necessary to warn the city beforehand, be it defended or not.

   However, an attack provoked by resistance to a levy must be preceded without fail by notification.

E. Is it necessary that non-combatants be allowed to seek refuge outside the attack sectors when the city is being surrounded?

   This may be readily refused, for favors based on pity need not be carried to excess.

II. There is evidence that the PHILIPPINE Government employees withdrew from MANILA on a hospital ship. Was there anything to prevent us from subjecting this ship to a visit and search and seizing it?

   As necessary, it is possible to take charge of a ship, conduct a visit and search, and then set it on an isolated course or detain it.

   However, a hospital ship may not be molested as long as it does not commit an act against the enemy.

(Reference Material:)

A. Definition of a hospital ship
   1. A public vessel, private vessel, or ship of neutral registry which is employed with the single purpose of succouring the sick, wounded, and ship-wrecked.
   2. Types and markings:

      A flag bearing a red cross on a white field flown with the national flag is accepted identification.

In each case, the states in conflict with the said belligerent must be notified of the use of these ships in advance.

   a. Naval hospital ships
      Painted white with a lateral green stripe of about one metre in width. Built and outfitted in the country using it.
   b. Privately owned hospital ships
      Painted white with a lateral red stripe of about one metre in width. Equipped by a private individual or corporation, and operated under orders from the belligerent state.
   c. Hospital ships of neutral registry
      Painted white with a lateral red stripe of about one metre in width. Equipped by a private individual or corporation in the neutral state, and must have the previous sanction of the government of registry and belligerent state.

B. The Rights and Obligations of a Hospital Ship:
1. No matter what nationality a ship may be, it may rescue from the sea the sick and wounded of belligerent powers.
2. Hospital ships may not be used for military purposes.
3. Hospital ships may not interfere with the transport of combatant troops.
Accordingly, the warships of belligerent powers may direct a hospital ship on an isolated course. If necessary, the warships can exercise the right of search and detention.
4. Hospital ships operate at their own risk:
If the symbol of the hospital ship is not recognized and it is attacked, the responsibility lies wholly with the hospital ship.

C. In cases where a hospital ship engages in forbidden activities by taking advantage of its special rights as a hospital ship, such as engaging in the transportation of personnel other than the sick, wounded, and survivors of ship-wreck or when it makes available information or engages in any other such military function, it forfeits its special rights and may be considered subject to the treatment afforded ordinary ships. (According to British opinion, it is not permissible for a hospital ship to return to the functions of a merchantman). When we consider, however, those rights which international law permits for the special handling of cases even in sick bays aboard warships we note that the hospital ship goes beyond its allotted powers when it takes aboard (from a warship) sick and wounded. Although it is permissible to open fire immediately upon it, except in absolutely unavoidable cases, it is allowed to get away.

III. How would you, if you were Commander of the WAKE Island Occupation Force, have dealt with the bearer of a white flag?

Though the situation is handled according to the decisions of the Commander of the Occupation Force and according to the principles established for land warfare, those articles which treat of the situation in international law are given below:

A. What is meant by the bearer of a flag (TN: in English):
1. He is acting under the orders of one of the belligerent parties (which indicates that he is representing one of the belligerent parties).
His Duty: To negotiate on behalf of one of the belligerent parti

His Identification: He bears a white flag.
2. The bearer of the flag and the interpreter, drummer, and bugler who accompany him possess certain inviolable rights.

B. Treatment of the Flag Bearer:
1. The question of whether or not to acknowledge the flag bearer who has been sent out is left to the discretion of the Force Commander and he is not always obliged to receive him.
(However, in the above case, a declaration that the flag bearer will not be received is customary.)
2. If the flag bearer takes advantage of his position to determine the state of affairs on our side, the Force Commander in order to prevent this may use what ever means he feels necessary.
3. If the enemy has abused the privilege of sending a flag bearer, he can be detained for a while.

C. Circumstances in Which the Flag Bearer Loses his Inviolable Rights:
1. When he incites treachery or when he takes advantage of his special right to further his own interests.
When he does either of the above acts, he immediately forfeits his special rights (There should be no compromise about treating him as an enemy).
2. The flag bearer who has been denied reception shall immediately withdraw but because of this, he doesn't lose his special rights. That is to say, because reception has been denied it is not permissible to perform immediately a hostile act against the flag bearer.

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SPECIFICATIONS OF THE NO. 10 TYPE MTB

1. HULL:

| | |
|---|---|
| Length Overall | 32.400 metres |
| Length at Waterline (official) | 31.770 metres |
| Beam | 5.000 metres |
| Depth | 2.800 metres |
| Displacement (official) | 84.600 tons |
| " (fully loaded) | 89.381 tons |
| " (light condition) | 68.277 tons |
| Draft forward | 1.104 metres |
| Draft aft | 1.116 metres |
| Mean draft | 1.111 metres |
| Fuel capacity | 17.000 liters |
| Cruising Range (official) | Speed of 28 Knots for 410 Miles |
| " " (under special conditions) | Speed of 16 Knots for 1200 Miles |
| Maximum Speed | 30 Knots |

2. ARMAMENT:

| | |
|---|---|
| Type 96 25mm dual-mount machine guns, Model 1, Modification 1 | 1 |
| Provisionally termed 40 kilogram smoke laying gear (TN: HATSUEN-KYU 發煙筐 ) | 4 |
| Type 99 7.7mm rifles | 5 |
| Pistols | 5 |
| Type 97 Gas Masks | 18 |
| Steel Helmets | 15 |
| Ammunition (25mm) | 1200 rounds |
| " (rifle) | 1400 rounds |
| " (pistol) | 360 rounds |

3. TORPEDO EQUIPMENT:

| | |
|---|---|
| Torpedoes Type 44 (Type 97) | 4 |
| Side Dropping Gear, Model 2 | 4 |
| Director, Type 14, Model 2 | 1 |
| Type 95 Depth Charge (when torpedoes aboard, 10) | 18 |
| Depth Charge Hand Launches, Model 2 | 6 |
| Air Reservoirs | 2 |

4. NAVIGATING EQUIPMENT:

| | |
|---|---|
| Type 90 Magnetic Compass, Model 2, Modification 1 | 1 |
| Compass for Small Boats, Model 2 | 1 |

5. OPTICAL EQUIPMENT:

| | |
|---|---|
| Manoueverable Range-Finder | 1 |
| 7 Power Prism Binoculars (NOVA, Model 1) | 4 |
| Type 96 Sextant, Modification 1 | 1 |

6. ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT:

| | |
|---|---|
| Primary Source of Power: | |
| Gasoline powered 6 KW 105 V DC Generators (for steering power and cooking use) | 2 |
| Secondary Source of Power: | |
| Storage Batteries, Model 3 (for use in starting and illumination) | 1 |
| Navigation Light | 1 |
| Illuminating Equipment (including 300W working lights) | 1 |
| Communication Apparatus | 1 |

7. RADIO EQUIPMENT:

| | |
|---|---|
| Type 96 Mark 4 Air (TN: KŪ 空 ) Wireless, sending (and receiving) | 1 |
| Secondary Power Equipment | 1 |
| Hydrophones (furnished by special orders) | 1 |

8. ENGINES:

| | |
|---|---|
| Main Engines - Mark 71 Model 6 internal combustion engines - 950 HP | |
| Gasoline Engines (VULCAN (ヴルカン) speed reduction equipment installed) | 4 |
| Shafts and Screws | 2 |
| Auxiliary Engines, Steering Engines (MHS Model 2 Steering Equipment) | 1 |

9. CREW:

| | |
|---|---|
| Officers and Warrant Officers | 3 |
| Enlisted Men | 15 |

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10. PRINCIPAL STORES:

| | |
|---|---|
| Anchor 100 kilograms | 1 |
| Anchor cable - diameter 15mm | 1 |
| Hand-operated Windlass | 1 |
| Fire extinguishing equipment, carbon dioxide type | 1 |
| ventilators (electrically operated) | |
| Training port (SENKAISŌ) (electrically operated) | 3 |

11. RUDDER:

Balanced Rudder

REFUELLING IN TOW

1 February 1942

1. ESSENTIALS:
To execute refuelling safely and swiftly at any time and place desired, maintaining the desired mobile strength and preparations for immediate response to the enemy.

2. PRECAUTIONS:
Since refuelling is an operation requiring cooperation between the fuelling and refuelling ships, careful preparation and investigation are necessary before the fact in order to insure close intercommunication.
Arrangements made beforehand; unity of planning.

3. METHODS:
Refuelling alongside: mainly done with cruisers and destroyers; suited to a pitching motion; large-scale refuelling possible; simple to perform.
Refuelling in tandem: possible for ships unsuited to refuelling alongside;
Diagonal refuelling.



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

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5. REFUELING ALONGSIDE - DIAGRAM:
(See Enclosure)

6. REFUELING RECORD:
A. Refueling method: alongside
B. Date: 24 January 1942, 0600
C. Place: (150° E. Long. on the equator)
D. Course: 0° Course intersection angle:
E. Shaft Speed: 8 knots (dangerous at 10-12 knots) Speed thru water: 6.6 knots.
F. Rudder compensation: 5° outboard
G. Wind direction: 340° Wind force: 3.5 metres per second
H. Roll: port 1.5°, starboard 2°
I. Barometric pressure: 758.4 mm Temperature: 25° C.
J. Distance between ships: 30 metres.
K. Pressure of oil pumped: 3 kilograms (TN: per sq. cm. ?)
L. Oil pumped: 240 tons per hour
M. Weights: 1.5 tons each Weight line: 24mm S.W. (steel wire)
N. Forward rope: 48mm S.W. Mooring Rope: 48 mm S.W.

7. HOW TO CALCULATE SHORT DISTANCES:




As is shown by the chart, puncture a piece of cardboard in two places with large match sticks and then hold the cardboard in a perpendicular position. Align the points where the sticks are visible so that the two points and the waterline of the fueling ship will be in the same plane. The bearing on which the distance being calculated lies in on the beam.

8. PROPER POSITIONS FOR THE SHIPS:
Port to Starboard - Ships should be about 35 metres apart.
Fore and Aft - The number flag flying aboard the fueling ship should be slightly forward of the bridge on the refueling ship.
When the ships are out of line, the proper position for each will be shown by numbers indicated on the side of the fueling ship.

9. STANDARD SIGNALS:
When the refueling ship hoists a white flag ....."The forward lines have been secured. No hindrance to putting out the weight."
When the refueling ship hoists a red flag ..... "The inboard line has been secured. No hindrance to running out the weight."
When the refueling ship hoists a blue flag ..... "The hoses have been connected. Begin to pump oil."
When the fueling ship hoists a blue flag ..... "Have started to pump oil."
After the fueling ship has started to pump oil, when it hoists a blue flag ..... "Have ceased pumping oil. Cast off the hose."
When the refueling ship hoists a blue flag ..... "Flow of oil has ceased. Hoses cast off.".

Completion of the Operation:

When the fueling ship hoists a red flag ..... "Cast off inboard line."
When the fueling ship hoists a white flag ..... "Cast off forward line.

(For additional communication during the operation, write the message on a small black board and hold it up (so it may be seen).)

10. CAUTIONS TO BE OBSERVED WHEN MANEUVERING THE SHIPS INTO POSITION:

(1) There must be close coordination between the turn and the compass. When both ships draw near, there should be proper orientation of the magnetic compass. When the ships are maneuvering into position, changes in distances shall be made by the fueling ship and because of the deviations caused by prevalent currents, waves, and other elements, in the adjustment of positions, allowances shall be made for these variable influences.

(2) When the angle of intersection of the courses of the ships is too great, since this has a direct relationship to the process of suction between the ships, it is dangerous for them to approach too rapidly.

(3) When there is a variation in speed because of the displacement of the refueling ship, weather, and other reasons, this variation may be decreased when high speeds are involved by means of a standard rule:

Cruisers ..... Decrease from 0 - 1/4 knots.
Destroyers ..... Decrease from 1/4 - 1/3 knots. If the differences in speed are too great, great strain will be placed upon the forward line and upon the inboard line.

(4) The angle of intersection of the course which the refueling ship should maintain with respect to the fueling ship should be fixed by considering the type of the ships, speed, weight, distance between the ships, influence of wind and waves, etc. Generally, 1° - 2° will be suitable.

If the angle of intersection is great, there is open space between the ships and if there is not much strain upon the forward and inboard lines, there is a tendency for the ships to mutually draw together.

## DRY-DOCKING OF THE KAKO

(19 November 1941; KURE)

I. THE SUBORDINATE WATCH OFFICER'S DUTIES

A. Hereafter he shall manage the docking operations
B. We plan to dock at 1030. Stand easy until then.
C. He shall supervise the deck crew in the changing of the anchor cables and wire-rope for hawsers fore and aft.
D. He shall prepare to cast both anchors.
E. Using a cutter, he shall change the wire-rope in the stern for a hawser. When finished, he shall supervise the hauling up of the bower cables.
F. Afterwards, the cutter shall be sent ashore.
G. He shall then supervise the securing of the gangway and boom by the division assigned to the task.
H. Davits shall then be turned inboard.
I. After the men from the Harbor Master's Office have come aboard, the starboard gangway shall be raised.
J. After 0930 the use of the head is prohibited.
K. After docking, he shall immediately put into effect the port fire bill. Each division shall make its preparations.
L. Otherwise, he shall do such work as is prescribed in the port bill (SHUTSUNYUKO BUSHO).
M. Attention! Carry on work at hand!

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II. (Enclosed a sketch).




III. DOCKING ESSENTIALS

First, the wire rope aft shall be taken in and replaced by a hawser. While paying this out, the wire-rope forward shall be taken in and replaced by a hawser. Then haul in the anchor cable.

One (150 ton) tug-boat forward and one on each side amidships and aft. While paying out the forward hawser take in the ones aft and let go the one forward. The forward buoy will be changed to the starboard by the tug. When the tug turns at "A" (TN: see sketch) this ship will aid in turning about by steering of the ship and then proceed directly to the dock. Forward there are 2 clearly visible markers. The officers-in-charge of the work party are 1 Harbor Master on "top" (TN: [illegible] ) and 1 officer-in-charge forward on the forecastle.

There will be hand-flag communication between the forward and aft masts.

Just a little before (TN: reaching) the dock the tug-boat changes course by turning to starboard, and lines are passed from the shore to both sides of the ship. As the stern approaches the entrance the tugs let go and lines are passed to both sides of the stern. Then while the starboard and port lines are being hauled the bow is pointed toward the two markers and the ship proceeds only by this power. (TN: i.e. by hauling on lines).

When dry-docking is completed, close the rear gates and begin drainage.

(End)

CONCERNING DRY-DOCKING

STANDARDS OF DRY-DOCKING (Regulations for Construction and Repair of Vessels, Item 61).

Combined Fleet:

1. Battleships and Carriers (those officially designated as being over 30,000 tons displacement).
   and Special Duty Vessels --- Once a year.
2. Warships: (Battleships, Carriers (as above) excluded) --- Twice a year.
   Destroyers, Submarines
   Torpedo Boats and Mine-Sweepers
3. Special Duty Boats As necessary.

DAILY ROUTINE WHILE DOCKED

| | |
|---|---|
| 0530 | All hands turn to; calisthenics (outside the dock); swabbing outer decks. |
| 0645 | Breakfast |
| 0730 | Daily routine; Inspection |
| 0845 | Lay to duties |
| 1130 | Secure from duties |
| 1145 | Lunch |
| 1305 | Calisthenics |
| 1315 | Commence instruction |
| 1600 | Secure from instruction |
| 1615 | Begin leisure time |
| 1700 | End of leisure time |
| 1715 | Supper |
| 1745 | Fire detail secures |

INSTRUCTIONS WHILE IN DRY-DOCK

1. There must be no running about on board ship.
2. Beware of what lies under foot. Take care that you don't fall down onto the dock.
3. A WO or above should be present when any heavy things are being moved or transported.
4. The safety rope must be used without fail whenever work is being done on the sides of the ship.
5. Secrecy shall be maintained. Be especially careful of the movement of laborers.
6. Fires are strictly prohibited. Do any work on the reverse side of a piece of oil-cloth.
7. The fire bill in dock must be thoroughly carried out.
8. The ship shall be fumigated upon entering and leaving the dock.

WHEN THE KAKO LEAVES DRY-DOCK

Preparations for Leaving the Dock (25 November 1941)

1. Hereafter (the subordinate watch officer) shall conduct the preparations for leaving the dock.
2. We expect to leave the dock at 1315. Afterwards we shall moor to buoy #4.
3. The fore deck crew shall prepare to moor the forward part of the ship.
4. The anchor crew shall prepare to cast both anchors.
5. The division assigned shall prepare to get out both gangways, swinging booms and propeller booms.
6. The 1st and 2nd Divisions shall prepare to take aboard ammunition.
7. All small boats shall proceed to the mooring place.
8. All hands away from their ship shall return by 1300.
9. Men performing work away from their ship will make certain of their life net
10. Set about preparing to leave the dock.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986
Page 67

Ships and shore stations spotting these signals shall indicate that they have received and understood them by hoisting the UNCLE flag or by transmitting the U (or cancel-U) code signal.

#3

ADDRESS BY OUR CAPTAIN UPON MY BOARDING SHIP

by Capt. TAKAHASHI, Yūji (Captain, KAKO)

16 November 1941

"For three years you have studied your duties diligently. And now I believe that as you stand here, at the battle front, your emotions have been heightened, as you sense impending action.

When you reflect upon it, this is no training suqadron; you have been assigned directly to the front. Officers in charge of your guidance and their assistants have been selected; but the fact of the matter is that each and every one of them has his battle station and shall not be able to devote his whole-hearted attention to your instruction. You appreciate, I am sure, the present situation, and will not depend on others too heavily. You must undertake your duties assertively, with a healthy spirit of initiative. Moreover, at this time special emphasis should be given to the caution, 'Always be at your station! '. It is extremely important that line officers always be on the upper deck, and that they observe everything. When they are on the upper deck, they are able to master anything that comes along.

In short, the present situation is certainly nearing its climax; indeed, it is in its most pregnant stage. I earnestly desire from you an uncommon amount of determination and effort."

ADDRESS ON NEW YEAR'S DAY, 1942

by Capt. HISAMUNE, Yonejirō (Captain, AOBA)

"If we put aside our merriment and stop to consider, we find that we have greeted this New Year's Day, in the 2602nd year of our Empire on the scene of battle. First, however, we should offer congratulations on the long life of our Emperor and Supreme Commander. I feel that it is not only a great honor for military men to greet the New Year on the battlefield, but that we shall long remember partaking of 'ZONI' (TN: a traditional Japanese New Year's Day dish of rice cake boiled with vegetables and meat), clad in our hot-weather gear.

"However, our foe is of great strength, too. In particular, it has been judged that a large American force of cruisers, in conjunction with carriers, has designs on the SOUTH SEA Islands. This force, which is charged with the heavy duty of protecting the SOUTH SEAS, must not relax its vigilance for one second. We have whetted our swords ten years for this one battle. 1942 shall be the year in which we will exalt our military might before the world, and in which we will achieve the object of our sacred war. Let each man strive his hardest."

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JICPOA Item #4986
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ADDRESS NO. 4 TO THE COMBINED FLEETS

(2003, 23 May 1943)

By the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets

On this occasion we pay our respects to the memory of a leader of the Combined Fleet, to a man whom we still remember. YAMAMOTO, the late Commander-in-Chief, died at the front. If we annihilate our stubborn enemy even at the cost of our lives, we will know that his spirit lives on.

During the past year and a half of this struggle, we have smashed the power of our great enemy and though we have, in the main, carried out our basic strategy, our enemy is striving for ultimate victory by expanding his preparations for offensive action and by devising plans for the strategic application of new weapons. Furthermore, taking advantage of the tide of the war in EUROPE, he is concentrating his main power in the GREAT EAST ASIA Area and is preparing to launch a counter-offensive. No matter how many times the enemy may advance against us, we shall always welcome combat with him and in exterminating him and securing for ourselves the ultimate victory, we shall by united effort and perseverance forge for ourselves a greater and greater military power. At the same time that we manifest a relentless spirit of attack, we shall be prepared to meet the changing conditions of warfare with new strategies and new weapons, always keeping one stop ahead of the enemy.

The war is now at its peak. We defend what is ours and the task of meeting and striking the enemy must be the prerogative of the Imperial Navy. We shall defend ourselves to the last breath and shall totally destroy the enemy. Should we cross paths with the enemy upon the seas, that will be fine. We shall in our traditional way close in upon him and deliver fierce attacks. We look forward confidently to seeing our enemy vanquished.

If in accordance with this desire we devote ourselves wholeheartedly to the utter destruction of the enemy, being animated by the spirit of the late Commander-in-Chief YAMAMOTO, we shall be united, first of all, with the brave soul of the Admiral of the Fleet and then with those many others now in Heaven, and shall be able to look forward to the crushing of the enemy and the fulfilment of the great responsibility of the defense of our fatherland.

Let each and every one ponder well upon this task; let us all, by exerting our efforts look forward to the realization of the Imperial wishes by carrying to its conclusion this responsibility.

( END )

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #10
(INTERROGATION OF JAPANESE PRISONER OF WAR
CAPTURED FROM THE JAPANESE SUBMARINE I-1
WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)
ENTITLED
"KUBOAKI, TAKEO, SUPERIOR CLASS ENGINEER PETTY OFFICER,
INTERROGATION OF"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

A16-2/(4) EF37

A8-2/EF37

A8/(25) SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE
OF THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER HDH/rww

Serial 0351

CONFIDENTIAL MAR 2 1943

From: The Commander South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force.
To: Distribution List.

Subject: KUBOAKI, TAKEO, Superior Class Engineer Petty Officer, interrogation of.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Interrogation.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for information and use.

M. R. BROWNING
Chief of Staff.

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H. D. Moulton

H. D. MOULTON,
Flag Secretary.

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE CENTER
SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL February 26, 1943.

EXAMINATION OF: KUBOAKI, TAKEO. SUPERIOR CLASS ENGINEER P. O.

(Interrogator: Lt. Col. H. D. Harris, U.S.M.C.)
(Interpreter: Capt. J. R. Shively, U.S.M.C.R.)

Personal History:

POW was captured from the I-1 after having spent 24 hours in the water. He was suffering from shark bites on the right heel and left forearm. POW had completed 9 years service in Nip Navy; was 28 years old; and had attended high school. The POW had a course at the Mechanics School and then finished the submarine school and had returned to Mechanics School for an additional course. POW served aboard I-4 for 1 year. POW had been on the I-1 for 28 months; previously to that he was on the KATORI from November 1939 to October 1940. The POW was on duty with the diesel engines on both the KATORI and the I-1.

Identifications:

The POW said that the commander of the 6th Fleet was Vice Admiral KOMATSU. Vice Admiral SHIMIZU formerly commanded the 6th Fleet.

The POW gave the following names for the officers of the I-1:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Commanding Officer | - | SAKAMOTO, Lt. Comdr. |
| Engineer Officer | - | BUTO, Hisao, Lt. |
| Gunnery Officer | - | OIKAWA, Ensign |
| Asst. Eng. Officer | - | FUJII, Warrant Officer |
| Electrical Officer | - | IMAI, Warrant Officer |
| Torpedo Officer | - | was a warrant officer - name unknown |
| Navigator | - | was a Lt. (jg) - name unknown |

Operational Information:

Following represents a chronological record of I-1 operations obtained from POW:

1. December, 1941 - operated in Pearl Harbor area, firing several torpedoes at transport - no hits. I-1 was attacked on 2 or 3 occasions without effect.

2. January 13, 1942 - returned to Japan via Marshalls where I-1 refueled. Torpedo supply replenished in Japan.

3. February 2, 1942 - departed Japan and proceeded to Indian Ocean remaining there 2 months. One merchant ship was attacked and sunk (probably Australian). The I-1 developed engine trouble (broken shaft).

4. April 2, 1942 - returned to Japan for overhaul, remaining there 3 months. The after gun was removed and ship rigged to carry one large motor landing craft (DAIHATSU). Ship's complement was supplemented by 3 additional men to man landing boat.

5. During July the I-1 was in Aleutian waters on a cruise which lasted about 50 days, during which no U.S. ships or planes were sighted.

6. September 10, 1942 - departed Japan for Rabaul, operating in Solomons area without incident until end of October.

7. November 1, 1942 - returned to Truk.

8. November 10, 1942 - departed for Japan.

9. November 20, 1942 - arrived Japan, remaining there until end of December.

10. January 3, 1943 - departed Yokosuka, Japan, for Truk in company with I-17. The MUSASHI and YAMATO were observed at Truk. The HAYATAKA left a day or two later.

11. January 10, 1943 - proceeded to Rabaul (ship repainted; engine trouble developed (clutch)). Proceeded to Guadalcanal.

12. January 29, 1943.- I-1 was attacked and destroyed January 29, 1943, while transporting stores and supplies to Guadalcanal.

Technical Information:

1. The I-1 carried 53 centimeter torpedoes - the speed of which was estimated to be 50 knots. Air pressure was 200 kg. per sq. cm.

2. The KATORI is powered with turbines, main engines, supplemented with diesel auxiliaries. Speed under diesel is 14 knots; diesel and turbines combined is 18 knots (carries one plane).

3. The I-17 is equipped with a monoplane (silver color) which when submerged is housed forward of conning tower.

4. Class "I" submarines carrying planes are the:

7, 8, 9, 15, 17, 19, 21 and 23 (planes were recently removed as battle gear from the I-5 and I-6).

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5. "RO" subs, which are smaller than the "I" class, do not carry planes.

6. The "I" class submarines carrying midget submarines are:

16, 18, 20, 22, 24.

7. The MUSASHI and YAMATO (BBs) are apparently the same size with 3 turrets of 3 guns each believed to be very large.

8. The I-1 required about one minute and 30 seconds to submerge completely and did not change course while submerging.

Miscellaneous:

1. Submarine sinkings developed were on the approximate dates as follows:

I-63 - prior to December 7, 1941.
I-124 - January, 1942.
I-123 - September, 1942.
I-15 - October, 1942.
I-4 - about December 15, 1942.
I-3 - December 15, 1942.
I-28 - no date.
I-1 - January 29, 1943.

2. Temperature rises to 40° centigrade aboard larger subs.

3. The following submarine divisions (SENSUITAI) are reputed to be based at Yokosuka:

1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9.

4. Four submarines are reported to be under construction at Yokosuka (interval of construction 3 to 4 months, output - 1 sub per month). No information on rate of production at other yards could be given by POW.

5. Air attack alarms used at Rabaul are:

(a) Siren during day.
(b) Red rockets at night.

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6. An airfield is known to be on Truk (Island of TAKESHIMA). Service personnel at Truk is principally navy (5,000), practically no army. Recreational facilities are provided.

7. There is a base hospital at Truk, possibly on NATSU ISLAND.

8. Following comments were also made by POW:

(a) While in Rabaul (January, 1943), he did not get ashore much. However, sake was to be had aboard.

(b) Believed sub sinkings in general principally caused by depth charges.

(c) Preference of duty is aboard "I" class of subs. However, has had no experience with "RO" class.

(d) Doesn't consider submarines are particularly good protection against enemy submarines (however, POW has never encountered enemy submarines).

9. POW had heard that HOSHO (CV) was sunk and saw the SHOKAKU under repair at Yokosuka in December.

10. Repair capacities at Rabaul are limited to the facilities carried on the one repair ship stationed there.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #11
(INTERROGATION OF JAPANESE PRISONER OF WAR
WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
AS A MEMBER OF THE CREW OF THE (CV) KAGA)
ENTITLED
"PRISONER OF WAR YOKOTA, SHIGEKI"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460)

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

CONFIDENTIAL - BRITISH SECRET

ALLIED TR. RELAYS AND INTERPRETER SECTION
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

SERIAL NO. 230

15 AUG '43

INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 148, YOKOTA, S.

1. Attached is a Report on information gained from Japanese PW YOKOTA, Shigeko.

2. All information contained in this Report has been extracted this PW source only. Its value should be assessed and its distribution restricted accordingly.

Examiner 7

CSS/WTH/BOW/1

SIDNEY F. MASHBIR,
Colonel, G.S.,
Co-ordinator.

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| [illegible] | 1 |
| [illegible] | 1 |
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| ATIS SWPA | 14 |

Original File No. JA (ESA) 100097

INTERROGATION REPORT No. [illegible]
(Further report by [illegible])

| | |
|---|---|
| Pris Name: | YOKOTA, [illegible] |
| Rank: | [illegible] Class Seaman |
| Unit: | TSUKUBA NAVAL BASED Air. [illegible] SHIP |
| Where Captured: | [illegible] Is. |
| By Whom Captured: | [illegible] |
| When Captured: | In action out. |
| When Captured: | [illegible] and '44 |
| Religion: | [illegible] |
| Weights: | [illegible] lbs |
| Age: | 23 |
| Private Address: | [illegible] KOBE KEN, [illegible] GUN, KAWANCHI MURA, 1989. |
| Education: | 6 yrs Primary, 2 yrs Higher Primary. |
| Civil Occupation: | Farmer |

1. PERSONALITY

He is of average intelligence and appears to have a very good memory, especially for names. He answers all questions readily and appears to have no "dea" of secrecy. His knowledge is limited due to his small service experience.

5. HOSTILE ACTIONS

1. Operations. Attack on PEARL HARBOUR, Dec '41. (All dates given in this are approximate). He was in (CV) Akagi.

(i) Composition of Task Force

(BB) [illegible] NAGATO
(BB) [illegible] MUTSU
(CV) [illegible] (Flag Ship)
(CV) [illegible]
(CV) [illegible] HIRYU
(CV) [illegible] SORYU
(CA) [illegible]
(CA) [illegible]
(CA) [illegible]
(CA) 2 [illegible] Kuma Class
(CL) 2 [illegible] and class unknown.
(CS) 1 [illegible] I-Class.
(AO) 1 [illegible] or numbers
(TV) Supply Ship. Resembled (AO) SHIRETOKO.

(ii) Assembly of Task Force. Task Force assembled at TANKAN (indicated [illegible] HITOKAPU WAN, HITOKUU is. in KURILES, middle of Nov '41, under [illegible] of [illegible] (Vice Adm) NAGUMO, Chuichi.

(BB) [illegible], KIRISHIMA, (CVs) [illegible], [illegible], & CA (possibly [illegible]) and 2 DDs arrived TAMAN before 20 Nov '41.

(CV) [illegible] left [illegible] 7 Nov '41, proceeded South of [illegible], off East coast of F.P.I., arriving TAMAN 15 Nov '41.

Three AOs (Oilers) and 1 TEN (Supply ship) arrived 16 Nov '41.

(CV) SORYU arrived 16 Nov '41.

(CVs) ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU arrived 17 Nov '41.

Three AOs joined Task Force on leaving TAMAN 22 Nov '41.

Units assembled as in following tracing of sketch drawn by Pri-




(T.N. Area with [illegible] shown as red on original)
(T.N. Least tracing from the original document.)

Tracing of Sketch Drawn by PW, Showing Task Force Anchorage at TAMAN, Nov '41.

(iii) Events at TAMAN. (For further particulars of TAMAN, see Sec 17).

PW saw no A/C or Patrol Vessels while at TAMAN, except 6 Torpedo Boats which anchored South-East of entrance for about one day.

Provisions were embarked in EACH 19 Nov. PW thought she oiled, but was not certain.

No shore leave was granted. No order was given, however, that no rubbish was to be thrown overboard, but was to be collected and burnt ashore by men near South-Eastern side of entrance. PW landed once, 20 Nov, for this duty. Officer in charge of working party gave orders that no one was to leave immediate vicinity of pier. PW saw, but did not speak to, about 3 fishermen who lived in 3 houses nearby; he saw no Army or Naval shore personnel, nor staff of A/T station further inland.

(iv) Outward Passage. - Task Force sailed 1400, 22 Nov '41, being joined by 2 AS on leaving. Formation on departure and on arrival was as follows:

[illegible]

[illegible]

79716 O—46—pt. 13——17

were not posted, this duty being carried out by A/A MG crews. Task Force did not fuel while on return passage.

(vii) Rumours and prior knowledge of Operations. Before leaving SASEBO, 7 Nov 41, ship's company of KAGA were instructed to settle all their bills. (All important documents, photograph albums, nautical instruments, and all other unnecessary items were put ashore. - M-Room Source). This gave them the impression that they were about to go on some operation.

After leaving SASEBO, the Executive Officer addressed them and indicated that they were going to an area South of HONG KONG. When they found they were proceeding further South, they were very surprised, and presumed they were going on a military operation, possibly against CHINA.

He did not admit that he had any idea of their real destination, stating that he was a very junior rating, knew very little and did not think much about the matter.

## 17. LOCALITIES

TANKAN, STORONG IS., FORMOSA. It is indicated on a map that TANKAN and HITOKAPPU BAY on South coast of STORONG IS. He knew no names of places in vicinity, but his general description agreed with that of HITOKAPPU BAY given in available publications. He stated that he did not know correct Chinese characters for TANKAN, but thought they might be [illegible]). Task Force assembled at TANKAN Nov '41 before leaving for attack on Pearl HARBOUR (See Sec 3).

(i) General Description (See tracing of Pilot's sketch below).


Tracing of Sketch Drawn by PO showing TANKAN, STORONG IS., Nov 41.

(P.A. Area within above in red on original)

Bay was surrounded by hills, highest peak being behind centre and about 300 metres high. Southernmost coast was low lying, with rocky foreshore as far as centre of bay. Low cliffs began here, rising to a maximum of about 200 metres at North-Eastern side of entrance. Hills were covered with low

scrub, not higher than 2 or 3 feet, and no trees could be seen. Ground was covered with snow, but there was no ice in bay or ashore. PW saw no signs of lakes, rivers or swamps. The coastal area appeared to be uninhabited except by fishermen who lived in 3 houses near pier. It was, however, impossible to see details of centre or North-Eastern side of bay from KMUA, and view beyond pier was obscured by low hills and an embankment.

PW estimated width of bay to be 6,000 metres and distance between entrance and opposite shore to be 2,000 metres. He thought there was a large rock close inshore near centre of bay. Bay was "deeper than most harbours", but he did not know exact depth. There was deep water right up to foreshore.

Wind was from North-West.

(ii) Pier and Vicinity. There was only one pier, situated at South-Western side of bay. It was constructed of concrete and stones, about 15 metres long, 4 metres wide, 2 to 4 metres high, and had steps cut at the end. Its height was difficult to estimate as waves were fairly high alongside. There was no crane or structure on it. Depth of water at steps was about 5 metres. PW had landed at pier on one occasion to burn rubbish, but was not allowed to leave the immediate vicinity or to speak with any local fishermen. It was high tide when he landed.

Ground inshore of pier was stony with short grass showing above snow.

There were 3 fishermen's houses inshore and a little to South of pier. They were not visible from KMUA's anchorage, but could be seen from pier. Behind houses earth embankment had been constructed, about 1 M (13 ft) high. Nothing could be seen beyond embankment except 3 W/T masts (See Sub-Sec (iv)). PW could not see whether there was a village in vicinity, but stated there was no smoke or other signs of habitation.

Between houses and embankment there was a narrow and very rough road, which could perhaps be used by cars. PW did not know where road led. He saw no cars. There were no fishing boats to be seen.

(iii) Landing Places. Landing would be difficult between pier and South-Western side of entrance, as there were a number of rocks offshore, height above water about 2 ft. Fishing stakes were placed among these rocks. PW saw no sand or beach in this area.

PW considered that landing from MLC would be easy between pier and centre of bay. There were few rocks offshore, and weight of foreshore above water did not exceed about 1 metre. Water appeared to be deep up to shore, but PW saw no beaches in immediate vicinity of pier.

From centre of bay to North-Eastern side of entrance landing would be impossible because of cliffs. PW saw no beaches in this area, but was unable to observe details from KMUA's anchorage.

(iv) W/T Station. Situated behind embankment near pier, but no details of buildings were visible. Three W/T masts stuck in sand, but PW could not estimate height or arrangement as they were partly obscured by embankment. He saw some of the personnel, but thought it was a Naval W/T station. He did not know any details of its organization, or number of personnel.

(v) Defences. He saw no defences, guns, or torpedo tubes mounted ashore. There was no evidence of A/Craft guns or Boom Defence. There were no indications of minefields, either across entrance or outside, and no buoys which might mark channels. There were no buildings visible on either side of entrance.



[illegible] He saw no a/c while at TANKAN, and did not know of existence of any airfields or A/F [illegible]. He could not tell from KAGA's anchorage, or from ship, whether there were any suitable sites for airfields; ground on south-western side of entrance was, however, low lying.

(vi) General. There were no lighthouses or shore lights visible. He imagines, but was uncertain, that Shore Signals were displayed in vicinity of W/T station.

[illegible] END ROLL.

[illegible] ATIS SERIAL 230 - Page 7

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #12
(A NAVY STUDY OF JAPANESE ESPIONAGE IN HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
CONSISTING OF
(A)
COM14 LETTER TO CNO SERIAL 0004 WITH ENCLOSURE 14ND SERIAL 234
(B)
CINCPAC-CINCPOA LETTER TO CNO SERIAL 000742
(C)
COMFIFTH FLEET LETTER TO COMINCH US PACFLEET SERIAL 000179
(D)
COMGEN HQ 5th PHIBCORPS LETTER TO COMFIFTH FLEET SERIAL 000374B
with
ENCLOSURE HQ 5th MARINE DIVISION 496 CIC DETACH, SASEBO, KYUSHU,
13 OCT 45, MEMO FOR THE AC OF S, G-2,
WITH ACCOMPANYING MAP AND SKETCH OF KAUI AND OAHU ISLANDS
SHOWING THE LOCATIONS OF ATTACKING JAPANESE
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, AIRPLANES AND SUBMARINES)

ENTITLED
"PRE-WAR ESPIONAGE IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
REPORT ON PRE-WAR HONOLULU COMMERCIAL BROADCASTS CONTAINING
CODED INFORMATION FOR THE JAPANESE FLEET"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460)

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

14TH NAVAL DISTRICT
OFFICE OF COMMANDANT
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 0004

TOP SECRET

23
TOP SECRET
CONTROL
NO. 2559

10 November, 1945.

3rd ENDORSEMENT on HQ VPhibCorps
Top Secret Ltr. 091/130, Serial
000374B dated 14 October 1945.

From: Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval District.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Pre-War Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.

Enclosure: (A) Top Secret Memo for DIO 14ND from Lt. R.H. Peterson, USNR, dated 7 Nov. 1945, Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

1. Forwarded.

2. Enclosure (A) is submitted in accordance with paragraph two of second endorsement on basic letter.

S.A. TAFFINDER.

Copy to:
Com 5th Flt (3rd End. & Encl (A).
ComGenVPhibCorps (3rd End. & Encl (A).
CinCPac/POA (3rd End. & Encl (A).

Serial: 0004

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District Intelligence Office
Fourteenth Naval District
5th Floor, Young Hotel,
Honolulu, Hawaii

14ND/A8-2
Serial 234 TOP SECRET RHP/wps

TOP SECRET

7 November 1945

MEMO FOR: The District Intelligence Officer.

Subject : Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

Reference: (a) HQ, Fifth Marine Division, 496th CIC Detachment TOP SECRET Memorandum for the AC of S, G-2, dated 13 Oct. 1945, subject: Pre-War Espionage in the Hawaiian Islands.

1. Reference (a) discloses that Yoshio SHIGA, Lt.Comdr., IJN, aviator who participated in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, made the following statements, in substance, on 9 October 1945 to Robert N. Tait, Special Agent, CIC, at Omura, Kyushu, Japan:

(a) That he believed quite strongly that information concerning all movements of ships into and out of Pearl Harbor was transmitted to the fleet through coded messages broadcast over a Honolulu commercial broadcasting station;

(b) That, in his opinion, the codes were many and varied but that if, for example, it was broadcast that the German attache lost one dog, it might mean that a carrier left Pearl Harbor, and that if, for another example, the German attache wanted a cook or a houseboy, it might mean that a battleship or cruiser had entered the harbor;

(c) That the (foregoing) information had been given to him by Lt.Comdr. Shigeharu MURATA, IJN, Chief of the Air Squadron aboard the flagship AKAGI, on their return to Japan;

(d) That the (foregoing) information was conveyed on radio programs just following the news broadcasts, which (SHIGA stated) were at 0630, 1200, 1900;

(e) That the time following the 1900 broadcast was probably used, since the Japanese agents would then have had an opportunity to convey information con-

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cerning a whole day's activities;

(f) That, on the first Saturday the force was at sea, reports were received that there were only one or two carriers in Pearl Harbor;

(g) That, on 6 December 1941, sometime between 2000 and 2100 (Hawaiian time) news came to him regarding numbers of ships in Pearl Harbor;

(h) That he could offer no other leads concerning the espionage conducted for the attack than that of the Honolulu Broadcasting Station;

(i) That, on 6 December 1941, the force was 800 miles due north of Hawaii, and that they then received, from the Japanese Navy Department, a wireless message "Climb Mt. Niitaka", which was the signal for the attack.

2. On 30 October 1945, FBI-Honolulu and G-2(CID) Honolulu were furnished one copy each of reference (a) by the Acting District Intelligence Officer, 14ND. FBI-Honolulu, G-2(CID) Honolulu and DIO-14ND conducted checks of their respective files with negative results in locating transcriptions, continuity scripts, or outlines of programs which had emanated from stations KGMB and KGU for the period of 27 November through 6 December 1941.

3. On 31 October and 1 November, 1945, reporting officer interviewed J. Howard WORRAL, Manager of Station KGMB, Honolulu, who stated substantially as follows after checking the files and transcription library of KGMB:

> There are no pre-war transcriptions, continuity scripts, or station logs for news, want-ads, or other local programs, including those which were given in the Japanese language, in our files or library. Transcriptions of the Japanese programs were made for many weeks prior to the war right up to 7 December 1941. All of these, with the exception of those for about 1 through 6 December, were cleaned out of our files and destroyed about two years ago following a discussion I had with either the Army Intelligence or the FBI. I recall that it was

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conceded, I think by the FBI, that there was no reason why we should continue to keep old material in our library when we needed the space so badly. All of that material which the Army wanted had been picked up, and the portion that was left, consisting of transcriptions of the Japanese programs, had been censored before it went out over the air. To my knowledge there was never any correspondence on the subject of cleaning out our files. We have kept no station logs over two years old; the FCC requires that we keep logs about two years before destroying them.

The transcriptions of Japanese programs for about 1 through 6 December 1941 were turned over to Major Henry C. Putnam of Army Intelligence a short while after the war started. I recall that Hugh Lyttel (phonetic) and (fnu) Albright (phonetic) of Army Intelligence were frequently up here early in the war assisting or working with Major Putnam.

George FUJITA (George Masuzo FUJITA) was in charge of the Japanese programs and HAYASHIDA (Akiyoshi HAYASHIDA) went over the transcriptions prior to their being put on the air to make sure they contained nothing subversive or objectionable. HAYASHIDA was recommended to us by Mr. Shivers of FBI as being entirely responsible and trustworthy. Material gathered for the Japanese program as well as the Want-Ads program had no direct connection with newspaper ads; ads which went out over the radio could have appeared in the newspapers although radio time was bought separately from newspaper space.

Our librarian prior to and during the early part of the war was Alan LISSER, in my opinion entirely reliable, trustworthy and loyal. LISSER is presently working in San Francisco for station KFRC and would probably recall the details of what we had and didn't have in the library during that period.

As a rule, no transcriptions were made of local news or Want-Ads programs; such broadcasts were prepared in note or continuity form and given direct to the "mike" by the

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announcer.

Our Hilo station, KHBC, was under a similar arrangement with respect to programs given in Japanese. A young woman, Miss Kazuho HIGUCHI, an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, supervised and censored all such programs before they went out over the air; she was also recommended to us by Mr. Shivers.

4. On 31 October 1945, reporting officer interviewed M. A. MULRONY, Manager of Station KGU, Honolulu, who stated substantially as follows after checking his files:

I am sure that we do not have the continuity scripts or program outlines you are looking for. No transcriptions were made of programs given in Japanese during the pre-war period. We did make up continuity scripts for those programs during that period. Copies of these scripts were furnished to DIO-14ND, FBI-Honolulu, and Army Intelligence; the copies were translated and sent back, with comments, before the programs went on the air. As I recall, all of the scripts in our files were picked up shortly after the war started by Army Intelligence. I have the idea that some were sent to Washington; none were ever returned to KGU. I don't recall what person or persons picked up the scripts.

Up until several months before the war, FURUKAWA (Shigeo FURUKAWA) was in charge of the Japanese Sunday program; he was dishonest in his dealings with KGU. After he left this work, GOTO (Richard Hisashi GOTO) was in charge; Jack NAWATANI (Jack Iwasaburo NAWATANI) did the announcing on week days. Material gathered for the Japanese Sunday program came from subscribers contacted by FURUKAWA and GOTO; the material didn't come from the newspapers. Few, if any, of the programs originating locally, including news and Want-Ads, were transcribed before being put on the air. NAWATANI gathered material for the daily programs.

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5. On 31 October 1945, reporting officer interviewed L. R. DAWSON, Supervisor of Federal Communications Commission, Honolulu, who stated substantially as follows:

> FCC made no transcriptions of programs originating from Honolulu broadcasting stations prior to the war, except for the period of one week in July, 1941. At that time, local programs given in foreign languages over KGMB and KGU were transcribed at the specific request of FCC in Washington and were forwarded to Washington without being translated locally.
>
> Commercial broadcasting stations are required to keep station logs for one year before destroying them.
>
> Amateur radio stations continued operating right up to 7 December 1941. Except for specific cases which were checked by our monitors, there were no records or transcriptions made of amateurs' transmissions in T.H. Pre-war reports of specific cases checked by our monitors were forwarded long ago to FCC in Washington.

6. On 1 November 1945, reporting officer interviewed Lt.Col. Wilson GADDIS, AUS, Public Relations Office, G2, Fort Shafter, Oahu, who stated substantially as follows:

> I worked very closely with Major Henry C. Putnam in the Public Relations Office, G2, in the early part of the war. I do not recall that Major Putnam ever picked up transcriptions of any Japanese programs from KGMB following the war. If he had, they would probably be in the files here or at G-2(CID) Honolulu. I feel certain that he has none of the transcriptions or continuity scripts with him at the present time.
>
> After checking thoroughly in the files here, I can state that no such transcriptions or continuity scripts are here.
>
> Major Putnam's present address is Mid-Pacific Liaison Officer, Bureau of Public Relations, War Department, Washington 25, D. C. Major Putnam will be back at Fort Shafter, Oahu, about 1 December 1945.

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7. On 31 October, 2 and 3 November 1945, files of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, the Honolulu Advertiser, and the Archives of Hawaii were checked for information pertinent to code mentioned in reference (a). Nothing was found under Want-Ads and other sections in either newspaper for the period of 27 November through 6 December 1941 regarding the German attache losing one dog or the German attache wanting a cook or houseboy.

8. Files of the Archives of Hawaii, Honolulu, checked on 3 November 1945, disclosed the following information relative to times of news, want-ads, Japanese programs, and other programs immediately following on stations KGMB and KGU for 5, 6, and (scheduled for) 7 December 1941:

KGMB - Friday, 5 December 1941; this schedule representative of other week days:

0715 News
0730 Wake Up and Live
0830 News
0835 Listen Ladies
0945 News and Want-Ads Program (Mrs. Nita BENEDICT)
1000 Around the Town With Gene Sawyer
1215 News
1225 Stock Quotations
1245 Japanese Program
1415 Columbia's School of the Air (CBS)
1500 News
1505 Plantation Melodies
1735 News
1740 Show Parade
1930 News
1945 John Nesbit's Passing Parade
2055 Streamlined Headlines
2100 Amos 'n' Andy
2125 News (CBS)
2130 Here's Morgan
2200 News
2215 Swing Nocturne

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Schedule for Saturday, 6 December 1941, same as the foregoing except for the following:

1415 Saturday News (following Japanese Program)
1420 Football Game Broadcast
1945 20th Century Serenade
2130 South American Way

Schedule for Sunday, 7 December 1941:

0600 to 0830 - Japanese Program
0930 News
0945 Sports Reporter
1900 News
1915 Charioteers
2200 News
2215 Serenade in the Night

KGU - Friday, 5 December 1941; this schedule representative for other week days:

0600 Japanese Community Program
0645 Easy Tunes and Topics
0700 Shell Transradio News
0710 Persan's Footwear Parade
0800 Shoppers' Guide
0810 Sunshine Program (E. Dropman & Co.)
0815 Bulletin Board
0830 Shoppe Serenade
0845 Waikiki on the Air
0950 Shell Transradio News
1000 Music School
1045 Japanese Program
1130 We The Abbotts
1215 Shell Transradio News
1225 Oddities in the News
1900 Shell Transradio News
1915 Parker Family (NBC)
2255 Shell Transradio News
2300 Ending 6987th Day of Broadcast

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Schedule for Saturday, 6 December 1941, same as foregoing except for the following:

1000 Morning Matinee
1225 Interlude
1715 Beyond the News
1730 Ranch House Roundup
1915 Band Concert from A.& N. YMCA.

Schedule for Sunday, 7 December 1941:

1300-1430 Japanese Program
1930 Shell Transradio News
1945 Red Skelton & Company

9. There is no record of transcriptions or continuity scripts of Japanese and other programs broadcast by stations KHBC, Hilo, Hawaii, and KTOH, Lihue, Kauai, during the period of 27 November through 6 December 1941 in the files of the three Honolulu investigative agencies or at stations KGMB and KGU.

10. While files of DIO-14ND do not contain transcriptions, continuity scripts, or outlines of programs of broadcasts on KGMB and KGU for the period of 27 November through 6 December 1941, there is considerable highly classified information in the files pertinent to this general subject, as follows in substance:

(a) Japanese programs on stations KGMB and KGU during the period of one to two weeks prior to 8 December 1941 were monitored by Lt.Comdr. Yale Maxon, USNR, and Comdr. Denzel Carr, USNR, of DIO-14ND. The cryptic phrases listened for by these officers were never heard on KGMB or KGU. Monitoring was accomplished by listening direct to the broadcasts; no transcriptions were made of said broadcasts.

(b) One of the cryptic phrases listened for did appear several times during the course of a Tokyo broadcast some hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor took place. The cryptic phrase in question came over

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station JZI program (from Tokyo), at some time later than 1145 8 December 1941, Japan time, frequency 9535 kcs.

(c) For many months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, up through 6 December 1941, Nagao KITA, Japanese Consul-General, Honolulu, kept the Japanese Foreign Office supplied with detailed information concerning movements of U.S. Naval vessels by means of coded dispatches sent through commercial telegraph channels. Of particular note is the message from KITA to Tokyo via R.C.A., under date of 6 December 1941, which gives disposition of ships, etc., in Pearl Harbor as of the evening of 5 December 1941.

(d) Bernard Julius Otto KUEHN, with aliases, espionage agent, submitted a plan to the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, on or about 2 December 1941, involving use of a code on the KGMB Want-Ads morning program (0945), as follows:

(1) A Chinese rug, etc., for sale- apply Post Office Box 1476; indicates 3 or 6

(2) A complete chicken farm for sale; indicates 4 or 7

(3) Beauty parlor operator wanted; indicates 5 or 8.

Under date of 3 December 1941 (Honolulu time), this simplified code system was transmitted by KITA to the Foreign Minister, Tokyo. A duplicate message was also addressed to Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff, signed FUJII. Under date of 3 December 1941 (Japan time), Foreign Minister TOGO telegraphed to KITA that he wanted KITA to hold onto the list of code words (presumably an older, complicated code system), including those intended for use on the radio broadcast, right up until the last minute; further, that when the "break" came, KITA

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was to burn the code immediately and wire TOGO that he had done so.

(e) FBI agents conducted an investigation to determine whether or not there had been any advertisements regarding the Chinese rug, beauty operator, or chicken farm, etc. over radio station KGMB Want-Ads program subsequent to 1 December 1941; newspaper ads were also checked for the same information. Records of the KGMB Want-Ads morning programs (0945) for the period of 24 November to 8 December 1941 were examined. No information was found, in the radio programs or newspapers, regarding the broadcast code system in question.

SUMMARY

11. Negative results were obtained in locating transcriptions, continuity scripts, or outlines of programs which emanated from radio stations KGMB and KGU for the period of 27 November through 6 December 1941; therefore it has not been possible to verify or refute statements of Yoshio SHIGA, Lt.Comdr., IJN, as contained in reference (a).

12. Japanese language programs on KGMB and KGU during the period of one to two weeks prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor were monitored by DIO-14ND. Although the purpose of this monitoring was to listen for certain phrases (which were not heard on KGMB or KGU), it does not appear likely that any phrases regarding the German attache would have been missed by the DIO-14ND monitors. There was a German Consul in Honolulu prior to 7 December 1941, but no attache; in the event, however, that the word "attache" were correctly used, the implication is that the commercial broadcast emanated from Japan.

13. The KGMB Want-Ads morning programs for 24 November to 8 December 1941 were checked by FBI-Honolulu with negative results in locating any coded phrases regarding a Chinese



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rug, chicken farm, or beauty parlor operator. It appears unlikely that phrases regarding the German attache, had they appeared on this program during the period in question, would have gone unnoticed by the agency conducting that investigation.

14. It is pointed out that the Japanese Consulate-General successfully furnished detailed military information to the Japanese Foreign Office up to and including the 6th of December 1941 by means of coded dispatches sent through commercial telegraphic channels.

15. Inasmuch as SHIGA's information was reportedly given to him by another officer aboard the AKAGI following the attack, its accuracy is subject to some doubt.

16. The accuracy of the statement of J. Howard WORRAL, manager of KGMB, regarding transcriptions of Japanese programs for about 1 through 6 December 1941 being turned over to Major Putnam, is doubted in view of Lt.Col. Gaddis' statement, his search of the files at Fort Shafter, and G-2(CID) Honolulu's search of their files.

R. H. PETERSON
Lieutenant, USNR

Cinepac File

A8-5

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Serial: 00[illegible]

5 NOV 1945

2nd ENDORSEMENT on
HQ VPhibCorps Top
Secret Ltr. 091/130,
Ser. 000374B dated
14 October 1945.

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From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval District.

Subject: Pre-War Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.

1. Forwarded.

2. Comment is requested from Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval District concerning broadcasts related in basic correspondence and on other material considered pertinent.

C. H. McMORRIS
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
Com 5th Flt (2nd End only)
ComGenVPhibCorps (2nd End only)

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A8-2(2)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 000179

TOP SECRET

24 OCT 1945

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
Hq. V PhibCorps Top
Secret ltr. 091/130,
ser. 000374B dated
14 October 1945.

From: Commander FIFTH Fleet.
To : Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Pre-war Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.

1. Forwarded.

D. C. Ramsey
D. C. RAMSEY,
Chief of Staff.

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091/130
Ser.000374B

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

14 October, 1945.

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From: The Commanding General.
To : The Commander, Fifth Fleet.

Subject: Pre-war Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.

Enclosures: (A) 2 copies subject publication.

1. The attached progress report from the 496th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment is forwarded in duplicate for your information.

2. Additional progress reports of the subject will be forwarded you as they become available to this Headquarters.

T. H. KANCEY,
By direction.

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HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH MARINE DIVISION
496th CIC DETACHMENT
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

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Sasebo, Kyushu
13 October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AC OF S, G-2:

SUBJECT: PRE-WAR ESPIONAGE IN HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

RE : Interview with Yoshio SHIGA,
Lt Cmdr, IJN

On 9 October 1945, this agent interviewed Yoshio SHIGA, Lt Cmdr, IJN, at the Kinkiso Tea House, OMURA, Kyushu. Although difficult, this interview was conducted without an interpreter as SHIGA speaks some English. Informant is an aviator and participated in the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOR on 7 December 1941. He lives at Itoyone, YAMAGUCHI CITY, Yamaguchi-Ken, Honshu. On about 15 October 1945, he is scheduled to fly a Japanese plane (escorted) from OMURA TO YOKOSUKA. Following this he plans to return to OMURA, by train, where he expects to be discharged from the Navy.

On about 1 April 1941, SHIGA said that he was directed to leave his assignment as instructor of pilots at OITA and report to SASEBO. Upon arrival he noted that the aircraft carrier "KAGA" was in port. Upon reporting at the base he was ordered, by Teigi YAMADA, Captain of the "KAGA", to go to YOKOSUKA with 23 other pilots and learn to fly "0's". From about 5 April until 19 April the group practiced flying these planes. On 20 April 1941 they went to SUZUKA, Honshu, and received new "0" planes.

The group practiced with these planes until the last of April when they were ordered to fly to KONOYE, Kyushu. En-route SHIGA noted that the carrier "KAGA" was anchored off KAGOSHIMA CITY. Following their arrival at KONOYE the group was ordered to practice landings aboard the "KAGA" as it steamed in and out of the bay. They did this until about 1 July 1941.

About 1 July, the carriers AKAGI, SORYU, and HIRYU arrived at SHIBUSHI BAY, a short distance from where the KAGA was anchored. All of the pilots from the carriers then went to KAGOSHIMA CITY. In practice the carriers alternated, three at SHIBUSHI BAY and one in KAGOSHIMA BAY. The fliers practiced carrier landings and dog-fighting. Team work was the essential of this training period. Two planes fought three planes, then three against six, and then six against nine. The objective of 9 against 18 was not reached, however.

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On about 8 August 1941, all of the carriers were ordered to YOKOSUKA. On about 10 August, the carriers SORYU and HIRYU were suddenly ordered to SAIGON, Indo-China. SHIGA, along with the rest of the pilots, was ordered aboard the HIRYU. The Japanese Army met no opposition at SAIGON. After the carriers were there for about a week they left for Japan and arrived at SASEBO about 5 September 1941.

After two or three days the two carriers were ordered to SAHEKI, Kyushu. Upon arrival SHIGA noted the carriers SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU and the battleship YAMATO were in the harbor. He stated that he then became suspicious that "something big was going to happen". While there the pilots practiced navigation, dog-fighting, and carrier landings.

"On 5 October 1941, a meeting was called of all officer pilots of the carriers, aboard the AKAGI in SHIBUSHI BAY, by the Chief of Staff of the carriers, Rear Admiral Ryonosuke KUSAKA. About 100 attended. They were told, very secretly, that on 8 December 1941 (Japan Time), a Japanese Naval air force would strike the American Fleet at HAWAII. Grand Admiral of the Japanese Navy, Isoraku YAMAMOTO, also addressed the group saying that although Japan never wanted to fight the United States they were forced to because they would be defeated regardless, if the United States continued its aid to China and its oil embargo. The U. S. fleet, he said, was Japan's strongest enemy, so if they could strike it unexpectedly at HAWAII it would be two or three months before it could manuever. By that time occupation of BORNEO, the PHILLIPINES, SINGAPORE, JAVA, and SUMATRA would be complete."

SHIGA stated that the consensus of the pilots following this startling news was, that to get to HAWAII secretly, was impossible. Hence it was a suicide attack. Also that it would be best for the Japanese Navy to fight the American Navy at sea without this attack. All of the carrier pilots were then granted a 7 day leave. On their return they went to SAHEKI and again practiced until 17 November 1941. On that date the KAGA, with 24 fighter planes, 36 torpedo planes, and 24 hell divers went to HITOKAPPU HARBOR.

Upon arrival at HITOKAPPU HARBOR, SHIGA noted the carriers AKAGI, SORYU, SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU, battleships KONGO, HIEI, heavy cruisers KUMANO, MIKUMA, SUZUYA, plus one other, about 16 destroyers, and four or more large submarines were in that port. He believed that these submarines had midget submarines aboard. In the carrier force there were about 300 planes plus 9 seaplanes aboard the battleships and cruisers.

Prior to departure for HAWAII SHIGA said that they were briefed that PEARL HARBOR anchorages were: battleships on the east side of FORD ISLAND, carriers on the west side, destroyers were anchored in northeastern corner, and heavy cruisers on the HICKAM FIELD side. They were also told that the U. S.

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carriers were usually around LAHAINA ROADS, MAUI, during week days and entered PEARL HARBOR on Saturdays, where they stayed until Monday mornings. SHIGA said that Rear Admiral OKADA, Captain of the KAGA, visited the flagship AKAGI daily. Just ~~prior to departure OKADA~~ told him that there were 6 carriers in Hawaiin waters, that the SARATOGA was on the U. S. west coast, and that the ENTERPRISE was two or three days out of Hawaiin waters, en-route from the PHILLIPINES.

Subject believes the force left HITOKAPPU HARBOR between the 27 and 30 November and at cruising speed headed for HAWAII. They knew, he said, that U. S. air patrols went 800 miles south of DUTCH HARBOR and 800 miles north of MIDWAY. Their course was right between the patrolled areas during which time, he said, the weather was foggy. They were 800 miles due north of HAWAII on 6 December. They then received, from the Japanese Navy Department, a wireless message, "CLIMB MT. NIITAKA". (This information corresponds with that received from a Japanese Navy Yeoman captured during the SAIPAN operation) This was the signal for the attack and at 24 knots they sped southward to within 250 miles of OAHU. There the planes took off.

A Japanese officer pilot during interrogation stated ~~SHIGA stated that he believed quite strongly~~ "that information concerning all movements of ships into and out of PEARL HARBOR was transmitted to the fleet through coded messages broadcast over a HONOLULU Commercial Broadcasting Station. Japanese ~~He~~ was certain "that there was a Hawaiin Nisei, who was a Japanese Naval Officer, aboard the flagship AKAGI, whose specific job was listening to these broadcasts and decoding them." ~~SHIGA~~ He said "that in his opinion the codes were many and varied but that if, for example, it was broadcast that the German attache lost one dog, it might mean that a carrier left PEARL HARBOR. If the German attache wanted a cook or a houseboy, it might mean that a battleship or cruiser had entered the harbor."

SHIGA said that this information was given to him by Lt Cmdr MURATA, Shigeharu, Chief of the Air Squadron aboard the flagship AKAGI, on their return to Japan when SHIGA inquired of him "who was the heroic person responsible for getting the information concerning the ships in PEARL HARBOR".

Source states ~~SHIGA believes~~ "that the information was conveyed on radio programs just following the news broadcasts, which he stated were at 6:30 AM, 12 Noon, and 7 PM. He was prone to think that time following the 7 PM broadcast was used since the Japanese agents would then have had an opportunity to convey information concerning a whole day's activities."

On the first Saturday when the force was at sea, (which means it had to leave prior to 29 November), SHIGA said that they received reports that there was only one or two carriers in PEARL HARBOR. Because of this the pilots were disappointed.

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SHIGA said that on 6 December 1941, some time between about 8 and 9 PM (Hawaiian Time) news filtered to him that there were no carriers in PEARL HARBOR, but that 8 battleships, and 15 cruisers were in the harbor. No report was received concerning destroyers. There was no set way of his receiving news of this type so it was impossible to determine at what time the AKAGI might have relayed it to the Captain of the KAGA.

At the briefing, prior to the operation, each pilot was furnished with a photograph of a map of PEARL HARBOR. The names of the ships in PEARL HARBOR were not known and each pilot just made rough entries of courses and anchorage areas or missions.

Since it was felt that more could be gained if a person versed in the technical phases of aviation interrogated SHIGA, he was turned over to Lt W. H. PEDRICK, S-2, Marine Air Group 22, stationed at OMURA, to fully develop the attack phase. A copy of his report, however, will be forwarded to this headquarters.

The rough sketch map concerning the attack, accompanying this report, is preliminary, resulting from the first interview with SHIGA by this agent.

Concerning the espionage conducted for the attack, which is of great interest to the CIC, SHIGA could offer no other leads than that of the HONOLULU Broadcasting Station. He said that at no time, to his knowledge, were visual land signals used from HAWAII.

The only person he could recall being alive from the AKAGI, who had participated in the PEARL HARBOR attack, was its commanding officer, Rear Admiral Ryonosuke KOSAKA. He is presently Chief Liaison Officer at the KONOYE Naval Base.

This agent is presently under orders and awaiting transportation to KONOYE where he will interview KOSAKA in an effort to obtain additional information.

Robert N. Tait
ROBERT N. TAIT
Special Agent, CIC

Lt. Col., CIC, USA

TOP SECRET

(There is a map accompanying the above report of ROBERT N. TAIT, Special Agent, CIC, which portrays by rough sketch the islands of Oahu and Kaui and the Kaui Channel, and has noted thereon information obtained with reference to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and other installations on 7 December 1941 as set forth in the report. This map is reproduced as Item No. 19 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #13
(A NAVY STUDY)
ENTITLED
"SORTIES BY ENEMY SUB-CARRIED PLANES
and
SUB CARRIER IDENTIFICATION"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

ENEMY ~~LISTS~~ SORTIES BY SUB-CARRIED PLANES (Lists)

New information on the enemy's use of submarine-borne aircraft for reconnaissance is furnished by a captured document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,212), which lists a series of sorties covering nearly a year in time and extending from ZANZIBAR east to OREGON.

During that period, the plane-carrying subs lost 24% of the aircraft which took off--most of them in landing and recovery accidents.

All sorties listed were flown from ten subs of the "I" class--the I-7, I-8, I-9, I-10, I-19, I-21, I-25, I-29, I-30 and I-31. A total of 38 sorties were flown bebtween 30 November 1941, and 11 November 1942. This was t the most active period for enemy sub-borne aircraft. (Hence, no mention is made of the Jap sub which reportedly reconnoitered PEARL HARBOR in October 1943.

Many of the subs employed have probably been lost during the past two years. The only identifiable loss among the group listed above, however, is the I-7, sunk at TWIN ROCKS, KISKA on 21 June 1943. This was confirmed by salvage operations.

The first listed flight, flown eight days before the attack on PEARL HARBOR, was a night sortie over SUVA BAY. The document states succinctly that the plane "did not return". Also noted are flights over PEARL HARBOR on 17 December 1941, 5 January 1942, and 24 February 1942, and over the OREGON coast on the nights of 9 and 29 August 1942.

The complete list:

| DATE | Name of Sub | Place | Time |
|---|---|---|---|
| 30 Nov. '41 | I-10 | SUVA BAY | Night |
| 17 Dec. '41 | I-7 | PEARL HARBOR | Dawn |
| 5 Jan. '41 | I-19 | PEARL HARBOR | Night |
| 7 Feb. '42 | I-25 | SYDNEY | Dawn |
| 24 Feb. '42 | I-9 | PEARL HARBOR | Night |
| 26 Feb. '42 | I-25 | MELBOURNE | Dawn |
| 1 Mar. '42 | I-25 | HOBART | Day |
| 8 Mar. '42 | I-25 | WELLINGTON | Pre-dawn |
| 13 Mar. '42 | I-25 | AUCKLAND | Pre-dawn |
| 19 Mar. '42 | I-25 | SUVA | Dawn |
| Not known | I-10 | DABAN(Comment: There is a DABANU on WOODLARK or MURUA IS., between Eastern NEW GUINEA and NEW GEORGIA IS.) | |
| 7 May. '42 | I-30 | ADEN | Dawn |
| 8 May '42 | I-30 | JIBOUTI | Dawn |
| 19 May '42 | I-30 | ZANZIBAR | Dawn |
| 19 May '42 | I-30 | DAR-ES-SALAAM | Dawn |
| 19 May '42 | I-21 | SUVA BAY | Dawn |
| 23 May '42 | I-29 | SYDNEY | Dawn |
| 24 May '42 | I-21 | AUCKLAND | Dawn |
| 25 May '42 | I-9 | KISKA, AMCHITKA | |
| 26 May '42 | I-9 | KISKA | |
| 27 May '42 | I-19 | "While making preparations for a night flight on the Northern side of BOGORLOF ISLAND (Comment: Probably BOGOSLOF IS. IN the ALEUTIANS) an enemy destroyed wasrecognized and we submerged, badly damaging our plane." | |
| 27 May '42 | I-25 | KODIAK | Day |
| 29 May '42 | I-21 | SYDNEY | Dawn |
| 30 May '42 | I-10 | DIEGO SUAREZ | Night |
| 31 May '42 | I-10 | DIÉGO SUAREZ | |
| 1 June '42 | I-10 | Plane search off coast of DIEGO SUAREZ | Night |
| 9 Aug. '42) | I-25 | OREGON (State) | Night |
| 29 Aug. '42) | | | Night |
| 19 Aug. '42 | I-29 | SEYCHELLES IS.(SEISERU SHOTO) | Day |
| 30 Aug. '42 | I-19 | SUDEKO TO | |
| 13 Oct. '42 | I-7 | ESPIRITU SANTO IS. | Dawn |
| 19 Oct. '42 | I-19 | NOUMEA | |
| 30 Oct. '42 | I-9 | NOUMEA | Dawn |
| 2 Nov. '42 | I-8 | EFATE IS. | "Moonlight from 0000 0030" |
| 4 Nov. '42 | I-31 | SUVA | 0100 |
| 4 Nov. '42 | I-9 | NOUMEA | Dawn |
| 11 Nov. '42 | I-7 | VANIKORO IS. | Dawn |
| 11 Nov. '42 | I-21 | NOUMEA | Dawn |
| 11 Nov. '42 | I-9 | ESPIRITU SANTO | Dusk |

Comment: No mention was made in the document of the I-17. When sunk off NEW CALEDONIA in August 1943, prisoners from this sub claimed that it had reconnoitered west coast areas by plane in February 1942.

## JAP CARRIER IDENTIFICATION

A recently captured order (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12, 253) presumed to have been issued by a Squadron CO of the 121st Air Group, describes identification markings which appear on flight decks of combatant carriers. The captured order indicates that markings are to consist of either the first two or the first and last Kana syllables of the ships' names. The Kana syllables "ZU HO" were already noted in a photograph of the CVL ZUIHO, sunk on 25 October (see Weekly Intelligence, Vo. 1, No. 18).

The order states that large white Kana symbols are to appear on the starboard side toward the stern. The first Kana is to be eight meters ($26\frac{1}{4}$ feet) square, the second four meters square.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #14
ENTITLED
"JAPANESE BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR
SUPPLY BATTLE LESSON NO. 1"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

This is a translation parallel to the translation stated in Source Document #15 post of the same captured Japanese Document.

C-C TRANS + INT "YU"

#10,678

43

SUPPLY BASES AND FUELING FLEET UNITS AT SEA
dated 10 June 1943, captured on SAIPAN.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

This document comprises extracts taken from an official study of problems relating to supply compiled 10 June 1943. Recommendations are included for the enlargement of supply bases and depots at BAKŌ, MIKAWA WAN and KURE. Examples are cited showing the difficulties experienced in fueling fleet units at sea during the first year and a half of the war; recommendations call for the installation of stern refeuling gear on all ships, an increase in the rate of supply per hour, and the strengthening of hoses used in fueling. It is stated that the maintenance of supply lines calls for the construction of two naval storeships of the IRAKO type. It is possible that keels for IRAKO type ships were laid before their usefulness as contemplated in this document was ~~xxxxxx~~ neutralized by the Allied advance.

#10,678

Military - Very Secret (GUNGOKUHI)

Committee on Investigation of
Battle Lessons, Supply Section
(BUNKAKAI)
10 June 1943

BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR

SUPPLY BATTLE LESSON No. 1

Table of Contents

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~~I. SUPPLY OF PROVISIONS FROM JAPAN~~

I. Enlargement of Facilities at Supply Bases

~~A. Battle Lesson (Solomons)~~

1. There has been a sudden increase in the operating efficiency of customs-houses, piers, and government buildings being used by the YOKOSUKA Naval District in YOKOHOMA. (YOKOSUKA Civil Engr Dept).

2. Facilities at Fuel Depot #3 must be enlarged to permit the mooring of two or three 10,000 ton AKs. (3rd Fuel Depot).

3. Loading and supply facilities at BAKŌ must be expanded. The capacity to supply fuel oil must be increased to 10,000 tons per 24 hours. (2nd Fleet).

4. Supply installations at MIKAWA WAN are insufficient and require enlargement. (1st Fleet).

5. The supply quay of the KURE Replacement Shop must be enlarged. It is frequently found to be too narrow for supply loading work and cause delay ~~results~~. (11th Air Depot).

6. Planes completed at the 11th Air Depot are operating on flights and as air transport after being transported by surface to the IWAKUNI Air Group; the loss in labor and time required for this is great. At least one runway of the KURE Airfield must be lengthened and widened. (11th Air Depot).

7. There have been numerous instances when the capacities of local Stores Departments have been insufficient and ~~could not~~ were unable to meet the demands of operating forces. It is essential to expand installations and place experienced persons in charge so as to keep on hand large amounts of stores and insure a rapid supply. (All depts concerned with naval stores).

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8. In order to expedite supply to the various forces in the farflung combat areas, and also in consideration of such things as air raids, it is necessary to establish branch offices of the local stores departments or branch supply depots with each front line force. (All Stores Depts).

9. Because of insufficient supply installations at local Stores Departments, heavy equipment such as DP guns and generators cannot be unloaded, and some things cannot be installed. The handling of torpedoes and mines is also very difficult. Not only is there a great possibility of damage to delicate equipment but there are many instances when it is not suited to rapid supply. The installations of piers, cranes, cranes on cargo lighters, and trucks is absolutely necessary. (All Stores Depts).

10. Acceleration in fitting out Specially Established Naval Stores Departments is earnestly desired. The 4th Naval Stores Department legally is tactically assigned to the 4th Fleet; however, it has a great deal of importance as a front line supply base even for ships of the Combined Fleet. Therefore it is necessary to attempt the speedy completion of installations as already planned and to equip them with an eye toward our persistent drive to the south. (2nd Fleet).

11. At RABAUL there is not a single sound pier installation, while great labor is being expended entirely on loading and unloading. No matter what other sacrifices are made, piers must be installed immediately. (108th Air Depot).

Conclusion: In order that deficiency in supply installations will have no great effect on naval operations, it is necessary to determine at the central /activity/ the urgency of actual conditions in all areas and to formulate remedial measures.

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[redacted]

II. Fueling of Fl at Units at Sea.

A. Battle Lesson (Japan)

There are many times in operational waters when fuel oil cannot be supplied unless refueling from astern is used.

The rate of oil received by ships per hour and the rate of supply to small ships from large ships is insufficient. (All Ships).

It is necessary in all cases to increase the rate of refueling to 300 metric tons per hour. (BatDiv 3).

The number of times refuelled and results during the year since BatDiv 3 commenced operations:

| | KONGŌ | HARUNA | Average Amount |
|---|---|---|---|
| From AO (2 hoses astern) | 8 times | 5 times | 160 m tons per hr |
| from DD (from alongside) | 17 times | 22 times | 110 m tons per hr |

The ZUIKAKU (CV) similarly loaded at 160 metric tons per hour, taking on 1942 m tons from the NICHIYŌ MARU in 12 hours. An increase to 300 or 400 tons is necessary. (ZUIKAKU (CV)).

Conclusion It is urgently necessary from a military standpoint to put into effect the following measures for the supply of fuel oil at sea:

1. The installationx of stern refueling gear on all ships.
2. A great increase in the rate of supply per hour in order to shorten the total time required.

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~~IV. IMPROVEMENT OF NAVAL STORES FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SUPPLY OPERATIONS~~

B. Battle Lesson (~~Reason~~)

1. More than ten hoses broke during ~~maneuvers~~ on the HAWAII Operation; and during the INDIAN OCEAN Operation the hoses of an oil tanker were damaged and supply was greatly delayed. (CarDiv 2).

2. Losses from cutting and leakage during towing and refueling are likely to occur. Also, since the hoses stretch about 10%, the part which bends is likely to become constricted and greatly reduce~~d~~ the capacity for supplying oil. The number of times accidents happened to hoses from the beginning of the war up to the end of 1942 is shown below: (BatDiv 3).

| | KONGŌ (BB) | | HARUNA (BB) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Times Executed | Times Damaged | Times Executed | Times Damaged |
| Astern from AO | 8 | 9 (TN: sic) | 5 | 3 |
| Alongside from DD | 17 | 3 | 22 | 1 |

3. If the innder surface of the hose breaks, the filter is likely to get clogged up. (KENYŌ MARU, ZUIHŌ (CVL)).

4. If the weak points of the 12 meter cellophane (SEROFUAN) hose were improved upon, it would be suitable for use on naval vessels. Ten hoses might be made standard equipment for BBs, reducing by half the number of 4.5 meter hoses now in use ~~by half~~.

Conclusion (~~Opinion~~) Cellophane (SEROFUAN) hoses must be made tougher.

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V. IMPROVEMENT OF SHIPS' HULLS, MACHINERY, FITTINGS AND EQUIPMENT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SUPPLY OPERATIONS

A. Battle Lesson (Japan)

1. It is necessary to install equipment for refueling from astern. (All ships).

2. In the case of tankers which supply from both sides, if supply cannot be carried out from both sides at the same time, the transfer of fuel cannot be initiated. Improvements are necessary so that separate supplying can be carried out. (AKEBONO MARU, DesRon 4).

3. There are instances in which extraneous matter becomes mixed with the oil when refueling is being carried out from tankers. Refueling speed is reduced about one-third and inconvenience in loading results. It is necessary to equip tankers with changeable filters. (ISE (BB))

4. In view of the many instances in which hoses are burst because of the extreme pressure caused by faulty operation of the intake valves, it is necessary to install equipment which will prevent great pressure, such as automatic cut-off valves. (TŌHŌ MARU).

5. Oil intake funnels should be installed on all fuel tanks. (MYŌKŌ (CA)).

Conditions on the MYŌKŌ

| No of funnels | No of auxiliary lines from each funnel | No of tank connection valves from each line | No of tanks |
|---|---|---|---|
| 12 | 1 | 0 | 12 |
| 2 | 1 | 2 | 4 |
| 8 | 2 | 0 | 16 |
| 2 | 2 | 4 | 8 |
| 6 | 3 | 0 | 18 |
| 2 | 3 | 4 | 10 |
| 2 | 4 | 0 | 8 |
| 4 | 5 | 0 | 20 |

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6. The great length of the air outlet pipe on fuel tanks makes necessary the enlargement of the pipe line to facilitate the outlet of air.

Unless there is considerable pressure on the intake valve, loading is impossible. (CHŌKAI (CA)), MYŌKŌ (CA)).

7. From the standpoint of rapid supply, it is necessary to reduce the number of fuel tanks and increase the capacity. (CHŌKAI (CA)).

8. It is necessary to place the containers for the fuel intake valve, the intake gauge pipe and the hose in places convenient for loading operations. (CHŌKAI (CA)).

9. When the YŪBARI (CL) is about half filled with oil, the upper tanks cannot be filled unless the hatch is removed and the hose directly led in. Since capacity fueling from astern is difficult, and inconvenient from an operational standpoint, it is necessary to equip each tank with a main intake pipe. Moreover, since funnel fueling of lower tanks requires time, it is necessary to convert to pressure fueling. (YŪBARI (CL)).

10. Often, large amounts of oil collect in the tanker's hoses at the time of refueling and the result is delay in the work of connecting the hose (5 large buckets of oil have been collected from one hose (about 0.3 ton)). (HAMAKAZE (DD)).

11. By reason of the hindrance to rapid fueling occasioned by the length of time required to drain (1.5 hours), it is necessary to increase from 40 tons to 80 tons the capacity of the seawater drainage ejector in the compensating oil tank. (MAKIGUMO (DD)).

12. It is necessary to equip tankers with oil heating equipment throughout, in case of low temperatures, the effect on the speed of refueling is great.(BatDiv 3

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13. It is necessary to install equipment so that oil may be supplied at night. (KENYŌ MARU).

14. It is helpful if the telephone can be used by both parties as a means of communication during refueling operations. For reasons of security, flare signals should not be used during refueling operations at night. (KENYŌ MARU).

15. It is necessary to provide aviation gas supply ships with supply hoses (about 50 m). (CarDiv 4).

16. AKs must be fitted out with hatches and derricks, and the crews must be well instructed in their use. (MineLayerDiv 18)

Sometimes, two hours are necessary for the launching of large landing barges. There are converted chartered vessels whose hatches are inconveniently placed for loading and unloading. (108th Air Depot).

17. Converted AKs are inconvenient for supplying lubricating oil. (NISSHŌ MARU).

Attention to ship's equipment is essential.

Conclusion (Omitted) It is necessary to re-examine plans for the supply facilities of vessels so that supply capacities may be increased to the utmost.

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III. Capacity, Performance, and Number of Supply Ships

[redacted]

~~A. Battle Lesson (Minor)~~

Signal flags by which the type of supply ship can be recognized at a glance must be adopted. Ammunition ships have been mistaken for storeships.

A. Battle Lesson (Major)

It is necessary to equip AKs with 40 ton derricks fore and aft to make possible the loading of lighters, large landing barges and other heavy objects. (YOKOSUKA Regional Transportation Dept).

Conclusion (Major) It is necessary to have a large number of AKs which are equipped with heavy derricks.

2. It is generally very profitable to use small, high-speed ships in southern areas. (MineLayerDiv 18, etc).

3. When accompanying a fleet, the present speed of 15 knots is difficult; a speed of 20 knots is necessary for a fully loaded oil tanker. (KENYŌ MARU).

Conclusion (Minor) Good, fast ships must be chosen as supply ships to accompany the fleet.

B. Battle Lesson (Minor)

1. Armament is weak; it must be strengthened. (MineLayerDiv 18).

2. Communications equipment is very deficient; it is inconvenient in directing maneuvers. (2nd Fleet).

3. It is necessary to add 2 MG. (Have at present one 7.7mm MG and 7 rifles). Two pairs of 12cm binoculars are required. (Have at present 8cm). (KENYŌ MARU)

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4. It is necessary to increase rifles by two DP guns and MG by 12mm or 25mm MGs. (KURE Navy Yard).

5. Three 8cm binoculars, one twin mount 11 mm MG, and DP gun are required. Still another secondary frequency for radio transmission is required. (NICHIYŌ MARU).

6. There are numerous instances when requisitioned ships are attacked from the side opposite the gun. In view of actual circumstances they should be equipped with one gun forward and one aft. Shells must be increased from 20 to over 50 rounds per gun, and depth charges from 4 to 6. (YOKOSUKA Regional Transportation Dept).

Conclusion

1. In view of the fact that there are many times when skill in lookout and evasive action determine the fate of a ship, it is profitable to develop these capabilities to the utmost.

2. Although AA, ASW, and communications equipment have been greatly increased, we believe that the present standard is inadequate.

B. Battle Lesson

In spite of the fact that there have been numerous opportunities for using converted airplane lighters, their number has been insufficient, as has been the number of large landing barges. (11th Air Fleet).

Conclusion Two converted airplane lighters must be assigned each air fleet and they must be equipped with 4 large landing barges.

D. Battle Lesson

1. Conditions are such that supply of fuel and lubricating oil in local

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areas is impossible and the torpedoes supplied cannot be prepared for firing. This is gradually being taken care of by transferring small amounts from the supply of other ships. Since this is a great inconvenience, it must be made possible to get oil from ammunition ships or from oil tankers. (KINUGASA (CA))

2. The torpedoes supplied, once adjusted, go several months without examination and readjustment; there are many that are defective from having been in storage a long time. If we were to participate in an operation immediately after the delivery of these torpedoes, not only would we find them not completely ready for firing, bu we would have some uneasiness regarding their accuracy. (KINUGASA (CA)).

Conclusion

1. Fuel oil and lubricating oil must be included with torpedoes supplied from ammunition ships. (This has been done).

2. Torpedoes supplied must be inspected at suitable intervals and imperfect one readjusted.

Battle Lesson

At present, conditions are such that with every possible use of the MAMIYA (AF), and the IRAKO (AF), supply is barely being carried on.

It is feared that in the event of an accident to these, supply lines would be thrown into disorder and the effect on morale and on operations would be great. Two naval storeships of the IRAKO type must be constructed and put into operation immediately /in order to supply fresh provisions/. (2nd Fleet).

At least two ships for storage provisions (including canteen goods and battle supplies) must be attached to the Combined Fleet. (2nd Fleet)

Conclusion. The number of naval storeships for fresh provisions must be increased.

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CINC[redacted] C.I.C. O.A. Item # 10,678

E. Battle lesson (Major)

1. Fuel oil is generally supplied every eight days; but fresh provisions are sometimes needed for as long as twenty days. (DesRon 2).

2. Oil tankers must be equipped with refrigerators and thus be enabled to supply fresh provisions at sea at the same time that they supply oil. (2nd Fleet).

Conclusion It would be well to plan for small craft such as DDs to be supplied with fresh provisions at the same time and place that they are supplied with fuel oil.

(End)

11.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #15
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"JAPANESE BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR
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This is a translation parallel to the translation stated in SOURCE DOCUMENT #14 supra of the same captured Japanese Document.

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These Article Lessons are compiled from proposals forwarded from the Beginning of the war to Sep 1943 by the sub-committees designated below as "◎", and from minutes of supply personnel in the forward areas. The sub-committees designated "△" are at present compiling material at their respective offices.

| Name of Sub-committee | Duties | Responsible Activity in Toronto |
|---|---|---|
| ◎ General Affairs | 1. Consideration and presentation of remarks and proposals on Article Lessons. 2. Matters not under the jurisdiction of other sub-committees. | Knowledge School |
| ◎ #1 | Matters concerning equipment related to the Technical Dept | TORONTO Naval Stores Dept |
| △ #2 | Matters concerning equipment related to Naval Air Sq | 2nd Naval Air Depot |
| ◎ #3 | Matters concerning ships stores, documents and records. | TORONTO Stores Dept |
| △ #4 | Matters concerning Fuel, fresh water and articles expendable in operations | TORONTO Stores Dept |
| △ #5 | Matters concerning clothing, food, canteen supplies and, soldiers relief goods and special service supplies | TORONTO Stores Dept |
| ◎ #6 | Matters concerning medical stores | TORONTO Naval Hospital |
| △ #7 | Matters concerning harbor supplies | TORONTO Harbor Masters Office |
| △ #8 | Matters concerning repair materials | C and R School |
| ◎ #9 | Matters concerning construction materials | TORONTO Civil Engineering Dept (Construction) |
| ◎ #10 | Items relating to army and navy transportation not under the jurisdiction of other committees (including General Affairs Committee) | TORONTO Army Transportation Dept |

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[illegible]

VI. Air Transportation

VII. Improvement of [illegible] from the Standpoint of Supply Operations

VIII. Improvement of Original Basic Machinery, Equipment and Equipment from the Standpoint of Supply Operations

Opinion of the Committee Members

Although methods are continually being devised, in the light of past battle learning for increased efficiency in the transport of supplies, the Committee feels the opinion that a great many improvements are needed in the strengthening of existing machinery, increase in the efficiency of loading and unloading, and so forth. However, as will be seen in these battle lessons, the customary lack of concrete plans in implementing. It is recognized that there has been a lack of consideration and resources in England in regard to supply in general, and that the reason for this lies in the fact that throughout the Central Area, the machinery for it is still constituent. Therefore, it will be recognized that the most urgent matter at hand is to effect a break in the present difficult situation by making a fundamental reorganization of this machinery, by improving and strengthening it, and by then by applying it everywhere.

Committee on Investigation of Battle Lessons

[illegible], Chairman,
Subcommittee on Supply Operations

[illegible] 2678

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1. [illegible]

| Paragraph | Observation | Conclusion (Opinion) |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | [illegible] ( [illegible] ) In general officers [illegible] the use of [illegible] the supplies of fuel [illegible] for local [illegible], for example, which required to be used at [illegible], [illegible] branch office there, has the Fleet and Transportation [illegible] that operate independently, [illegible], have increased, [illegible] [illegible], and duplication of [illegible] is apparently difficult to avoid. ( Joint Fuel Depot, [illegible] ) | It is necessary to adopt the [illegible] procedure which regard to the machinery and methods of supply in local areas. |
| 2. | There are numerous instances of duplication and delay in supply and of inequities in [illegible] because of inadequate knowledge of the duties and logistics of military supply. [illegible] ( all Naval Shore [illegible] ) | There is a need for research and instruction in the duties and logistics of supply. In addition, there is a need for effecting increased efficiency by upgrading experienced persons as supply and transportation personnel in local areas. |
| 3. | XI. Loading efficiency is very poor as a result of the [illegible] activities [illegible] of loading operations in the same port. ( all Depot [illegible] ) XI. In [illegible] numerous examples of extreme climatic and [illegible], waste of time and labor, damage or loss of military stores, mistakes in delivery and delay in the time of [illegible] and even instances which [illegible] the place for the general disposition of shipping has been disrupted. ( Joint Air Depot ) | Regulations must be improved in all areas in order to speed up loading and to increase the efficiency of transportation operations as much as possible. Advance base transportation machinery which actually effects forthcoming military operations requires enlargement of scope and the added facility of actual contact. The loading of vessels must be partially supervised, and |



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[illegible]

| Number | Bitter Lessons (Review) | Conclusion (Solution) |
|---|---|---|
| | The central transportation agency must constantly investigate the capacity for supply and conditions existing in all supply areas and must accordingly dispatch supply vessels in accordance with the size /of the area/. | It is essential to also constantly dependable surveys of the capacity for supply and of conditions existing in all supply areas and at the same time to make possible the supply of essential goods to supply ships. |
| 6. | Because a shipment/ scheduled to go from Naval Base a ammunition to the theater of operations was changed to go from [illegible] to the theater of operations, difficulties arose in the supply of food and expenditure for the supply ships ships. ( [illegible] Shared Page, [illegible] Remark) | |
| 7. | Commercial vessels can in many cases be used for transport purposes in addition to their original function. ( [illegible] Auto Transportation Bugs ) 2). At times, commercial vessels, primarily used in ammunition and AA operations, have for opportunities to carry out their original duties and consequently are used solely for transport work ( [illegible] Jetty ). Because the holdings are secured and many of the crew are in charge of the military equipment, there is no means for damage to the cargo. It is recognized as profitable to use these fast ships as transports. ( Shipbuilding 26 ) | It is absolutely essential to utilize shipping space in converted vessels for transport purposes as the need arises. |

[redacted]

| Number | Bottle Neckers (Problem) | Conclusion (Solution) |
|---|---|---|
| [redacted] | Units in ASSAM are trying to handle requests for supplies from advance headquarters units everywhere as they arise. They complain [redacted] the quantity of urgently needed supplies and forward transportation requests to the Transportation Dept. But because there is a lack of co-operation, the result is the present unavoidable situation in which supplies are left as they are needed for rather long periods of time (from requisition to receipt of goods, sometimes as much as six months). [redacted] Obstacles to medical treatment for those who had requested /the supplies/, inevitably have a demoralizing effect on the morale of supply personnel. ( All hospitals ) | It is necessary to utilize ship tonnage and as much cargo space [redacted] and to plan for as increasing number of trips in order to facilitate the supply of medical materials between bases of operations and the places supplied. |
| 7. | The use of construction materials in ships is indicated in Section 3, Screen of Military Affairs [redacted] # 120 of 6 July 1939. However, since the beginning of the war there has developed a marked tendency to depend on solely on ship [redacted] materials. There is also the prevalent tendency to depend upon Naval Stores Depts | The classification of supply of construction materials to be used for operational purposes by land and forces must be clarified. |

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| Number | Little Lessons (Reasons) | Conclusions (Opinions) |
|---|---|---|
| 9.(cont.) | for the supply of materials to be used by land or forces. It is necessary to effect such supply from Navy funds and from the Civil Engineering Dept(illegible) also. (Mr Sampler entitled as involved). | |
| | ( All Stores Depts ) | |
| 10. | The detailed experiment of the eight months since the transfer of the Military to the Naval Stores Dept shows that for the following reasons it is necessary to make a further change at the present time, & to put the Military under independent jurisdiction and to re-organize it so that it may become stronger. | It is necessary to reform and expand the Military system and to give it a single, independent jurisdiction. |
| | 1). Classified documents such as code books possess the highest degree of secrecy. In the handling of these, there are many cases where errors, delay and the like have created a tremendous immediate effect on military operations. | |
| | 2) Since classified documents have the above-mentioned special characteristics, they cannot be handled like military & equipment such as Navy stores and are not suited to the "department store" technique used by the Naval Stores Depts. | |
| | 3). Errors and delays are apt to occur in the handling of classified documents if the office system and chain of command do not go through the regular channels between the central Dep'ts bureaus, the Navy Materiel, and the various other offices. | |

| Number | Notes (continued) | Comment on Opinion |
|---|---|---|
| 10. (cont.) | 1). The great increase in cost times since the beginning of the war, coupled with frequency of alteration of orders, has added increasing to the volume of manual classified documents handled and the pressure upon Libraries has not keeped with pace of days. (All Stores Depts.) | |
| 11. | (All Stores Depts.) Since the opening of the Greater East Asia War, Library Action has undergone a very sudden pressure of business and inconvenience has set kept pace, there has been a pronounced delay in supplying (especially of classified documents). Because charts and documents subject to liaisonship with the exception of Naval General Staff documents, are periodically considered military stores, re-certification of registration in accordance with accounting regulations for military stores, as well as their entry in the master registry for ledgers showing custody, receipt and issuance is absolutely necessary. The complexity of accounting work is causing increasing delay in re-registration. It is recognized as very essential to accept the above-mentioned classified documents and charts from military stores (documents published by the Naval General Staff and ones of similar nature), to identify such and to concentrate on the master registry and supply work. (All Stores Depts) | It is necessary to exclude classified documents, classified military training documents, classified 2D charts and charts other than the accounting regulations for military stores, and to incorporate conditions concerning 2D charts and charts from registration. |

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| Number | Battle Lessons (Causes) | Conclusion (Opinion) |
|---|---|---|
| 12. | There is room for further research on the materials carried by specially established forces at the time of their departure for combat areas. When one considers that even the loading of essential gear at forward areas has not been as desired and when one considers the labor involved in unloading in these areas, it must be recognized that bayonet and fencing gear of forces going out for the first time must be kept at a minimum and sent later as secondary goods. Therefore, it is essential to indicate the classifications primary and secondary in tables showing regulation amounts of materials in order to indicate standards for the time of departure and for later shipment. ( all Stores Depts ) | Materials carried by specially established forces at the time of their departure for combat areas are also the concern of transportation. It is essential to limit these to the necessary minimum. |
| 13. | It is recognized that it is essential to expedite matters by formulating at once regulations for equipment accounting to conform to the characteristics of aviation equipment, to simplify their arrangement and further, to simplify equipment records. ( 11th Air Depot ) | It is necessary to amend those parts of accounting regulations for military stores which are not suitable for aviation equipment and to simplify equipment records. |
| | It is necessary to eliminate the need for obtaining the Navy Minister's approval for the transfer of even one plane to another ship, so that this can be done with the approval of the CinC. ( 1st Air Fleet) | |

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It is necessary to eliminate the need for getting the Navy Minister's approval for the transfer of even one plane to another ship, so that this can be done with the approval of the CinC.

(21st Air Fleet)

14

When spare parts are scarce as at present, we believe that if they are ordered under one head all as either material or equipment, confusion among petition the various depots will be eliminated. Moreover, if they are ordered as material, it will not be necessary to transfer them from equipment (as much as 70% has been transfered to material ); it is felt that matters can thus be expedited and receipt of goods facilitated.

(11th Air Depot)

Orders for the supply of aircraft parts must be centrally controlled.

15

It must be clearly indicated that canteen goods necessary for all troop organizations in wartime are to be handled as naval stores. However, we believe that articles difficult to obtain or to supply, once lumped under one head, should be treated so that they may be delivered as battle supplies (military stores) land, when necessary,

The handling of canteen goods which are indispensable to life in forward areas must be improved so that supply is always maintained and so that security is not endangered, and a loading standard for ships must be established.



a pair of sons may be sent
to the cartons.

Because vessels which are
under the jurisdiction of the Navy
Dept. they are likely to be treated
as of secondary importance in their
transport and supply. From the point
of view of security too, this is a
serious matter.

Rem. In order to [illegible] make the
supply of cartons good [illegible]
[illegible] we believe that the best
method is to establish a single
section(Business Goods Section) in
the Supplies Dept to handle them
exclusively. There are instances
of [illegible] implement which
have given rise to obstacles in emer-
gency work for military operations.

Tentative plans have been made
to establish a standard for loading cartons
goods in 2nd Fleet [illegible] of 1 Oct.
1942.

(2nd Fleet)

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| Number | Factual Issues (Cont'd) | Conclusion (Cont'd) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | (3) There has been [illegible] increase in the [illegible] tonnage of the [illegible], plant, and [illegible] facilities by the TOKYO Naval District in [illegible]. (TOKYO Civil Eng Dept)<br><br>(4) Facilities at Pool Depot [illegible] must be enlarged to permit the mooring of [illegible] or [illegible] 20,000 ton [illegible]. (Pool-Dockyard) (See Pages [illegible] of Report)<br><br>(3) Loading and supply facilities at [illegible] must be expanded. The capacity to supply [illegible] oil must be increased to [illegible] tons per [illegible]. (Oil Plant)<br><br>(4) Depot [illegible] at [illegible] are insufficient and require enlargement. (Oil Plant)<br><br>(5) The supply quay of the [illegible] Replacement Group must be enlarged. It is frequently found too narrow for supply loading work and delay results. (11th Air Depot)<br><br>(6) Planes completed at the 11th Air Depot are operating [illegible] flight and air transport after being transported by surface to the [illegible] Air Group and the loss in labor and time required for this is great. At least one runway of the [illegible] airfield must be lengthened and widened. (11th Air Depot) | The author does not think the supply installations have a great effect on the naval operations. It is necessary to determine at the [illegible] of the naval operations in [illegible]. In all areas are in [illegible] condition requiring repairs. |

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(10) [illegible] specially established Naval Stores Departments is earnestly desired. The 4th Naval Stores Department legally [illegible] to the 4th Fleet, however, it has a great deal of importance as a [illegible] supply base for ships of the Combined Fleet. Therefore it is necessary to attempt the speedy completion of installations as already planned and to equip them with an eye toward our persistent drive to the south.

(2nd Fleet)

(11) At Rabaul there is not a single sound pier installation, while great labor is being [illegible] entirely on loading and unloading. No matter what other sacrifices are made, piers must be installed immediately. (108th Air Depot)

2

(1) It is very unprofitable to have an aircraft tender (SOKAN) return to JAPAN for the supply of aircraft equipment. All air depots must be outfitted with equipment and be made able to receive tenders.

(1st, 11th, and 4th Air Fltls and Cruiser 7)

(2) At [illegible] the communications are such that it is impossible to renovate planes or to test large or medium types. Their supply from JAPAN is also difficult and thus there is great anxiety over operational flights.

(Battly 7)

Aircraft equipment must be kept on hand in as far as possible at the local air depots.

[illegible]

(1) In addition to the [illegible] in Samoan waters, [illegible] provision [illegible] destination[illegible] ports in possession where there are [illegible] ports. The number of ships required for supplies from JAPAN [illegible] 1 or 2 months [illegible] be reduced. And it must be made possible to get supplies through the movements of Naval Forces.

(ii) Naval Transports

(2) Since these movements are frequent it would be excellent if there were some means of making it possible to get supplies [illegible] transport is difficult or urgent.

( Kashmi (CL); DesDiv 5; SOYA (AK); 16th Construction Battalion; SAI-7; Kumi (CVS); IYOMA MARU; [illegible] MARU; 4th Base Force; 6th Submarine Base Unit; 4th Commun(ications Unit); [illegible]; 5th Guard Unit; 14th Air Group; 6th Guard Unit; MAIZURU Naval Hospital; SAKURO MARU; Gunboat Div 31 (SONIGAKI, [illegible]); [illegible] MARU; MUROTO (AK); MAIZURU [illegible]; NAGARA (CL); DesDiv 34; 65th Guard Unit; MUTSU (BB); HIE MARU; NAKAIGAWA MARU; Second Air Group)

(3) It is anticipated that arrangements will be made whereby sufficient supplies in the required amounts can be given all submarine tenders and all submarine base units.



The supply machinery for material items to all [illegible], submarine bases, etc. must be [illegible].

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(4) Although it is necessary to [illegible] medical supplies from converted hospital ships, it is extremely difficult to supply the required amount in the required period of time because of the movements of both parties concerned. Therefore a large amount of medical supplies must be distributed to the [illegible] hospitals in the most advanced bases so as to be able to supply while wherever they enter port. (TAKEO (CA) )

When giving material repairs, tents [illegible], or cost lines [illegible] system, much time is required and previously unsatisfactory.

For your information, the numbers of general repair jobs and the numbers of lost items of a major nature at the YOKOSUKA N.T.K. Hospital during the last year are as follows.

Number of general repair jobs for year 1942

Medical [illegible] equipment 2,753

General material 702

(B) Major items

Sterilizer pump 931

Stretchers 622

Sterilizers 75

Beds 367

(a) Promotion of contributors 26,000

(Tai Kawai Hospital)

It is essential that hospitals in Japan be equipped for repair of material used for medical treatment, this requires to effected quickly, so that supplies be adequate.

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III SUPPLY OF PROVISIONS IN LOCAL AREA

~~NUMBER THREE: LOCAL SUPPLY~~

| Number | Battle Lesson (Reason) | Conclusion (Opinion) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Considerable efforts are being made toward local self-suffiency in fresh provisions. However, the NISSAN Forestry and Agriculture (日産農林) and the NOSAN Fisheries (農水産) which are working to supply the navy with fresh provisions at TARAWA, under authorization of Stores Depot Secret Provisioning Order #120, both have their bases and producing areas in the former British area north of TARAWA and have therefore run into difficulties.<br><br>For example:<br><br>In June of last year the SHINGU MARU (新宮丸) (from the OKINAWA Fishing Corp.) (沖縄漁業), a fishing vessel allocated to the NOSAN Fisheries, was prohibited from fishing in the former British possession (the north coast of TARAWA).<br><br>It is necessary to get permission to get fresh vegetables from the NISSAN farms at TARAWA and since even fresh provisions allotted the Navy are bartered for supply is difficult.<br><br>(101st Fuel Depot, TARAWA Branch) | A central agreement between the Army and Navy regarding the policy of local self-sufficiency in fresh provisions must be made and the local authorities must be made to comply. |

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2

Even if TARAKAN on this place /TARAKAN/ were to attempt self-sufficiency, there would not be enough fresh provisions for the area. Fresh meat and green vegetables especially must be supplied from some place like JAVA, but at present a storeship makes only one or two trips every two months from the 102nd Naval Stores Dept (SOERABAJA). The number of storeships for local Stores Dept's must be increased; at least two or three trips a month must be made.

For information, the amounts needed here and the percentages of self-supply are given in the following tables:

| Type | Amt needed by all govt offices & forces here (kg per day) | Percentage of self-supply | Shortage | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fresh fish | 200,000 | (5days) 68% | 3,200 | 3 mo average starting |
| Fresh meat | 160,000 | (10days) 13% | 1,030 | Nov 1943 |
| Fresh vegetables | 600,000 | 54.9% | 6,130 | |

(101st Fuel Depot, TARAKAN Branch)

A greater number of storeships is needed for the local supply of locally raised provisions.

3

Supply for personnel of the southern Forces in the South (during the first phase of the war totalling 100,000) is insufficient with the storeships used at present.

(2nd Fleet)

Machinery for the purveyance of local products must be established in order to compensate for the shortage of storeships.



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2

4

[illegible] locally.

[illegible] SUPPLY [illegible]

1

(1) There are many times in operational waters when oil cannot be supplied unless [illegible]

(2) The rate of oil [illegible] per hour and the rate of supply [illegible] from large ships is insufficient.

(All Ships)

It is necessary in all cases to increase the rate of refuelling to [illegible] metric tons per hour. [illegible]

[illegible]

(2) A great increase in the [illegible] rate of supply per [illegible] in order to shorten the [illegible] required.

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| | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] |
|---|---|---|---|
| [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | 160 [illegible] |
| [illegible] | 17 " | 22 " | [illegible] |

The [illegible] (17) [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | [illegible] vegetable. (1st Fleet, MAIZURU Naval Hospital, MIZUTO Naval Hospital, 5th Guard Unit Detachment) | |
| | (3) The movements of hospital ships are very limited; they rarely go into areas where small craft are operating. However, [illegible] ships (Rabaul Sow) [illegible] ships) make trips once or twice a month and therefore their medical officers must be made responsible for the supply of medical materials between ships. (TAKE, TOKUSUKA 6th SHIP) | |
| 3 | When ships are going to [illegible] areas [illegible] they are reasonably certain of obtaining the [illegible] of getting supplies are good, by transferring as much of their supplies [illegible] possible to [illegible] remaining behind, they may serve as an aid in offsetting the scarcity of [illegible]. (Bat Div 3) | The transfer between ships of clothing, provisions, canteen goods, navy relief goods, and special wartime kits must be regulated at fleet Hq in order to insure smoothness and efficiency. |
| | [illegible] THE CAPACITY, PERFORMANCE, AND NUMBER OF SUPPLY SHIPS | |
| Number | Battle Lesson(Reason) | Conclusion (Opinion) |
| 1 | Signal flags by which the type of supply ship can be recognized at a glance must be adopted. Ammunition ships have been mistaken for storeships, and thereby opportunities to load supplies have been lost. (Deason 2) | Signal flags which indicate the type of supply ship should be [illegible] at appropriate times. |
| 2 | (1) High-speed, medium type ships must be used in [illegible] (Bat Fleet) [illegible]<br>(2) It is generally very profitable to use small, high-speed ships in southern areas. ([illegible] 18, etc.)<br>(3) [illegible] normal circumstances is difficult. | Good, fast ships must be chosen as the supply ships to accompany the fleet. |

24

1

speed of [illegible] knots is required of a fully loaded oil tanker. ([illegible])

3

(1) Armament is weak, it must be strengthened. ([illegible] 18)

(2) Communications equipment is [illegible] deficient; it is inconvenient in [illegible]

(1) In view of the fact that many times when skill in lookout and evasive action determine the fate of a ship,

[illegible]

(3) Is it necessary to add 2 MG [illegible] 5 groups, 7.7mm MG on 7 ships.)

2 pairs of 12cm [illegible] [illegible] (4 [illegible] present 8cm.)

([illegible])

[illegible] MG [illegible] is [illegible] required. [illegible] number [illegible] from [illegible] [illegible] relaying [illegible] [illegible].

([illegible])

creased from 20 to over 50 rounds per gun, and depth charges from 4 to 6.

(TOKOSUKA Regional Transportation Dept.)

4

In spite of the fact that there have been numerous opportunities for using converted airplane lighters, their number has been insufficient, as has been the number of large landing barges. (11th Air Fleet.)

Two converted airplane lighters must be assigned each air fleet and they must be equipped with 4 large landing barges.

5/✓

(1) Conditions are such that supply of fuel and lubricating oil in the local area is impossible and torpedoes supplied cannot be prepared for firing. This is gradually being taken care of by transferring small amounts from the supply of

(1) Fuel oil and lubricating oil must be included with torpedoes supplied as ammunition ships. (This has been done.)

(2) Torpedoes supplied must be inspected at suitable intervals

other ships. Since this is a great inconvenience, it must be made possible to put (d) from unmanned ships or from all tankers. (KIMMEL(3))

(2) The torpedoes supplied, good adjusted, go general service without modification and reinstatement but there are many that are defective from having been in storage a long time. If we were to overhaul in in operation immediately after the delivery of these torpedoes, we may would we find them not immediately ready for firing, but we would have considerable some misgivings regarding their accuracy. (KIMMEL(4))

(1) Personnel wounded in the JAVA operation were immediately put aboard a mothership and taken as far as SAMARANG. Thereafter they were transferred to a hospital ship.

(2) Casualties in the 3d Battle of the SOLOMONS (Feb 12-14 Nov 1942) were transported on board a transport because there was no hospital ship at TRUK.

(3) There are few opportunities when ordinary cargo ships are in difficulty to call upon hospital ships for a supply of medical materials. Torpedo boats and destroyers are unsuitable when a number of seriously wounded are to be transferred. After both the LUZON operation and the 3rd Battle of the SOLOMONS cargo lighters were borrowed for transporting casualties.

and imperfect ones readjusted.

(1) The number of hospital ships must be increased and the evacuation of the sick and wounded and the supply of medical materials facilitated.

(2) The capacity of hospital ships for supplying medical materials must be increased.

(3) Cargo lighters to be used to transfer patients must be loaded aboard hospital ships.

(Section 7)

At present conditions are such that with every possible use of the [illegible] (AF) and the [illegible] (AF), supply is barely being carried on.

It is feared that in the event of an accident to these, supply lines would be thrown into disorder and the effect on morale and on operations would be great. Two naval [illegible] of the [illegible] type must be constructed and put into operation immediately in order to supply the (2nd Fleet) provisions.

The number of naval storeships for fresh provisions must be increased.

Operational maneuvers in remote places at least three months or more and the rapid supply of large quantities of storage goods to forward areas is impossible. Moreover, storage facilities for provisions at forward supply bases are poor and conditions are such that naval forces stationed in these areas are only supplied with difficulty. Also, because other equipment, ammunition, and miscellaneous goods have been loaded indiscriminately on supply ships of the Transportation Department system and the movements of these ships have not been under the direct supervision of the Combined Fleet, the status of transport from Japan has been such that the rapid, large-scale supply of first line operational forces, [illegible] coordinated with their carrying movements, is impossible.

At least no [illegible] for storage provisions (including canteen goods and

Supply facilities for storing provisions in forward areas must be expanded and, where necessary, naval [illegible] for storage provisions must be attached to the Combined Fleet.

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battle supplies) must be attached to the Combined Fleet.
(2nd Fleet)

(1) ~~Small~~ Fuel will be generally supplied every eight days but fresh provisions are sometimes needed for as long as twenty days. (Destroyer 2)

(2) Tankers must be equipped with refrigerators and thus be enabled to supply fresh provisions at the same time that they supply oil. (2nd Fleet)

It would be well to ~~have~~ make small craft such as ~~these~~ to be supplied with fresh provisions at the same time and place that they are supplied with fuel oil.

~~[illegible]~~ AIR TRANSPORT

| Number | Battle Lesson (Reason) | Conclusion (Opinion) |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | (1) Since it is believed to be very profitable both in the supply and transfer of urgently needed spare parts, ~~freight transport~~ C.O.D. planes should be detailed to all air depots for their exclusive use. (11th Air Depot, 13th Air Depot) | ~~Positive regulation and strengthening be applied to~~ Air transportation [illegible] |
| 1 | (2) Fleets or Stores Depots in ~~overseas~~ local areas must be provided ~~transport~~ planes and every effort must be made to provide a rapid supply of highly expendable light equipment. (TOKOSUKA ~~NAVY~~ Naval Stores Depot) | |
| | (3) In view of the great amount of medical supplies requiring care in preservation and urgent goods such as blood vaccine and X-ray film, it is necessary to meet the demand by increasing air facilities. (KURE Navy Yard, Sub-Base 3) | |
| | (4) Since it is difficult to supply operational centers by surface, ambulance | |

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please [redacted] provisional temporary designation) sent to used to fill [redacted] urgently needed medical materials (serums, surgical dressings, etc.) out and patients sent. (MATSUMO Naval Hospital)

[redacted] THE DEPARTURE OF NAVAL STORES FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SUPPLY OPERATIONS

| Number | Battle Lessons (Reason) | Conclusion (Evaluation) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | (1) [redacted] the tanker [redacted] damaged during the Battle of Midway and during the BATTLE OF THE SOLOMONS Operation the hoses of an oil tanker were damaged and supply was greatly delayed. (Cardin) (1077) (2) Losses from cutting and leakage during towing and refueling are likely to occur. Also, since the hoses stretch about 100, the part which bends is likely to become constricted and greatly reduces the capacity for supplying oil. The number of times accidents happened to hoses from the beginning of the war up to the end of 1942 is shown below; (Detail 1) | Calliopeans [redacted] hoses must be made tougher. |

| | KONGO (BB) times damaged | times damaged | HARUNA (BB) times executed | times damaged |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Actual hoses from AO | 6 | 9(Ths etc) | 5 | 3 |
| Electricide hoses from BB | 17 | 3 | 22 | 1 |

(3) If [redacted] filter is likely to get [illegible] (KENYO MARU, ~~[illegible]~~ ZUIHO (CVL)) [illegible] the war [illegible] of [illegible] (1077) [illegible] hose [illegible] were improved [illegible] 1 [illegible] suitable for use on naval vessels. [illegible]

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| Number | Battle Lessons (Reasons) | Conclusion (Opinion) |
|---|---|---|
| 1. (cont.) | equipment for 55s, reducing the number of 4.5 motor hours now in use by half. | |
| 2. | Wheels and the like cannot be lifted manually, and it is necessary, at the time of manufacture, to supply hooks to be used in lifting heavy articles which are shipped as they are.<br>There are many instances in which accessories have been damaged in transit.<br>( 108th Air Depot ) | Heavy goods should be fitted with metal attachments for convenience in carrying and the weight of the goods should be plainly marked. |
| 3. | Generally, the size and weight of the packages must be limited as much as possible. Mixing articles of varying sizes and weights in a large box simply increases the rate of damage.<br>Furthermore, since packing boxes are stacked out of doors for a fairly long time in combat areas, it is important to make clear the necessity for care in handling and preserving the contents.<br>( 168th Air Depot ) | To prevent damage, it is necessary to material/pack articles varying in weight and size in the same box. The weight and size of the box must suit the articles /packed/.<br>Precautions must be noted clearly on the outside of the box. |
| 4. | Because of the weakness and inferior materials in bomb boxes now in use, there is not only damage to bombs, which damage easily, but the inconvenience in handling is keenly felt.<br>( 11th Air Depot, 168th Air Depot ) | It is necessary to construct a framework for convenience in handling bomb containers and for putting in and taking out bombs. |
| 5. | 1). There are many examples of deterioration and decreased efficiency which occur with expansion of combat areas and because of conditions of temperature and climate which make special articles necessary. | In keeping with the expansion of combat areas, it is necessary to consider the temperature and climate in each area and to make studies concerning improvement |

CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item # 10476

Page 10

| Number | Battle Lesson (Reason) | Conclusion (Opinion) |
|---|---|---|
| | Various studies in this regard are being conducted. Research has already been carried out concerning hermetic dry batteries and packing for the prevention of self discharge thereof during transportation or storage. There is also a gradual improvement in barracks equipment. These problems should be studied in peace time so that varied circumstances may be coped with. It is necessary to set up vigorous research agencies. | and selection of military stores appropriate to the area and concerning protection in packing. |
| 5. | ( YOKOHAMA Stores Dept ) 2). Humidity is high in tropic zones, and in these areas, many sweets supplied from JAPAN are unusable when received. It goes without saying that the preservation of these items is difficult. ( 101st Fuel Depot, TARAKAN Branch ) 3). Dry plate photographic papers paper paper kept in storage in tropical zones for three months becomes moldy and cannot be used. ( 108th Air Depot ) 4). In TARAKAN, [redacted] sulphuretted sulphurization is great due to the mountains in the area. As a result, the illuminated dials of measuring instruments corrode and the internal mechanism and coils are broken or damaged. ( 108th Air Depot ) | |

CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item # 10678

Page 31

| No. | Battle Lesson (Reason) | Conclusion (Opinion) |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 1). Defective parts are frequently found in storage as being in good shape. ( YOKOSUKA Stores Dept ) | Equipment forwarded from to local areas and equipment transferred from Stores Depts for supply purposes should be sent only after re-inspection and adjustment. |
| 6. | 2). Many articles have been sent to an area immediately after being taken from storage, and inspection after arrival has revealed many defects. It is recognized that the many causes due to suppose this is in the transporting. ( YOKOSUKA Stores Dept ) | |
| 6 | It is advisable to use ships within the department for the delivery of classified documents. In anticipation of difficulty due to /ship's/ movements, it is necessary to pack them in heavy paper or bind them with strips of cloth. | When classified material is sent additional attention and study must be devoted to the packing. |
| 7. | Furthermore, in accordance with Military Affairs SECRET Order #850, Section 1, dealing with methods of disposal of the classified documents when no longer of use, the cover bearing the name of the document(in drawings, those parts which bear the classification number and place names) must be returned for filing, thus preventing the spread of information and contributing to much security. ( YOKOSUKA Stores Dept ) | |
| 8. | Agencies for the distribution of supply of spare parts used in a great many types of spare parts for a great many types of cars are being setup by area, such as NISSAN in "A" area and TOYODA in "B" area. When units are transferred from one area to another, it is necessary to exchange the parts supplied in that area so that a duplication of parts will not result. | In order to simplify articles used the spare parts should be standardized as much as possible. ( YOKOSUKA Stores Dept ) |

| Number | Battle Lessons (Reason) | Conclusion (Opinion) |
|---|---|---|
| 8 | When specially established forces depart for forward areas, furniture requires the most space and packing, and a great deal of labor, time and freight space is expended in its transportation. It is usually damaged in transit and from the standpoint of supply, ~~is a loss~~. | Stores for land-based units in combat areas should be kept as simple as possible. In furniture, collapsible and knock-down styles should be used. |
| 9 | ( TOKUSHU Stores Dept ) | |

VIII. THE IMPROVEMENT OF SHIPS' HULLS, MACHINERY, FITTINGS AND EQUIPMENT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SUPPLY OPERATIONS.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| V | 1). It is necessary to install equipment for refueling from waters. ( All ships ) | It is necessary to reconsider plans for the supply facilities of vessels so that supply capacity may be increased to the utmost. |
| | 2). In the case of tankers which supply from both sides, if supply cannot be carried out from both sides at the same time, the transfer of fuel cannot be initiated. Improvements are necessary so that separate supplying can be carried out. ( AKEBONO MARU, Pension ) | |
| I | 3). There are instances in which extraneous matter becomes mixed with the oil when refueling is being carried out from tankers. Refueling speed is reduced about one-third and inconvenience is leading results. It is necessary to equip tankers with changeable filters. ( IKI(ex) MARU ) | |
| | 4). In view of the many instances in which the hoses are burst due to ~~fueling operation~~ extreme pressure caused by faulty operation | |

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| No. | Battle Lesson (Reason) | Conclusion (Opinion) |
|---|---|---|

of the intake valves, it is necessary to install equipment which will prevent great pressure, such as automatic cut-off valves.

( TOHO MARU )

5). Oil intake funnels should be installed on all fuel tanks.

( MUTSU (CA) )

Conditions on the MUTSU

| No. of funnels | No. of auxiliary lines from each funnel | No. of tank connection valves from each line | No. of tanks |
|---|---|---|---|
| 12 | 1 | 0 | 12 |
| 2 | 1 | 2 | 4 |
| 8 | 2 | 0 | 16 |
| 2 | 2 | 4 | 8 |
| 6 | 3 | 0 | 18 |
| 2 | 3 | 4 | 10 |
| 2 | 4 | 0 | 8 |
| 4 | 5 | 0 | 20 |

6). The great length of the air outlet pipe on fuel tanks makes necessary the enlargement of the pipe line to facilitate the outlet of air.

Unless there is considerable pressure on the intake valve, loading is impossible.

( CHOKAI (CA), MUTSU (CA) )

7). From the standpoint of rapid supply, it is necessary to reduce the number of fuel tanks and increase the capacity.

( CHOKAI (CA) )

8). It is necessary to place the containers for the fuel intake valve, the intake gauge pipe and the hose in places convenient for loading operations. (CHOKAI (CA))

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| No. | Battle Lesson (Lesson) | Conclusion(Opinion) |
|---|---|---|
| | 9). When the TONAKI(OL) is about half filled with oil, the upper tanks cannot be filled unless the hatch is removed and the hose directly led in. Since capacity fueling from the outer is difficult and inconvenient from an operational standpoint, it is necessary to equip each tank with a main intake pipe. Moreover, since normal fueling of lower tanks requires time, it is necessary to convert to pressure fueling. ( TONAKI(OL) ) | |
| | 10). Often, large amounts of oil collect in the tanker's hoses at the time of refueling and the result is delay in the work of connecting the hose( 5 large laundry baskets of oil have been collected in one hose( about 0.3 ton) ). ( HAMAKAZE(DD) ) | |
| | 11). By reason of the hindrance to rapid fueling occasioned by the length of time required to drain(1.5 hours), it is necessary to increase from 10 tons to 30 tons the capacity of the connector drainage ejector in the compensating oil tank. ( HATSUHO(DD) ) | |
| | 12). It is necessary to equip tankers with oil heating equipment throughout. In case of low temperatures, the effect on the speed of refueling is great. ( Reddy 3 ) | |

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| Battle Lesson (Reason) | Conclusion (Opinion) |
| --- | --- |
| 13). It is necessary to install equipment so that oil may be supplied at night. | |
| ( [illegible] ) | |
| 14). It is helpful if the telephone can be used by both parties as a means of communication during refueling operations. For reasons of security, flare signals should not be used during refueling operations at night. | |
| ( [illegible] ) | |
| 15). It is necessary to provide aviation gas supply ships with supply hoses (about [illegible] dia.) | |
| When wind and tide are high, it is dangerous to refuel a supply a carrier. | |
| ~~[illegible]~~ | |
| 16). All must be fitted out with hatches and derricks and the crews must be well instructed in their use. | |
| Manchester Div | |
| ( [illegible] ) | |
| ~~This~~ Sometimes, two hours are necessary for the launching of large landing barges. There are commercial chartered vessels whose hatches are inconveniently placed for loading and unloading. | |
| ( 108th Air Depot ) | |
| 17). There are examples in which cargo spoilage has reached as high as 50% due to improper refrigeration equipment ( small refrigerators, weak refrigeration, imperfect packing) aboard shipmentage. | |
| ( [illegible] ) | |

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| | Weekly Lessons (Reason) | Conclusion (Opinion) |
|---|---|---|
| (Week) | 10). Converted ships are inconvenient for supplying lubricating oil. ( MISSED WEEK ) Attention to ship's equipment is essential. | |
| | ( MISSED WEEK ) | |
| 2 | It is necessary to equip ship with 40 ton derricks fore and aft to make possible the loading of lighters, large landing barges and other heavy objects. (Yokosuka Regional Transportation Dept) | It is necessary to have a large number of ship which are equiped with heavy derricks. |

(End)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #16
(U S NAVY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
VOLUME 1 No. 22, 8 DECEMBER 1944)
ENTITLED
"UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS,
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)


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Vol. I No. 22
8 DEC. 1944
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
WEEKLY
INTELLIGENCE
U.S.S. NEVADA AFIRE ON 7 DECEMBER 1941
(see story of PEARL HARBOR on page 1)

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"Weekly Intelligence" receives wide distribution among fleet units and key Navy, Marine and Army Commands. Any requests for additional distribution may be addressed to Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area.

Note: Starting with the next issue, the regular publication date of CINCPAC-CINCPOA "Weekly Intelligence" will be Monday rather than Friday. Therefore, Vol. 1, No. 23 will be issued on 18 December.

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# PEARL HARBOR: THE PLANNING STAGE

When Jap planes struck clustered U.S. warships and aircraft at PEARL HARBOR on 7 December 1941, the enemy was carrying into effect pin-pointed plans conceived months in advance and long cloaked in secrecy. Until recently, little has been known of the planning stage prior to the sneak raid on HAWAII.

The first concrete intimations of early enemy intentions are revealed in the interrogation of a Japanese Chief Yeoman who worked closely with top-ranking Jap Navy personnel during critical months in mid-1941. The prisoner, who was captured on SAIPAN, had access to highly confidential documents as well as behind-the-scenes rumors while plans for PEARL HARBOR were being perfected.

The prisoner appears both exceptionally intelligent and cooperative. Testimony capable of confirmation from other sources checked closely. Tactical information (as contained in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, Nos. 2 and 3) proved reliable.

Most remarkable of the POW's assets is his memory of details, as indicated in his reconstruction of the historic Combined Fleet Secret OpOrder #1, of 1 November 1941. This document, reproduced entirely by memory, is believed to be fairly accurately transcribed, and will be printed in full later in this article.

As a yeoman attached to the Staff of CinC Combined Fleet (Admiral YAMAMOTO), the prisoner became familiar with Jap war games. Staffs of the various Japanese Fleets worked these out on a large game board. Games were held frequently, sometimes as often as twice a month.

Prior to late August (1941), war games were held at such anchorages as SUKUMO, SAEKI, KAGOSHIMA, and KANOYA. Close attention was devoted to current experimental data, which was incorporated in tactics employed. Although the prisoner insists that enemy countries were not specifically designated during these games, the identity of possible Jap foes could scarcely have been obscure.

During this period, the prisoner added, there was a constant interchange of personnel between CinC Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff. Men on these staffs were reportedly "definitely much keener" than members of other Fleet staffs.

Final planning stages were presaged late in August, when CinC Combined Fleet ordered all Fleet Commanders and their key Staff members to TOKYO for further war games. Offices at the Naval General Staff at JAPAN's capital were found inadequate, and the games were thereafter held in the Naval War College. The POW claimed that security measures at the War College were woefully inadequate. Classes at the College continued as usual; "any man with a half-official air could easily have walked in".

On 2 September the final all-important "games" got underway, with an introductory speech to all officers taking part. Rooms were assigned to the "N" Team, the "A" Team, and the "E" Team (Nippon, America, and England) and to the umpires. The teams, composed of virtually every top-notch Jap Naval officer, were made up

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as follows:

UMPIRES

| NAVAL GENERAL STAFF | RANK | OFFICIAL DUTIES |
|---|---|---|
| NAGANO, Osami | Admiral | |
| FUKUTOME, Shigeru | Rear Admiral | Head of First Section (War Planes and Operations). |
| UOZUMI, Jisaku | Captain | Member First Section. |
| YAMAMOTO, Chikao | Captain | Head of Sub-Section, First Sect. |
| MAYUZUMI, Harue | Commander | Member " " " " |
| TAMURA, Saburo | Commander | " " " " " |
| SANAGI, Tsuyoshi | Commander | " " " " " |
| UOZUMI, Yoriichi | Commander | " " " " " |

NAVY MINISTRY

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| TAKATA, Toshitane | Captain | Member of Military Affairs Bureau. |
| SHIKI, Tsuneo | Commander | " " " " " |
| TOIBATA, Kurie | Commander | " " Office of Military Supply |
| FUJII, Shigeru | Commander | Private Secretary to Navy Minister (Admiral SHIMADA, Shigetaro). |

N-TEAM

COMBINED FLEET

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| YAMAMOTO, Isoroku | Admiral | CinC Combined Fleet. |
| ITO, Seiichi | Rear Admiral | Chief of Staff. |
| KUROJIMA, Kameto | Captain | Deputy Chief of Staff. |
| GOTO, Shigeru | Commander | Staff Adjutant. |
| ISOBE, Taro | Commander | Staff Engineering Officer. |
| SUGI, Toma | Commander | Staff Gunnery Officer. |
| SASAKI, Akira | Commander | Staff Air Officer. |
| WADA, Yushiro | Commander | Staff Communication Officer. |
| NAGATA, Shigeru | Commander | Staff Navigation Officer. |
| WATANABE, Yasuji | Commander | Staff Operations and Plans Officer. |
| ARIMA, Takayasu | Commander | Staff Torpedo Officer. |
| SEIMI, Ichiyoshi | Commander | Staff Supply Officer. |
| OTA, Kanai | Commander | Meteorologist attached to Staff. |

1st COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (RADIO INTELLIGENCE)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| KAKIMOTO, Gonichiro | Rear Admiral | Commander. |
| ARISAWA, Naosada | Commander | Deputy Chief of Staff. |

E-TEAM

SECOND FLEET

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| KONDO, Nobutake | Admiral | Commander. |

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| | | |
|---|---|---|
| YANAGIZAWA, Kuranosuke | Captain | Deputy Chief of Staff. |
| OISHI, Tamotsu | Commander | Staff Navigation Officer. |

FOURTH FLEET

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| INOUE, Semi | Vice Admiral | Commander. |

FIFTH FLEET

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| HOSOGAYA, Boshiro | Vice Admiral | Commander. |

ELEVENTH AIR FLEET

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| TSUKAHARA, Nishizo | Vice Admiral | Commander. |
| KUSAKA, Jinichi | Rear Admiral | Chief of Staff. |

A-TEAM

THIRD FLEET (Amphibious Forces for Southern invasions)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| TAKAHASHI, Ibo | Vice Admiral | Commander. |
| ISHIHARA, Hajime | Captain | Deputy Chief of Staff. |

SIXTH FLEET

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| SHIMIZU, Mitsumi | Vice Admiral | Commander. |
| KANOAKA, Tomojiro | Captain | Deputy Chief of Staff. |

FIRST AIR FLEET (Carrier Fleet)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| NAGUMO, Chuichi | Vice Admiral | Commander. |
| KUSAKA, Ryunosuke | Rear Admiral | Chief of Staff. |
| GENDA, Minoru | Commander | Deputy Chief of Staff. |

On 3 September, officers involved studied classified material. POW was assigned to "N" Team (CinC Combined Fleet). That afternoon, Commander WATANABE - Admiral YAMAMOTO's hard-working, fact-finding Plans and Operations Officer - handed the POW an outline of conditions under which the games were to be held, and requested fifty copies. These terms, which set forth a working basis for the games, contained the heart of the forthcoming 1 November OpOrder #1. Extensive preliminary planning was indicated. The prisoner believed that these plans must have been under development for several months. This was the first time that the POW realized that something of unusual significance was in the air.

On 5 September, the POW was attached directly to Commander SASAKI, CinC Combined Fleet's Staff Air Officer. When he entered the smoke-filled room at about 1000, he found PEARL HARBOR plans under discussion. The Japs apparently expected to catch all major U.S. Fleet units in the Pacific in PEARL HARBOR as well as units believed recently transferred from the Atlantic. The prisoner was surprised to overhear that "N" Team expected to lose one-third of the units participating in the attack on HAWAII; one AKAGI Class CV and one SORYU Class CV were estimated as

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sunk.

On 6 and 7 September, the conference of "N" Team debated the best means of assaulting PEARL HARBOR. (The POW, who was adept at the abacus - calculating board - was often used during these sessions to estimate fuel used by Fleet units at varying speeds). It was during this stage of planning that Captain KUROJIMA (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral ITO (Chief of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an amphibious assault on HAWAII. The cool and precise ITO was (surprisingly) in favor of an early landing, and YAMAMOTO was inclined to agree, but the intuitive, tempermental KUROJIMA won the discussion by pointing out insuperable logistics problems. The POW believes that ITO's plan was a last-minute, improvised idea, and that - when KUROJIMA's argument succeeded - the basic plan continued as originally intended.

These early sessions, the POW said, seemed confined primarily to two general problems: first, the details for a successful surprise raid on PEARL HARBOR; and second, a carefully worked-out schedule for occupying MALAYA, BURMA, D.E.I., the PHILIPPINES, the SOLOMONS, and Central Pacific Islands - including (ultimately) HAWAII. Neither AUSTRALIA nor NEW ZEALAND was apparently considered as immediate military objectives; the Japs intended simply to cut them off from outside help. The POW heard INDIA mentioned only once, when some senior officer remarked "that's where friction with GERMANY will begin".

The conferences (and "games") were ended about 13 September. The prisoner helped carry the notes to KURE, and thence by launch to the NAGATO, YAMAMOTO's Flagship, which was anchored at HASHIRAJIMA. About half of the Staff were already on board.

On 15 September, all the Staff with four yeomen (not including POW) journeyed to the IWAKUNI Air Group to confer with the Army. The POW remembers TERAUCHI mentioned, but cannot recall other names. He insists, however, that TOJO - then still War Ministsr - was not present. It was widely rumored (but never confirmed by other evidence) that the Army conferees at this meeting had not previously learned of plans to attack PEARL HARBOR.

The NAGATO remained at HASHIRAJIMA for about six more days. At the end of September, the main body of the Jap Fleet moved to SAEKI. There were four revisions of Combined Fleet OpOrder #1 while the Flagship was at SAEKI, though no major changes were made.

On 1 November, the final printing of the order was started, requiring almost three days to complete. Two copies were sent to the Army. Staff officers of other Fleet units at SAEKI called for copies in person. In all, 300 copies were distributed. OpOrders #2 and #3, designating Y-Day and X-Day, were issued on 5 and 10 November, respectively.

(Comment: The enemy naturally uses East Longitude Time in his OpOrder - i.e., the date of 8 December for the PEARL HARBOR attack is correct ELT.)

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The prisoner once knew the OpOrder intimately. Over a period of weeks, he has labored to reproduce on paper as much of the Order as he could remember. This version is obviously incomplete and not to be compared with the original document, but in main outline is believed to be substantially as printed. Notes in parentheses were added by the editor.

---

Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI WAN
1 November 1941

COMBINED FLEET SECRET OPORD #1

The Japanese Empire will declare war on the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS.

War will be declared on X-Day.

This order will become effective on Y-Day.

GENERAL SITUATION

(a) Policy toward the UNITED STATES.

In spite of the fact that the Empire has always maintained a friendly attitude toward the UNITED STATES, the UNITED STATES has interfered in all the measures which we have taken in self protection for the preservation of our interests in East ASIA. Recently, she has blocked our speedy settlement of the CHINA Incident by aiding the government of CHIANG Kai-shek and has even resorted to the final outrage of breaking off economic relations. While senselessly prolonging Japanese-American negotiations, she has continued to strengthen her military preparations. She offers a threat to us in the form of a concentration of her Fleet in the PACIFIC OCEAN, thus attempting to exert on ue both economic and military pressure.

(b) Policy toward GREAT BRITAIN.

BRITAIN is aiding the government of CHIANG Kai-shek and, acting in concert with her Allies and the UNITED STATES, in interfering with our program of construction in East ASIA. Recently she has been steadily building up the defenses of her bases in East ASIA in an attempt to threaten us.

(c) Policy toward the NETHERLANDS INDIES.

Although economic negotiations of a peaceful nature have been underway with us for a number of months, the NETHERLANDS INDIES has been led by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES to reject flatly the continuance of mutually beneficial economic relations. Recently she has threatened the fortunes of Japanese which have been built up as a result of persevering work through long years.

(d) The ports and the vast fertile regions of the coast of CHINA have been occupied by us and most of her great cities captured. CHINA, however,

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supported by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, has not yet awakened from the deluding dream of "Fight the War and Save the Country" and is attempting total resistance to JAPAN in the form of a "scorched earth" policy for all CHINA.

While organized resistance is gradually becoming weaker, the prevalence of guerilla warfare has obliged us to commit large numbers of troops to permanent garrison duty there. If we are to secure decisive victory, BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, the powers behind CHINA, must be destroyed.

(e) Policy toward the SOVIET UNION.

The strength of Soviet forces on the Soviet-Manchukuoan border is formidable.

The USSR is maintaining a vigilent alert, awaiting developments. However, if the Empire does not attack the SOVIET UNION, it is believed that the SOVIET UNION will not commence hostilities.

OUR SITUATION

The Fourth Fleet has largely completed preparation in the Mandated Islands, as has the Eleventh Air Fleet (Naval shore-based air) at essential bases in CHINA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND. The state of repair of our ships and planes is generally excellent and the efficiency of their personnel has markedly improved.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

To drive BRITAIN and AMERICA from Greater East ASIA, and to hasten the settlement of the CHINA Incident. In addition, it is expected that when BRITAIN and AMERICA have been driven from the NETHERLANDS INDIES and the PHILIPPINES, an independent self-supporting economic entity may be firmly established. The vast and far-reaching fundamental principle, the spiritual guide of our nation, (the "Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof - HAKKO ICHIU ), may be demonstrated to the world. To this end we will use all the military strength necessary.

STRATEGY

The strategy to be adopted against BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and the NETHERLANDS will be as directed in the Annexed Volume. X-Day and Y-Day will be announced later.

If before Y-Day the enemy is believed to have been able to ascertain our plans, the execution of X-Day will be made the subject of a special order.

If before X-Day we should be attacked by the enemy, his attack will be crushed with all available strength. All commanding officers will act in conformance with "Strategy to be Adopted in the Case of an Enemy Attack".

In the case of the SOVIET UNION, every effort will be made to avoid provoking hostilities. At the same time, every effort will be made to insure the secrecy

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of our plans. If the enemy should ascertain our plans, military operations will immediately be begun in accordance with "Measures to be Taken in the Case of an Attack by the SOVIET UNION".

Circulation of this order is limited to Fleet and Force Commanders. These Commanders will take every possible measure to prevent leakage of these plans prior to their being carried out.

Precaution: Disposal of this order.

This order must be burned when no longer of use. If there is any danger of its falling into enemy hands as the result of a ship sinking or some other untoward occurrence, the responsible Commander shall personally make immediate disposal of it.

---

Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1

ANNEXED VOLUME

1. Joint Army-Navy operations will be carried out in accordance with the "Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement".

2. A Striking Force (Carrier Task Force), having the 1st Air Fleet (Carriers and Escorts) as its main element, will depart its naval bases or operating areas about X-16 Day, and will set course, by way of TANKAN BAY (HITOKAPPU BAY, ETOROFU ISLAND, KURILES) for PEARL HARBOR, the base of the American PACIFIC Fleet, where it will deliver a surprise attack.

   X-Day is expected to be during the early or middle part of December.

3. Targets for attack are airfields; aircraft carriers; battleships, cruisers and other warships; merchant shipping; port facilities; and land installations, in that order.

4. From the time set by the Force Commander for the Striking Force to leave port in JAPAN, strickt radio silence will be observed. Communications will be via ordinary broadcast system. The code book to be used will be "(not certain)". The following communications abbreviations will be in effect:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| "Many warships in PEARL HARBOR". | - | "The fate of the Empire". |
| "No warships in PEARL HARBOR". | - | "The cherry-blossoms are in all their glory". |
| "The weather is clear and visibility good in the region. Suitable for an attack". | - | "Climb MT FUJI". |
| "The time to commence the attack is 0520". | - | "The depth of the moat of HONNOJI Temple is 0520". |
| "All forces attack". | - | "Climb MT NIITAKA!". |

etc.

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5. The course and the disposition of the attacking units will be determined by the Striking Force commander.

The Commander of the Striking Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he determines on the course and disposition of the attacking units. Care must be taken to avoid ordinary merchant shipping routes and to keep the plans from disclosure under any circumstances whatever.

6. Procedure to be followed in case of discovery before the attack either by a ship of the nation against which war is to be declared, or by a ship of a neutral nation (including the SOVIET UNION).

(a) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a nation against which war is to be declared, make immediate preparation to attack and sink it.

(b) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a neutral nation, the ship should immediately be detained until it can do us no actual harm; strict surveillance should be kept of its radio transmission. In case it should make any transmissions which might prove harmful to us or give us reason to fear that our plans might be revealed, the ship will be seized by a destroyer which will make immediate attack preparations.

(c) In case of discovery by a foreign ship more than 600 miles from the objective, the ship will be detained and radio transmission forbidden. However, if it seems highly probable that our general intentions have been guessed, an attack should be made immediately, if between X-5 Day and X-Day. If before X-5 Day, the Striking Force commander will decide the disposition of the ship, depending on the circumstances. In the case of detention of an enemy ship, "B" method will be followed.

7. The Commander of be Surprise Attack Force (Submarine Force), having the 6th Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main element, will have most of the submarines leave the western part of the INLAND SEA on X-20 Day to attack PEARL HARBOR. Its entire strength will be disposed so as to command the harbor mouth. It will attack any enemy warship which may have escaped from the harbor. It will also carry out reconnaissance before the attack, and if the opportunity presents itself, will carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships with midget submarines. The time for such attacks will be after the flights of planes have attacked OAHU. Every possible means for recovery of midget submarines should be considered.

8. Joint Army-Navy operations should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Central Headquarters Agreement. The disposition of forces will be determined by the Commander of the Advance Force (principally Second Fleet cruisers and destroyers). The Commander of the Advance Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he decides on the course and disposition of the attacking units.

The point of departure for the ships of the MALAY and FRENCH INDO-CHINA Forces will be BAKO and the point of departure for the PHILIPPINES Occupa-

tion Force will probably be PALAU.

9. The capture of English and American troops and ships in CHINA will be arranged by the Commander-in-Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet. The occupation of HONG KONG will conform to the provisions of the Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement and is the responsibility of the Commander, 2nd CHINA Expeditionary Fleet.

10. English and American merchant ships which are in ports under Japanese sovereignty at the time of the outbreak of the war or which are in ports which may be taken are to be captured if possible.

SOVIET shipping is to be kept under surveillance after undergoing a rigid inspection.

It whould be so planned that none of our shipping will be in foreign ports when the war breaks out.

11 Beginning on Y-Day the Commander of the 1st Combined Communication Unit will send false messages to give the impression that the main strength of the fleet is in the western part of the INLAND SEA.

After Y-Day has been determined, the NYK passenger vessel TATSUTA MARU, which is scheduled to proceed to the west coast of AMERICA, will sail; arrangements will be made to have her return while en route. (This was done, and Allied passengers were interned; the same procedure would have been followed with any trans-Pacific liner scheduled to sail in this period).

When Y-Day has been determined, the Commandant of the YOKOSUKA Naval District will allow as many men of his command as possible to go ashore so that the number of men on liberty in TOKYO and YOKOHAMA will give a false impression. (Another POW confirms this).

12. The Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Fleet (Mandates Fleet) will expedite the attack and occupation of British, American and Dutch bases in the North and South PACIFIC, acting in close cooperation with forces of the 11th Air Fleet in the South PACIFIC. Enemy air power within our sphere of operations will be checked and communication between AUSTRALIA and the mainland of the UNITED STATES will finally be cut.

It is expected that in this manner AUSTRALIA will be isolated and dominated completely. The natural resources of all kinds which the bast continent of AUSTRALIA boasts will then fall to us.

(The dates for execution of assault and occupation of various British, U.S., Netherlands bases were then listed in this paragraph - a few of which follow:)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| (1) | GUAM | about X plus 2. |
| (2) | WAKE | about X plus 7. |

CONTINUED

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(3) (The dates for the invasions of RABAUL and the islands from the SOLOMONS to the FIJIS, SAMOA, and SANTA CRUZ groups were all entered.)

13. The date for the seizure of MIDWAY is set as late Spring of 1942. The date for the occupation of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS is scheduled for October 1942.

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Herewith are two of the above referenced documents.

THE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.

The object of Imperial Headquarters, Army Department and Imperial Headquarters, Navy Department in setting forth clearly the division of duties and command in joint operations was to promote a maximum display of efficiency. (According to POW, it was issued at the end of October 1941. A resume of the contents follows:)

1. The highest ranking Army officer for SUMATRA, BORNEO, the MALAY Peninsula, CELEBES, and the PHILIPPINES (including FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND) will be Field Marshal TERAUCHI, Hisaichi. His command will be called the Southern Army and ite headquarters will be in SAIGON.

2. Plans for escorting large Army convoys and the place, time and date for landings.

3. Agreements on Aerial Warfare Agreements on the places to be attacked by both Army and Navy planes and on the places, dates and times of attacks by Army or Navy planes acting independently. Agreements on the airfields to be uses, such as "XX Airfield will be used primarily by the Army and secondarily by the Navy."

4. Supply Plans.

   Plans for the supply of Army landing forces to be effected by Army shipping and for the Navy's support of same.

5. Communications Plans.

6. Agreement on occupied territories, cities, and resources such as, "The BANDJERMASIN Oil Refinery will be controlled by the Navy".

---

MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF A SOVIET ATTACK.

(POW does not remember the date exactly, but it was the end of October - and stated in effect:)

"It is believed likely that we shall not be attacked by the SOVIET UNION unless we attack first, but in case JAPAN is attacked first, the 5th Fleet (Northern Force) will counterattack with all its strength and maintain local supremacy."

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
Commanding, Combined Fleet

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Flagship AKAGI, SAEKI WAN
10 November 1941

STRIKING FORCE OPORD #1

1. All ships will complete battle preparations by 20 November.

2. The fleet will rendevous at TANKAN WAN. (HITOKAPPU BAY, ETOROFU Is. KURILES).

3. Inasmuch as the plans for the coming operation must be kept absolutely secret, strict security will be maintained in regard to them, up to the time they are explained to the crew after port of departure in JAPAN has been cleared.

4. Break-down of attack plane units.

   The AKAGI 1st Attack Plane Unit
   Unit Commander: Lt. Comdr XX
   1st Carrier Attack Unit
   Etc. (details not recalled by POW).

5. Fleet cruising formation
   (Including retiring formations)

6. All transmission of messages is strictly forbidden.

   Transmission and reception will both use the TOKYO #1 broadcast communications system.

NAGUMO Chuichi
Commanding
Striking Force

Verbal explanation by the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet of ambiguities in Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1.

(Printed version of an explanation of details not covered in the order delivered to the High Commanders in an informal talk.)

1. That the coming declaration of war against ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES will usher in a great war of survival with the two leading naval powers of the world.

   That this war is really one in which our existence is in question, one in which we have no choice but to strike with our military power.

2. That our Navy, in engaging a worthy enemy, is about to realize an ambition which dates back to the foundation of the Imperial Navy many years ago.

CONTINUED

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3. That the alliance with GERMANY was not desired by the Navy, but was a project favored by the Army which thought it would hold the SOVIET UNION in check. (1)

4. That the campaigns in the NETHERLAND INDIES and in the PHILIPPINES will be preceded by the securing of advanced bases in THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA. It is believed that these operations will come off in extremely smooth order.

   The Navy will be able to secure sources of oil supply swiftly by means of these campaigns.

5. In connection with the attack on PEARL HARBOR, reports indicate that a gigantic fleet, which includes the ATLANTIC Fleet, has massed in PEARL HARBOR.

   This Fleet will be utterly crushed with one blow at the very beginning of hostilities. It is planned to shift the balance of power and thereby confuse the enemy at the outset and deprive him of his fighting spirit.

   Our objective, however, lies more than three thousand miles away. In attacking this large fleet concentration it is to be expected that countless difficulties will be encountered in preserving the absolute security of the plans. If these plans should fail at any stage, our Navy will suffer the wretched fate of never being able to rise again. The success of our surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR will prove to be the "WATERLOO" of the war to follow. For this reason the Imperial Navy is massing the cream of its strength in ships and planes to assure success.

   All of the planes of CarDiv 1, CarDiv 2, and CarDiv 5 will be concentrated in the attack on OAHU. If there are any ships which escape, almost the entire submarine strength of the 6th Fleet will be in command of the harbor mouth and will concentrate torpedo attacks on them. In addition to these, the destroyer strength of (DesRon 1) will be deployed in a screen (mainly for night attacks) and the fast battleships of BatDiv 3 deployed in a fourth echelon. If the main force of the enemy fleet should escape from PEARL HARBOR and make for the open sea, it will be waylaid by the Main Body of our fleet.

6. The midget submarine unit has been studying and training at the KURE Navy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, but it is still too much to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. In any case, the crew members are supremely confident. The 6th Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within the harbor.

7. It is clear that even if AMERICA's enormous heavy industry productive power is immediately converted to the manufacture of ships, planes and other war materials, it will take at least several months

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for her manpower to be mobilized against us. If we insure our strategic supremacy at the very outset of the conflict by attacking and seizing all key points at one blow while AMERICA is still unprepared, we can swing the scales of later operations in our favor.

8. Heaven will bear witness to the righteousness of our struggle. It is hoped that every man will exert his full efforts toward the realization of the objectives of this holy war by determinedly carrying out our original purpose, in the full realization of the unparalleled opportunity which this war offers.

Communications Plans.
(POW does not know about these; no details.)

Supply Plans. (outline)

The Naval bases of YOKOSUKA, KURE and SASEBO will be rear supply bases. BAKO, PALAU, TRUK and OMINATO will be forward supply bases. In addition to these, supply ships will be attached to each fleet.

---

5 November

Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #2

Y-Day will be 23 November.

---

10 November

Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #3

X-Day will be 8 December.

---

During the actual attack on PEARL HARBOR, the prisoner remained aboard the NAGATO in the Empire with the Flag of CinC Combined Fleet. Details of the Carrier Task Force which conducted the raid are known from other prisoners and from documents. See, for example, the chart of 1st Air Fleet movements as reproduced elsewhere in this issue.

The TF sortied from ETOROFU TO, in the KURILES, on or about 27 November (ELT), and headed eastward under a heavy front before turning south to the attack. The composition of the Force, which was commanded by the late Vice Admiral NAGUMO (CinC 1st Air Fleet) is fairly well established. The enemy had six carriers: KAGA, AKAGI (CarDiv 1) SORYU, HIRYU (CarDiv 2) SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (CarDiv 5 less HOSHO); two BBs: HIYEI, KIRISHIMA (BatDiv 3, less KONGO and HARUNA); three cruisers: TONE, CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8), plus ABUKUMA; elements of DesRon 1; and about twenty subs.

CONTINUED



79716 O—46—pt. 13——23

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(Comment: It is of interest to note that all six carriers and both battleships participating are now identified as sunk, plus the CA CHIKUMA; the majority of other units involved are also believed sunk or severely damaged, although definite identification is not yet possible).

One of the Japs' chief headaches during the sortie was the fueling problem. One well informed prisoner who was a CPO on fueling detail described emergency measures required to keep the speedy SORYU and HIRYU in fuel. These two ships were fueled daily, and drums carried as supercargo were unloaded by bucket-brigade when the fast dash to the plane-launching point was begun. At that, the SORYU arrived back at KURE with only 95 tons of oil in her tanks. AOs coming alongside the TF to fuel units had considerable trouble, and visibility was so bad that "towing spars" for position keeping were almost constantly in use.

At the time of the raid, considerable information was derived from documents taken from crashed planes and a beached midget sub.

Reproduced on the following page is a proposed track chart of a midget sub which had planned to transit PEARL HARBOR but apparently failed. This sub beached itself the following day on the opposite side of OAHU, and one of the two crew members was taken prisoner. Little was learned from the POW, but it is believed that the sub was damaged on a reef near the entrance of PEARL HARBOR, putting sound gear out of commission and forcing retirement. Subsequent examination of this sub's torpedo tubes indicated that an attempt had been made to fire torpedoes, but launching gear fouled.

The original chart, too frayed for reproduction, was evidently a U.S. Navy H.O. chart, with detailed navigational data carefully translated into Japanese. Rough notes were scribbled on the chart, in some cases too illegible to translate. On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The sub also carried a rough profile of the PEARL HARBOR skyline. The mission of the sub was both attack and reconnaissance. The KANA code as shown on the chart is similar to codes recovered from aircraft.

At least three Jap midget subs were lost by our counter-actions at this time. One sub actually entered the harbor; it suffered a direct five-inch shell hit, and was thereafter rammed and depth-charged beyond recognition. The Japs admitted the loss of five of these undersize subs.



Midget sub beached on OAHU.

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


**Translation of code tables carried by Jap planes. Simple combinations of two KANA syllables served to report disposition and movements of U.S. Fleet.**

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


Photostat of a document from a crashed Jap plane after the PEARL HARBOR raid. Above, code designations are applied to ship anchorages near FORD ISLAND. Below, sectors from LAHAINA (on MAUI, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS) are indicated in code. Codes were presumably to be used for either voice or radio transmission.

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

| 局名 | 周波数 | 發射時刻 | 角度 |
|---|---|---|---|
| KGMB | 590 | 1/00 以后連續放送 | |
| KGU | Y60 | 1/00 以后連續放送 | 5 |

Novel aid for Jap PEARL HARBOR raiders. Captured fragment above gives name, frequency, time of transmission and signal strength of two chief HONOLULU radio stations.



Chart of torpedo runs, recovered from crashed Jap plane. Broken lines indicate aircraft from CV KAGA. Solid lines denote planes from other carriers.

Captured Japanese photograph of FORD ISLAND under attack on 7 December 1941. A VAL has just scored a near miss.



Above photograph is captioned in Japanese "the pitiful American Capital Fleet".

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

Photographs of the PEARL HARBOR raid were widely distributed among Jap personnel for morale purposes. Captured souvenir albums of Jap sailors often contain a set of these photos along with several equally dramatic shots of the PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE sinking off SINGAPORE. Above photograph shows WHEELER FIELD during raid.




One enemy submarine was definitely sunk near the Empire on the 29th.

Absence of sighting and contact reports between HAWAII and the Mainland indicate the probable return of that sub to the Empire.

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# JAP SHIPS SUNK IN MANILA HARBOR, THROUGH 14 NOVEMBER 1944

**It is estimated that more than 160,000 gross tons of Japanese merchant shipping have been sunk in MANILA Harbor as a result of air attacks by the Third Fleet. This estimated tonnage refers only to MANILA Harbor proper and does not include tonnage sunk in adjacent areas.**

The 31 merchant ships noted to have been sunk consisted of two tankers, four of the new 6500 gross ton engine-aft cargo ships (see "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 21), and 25 freighters or freighter-transports ranging from 2000 to 9000 gross tons. Ships of less than 1800 gross tons were not considered in the above estimate.

In addition to the above merchant ships, two warships were sunk in MANILA Harbor and have been identified as a light cruiser of the KUMA Class and a destroyer of either the TAKANAMI or new KIYOSHIMA Classes.

The sketch on the opposite page shows the approximate locations of the sunken ships, the names if identified, the tonnage and type. The symbol used to mark the location of each sunken ship also indicates the date of the photograph in which the ship was first observed to have been sunk.

Of particular interest in MANILA Harbor is a ship of the HOEISAN Maru Class, indicated by an arrow. The ship has a minimum of 10 gun positions and extra deck houses. The excessive AA plus the fact that the ship has remained in the same position throughout all photographic coverages suggest that it may be a flak ship.

MANILA Harbor photographed on 5 November by TICONDEROGA aircraft. Note concentration of destroyers.


MANILA
KEY
SHIPS PHOTOGRAPHED SEPT 21-22 ○ DAMAGED ● SUNK
OCT 18 X
NOV 5 □
NOV 13-14 △
PASIG RIVER
AMAKASU M. CLASS 1950 G.T.
SB(A) 6500 G.T.
3000 G.T. UNIDENTIFIED
F-5300 G.T. BENGAL M. CLASS
F-5000 G.T.
F-6000 G.T. HOEISAN M. CLASS
3000 G.T. UNIDENTIFIED
F-4500 G.T.
FT 9300 G.T. KAGA M. CLASS
F-4400 G.T. SORATI M. CLASS
AO 9500 G.T.
3000 G.T. UNIDENTIFIED
SB(A) 6500 G.T.
FT-6500 G.T.
FT-5000 G.T.
F-5500 G.T. ADEN M. CLASS
FA 8200 G.T. HAKUSIKA M. CLASS
FT-2000 G.T.
F-4500 G.T. MISAKI M. CLASS
NEW ORE CARRIER CLASS 5600 G.T.
FT-2000 G.T.
FT-2500 G.T.
DD
3000 G.T. UNIDENTIFIED
FT-2500 G.T.
CL KUMA-NATORI CLASS
SB(A)-NEW ENGINES AFT CARGO 6500 G.T.
F-BENGAL M. CLASS 5300 G.T.
F-5500 G.T. ADEN M. CLASS
N
AO-KYOKUTO-GENYO M. CLASS 10,000 G.T.
SB(A) 6500 G.T.
FT-NANA-KENYO M. CLASS 6700 G.T.
FT-NAGARA M. CLASS 7150 G.T.
STATUTE MILES

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# MANILA STRIKE RESULTS

Results of Third Fleet aircraft strike on MANILA Harbor 11-14 November 1944. Ship in foreground is a new type 6500 ton freighter, Sugar Baker (a), described in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 21.

Two freighters on the bottom near the breakwater give testimony to the effectiveness of the strike.



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Burning ships and shore installations at MANILA Harbor.

Pier Seven and other installations showing damage from Third Fleet bombs, 11-14 November 1944.



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# PROBABLE CONVERSION OF JAP HOSPITAL SHIP

Photographed below in MANILA on 21 September is a ship apparently identical to the BAIKAL MARU, an AH. Still officially listed as a hospital ship, this vessel has no known sister ship. It was not painted with the prescribed markings for hospital ships and has apparently been reconverted to a merchantman to ease the current severe Jap shipping shortage. Two gun platforms are noted forward and one aft.

Although positive identification of this vessel as the BAIKAL MARU must await further confirmation, it is logical to expect the enemy to reconvert his AHs for more practical if less humane purposes. More than 20 sizeable Japanese vessels are still officially on the books as hospital ships - a disproportionate allotment in view of his general shipping situation.



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# INCREASED AA ARMAMENT ON JAP FREIGHTER-TRANSPORT



Photographed by planes of the 13th Bomber Command on 11 November in ORMOC Bay, the Japanese freighter-transport seen above is more heavily armed with AA than any other ship of this type previously observed.

The unusually large AA platform in the bow mounts four three-inch AA guns. In addition, there is one 25-mm in the gun tub forward, and six additional light AA - probably single-mount 25-mm - mounted three on each end of the bridge. This armament is in sharp contrast to the standard one or two AA guns usually observed on such vessels.

The enemy may be expected to bolster his AA defense aboard all types of merchantmen when armament is available, in a further move to counter increasingly heavy Allied shipping strikes.

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MANILA, PHILI

This striking photograph of MANILA Harbor and environs was taken by planes from the USS HANCOCK on 25 November. Most of the ships seen, including a KUMA Class light cruiser, are resting on the bottom.

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'PINE ISLANDS

The white governmental buildings are seen in the right foreground. The largest pier (number Seven) has a sunken freighter alongside. The PASIG River winds through the city and enters the sea just outside the breakwater.

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## KUMA-NATORI CLASS CL

Effectiveness of Allied aircraft against Jap warships has prompted a continuous increase in AA armament. Recent photographs of KUMA-NATORI Class light cruisers offer added documentation of this trend.

On the facing page are reproduced revised measured drawings. The refitted cruisers are now believed armed as follows:

Two 5-inch AA in twin shielded mounts (these replace the No. 7 5.5-inch guns of the original armament).
Five 5.5-inch guns of the original armament.
Four 25-mm single mount guns.
Ten 25-mm in dual mounts
Three 25-mm in a triple mount.
Two 13-mm in a dual mount.

Available photographs do not offer a clear view of the well aft of the bridge, and it is not possible to determine whether the two twin torpedo tubes mounted there have been removed to make room for additional AA. Although possible, this change is believed unlikely.

The catapult and the crane on the mainmast have been removed. A raised AA platform now occupying the former catapult base is believed to contain a triple-mount AA gun.

The old 5.5-inch No. 5 gun has been removed, and twin 25-mm added on each side of its former location.

A launch and whaleboat are now carried athwartship of the No. 1 and 2 stacks.

## LONG DELAY BOMB FUSE

A captured document,(CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 8309 ) disclosed that the Japanese have developed a new long delay bomb fuse. It is designated as Experimental Type 1 Special Nose Fuse, and is to be used in the Model 3 No. 6 Mark 23 bomb, Model 1. This bomb is the Japanese 132-lb. delay-type generally used against airfields.

Nothing is known of the time delay incorporated in this new fuse, but the only other Japanese time delay fuse known has three settings, 5, 36 or 72 hours. In construction this new fuse is an improvement over the old one.

ERRATUM: In "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 17, it was erroneously stated both in the text and on the charts of the Second Battle of the PHILIPPINES Sea that Third Fleet BBs sank a crippled cruiser on the afternoon of 25 October. Actually, U.S. light cruisers sank this Jap warship.




## KUMA - NATORI CL

### ESTIMATE OF REVISED ARMAMENT

BASED ON PHOTOGRAPHS [illegible]
TAKEN BY 23rd & 31st [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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## FLOATING MINES IN THE JAPAN SEA

Data on the chart on the opposite page was taken from a recently recovered enemy document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,410). Although dated well over a year ago, the information plotted offers a revealing glimpse of the extensive Japanese mining activity in the strategic waters of the JAPAN Sea. Floating mines reported to Jap hydrographers along the southwest coast of HONSHU were very possibly brought north by ocean currents from the heavily-mined CHOSEN Strait. The cluster of mines reported south of VLADIVOSTOK reflects the use of mines by RUSSIA to protect her greatest Pacific port area. The total number of mines reported during the brief two-month period indicates one of the strongest threats to U.S. subs operating in these Jap-controlled waters.

## NEW JAP RIFLE GRENADE

A new type of Japanese high explosive rifle grenade, embodying several features not previously encountered, was captured during a recent operation. This grenade is designed to be fired by a wooden bullet from the Type 38 and Type 99 rifles. Since these rifles are standard combat issue, it is believed this grenade was produced for universal use.

Carrying a main charge of three ounces of cast TNT and an instantaneous fuse, this grenade has four fins of light metal attached to the stabilizer to guide it in flight.

Upon impact, an inertia block is forced into the fuse body, breaking a brass shear wire and driving the steel striker into the percussion cap. The cap ignites a black powder relay which sets off a cyclonite primer. Then, in succession, the tetryl booster and the main TNT charge are ignited.

The heavy construction of the inertia weight shear pin indicates that contact with a soft object might not be sufficient to fire the fuse. However, a notation attached to the captured grenade warns against dropping or striking the nose of the projectile. A safety fork, which must be removed before firing, supposedly prevents accidental detonation.

A complete round of this new grenade has been examined by Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit #4, but its effectiveness has not been determined. The explosive charge was reported comparable to the KISKA-type hand grenade.

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

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# GENYO CLASS TANKER VICTIM OF PB4Y

On 31 October, a PB4Y of the 115th Bombing Squadron observed and photographed a 10,000-ton GENYO Class Jap tanker off KUDAT airdrome in MARUDU Bay (North BORNEO). The Allied plane attacked and apparently sank the AO with a single 250-pound GP hit, which ripped an eight-foot hole in the starboard bow. A 4-5-second delay fuse was used. Photo below shows the victim on the next day.

On 1 November another PB4Y observed the same ship lying on its side in this same location. On the following day it was observed on the bottom in 10-15 fathoms.

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# JAP AERIAL ANTI-SUB DOCTRINE

A detailed explanation of the Japanese Navy's aerial anti-submarine doctrine is contained in an unusually lucid and analytical captured document.

This document was somewhat mutilated and its date of publication and issuing authority are missing. Its relatively recent origin, however, is established by the fact that episodes as late as February 1944 are mentioned, and its general tone indicates that it may be one of the series of tactical research studies published by the authoritative YOKOSUKA Naval Air Group.

Of special interest are notations referring to the use of radar and magnetic detectors. The tactical doctrine for these devices appears to be still in a state of development, but their use may be expected to grow. Previous documentary evidence has established the installation of magnetic detectors on JAKEs early last summer and it is probable that other planes may be so equipped now.

The document, which will be published in full as (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 9979), shows a full appreciation of the alertness and perseverance necessary in effective aerial anti-submarine warfare. It contains many combat examples which are not reproduced in this article.

Aerial anti-sub tactics, says the document in its introduction, must be based on the rapid employment of large numbers of aircraft, even if it is necessary to make some sacrifice in quality.

"The commanding officer must stand at the head of his troops", it states.

"The present combat conditions, if compared to land warfare, represent not a battle of confrontation with the commander back of the center, but a final charge led by the commander. In forces having detachments, the commander should shift frequently to the various detachments, and direct activities on the spot.

"Patrol duty requires especial attention to promotion of morale because of the tediousness of the topography. A patrol which has been lacking in alertness is nothing but throwing away fuel."

Aggressiveness is stressed.

"It is necessary to attach importance to persistent and thorough sweep attacks. If we concentrate on defense alone in combat, the enemy gradually counters with increased threats. When we strike a strong blow against them, they immediately cease their pressure. This is shown by the fact that after the CAMRANH Bay Force (BUTAI), KUSHIMOTO Force (BUTAI), and TATEYAMA Air Group YAMADA Detachment had achieved considerable success in combat, the enemy subs in that area lay low for a while."

Patience and imagination are essential.

"Even though our efforts are not rewarded and success in battle is not attained,

CONTINUED

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we must not become impatient and do anything rash.

"Such things as new tactics should be tried out as much as conditions permit. In anti-submarine patrol nothing as yet exists which can be called fixed rules. This is especially true under conditions where definite superiority cannot be determined."

In regard to night operations.

"Night training in many cases is not carried out due to the pressure of work or liberty or the like. However, there is great need for an increase of ability in night operations, and it is essential to carry this out strictly because of its special need in reference to the use of radar."

Lack of proper preparation may spoil an attack.

"In the fall of 1943 the CHUYO, about 300 nautical miles southeast of SUNOSAKI was hit by a torpedo and sank, but a medium attack plane of the TATEYAMA Air Group patrolling in the area immediately after this sighted a surfaced enemy submarine and headed for it. The plane was shortly picked up by the radar and when it reached the spot, only the wake was to be seen. A bombing attack was made and the first bomb fell with a right-left deviation of 0, seventy meters ahead of the target, but the second bomb of the run did not drop because of failure of the release. Although they attacked again after repairing this, the bomb fell short and no results were obtained. If the second bomb had dropped on the first run, success would have been assured, but because of poor preparations the opportunity was missed and they could get no revenge."

Planes must be ready for instant operations.

"It is necessary to send out attack units immediately after receiving warning reports. The sea area requiring patrol increases proportionately to the square of the time elapsed from the sighting of the enemy to the arrival on the scene of the attack units. However, since the arrival on the spot of attacking vessels is usually markedly late, it is essential that the air forces consider this matter so as to remedy the deficiency."

Bad weather must be turned to account.

"At such times there are chances for catching the enemy. When the visibility on the surface is bad, it is generally the plane that makes the sighting before the submarine does. Instrument flying training should be carried out so that it is at least possible to fly with safety in bad weather. If necessary it should be carried out while on patrol at times when vigilance may be relaxed, even if it means sacrificing observation by the pilot. However, assigning unreasonable operations to untrained personnel and suffering useless losses is condemned. Hence, in weather in which the ability of the flying crew is not to be trusted, it is best to return to base without loss of time."

U.S. submarine tactics.

"By always carefully observing the condition of the enemy and knowing his

present tactics, strike the first blow, and realizing that the tactics in present use will finally become historical old tactics, prepare for future combat."

"At present the enemy makes the utmost use of radar and sonar to catch his prey, and then carries out accurate firing by exposing the periscope. However, a shift to completely submerged firing is being planned for the near future. Counter-measures must be studied.

"Surfaced submarines sometimes use camouflage and deceptive measures. When a strange boat has been sighted, she must be reconnoitered in detail. These subs change their appearance to that of a fishing boat by the use of sails or nets, or put up false smokestacks, and the like, and disguise themselves as boats of other types.

Tactics for anti-sub patrol.

"When there are large and small planes at the same base, the large planes will chiefly carry out day and night long range patrols around convoy routes and make it impossible for enemy submarines to operate on the surface. In addition to making it difficult for them to approach our strategic places and convoys, these planes will carry out surprise attacks, taking advantage of the relaxing of the enemy's guard. The small type planes will have as their chief duty the thorough patrolling of areas near strategic points and direct escort of convoys. The large type planes, even though slow of movement, can still obtain favorable combat results.

"Patrol must be maintained day and night with as many planes as possible.

"Continuous neutralizing sweeps only show results when there is no let-up during the night. No matter how severely subs may be suppressed during the day, if there are weak points at night it is very easy for enemy subs to flee on the surface."

Tactics for planes directly escorting convoys.

"When direct escort planes sight torpedoes, they will bomb the spot from which the torpedo tracks originate and strafe the torpedoes. Depending on conditions (distance from the ships, number of bombs carried, etc.), the torpedoes may be bombed and a report of this made to the unit under direct escort (escorting vessels).

Patrol altitudes and security.

"Determine the altitude, considering foremost ease in sighting, and secondarily the ease of carrying out bombing and/the possibility of/complications.

"(1). When primarily for visual contact.
"a. Usually 400-800 meters will be suitable.
"b. In darkness it is best/to fly at/about 200 meters.
"c. For confirming/sightings, etc./it is best to fly at about 300 meters

"(2). When using magnetic detector
"Daytime - under 80 meters is best.

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"Night time - 80-100 meters is best.

"When an important escorted convoy is passing it is necessary to report its movements to the forces responsible for the next sector and make sure that there are no gaps in the escort protection.

"In carrying this out, care must be taken that the enemy is not informed of the movements of the convoy.

The lookout.

"The first step which determines the success or failure of attacks on enemy subs is the lookout.

"It is necessary that before boarding/the plane/the sectors of responsibility be determined, and that there be the will to sight the enemy without fail within the field of visibility by an alert lookout at all times.

"Enemy submarines do not give up just because of the presence of a plane overhead. If there is neglect in the lookout, aimless flying or the like, serious results will certainly follow. In all the combat examples relating to the sighting of enemy submarines, one cannot but wonder whether the flight crews put forth serious efforts.

"It is necessary to maintain a strict visual lookout even when using radar, magnetic detectors and the like.

"The magnetic detector is employed especially in cases when the potential submarine area is small, as in the early stages after a sighting, and the like, and the radar is employed especially at night in search of surfaced enemy submarines.

"When it is feared that an enemy submarine has gotten away, it is necessary to intensify direct escort in the area in which it is most probable that the sub is operating or lying submerged, and the area must also be swept. Generally when patrol, direct escort, and attack are incompatible, put emphasis on the attack; and when afraid the enemy has been lost, the emphasis must be shifted to direct escort without loss of time.

Principles of the attack.

"When an enemy sub has been sighted, take care that it is not bombed inaccurately in confusion, and make it a principle not to have to make a second try. When the aim is found correct, all bombs must be dropped in one pass. If they are not, the second attack generally has lost its target due to the sub's diving or there may be no results on single dropping due to fuse failure. When it is clearly recognized that there has been no result, a second attack must be planned.

"However, if circumstances warrant, it may be all right to drop single bombs as signals.

"The results of submarine attacks, even when the bomb lands well, being uncertain

due to frequently having a bad underwater trajectory or exploding at the wrong depth, it is necessary to attack with as many bombs as possible. The underwater trajectory of a bomb is generally uniform to a depth of about 20 meters, but beyond that varies greatly. When there is any suspicion of an enemy sub, unless there is fear of attacking friendly forces, attack and do not spare the bombs.

"Intimidation attacks should be made when the positional error of the enemy sub is within 6000 meters and there is necessity for preventing its raising its periscope and making another attack.

Guiding other planes to the attack.

"The plane which has sighted an enemy submarine will drop target marker bombs so that it does not lose track of it, and guiding other planes by radio, it points the direction of the enemy sub with a small blue flag after bringing them to the position of the enemy sub. Moreover, if necessary, it drops more target marker bombs and carries out bombing operations. It flies, banking toward the true bearing of the enemy sub's position from the bombing splashes and target markers, or reports the bearing and distance by radio.

"The planes being guided will focus their attention on the direction indicated. When the position of enemy sighting or the point of the said direction and distance is an unknown distance, they will bomb a point 50 meters in that direction. If the planes being led do know the position of the enemy sub, when necessary they will approach the guide plane, show a small blue flag and bank.

"When two or more planes have gone into bombing runs at the same time, the one having the higher altitude will give way and begin over again. When the altitude is the same, the one having the companion plane on its right will break off and make a second run.

Cooperation of magnetic detector planes.

To cooperate with magnetic detector planes, the bomber should follow the vectoring bombless plane - but at the same time, the bomber should keep a close visual lookout. (Comment: sic!)

"Method of dropping target bombs.

Number next to circles indicate the order of dropping.




White are dropped according to detector signal.
Green are dropped when the (X) area is reached.

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"When the position of an enemy sub is deduced, drop a smoke bomb as near as possible to that point. Especially are these always to be used when guiding surface craft.

"The attacking planes will watch the above conditions, infer the movements of the enemy, and attack.

Cooperation with surface craft.

"The secret of cooperation is based on mutual understanding. Therefore, we must work for perfection of communications, both visual and wireless, since they are a most important means of establishing understanding.

"In establishing a thorough-going, unobstructed understanding, radio communications must by all means be put to practical use. Even under present conditions, this is never impossible; and, as the actual experience of the YOKOSUKA Air Group clearly shows, if both parties have the proper determination, the desired understanding can be realized.

"Still, when the nature of the present surface craft anti-submarine staff is considered, present development primarily is awaiting vigorous leadership from the aircraft section.

In directing surface craft, remember that they are often not furnished with sonic gear, that their sighting level is restrictive, and that they are slow. Treat them as if blind.

Ordnance and equipment.

"New weapons should be quickly mastered. Before new equipment is received, as much research as possible should be carried out beforehand. Radar, in particular, has revolutionized warfare, and as it is said of old, "Without a rifle, no infantry", so without radar, no war planes. In this our country, since it is in the unfortunate position of having started late in this field, requires the utmost endeavor.

"The No. 6 (132 lb.) bomb has little power, and so if it does not hit directly, it can not cause great damage to the enemy. It is best to use the No. 25 (550 lb.) bomb as much as possible.

"The fuse must be set properly. The depth of explosion of anti-submarine bombs is better deeper, rather than shallower than the enemy's depth. Depending on transparency of the water in the patrol area, the type bomb used, and so on, a suitable fuse timing must be used. Usually the first bomb will be set shallow, and the second and succeeding ones should be set for a deep depth to cope with evasive tactics."

(Comment: The Japanese use time, rather than hydrostatic fuses for anti-sub bombs.)

"Aggressive use of machine guns must be planned, fitting it to the conditions at the time. Although the results of strafing submarines cannot be expected to be

outstanding, by casualties to the officers and other annoyances it can make diving impossible. And it can make the submarine show its position by oil leakage, so the aggressive use of strafing must be kept in mind.

Maintenance.

"The maintenance of aircraft, due to the inadequacies in the supply of materiel, depends in great part on the efforts of the Air Group maintenance crews. For this reason the diligent endeavors of maintenance squad leaders are required."

Confirmation evidence.

"The confirmation of combat results is extremely important for the planning of future attacks.

"Furthermore, since it is not easy because of the peculiar characteristics of submarines and additionally because enemy subs are pulling various sorts of deceptive tricks/confirmation/is becoming more and more difficult.

"Usually, either because the pilot is personally satisfied of the results or dislikes the trouble of continuing, the attack is broken off prematurely. It is easy to let the enemy slip away in the last five minutes so care is necessary.

"When the following phenomena have been noted, consider the sinking confirmed.

"1. Large amounts of oil leakage and leakage of air bubbles for over 10 minutes, or, although the period of leakage of air is short, when a large amount of air is released due to the damage to the inner shell of the hull.

"2. When oil leakage continues over a fortnight.

"3. When parts which are inside the inner shell of the enemy sub which has been destroyed, come to the surface."

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# LONG-SHAFTED ENGINE USED ON JACK

The smoothly streamlined cowling of the new Jap Navy interceptor, JACK, is made possible by the installation of an unusually constructed engine, the long-shafted Kasei 23.

Information on the appearance of this new powerplant is gained from a recently recovered document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,608). Data on its performance has appeared in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 4 and in other publications. Maximum horsepower is 1820 at takeoff.

The extended, Farman-type reduction gearing permits the installation of a highly streamlined cowling and results in a relatively small frontal area. The cooling problem is overcome by the addition of an auxiliary fan, geared to the propeller shaft and turning in the same direction at an increase ratio of 3.18 to 1.

The Kasei 23 engine is the 20-series parallel of the older Kasei 13, which also has a Farman transmission and is similar in appearance but lacking the fan. The 13 does not appear on any currently operational plane, but served its purpose as an experimental fore-runner of the 23.

The Kasei 23 displays several features of German design influence. The cooling fan is similar to that employed on the FW190; in place of a carburetor, it has a wobble-plate fuel injection system with individual injectors for each of its



Kasei 23 engine, used in JACK. Photo from captured document.

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14 cylinders, a development similar to that used on the German BMW801. The same device is used on the Ha 112, Model 2 engine installed in DINAH 3.

This type of fuel system plus the fact that the engine uses 91 octane aviation gas as well as water methanol makes its performance different from that of the Kasei 21. The dry weight of the engine, fully equipped, is 1895.95 lbs.

Of special interest is the duraluminum cooling fan which is mounted on a splined sleeve on the propeller shaft. The fan gearing consists of a set of planets mounted on a plate which is splined to the propeller shaft. These planets mesh with a fixed internal spur gear and rotate the sun gear which turns the cooling fan in the same direction as the propeller.

The sun gear rotates on a sleeve around the propeller shaft in a lead-bronze bearing. It is lubricated by oil under pressure from the propeller shaft. This oil is thrown out from the sun gear and lubricates the entire assembly. The propeller shaft has been lengthened 13.78 inches and the extended reduction gear housing is constructed of a lightweight magnesium alloy.

## NEW ARMY AIR DIVISION

The existence of an 11th Army Air Division is revealed in a Jap address book taken from an Army twin-engined bomber SALLY shot down over SAIPAN on 3 November (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,300). The location of this unit is given as OSAKA, which is also the headquarters of the Central District Army. This association might indicate that the 11th Air Division has been established to control the air defense of the industrial KOBE-OSAKA-NAGOYA area. The date of organization of the 11th Air Division is not given, although the 10th is known from transfer lists to have been organized in JAPAN last March.

An Air Division in the Japanese Army Air Force is a high tactical and administrative command, subordinate only to an Air Army. The 11th Air Division therefore is presumably subordinate to the 1st Air Army at TOKYO, which is the top Army Air Command for the Empire. An Air Division theoretically commands at least two Air Brigades of three Air Regiments each, or about 200 airplanes. However, in practice the strength of Air Divisions has varied widely.

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# JAP AIRFIELD CAMOUFLAGE

Jap use of trees and shrubbery to camouflage planes on the ground is illustrated by photographs of LIPA WEST FIELD on LUZON. Methods used are regarded as fairly successful, since planes are not easily visible from medium altitudes. Note that, contrary to usual Jap practice, netting is not used.



LIPA WEST FIELD's paved runway and trunk taxiways are not successfully toned down and stand out clearly. Smaller loop taxiways, extending 650 yards from the runway, are dirt surfaced and do not stand out as sharply. Revetments, also made of earth, have shrubs growing on them and some have trees within their walls. This prevents sharp contrasts in color or tone in the dispersal areas.

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


Planes in this and the preceding photo are camouflaged by hiding under trees and by tying palm fronds and other foliage to the wings and foliage. In most instances the tail assembly of the plane has been placed between two palms and the plane has been pushed under as far as possible. Protruding engines and noses are well covered with foliage. In a few cases one or two palms have been removed, leaving enough space to push the plane clear under cover. Even when this is done, foliage has been thrown over the plane to prevent its disclosure by outline or reflection.

Planes camouflaged in this way are necessarily located within one plane-length of the edge of the taxiway. In some cases, the best indication of a hidden plane is the shadow of revetment walls showing between the trees.

There are no dummy planes on the field, but dud planes are left in plain view even where they partially block taxiways. No damaged planes appear to be camouflaged, but several apparently operational planes are left in treeless areas, both with and without foliage covering.

(Photographs and interpretation by Second Carrier Task Force).

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# THUMBNAIL BIOGRAPHIES OF JAPANESE AIRCRAFT

## HELEN

(Fourteenth in a series outlining the background of important Japanese Aircraft).

HELEN, the Japanese Army's Type 100 Bomber, has failed to prove in combat the extravagant claims which were made for it at the time of its introduction, but new developments may make it much more formidable.

This aircraft, made by Nakajima, is known to the Japanese as "The Dragon", and was hailed at one time as the plane which would bring the Pacific war to a quick end. However, it has not appeared in substantial quantities and its performance to date has not been outstanding, even though it is among the most heavily armed and armored of Jap bombers.

The original HELEN, Model 1, was powered with 1250 h.p. engines. It was replaced in mid-1943 by a Model 2, with engines of 1450 h.p. Both models are similar in appearance, being distinguished by a built-up wing section between fuselage and nacelles similar to that of the British Mosquito.

There are indications that a Model 3, equipped with engines of more than 2000 h.p. and with greatly improved performance, is under development, but this version has not been definitely identified.



Heavily camouflaged HELEN, under Allied strafing attacks. Photo from AAF, SWPA.

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# PROVISIONAL SKETCH OF GEORGE

Reproduced below are provisional sketches of GEORGE, new Jap Navy interceptor.

This drawing has been synthesized from documentary evidence, POW statements and sketches, and two rough and incomplete drawings found in a captured mimeographed manual.

No positively identifiable pictures of GEORGE are available, and no specimen has been examined in the field. The accompanying sketch is provisional and will be superseded when better information is at hand.

Characteristics on which available information agrees and which are believed quite reliable include the squarish wing and tail tips, blister canopy, airscoop at five o'clock and large spinner.

Both reported variations of armament and wing position are shown.



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# SIDELIGHT ON SUICIDES

A JUDY pilot interrogated by Third Fleet after being shot down in an attack off the PHILIPPINES provides a sidelight on the nature of the so-called "KAMIKAZE Special Assault Force" of suicide divers.

This pilot was a member of 502 Naval Air Group, which he said had been joined with several other groups for operations in the PHILIPPINES. His information is open to question, but he appeared reliable on matters which could be checked.

Quoting the interrogation report:

"POW stated that his unit had become a "suicide" squadron on the 27th of October. The designation as a suicide squad came as a result of the group's commanding officer's request for such designation having been granted by higher authority. The prisoner stated that pilots and other personnel of the group were not questioned as to their desire to become members of a suicide squad.

"He felt that the order to dive on carriers to one's self-destruction was absurd (Bakarashii), but since it was an order he fully intended to carry it out. He did feel that there had been a needless expenditure of life with very little visible success to date. The pilot claimed that he had been given no instruction on the best way to carry out suicidal attacks on carriers; however, he did feel that he would attempt to hit an elevator in that elevators on a carrier were "weak points". At the time he left MABALACAT (his base) there were still 50 members of the suicide squadron alive but very few flyable aircraft were available. (Subsequent strikes on LUZON by our carriers may have cut down this number).

"POW was of the opinion that his unit was the only dive-bomber squadron in the Japanese Navy that had been designated as a suicide squadron; however, he felt that in the event of carrier attacks being launched on JAPAN proper, suicidal attacks in large numbers should be anticipated. POW did not believe green and yellow silk flight clothing reported as having been recovered from the body of a Jap pilot who had made a suicide attack on a U.S. carrier had any special significance.

"POW stated that the lack of aviation gasoline had caused the Japs to cut down on the extent of training, but he had heard of no instances in which offensive missions could not be flown as a result of a lack of AvGas."

POW's belief that his unit was the only one designated as a whole for suicide work coincides with other available evidence. From recent Japanese propaganda broadcasts, it appears that most of the so-called "KAMIKAZE" units are made up more or less extemporaneously of volunteers from various groups acting independently. The "KAMIKAZE" designation appears to be a special mark of distinction applied to any such volunteers, rather than the name of a formal organization.

If true, however, the designation of an entire air group as a suicide unit may mark a significant change in the development of this tactic.

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# JAPS DEVELOP INDO-CHINA

The strategic importance of INDO-CHINA to JAPAN has increased as the position of JAPAN in the PHILIPPINES and her supply line to the EAST INDIES have become more precarious. The limited railroad facilities of the country are being utilized to their fullest extent in an endeavor to find safe supply lines. Her ports, particularly SAIGON and CAM RANH BAY are used for the protection of convoys and as staging points for military operations. As JAPAN's sources of supply on the periphery of her empire are cut off it is to be anticipated that the resources of INDO-CHINA will be increasingly developed.

It is estimated that there are at present no more than 35,000 ground troops permanently stationed in the country, plus approximately 2,000 special Navy Landing Force troops.

There are 64 airfields, ranging from emergency fighter strips to major airports capable of handling Jap bombers. The larger fields, such as those at SAIGON, CAPE ST. JACQUES, TOURANE, CAT BAI and HAIPHONG, function not only as combat and transport plane bases, but also as training centers.

Of the ten seaplane anchorages, the best equipped ones are in the HAIPHONG-HON GAY area, at TOURANE, CAM RANH BAY, and CAPE ST. JACQUES. The air force in INDO-CHINA is believed to consist mainly of float planes and flying boats for convoy coverage and anti-submarine patrol.


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## CAT BAI AIRFIELD



CAT BAI A/F, located 3 miles SE of HAIPHONG, has two intersecting hard surfaced runways and is reported to be a first-class military installation. Included in the facilities are a radio station, repair shops and AA positions. Revetment areas are being extended and an attempt is being made to camouflage the taxiways.

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## HON GAY



HON GAY - the chief coaling port of FRENCH INDO-CHINA, located on the north shore of the Gulf of TONKIN. Facilities include a coal treating plant with steam and electric loading devices, concrete piers and extensive railroad yards.

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## CAM RANH BAY



CAM RANH BAY - one of the finest fleet anchorages in the ORIENT. Affording complete typhoon protection, it was a staging point for Jap troops enroute for the conquest of MALAYA and NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.

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# JAP ORDNANCE VS ALLIED AIRCRAFT

Improvisation in Japanese ordnance to combat strafing Allied planes continues. The latest development - the use of implanted bombs - is described in a report from the Central Pacific dated 23 September 1944 and forwarded by BuOrd.

Selecting the logical paths of approach of low-flying Allied planes on strafing missions, the Japanese had buried the bombs in definite patterns on all sides of the air strip. Particular attention was given to the approaches of revetments and the main parking areas on the field.

Examination of the bombs revealed they were rigged in the following manner.

a). The nose cavity of each bomb was filled with either Composition C or dynamite. About one fourth of the bomb noses were filled with the plastic explosive and the remaining three fourths were filled with dynamite.

b). The explosive was tamped into the nose cavity and electric blasting caps inserted into the explosive.

c). The electric blasting caps were wired in series and had 2 leads running to a dugout. The observer, hidden in the dugout, could detonate the bombs when the strafing planes were immediately over the mined area. Each of the five areas had lead wires running to a separate dugout. The bombs were buried and well concealed with either sod or coconut leaves and would not be visible from the air.

It is interesting to note that the Japs employed no particular type or size bomb for this purpose. Over 150 bombs rigged with electrical detonators and ranging in size from 32 kg. to 250 kg. were rendered safe.

Other instances of Japanese ingenuity in organizing and planning defenses against low-flying aircraft are reported in Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 40, Air Command, Southeast Asia. A brief resume of unorthodox and impromptu defenses encountered by airmen in this theatre includes small arms fire by ground troops, multi-barrelled MG's mounted on trucks and anti-aircraft guns mounted on freight cars.

Among the more ingenious devices employed in the Southwestern Pacific area, was a BETTY (medium bomber) conveniently parked at the end of a runway offering an unusually easy target. Unfortunately machine gun pits containing 20 mm guns had been dug in the shadow of the wings. The attacking fighters received a very warm reception. In other cases of this type, trucks, tanks, huts and barges have been substituted for the BETTY as bait.

Another type of defense against strafing is the use of wires, strung across narrow valleys, between large trees and between small hills on either side of the river. Bridges, railroads and landing strips have been reported as having possible trip-wires either over them or guarding the open approaches.

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Other areas have reported the use of a type of 70-mm mortar. The projectile is reported to burst between 1500 and 2000 feet, ejecting 7 canisters which in turn release parachute-suspended bomb tubes. These take two or three minutes to float to the ground and constitute a definite hazard as they are difficult to see. If contact is made with one of the suspending cords, it causes the bomb to explode with a detonation described as about twice that of a 20-mm shell.

## JAP ANTI-SUBMARINE BOMB

The enemy is having trouble because his anti-submarine bombs ricochet. In the case of their 300-kg. bomb (Type 1, No. 25 bomb, Mark 2, Model 1, Modification 1) the Japs have attempted to correct this with an anti-ricochet nose attachment. Photographs of an altered bomb captured on GUAM and examined by MEIU No. 4 show the steel cylinder which is secured to the nose of the bomb by welding. This type of alteration should prove reasonably effective.



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**WEEKLY COVERAGE REPORT**

Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to and including 1 December 1944

* PRINTS ONLY RECEIVED
** SORTIES DISTRIBUTED

**JAPAN**

**Kyushu:** Good vertical partial coverage of Sasebo and Nagasaki.

| V/O | F. L. | Alt. | Sortie No. | Jiopos # | Date Taken |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | 154.9 mm | 32,500' | M10/25B-21P | 9223-41 | 10/31** |

**CHINA:** Good split-vertical and vertical coverage of areas indicated.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | 152.6 mm | 20,000' | M27-14FL | 9240-153 | 9/29 |
| V | 6" | 32,600' | M13/SC-21FS (Amoy A/D) | 9230-222 | 1/23 |
| V | 24" | 32,600' | M13/SC-21FS (Amoy A/D) | 9231-223 | 1/23 |
| V | 6" | 25,450' | M11/SC-21FS (Amoy Is.) | 9230-224 | 11/7 |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 25,450' | M11/SC-21FS (Amoy Is.) | 9231-225<br>9232-225 | 11/7 |
| V | 6" | 29,300' | M7/2-9FS-41 (Shanghai) | 9237-226 | 7/12 |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 20,000' | AM3-24CM (Amoy Vic. to W. of Chelin) | 9241-227<br>9242-227 | 8/8** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 20,000' | AM3-24CM (Linyung to Shalung) | 9249-228<br>9250-228 | 8/8** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 20,000' | AM3-24CM (Chinhanchi to Sanlui Vic.) | 9251-229<br>9252-229<br>9253-229<br>9254-229 | 8/8** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 20,000' | AM3-24CM (Changtung to S. of Paotai) | 9255-230<br>9256-230<br>9257-230<br>9258-230 | 8/8** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 20,000' | AM3-24CM (Santow to Amoy Vic.) | 9259-231<br>9260-231<br>9261-231<br>9262-231 | 8/8** |
| V | 24" | 7,300' | 21FB-4MR201 (Sanchiosse - Swelimg Lisc Area) | 9265-232 | 9/21** |
| V | 24" | 9,000' | 21FB-4MR201 (Tanganbsian) | 9266-233 | 9/21** |
| V | 24" | 14,000' | 21FB-4MR201 (Chiting) | 9267-234 | 9/21** |
| Spf Vert. | 24" | 20,000' | 24CM-4MA1 (Samya to Saikiao) | 9314-235<br>9315-235 | 7/27** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 20,000' | 24CM-4MA1 (Tantian to Kwanyinting) | 9316-236<br>9317-236 | 7/27** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 20,000' | 24CM-4MA1 (SW Baoshan N Pingtan) | 9318-237<br>9319-237 | 7/28** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 20,000' | 24CM-4MA1 (N Pingtan to SE Santo to Lieta) | 9320-238<br>9321-238 | 7/28** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 20,000' | 24CM-4MA1 (Lieta to S of Poochow) | 9322-239<br>9323-239 | 7/28** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 20,000' | 24CM-4MA1 (S Poochow to N Kingsu) | 9324-240<br>9325-240 | 7/28** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 20,000' | 24CM-4MA1 (N Kingsu to Wulchowshang) | 9326-241<br>9327-241 | 7/28** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 20,000' | 24CM-4MA1 (Lischow to Swelim) | 9328-242<br>9329-242 | 7/25** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 18,500' | 24CM-4MA2 (Kitung to S Mi W Sungki) | 9347-243<br>9348-243 | 8/7** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 18,500' | 24CM-4MA2 (S Mi W Sungki to Kumotow) | 9349-244<br>9350-244<br>9351-244<br>9352-244 | 8/7** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 18,500' | 24CM-4MA2 (Linyung to Paiskih) | 9353-245<br>9354-245<br>9355-245<br>9356-245 | 8/7** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 18,500' | 24CM-4MA2 (6 Mi S Siacum to 10 Mi SE Kumotow - 10 Mi W Kumotow to Kaoccasha) | 9357-246<br>9358-246 | 8/7** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 18,500' | 24CM-4MA2 (8 Mi NW Julian to Changyang) | 9359-247<br>9360-247 | 8/7** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 18,500' | 24CM-4MA2 (Pengwei to Amoy) | 9361-248<br>9362-248 | 8/7** |
| V | 24" | 18,500' | 24CM-4MA2 (Amoy to Paisuiying) | 9363-249 | 8/7** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 20,000' | 24CM-4M9-21A (26° 50' N, 117° 57' E to 26° 50' N, 119° 24' E) | 9395-250<br>9396-250 | 9/16** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 20,000' | 24CM-4M9-21A (24° 50' N, 118° 10' E to 25° 42' N, 118° 53' E) | 9397-251<br>9398-251 | 9/17** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 20,000' | 24CM-4M9-21B (25° 48' N, 118° 59' E to 26° 20' N, 119° 29' E) | 9399-252<br>9400-252 | 9/17** |
| V | 24" | 30,000' | 21FB-4MR21 (Canton, White Cloud & Tienho A/Ds) | 9493-277 | 3/13** |
| V | 24" | 30,000' | 21FB-4MR21 (Shampoa Docks) | 9494-278 | 3/13** |
| V | 24" | 30,000' | 21FB-4MR21 (Kowloon and (Hongkong) | 9495-279 | 3/13** |

**BOMB GROUP - Sampo Shoto**

**Chichi Jima:** Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing bomb damage.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | 24" | 17,000' | C-810-26BS-4-11-65 | 9401-184 | 11/2** |
| V | 24" | 17,000' | B-933-26BS-4-11-65 | 9402-185 | 11/2** |
| V | 12" | 17,000' | A-002-26BS-4-11-65 | 9403-186 | 11/2** |
| V | 24" | 18,500' | A-974-38BS-4MJO-71 | 9404-187 | 11/24** |
| V | 24" | 18,500' | B-973-38BS-4MJO-71 | 9405-188 | 11/24** |
| V | 20" | 19,450' | C-617-38BS-4MJO-71 | 9406-189 | 11/24** |
| O | 6 3/8" | 200' | A-682-42BS | 9407-190 | 11/17** |
| O | 6 3/8" | 200' | B-662-42BS | 9408-191 | 11/17** |
| O | 6 3/8" | 200' | C-327-42BS | 9409-192 | 11/17 |
| V | 24" | 18,900' | A-526-81BS-4MJO-71 | 9454-193 | 11/24** |
| V | 24" | 17,500' | C-674-81BS-4MJO-71 | 9455-194 | 11/24 |
| V | 12" | 17,500' | D-527-81BS-4MJO-71 | 9456-195 | 11/24** |
| V | 24" | 16,000' | A-873-98BS-11-65-7BC | 9457-196 | 11/23** |
| V | 12" | 17,000' | B-876-98BS-11-65-7BC | 9458-197 | 11/23** |
| V | 24" | 17,000' | C-951-98BS-11-65-7BC | 9459-198 | 11/23** |
| O | 12" | 200' | A-016-43JBS-4-11-64 | 9474-199 | 11/2** |
| V | 40" | 20,000' | VD5-1A | 9475-200 | 11/25** |
| V | 40" | 20,000' | VD5-1C | 9476-201 | 11/25** |
| V | 40" | 20,000' | VD5-1E | 9477-202 | 11/25** |
| V | 24" | 20,000' | VD5-1F | 9478-203 | 11/25** |
| V | 24" | 20,000' | VD5-1G | 9479-204 | 11/25** |
| V | 24" | 20,000' | VD5-1H | 9480-205 | 11/25** |

**Haha Jima:** Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing bomb damage.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | 12" | 11,720' | A-848-38BS-4MJO-55 | 9193-71 | 11/8** |
| O | 12" | 12,725' | A-491-98BS-7BC | 9194-72 | 11/9** |
| O | 24" | 12,750' | B-951-98BS-7BC | 9195-73 | 11/9** |
| V | 12" | 13,000' | A-153-43JBS-47 | 9196-74 | 11/9** |
| V | 24" | 16,500' | A-621-81BS-4MJO-53 | 9197-75 | 11/6 |
| O | 6 3/8" | | No data | 9198-76 | |
| O | 12" | 200' | A-016-43JBS-4-11-64 | 9471-77 | 11/2** |
| V | 24" | 14,500' | B-223-43JBS-4-11-61 | 9472-78 | 11/21** |
| V | 12" | 11,400' | B-683-81BS-4MJO-71 | 9473-79 | 11/24** |
| V | 12" | 14,000' | A-016-43JBS-4-11-64 | 9470-80 | 11/2** |
| V | 40" | 20,000' | VD5-2A | 9481-81 | 11/25** |
| V | 24" | 20,000' | VD5-2E | 9482-82 | 11/25** |

**Kishino Shima:** Distant oblique partial coverage.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | VB102-1E | 9216-6 | 11/7** |

**KAIAR GROUP - Sampo Shoto**

**Iwo Jima:** Good vertical partial coverage of island in color.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | 24" | 20,000' | VD4-97 | 9219-261 | 11/19 |
| V | 24" | 20,000' | VD4-97 | 9220-262 | 11/19 |
| V | 24" | 20,000' | VD4-97 | 9221-263 | 11/19 |
| V | 24" | 20,000' | VD4-97 | 92[illegible]-264 | 11/19 |

**MARCUS - Sampo Shoto - Good complete vertical coverage.**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V | 24" | 17,000' | A-880-26BS | 9199-36 | 11/7** |
| V | 12" | 13,300' | A-998-39ZBS-4MJO-55 | 9200-37 | 11/9** |
| V | 24" | 18,000' | A-846-98BS-7BC | 9201-38 | 11/7 |

**PHILLIPINE ISLANDS**

**Cebu:** Good trimetrogon partial coverage.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tri Met. | 6" | 13,500' | Essex-131 (V)<br>Essex-131 (P)<br>Essex-131 (S) | 9213-83<br>9214-83<br>9215-83 | 9/13** |

**Negros:** Good trimetrogon partial coverage.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tri Met. | 6" | 13,500' | Essex-131 (V)<br>Essex-131 (P)<br>Essex-131 (S) | 9210-65<br>9211-65<br>9212-65 | 9/13** |

**Luzon:** Good split-vertical and oblique coverage of areas indicated.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Split Vert. | 24" | Var | CV16-2652 (Manila)<br>CV16-2653 | 9263-132<br>9264-132 | 11/5** |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | Tico-5 (Manila) | 9268-133 | 11/5** |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | Tico-6 (Manila) | 9269-134 | 11/5** |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | Tico-7 (Manila) | 9270-135 | 11/5** |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | Tico-8 (Manila) | 9271-136 | 11/5** |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | Tico-9 (Manila) | 9272-137 | 11/5** |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | Tico-10 (Manila) | 9273-138 | 11/5** |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | Tico-11 (Manila) | 9274-139 | 11/5** |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | Tico-12 (Manila) | 9275-140 | 11/5** |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | Tico-14 (Manila) | 9276-141 | 11/5** |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | Tico-15 (Manila) | 9277-142 | 11/5** |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | Tico-16 (Manila) | 9278-143 | 11/5** |
| O | 8 1/4" | Var | Tico-17 (Manila) | 9279-144 | 11/6** |

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| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | CV11-125 (North Tip) | 9280-145 | 10/18** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | CV11-111 (North Tip) | 9281-146 | 10/18** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | CV11-1 (North Tip) | 9282-147 | 10/18** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | CV11-114 (North Tip) | 9283-148 | 10/18** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | CV11-126 (North Tip) | 9284-149 | 10/18** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | CV11-113 (North Tip) | 9285-150 | 10/18** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | CV11-107 (North Tip) | 9286-151 | 10/18** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | CV11-112 (North Tip) | 9287-152 | 10/18** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | Frank-149 (Manila Bay) | 9288-153 | 10/18** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | CV127-201 (Manila Bay) | 9289-154 | 11/6** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | CV127-196 (Manila Bay) | 9290-155 | 11/5** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | CV127-198 (Manila Bay) | 9291-156 | 11/5** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | CV127-202 (Manila Bay) | 9292-157 | 11/6** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | CV127-197 (Manila Bay) | 9293-158 | 11/5** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | CV127-199 (Manila Bay) | 9294-159 | 11/5** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | CV16-2649 (Manila Bay) | 9295-160 | 11/5** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | CV16-2651 (Manila Bay) | 9296-161 | 11/5** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | BDXL-366 | 9297-162 | 10/18** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | BDXL-367 | 9298-163 | 10/18** | |
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | BDXL-368 | 9299-164 | 10/18** | |

**FORMOSA:** Good split-vertical coverage of areas indicated.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Split Vert. | 24" | 30,000' | 21FM-AMB16) (Takao A/D & Docks) | 9243-339 9244-339 | 9/12** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 29,800' | 21FM-AMB16) (Sinsaku A/F) | 9245-340 9246-340 | 9/12** |
| Split Vert. | 24" | 29,500' | 21FM-AMB16) (Taito A/D) | 9247-341 9248-341 | 9/12** |

**MALAY STATES:** Good vertical coverage of Singapore.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Y | 24" | 22,070' | (44ABG)(AMB15)(444-AC352) | 9340-2 | 11/5** |
| Y | 24" | 21,500' | (46ABG)(AMB15)(462-AC375) | 9341-3 | 11/5** |
| Y | 12" | 22,900' | (44ABG)(AMB15)(444-AC392) | 9342-4 | 11/5** |
| Y | 12" | 21,000' | (44ABG)(AMB15)(444-AC411) | 9343-5 | 11/5** |
| Y | 24" | 22,000' | (44ABG)(AMB15)(444-AC384) | 9344-6 | 11/5** |
| Y | 24" | 22,300' | (44ABG)(AMB15)(444-AC485) | 9345-7 | 11/5** |
| Y | 24" | 22,300' | (44ABG)(AMB15)(444-AC439) | 9346-8 | 11/5** |
| Y | 24" | 21,300' | (46ABG)(AMB15)(462-AC382) | 9347-9 | 11/5** |
| Y | 24" | 21,300' | (46ABG)(AMB15)(462-AC521) | 9348-10 | 11/5** |

**BURMA:** Good vertical coverage of areas indicated.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | (Rangoon) | | |
| Y | 24" | 24,000' | (46ABG)(AMB14)(462-AC-581) | 9366-3 | 11/3** |
| Y | | | (46ABG)(AMB14)(462-AC329) | 9367-4 | 11/3** |
| Y | | | (46ABG)(AMB14)(462-AC479) | 9368-5 | 11/3** |
| Y | 12" | 21,400' | (46ABG)(AMB15)(462-AC479) | 9369-6 | 11/5** |
| Y | 40" | 23,500 | (46ABG)(AMB13)(462-AC446) | 9370-7 | 11/3** |
| Y | | | (46ABG)(AMB14)(462-AC475) | 9371-8 | 11/3** |
| Y | 24" | 23,500' | (46ABG)(AMB14)(462-AC463) | 9372-9 | 11/3** |
| Y | 24" | 22,000' | (46ABG)(AMB14)(462-AC461) | 9372-10 | 11/3** |
| Y | 24" | | (46ABG)(AMB14)(462-AC508) | 9373-11 | 11/3** |
| Y | 24" | 22,000' | (44ABG)(AMB14)(444-AC485) | 9374-12 | 11/3** |
| Y | 24" | 22,000' | (44ABG)(AMB14)(444-AC439) | 9375-13 | 11/3** |
| Y | 24" | 22,000' | (44ABG)(AMB14)(444-AC580) | 9376-14 | 11/3** |
| Y | 40" | 22,000' | (44ABG)(AMB14)(444-AC524) | 9377-15 | 11/3** |
| Y | | 22,000' | (44ABG)(AMB14)(444-AC411) | 9378-16 | 11/3** |
| Y | 24" | 21,000' | (14FL)(AMB14)(468-AC525) | 9379-17 | 11/3** |
| Y | 24" | 21,400' | (14FL)(AMB14)(468-AC494) | 9380-18 | 11/3** |
| Y | 12" | 21,500' | (14FL)(AMB14)(468-AC546) | 9381-19 | 11/3** |
| Y | 40" | 21,200' | (14FL)(AMB14)(468-AC469) | 9382-20 | 11/3** |
| Y | 24" | 21,000' | (11FL)(AMB14)(40-AC508) | 9383-21 | 11/3** |
| Y | 12" | 20,500' | (11FL)(AMB14)(40-AC452) | 9384-22 | 11/3** |
| Y | 12" | 21,000' | (11FL)(AMB14)(40-AC574) | 9385-23 | 11/3** |
| Y | 12" | 20,800' | (11FL)(AMB14)(40-AC541) | 9386-24 | 11/3** |
| | | | (Taungup) | | |
| Y | 12" | 16,500' | (44ABG)(AMB14)(444-AC202) | 9387-25 | 11/3** |

**SUMATRA:** Good vertical coverage of area indicated.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Y | 24" | 21,300' | (44ABG)(AMB15)(444-AC580) (Pangalan Brandan) | 9388-4 | 11/5** |

**CAROLINE ISLANDS**

**Palau:** Good vertical and oblique coverage of areas indicated.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Y | 24" | 14,800' | 28FRAME77-1 (Babelthuap A/F) | 9421-475 | 11/1 |
| Y | 40" | 14,000' | 28FRAME90-1 (Babelthuap A/F) | 9422-476 | 11/5 |
| Y | 40" | 13,000' | 28FRAME94-1 (Babelthuap A/F) | 9423-477 | 11/9 |
| Y | 24" | 12,000' | 28FRAME82-1 (Central Harbor Area) | 9424-478 | 11/3 |
| Y | 6" | 2,500' | 28FRAMEC97-1 (Ngeregon Is) | 9425-479 | 11/10 |
| Y | 40" | 15,000' | 28FRAME95-1 (Urukthapel Is) | 9426-480 | 11/9 |
| Y | 40" | 14,000' | 28FRAME88-1 | 9427-481 | 11/5 |
| Y | 40" | 10,000' | 28FRAME118-1 (Urukthapel Is) | 9428-482 | 11/15 |
| O | 12" | 500' | 28FRAEC97-2 (Ngeregong Is) | 9429-483 | 11/10 |
| Y | 40" | 14,000' | 28FRAME94-1 (Koror Is) | 9430-484 | 11/9 |
| Y | 40" | 16,000' | 28FRAME83-1 (Koror Is) | 9431-485 | 11/3 |
| Y | 40" | 14,000' | 28FRAEC110-1 (Eylanik Is) | 9432-486 | 11/10 |
| O | 12" | 50' | 28FRAME81-1 (Ngargol Is) | 9433-487 | 11/2 |
| O | 6 3/8" | | VFB117 | 9434-488 | 11/27 |

**Ponape:** Good vertical and oblique partial coverage.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| O | 6 3/8" | 1,700' | MAC22-VXP-422-8 | 9311-596 | 11/22 |
| O | 6 3/8" | 1,000' | MAC22-8A-68 | 9312-597 | 11/22 |
| O | 6 3/8" | 15,000' | MAC22-VXP-113-8 | 9313-598 | 11/22 |
| Y | 20" | 10,000' | MAC22-7 | 9444-599 | 11/12 |

**Palau Annex:** Good vertical partial coverage.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Y | 40" | 5,000' | 28FRAME70-1 | 9235-6 | 10/30 |

**Somesrol:** Good vertical and oblique partial coverage.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Y | 40" | 5,000' | 28FRAME70-1 | 9228-3 | 10/30** |
| O | 12" | 50' | 28FRAME70-3 | 9229-4 | 10/30** |

**Truk:** Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing bomb damage in airfield areas.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Y | 12" | 19,300' | A-236-27RS-AM30-70 | 9445-596 | 11/22 |
| Y | 12" | 19,400' | B-151-27RS-AM30-70 | 9446-597 | 11/22 |
| Y | 12" | 18,200' | C-435-27RS-AM30-70 | 9447-598 | 11/22 |
| O | 6 3/8" | 18,800' | D-633-27RS-AM30-70 | 9448-599 | 11/22 |
| Y | 24" | 18,000' | E-810-27RS-AM30-70 | 9449-600 | 11/22 |
| Y | 24" | 18,000' | A-425-39ZRS-AM30-70 | 9450-601 | 11/22 |
| Y | 12" | 18,200' | B-438-39ZRS-AM30-70 | 9451-602 | 11/22 |
| Y | 12" | 17,600' | C-358-39ZRS-AM30-70 | 9452-603 | 11/22 |
| O | 6 3/8" | 17,600' | D-358-39ZRS-AM30-70 | 9453-604 | 11/22 |

**MARIANAS**

**Aguijan:** Good oblique partial coverage.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | VB117-23 | 9218-30 | 11/15** |

**Paralleo De Medinilla:** Good complete vertical coverage.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Y | 24" | 13,000' | B-832-26RS | 9469-6 | 11/[illegible] |

**Guguan:** Good complete vertical coverage.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Y | 24" | 10,000' | 28FRAMC168-1 | 9223-6 | 11/14** |

**Pagan:** Good oblique partial coverage.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | VB117-22A | 9227-134 | 11/14 |

**Rota:** Good vertical and oblique partial coverage.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Y | 12" | 3,000' | 28FRAMC167-1 | 9236-185 | 11/14** |
| O | 12" | 50' | 28FRAMC169-1 | 9238-186 | 11/16** |
| O | 12" | 75' | 28FRAMC170-1 | 9496-187 | 11/16** |

**Saipan:** Good oblique partial coverage.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | VB117-22 | 9224-8 | 11/14 |

**Realandria Park:** Good oblique shot.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| O | 6 3/8" | Var | VB117-22B | 9226-1 | 11/14 |

CONFIDENTIAL

# LUZON AIRFIELDS

These photos, taken by carrier-based planes, are representative of the Jap-held airfields encountered by our aircraft on recent strikes against LUZON.


An example of the concentration of Jap fields in the vicinity of MANILA. Five of the six CLARK landing grounds are visible; the sixth is hidden by the cloud in upper right. Center - the four ANGELES airfields.

CONFIDENTIAL



GRACE PARK Airfield, located in the northern part of MANILA, is a fighter field. The new runway is concrete, however, the old runways outlined above are not paved and are believed unserviceable.

Page 60

CONFIDENTIAL




LEGASPI Airfield, situated 1½ miles north of LEGASPI Town, is a medium bomber field with an improved runway. Note bomb crater, fallen trees and debris in foreground - the result of one of our recent strikes.

Page 61

CONFIDENTIAL


Fort STOTSENBURG, former American Army Headquarters, now believed to be a Japanese Garrison Headquarters at least partly responsible for the defense of the many airfields in this area.

Page 62

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #17
(PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF ORIGINAL JAPANESE DOCUMENT
CAPTUTED BY U S MARINES
AT SAIPAN DURING JUNE 1944
CONTAINING
MATERIAL PERTINENT TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
CONSISTING OF
NOTES ON FUELING AT SEA
/FUELING AT SEA OF PEARL HARBOR STRIKING FORCE/)
ENTITLED
"BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

The pertinent material in this SOURCE DOCUMENT is embraced in the translations stated in SOURCE DOCUMENTS Nos. 14 and 15 (supra), which were used by the Navy in compiling said Navy Summary of the "Japanese Plan for the Attack on Pearl Harbor."

79716 O—46—pt. 13——26



| 配布先 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 軍令部 | 一〇 | 防備隊 | 各一 | 聯合航空總隊 | 二 |
| 海軍省 | 一〇 | 工廠 | 各五 | 航空隊 | 各一 |
| 艦政本部 | 一〇 | 航空技術廠 | 四 | 海軍潛水艦部 | 一 |
| 航空本部 | 五 | 航空廠 | 各二 | 潛水艦基地隊 | 各一 |
| 施設本部 | 五 | 燃料廠 | 各二 | 根據地隊 | 各一 |
| 海軍運輸本部 | 五 | 港務部 | 各一 | 特別根據地隊 | 各一 |
| 水路部 | 二 | 運輸部 | 各一 | 學校 | 各一 |
| 技術研究所 | 一 | 軍需部 | 各五 | 艦隊司令部 | 各一 |
| 横須賀鎮守府 | 四 | 海軍病院 | 各二 | 戰隊司令部 | 各一 |
| 吳、佐、舞鎮 | 各二 | 經理部 | 各一 | 戰訓分科會 | 各一 |
| 警備府 | 各一 | 建築部 | 各一 | 發行廳保管 | |



2



































2

[illegible]

(2) 現在（[illegible]）ニ於テハ飛行機ノ
更新大中隊及其ノ可能ニシテ
[illegible]内地ヨリ供給スル容易ナラザル
[illegible]故ニ今日ノ戦況ニ鑑ミ
等ニ不安大ナリ

(IAF IAP 75)

(35)

(3) 戦地ニ於ケル海軍兵隊事制ハ
[illegible]外ニ根據地設営及地等ノ事
制ハ支部（略称）ノ受量ニ内
地補給ニ頼ル者多キ故（一二月
[illegible]ノ試ヲ顧ルト同時ニ
[illegible]部隊移動ニ[illegible]
能ク防止スル要アリ

（各国）

(4) 移動[illegible]ヲ以テ新造国[illegible]

27



4

原油及支援ヲ現地適當ナル地ニ
投ジルヲ要ス

（高雄）

現地ニ於テ要ス
（各地）



第三

現地調査品ノ補給ニ関スル件








補給
補給艦相互間
補給艦隊
補給部隊
35

補給（所見）

重油ノ洋上補給ニ関シ我上主意充記材茶ノ情況ヲ要ス

（既ニ補給記録ノ各艦船ノ報告ヲ備フルコト）

（補給所要時間ノ延長ノ為艦力各時ノ補給能力ヲ備フルコト）

我海面ノ状況（理由）

（作戦海面ノ状況ハ重油ノ補給不可能ナル場合多シ）

（艦船ノ各時重油受入能力及大艦ヨリ小艦ヘ移乗ノ重油供給能力不充分ナリ）

（各艦）

何レモ三ノ艦ノ身程度情況ヲ要ス

（35）

35間我ノ米約一年間ノ補給回数及補給量

給油船ノ数量及補給量

| 給油船 | 数量 | 補給量 |
|---|---|---|
| 給油船 | 八回 | 五回 |
| 給油船 | 三回 | 三回 |

物資ノ回復ノ為ノ艦ノ出港ノ日数ハ一九四二年ノ場合ノ一二時間ノ要







| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 補助艦ハ[illegible]種別ヲ明示セル[illegible]ノ清時掃掃スルヲ要トス | 一見セル補給艦ノ種別ヲ別知ル[illegible]標識ヲ先ヲ付スルヲ要ス 給油船ト誤リ搭載機ヲ[illegible]ルコトアリ (95) | 要 |
| 2 | 艦隊ニ随伴シ[illegible]ノ場合ハ給油船トシテハ力ノ優速船ヲ撰ブヲ要アリ | (イ)航空基地移動用ハ高速中型船ヲ用フル要アリ (下ノ2) (ロ)一般ニ南方海面ニ於テハ小型優速船ノ利用適但船ノ大アリ (185 五ノ他) | 制 |
| | | (イ)艦隊ニ随伴シ現状ノ十五節ニテハ困難アリ 給油船ノ実速満載時二十節ヲ要ス (使洋丸) | 理由 |
| | | (イ)兵装艦ヲ衰弱セシムルヲ以テ強化スルヲ要ス (185) (ロ)通信兵器強化ノ為本俗ニシテ行動指示上不便アリ (下) | |

40






















諸給與及見地門五九船休戦關
蘇聯邦政府等ノ改善事項















DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #18
(PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF ORIGINAL JAPANESE DOCUMENT
CAPTURED BY U S NAVY
AT MANILA FROM THE JAPANESE CRUISER NACHI ON 1 APRIL 1945
CONTAINING ON PAGES 2-1 THROUGH 2-152 ONLY
MATERIAL PERTINENT (OTHER PAGES NOT BEING PERTINENT)
TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
CONSISTING OF
PLANS AND ORDERS FOR COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES
ENTITLED
"TOP SECRET COMBINED FLEET OPERATION ORDER #1
and
TOP SECRET COMBINED FLEET OPERATION ORDER #2"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

The material in this SOURCE DOCUMENT is embraced in the translations stated in SOURCE DOCUMENTS Nos. 1 and 2 (supra), which were used by the Navy in compiling said Navy Summary of the "Japanese Plan for the Attack on Pearl Harbor."



TOP SECRET

# TOP SECRET

# DOCUMENT NO. 2

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

聯合艦隊司令長官ヨリ不五十六

聯合艦隊命令

對米英蘭戰爭ニ於ケル聯合艦隊ノ作戰ニ
別冊ニ依リ之ヲ實施スベシ

聯合艦隊命令作戰第一號別冊

第一章 米英蘭戰爭ニ於ケル聯合艦隊ノ作戰

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第七章　補給
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第三節 支那方面艦隊ノ作戰

第九章 海軍ノ協定（別冊）

第三編 [illegible]ノ戰ニ[illegible]國ト開戰スル場合ノ作戰

第一章 [illegible]方針

第二章 兵力部署

第三章 聯合艦隊以外ノ作戰

第一節 台灣守府要港部部隊ノ作戰

第二節 支那方面艦隊ノ作戰

第三編 雜則

第一章 使用時

第二章 使用海圖

第三章 敵味方識別

（終）

第一編　對支作戰ヨリ米國英國及蘭國ト
開戰スル場合ノ聯合艦隊作戰

第一章　作戰要綱

一、東方ニ對シテハ米國艦隊ヲ擊破シ且東洋ニ對スル米國ノ作戰線及補給線ヲ遮斷ス

二、西方ニ對シテハ英領馬來方面ヲ攻略シ英國ノ東洋ニ對スル作戰線、補給線及「ビルマルート」ヲ遮斷ス

三、在東洋敵兵力ヲ擊滅シ其ノ作戰據點ヲ奪フト共ニ資源地ヲ獲得ス

四、要地ヲ攻略擴大、防備ヲ強化シテ持久作戰態勢ヲ確保ス

五、敵兵力ヲ邀擊撃滅ス

六、戰果ヲ擴大シ敵ノ戰意ヲ奪フ

第二章　開戰準備及開戰

第一節　開戰準備

一、帝國ヲ米國英國及蘭國ニ對シ開戰ヲ豫期シ諸般ノ作戰準備ヲ完成スルニ決シタル場合ハ開戰概定期日（丁日）ト共ニ「第一開戰準備」ヲ下令ス、各部隊ハ左ニ依リ行動ス

(1) 各艦隊部隊ハ特令ナクシテ第一段作戰第一

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

第三節 開戦及開戦前ノ武力行使

一 開戦時機ハ大命ニ依ル開戦日（X日）ハ数日前

[illegible]）ヲ以テ示ス

Y日[illegible]

[illegible]

二 [illegible]

[illegible]

三 [illegible]

[illegible] X日

[illegible]

(ロ) X日発令以[illegible]ニ於テ[illegible]直

チニ開戦状態ニ入リ作戦ヲ開始ス

(ハ) X日発令以前ニ於テハ大命ニ依リ開戦ス

三 「第三開戦準備」下令後ハ已ムヲ得ザル場合

左ニ依リ武力ヲ行使スルコトヲ得

(イ) 米国英国又ハ蘭国ノ艦船航空機我領海

附近ニ近接シ其ノ行動我ヲ危険ナラシムル[illegible]

認メタル場合

(ロ) 我領海附近以外ニ於テモ[illegible]ヲ

危険ナラシムルガ如キ[illegible]国軍ノ積極

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

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(四)前項作戦ノ成果ヲ待チテ陸軍攻略兵團ノ主力ヲ菲律賓及英領馬來ニ上陸セシメ速ニ菲律賓及英領馬來ヲ攻略ス

(五)作戦初期ニ於テ蘭領「ボルネオ」南部「スマトラ」ノ要地ヲ又機ノ見テ「モルッカ」諸島「チモール」島ノ要地ヲ占領シ所要ノ航空基地ヲ整備ス

(六)前項ノ航空基地整備次第逐次航空部隊ヲ推進シテ爪哇方面敵航空兵力ヲ制圧シ爪哇ノ反抗ノ待チテ陸軍攻略兵團ノ上陸ヲ



八

爪哇ニ上陸セシメ同島ヲ攻略ス

(七)新嘉坡攻略後北部「スマトラ」ノ要域ヲ占領シ又敵ノ對支補給路遮断ノ目的ヲ以テ適時緬甸ニ對シ作戦ス

三、米國艦隊來攻スル場合ハ一時南方作戦ハ第三艦隊ノ一部ヲ以テ之ニ対シ決戦ヲ実施シ決戦兵力ノ大部ハ邀撃作戦ヲ實施ス

四、聯合艦隊ノ一部ノ兵ニ成宜太平洋及印度洋方面ニ於ケル敵海上交通ヲ破壊ス

五、泰國及佛領印度支那ニ對シテハ極力彼ノ敵

意ヲ挑發セザル如クシ我作戰ニ隨意セシムルニ努ムルモ其ノ敵對行動ヲ認メタル場合ハ武力ヲ以テ作戰ノ障害ヲ排除ス

第二節　對米國艦隊作戰要領

對米國艦隊作戰理論及作戰要領左ノ通定ム

各部隊ハ指示作戰種別ニ應ズル如ク作戰ス

| 開戰時 | |
|---|---|
| 對米國戰隊 | 一、先遣部隊ハ米國艦隊ヲ監視奇襲攻撃ス<br>情況ニ依リ機宜ノ兵力ヲ以テ「バウラニド」島ヲ |

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| 作戰第二法 | 第三法 | 第四法 |
|---|---|---|
| 機動部隊ハ米國艦隊ヲ攻撃ス | 對米國艦隊作戰 | 對米國艦隊作戰 |
| 一、先遣部隊 機動部隊 南洋部隊 北方部隊ハ米國機動部隊ニ對シ作戰ス<br>二、主力部隊ハ所要ニ應ジ之ヲ支援ス<br>三、情況ニ依リ第二航空艦隊ノ一部ヲ一時東方ニ転用スルコトアリ | 一、遣撃部隊 機動部隊 南洋部隊 北方部隊 主力部隊ハ米國艦隊ニ對シ作戰シ南方部隊中ノ決戰兵力ハ速ニ遣撃作戰ニ加入ス<br>二、南方作戰ハ第三艦隊 南遣艦隊 第二航空艦隊ノ戰闘機等ヲ以テ之ヲ遂行ス | 一、遣撃部隊ハ米國艦隊ヲ攻撃ス<br>二、機動部隊ハ米國艦隊ニ備フ |

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第三節　南方作戰要領

南方作戰ハ作戰方針及艦隊司令長官南方軍總司令官間協定ニ基キ特令スルモノヲ除ク外南方部隊指揮官之ヲ實施ス

第四節 作戰期別

第一段作戰ヲ左ノ通區分シ其ノ變換ハ特令ス

一 第一期作戰

開戰ヨリ概ネ菲律賓攻略陸軍主力上陸完了迄ノ作戰

二 第二期作戰

第一期作戰後ヨリ概ネ英領馬來攻略陸軍主力上陸完了迄ノ作戰

三 第三期作戰

第二期作戰後ヨリ蘭印攻略作戰一段落迄ノ作戰

第五節 兵力部署

第一段作戰ニ兵力部署左ノ通定ム

一 第一期作戰兵力部署 別表第一

二 第二期作戰兵力部署 別表第二

三 第三期作戰兵力部署 別表第三

四 變換後作戰兵力部署 別表第四

# 第四章 第二段作戦

## 第一節 作戦方針

一、米国及英国艦隊ニ対シ先遣部隊等ヲ以テ監視奇襲ヲ継続シ好機基地航空部隊母艦航空部隊等ヲ以テ攻撃ス

二、米國及英國ノ東洋ニ對スル作戦線及補給線ノ確保ニ遮断シ要地ノ防備ヲ強化ス

三、蘭領海面内敵兵力及攻略要地ノ殘敵ヲ掃滅シ資源ヲ確保シ海上交通ヲ保護ス

四、米國及英國艦隊來攻セバ内線ノ利ヲ占メ各個ニ撃破ス

五、對米國、英國海上交通破壞作戦ヲ強化ス

## 第二節 占領地域中防備スベキ重要地點及前進根據地

一、占領地域中防備スベキ重要地点左ノ通豫定ス

馬尼剌、「グアム」、新嘉坡、「バタビヤ」、「スラバヤ」、「クラカン」、「パレンバン」、「メナド」、「マクッサル」、「アンボン」、「ペナン」、「ラバウル」

二、占領地域ニ於ケル前進根據地左ノ通豫定ス

馬尼剌、新嘉坡、「スラバヤ」

第三節　我ノ占領又ハ破壊セラルル

ノ戰時法規ニ限リ更ニ占領又ハ破壊セントスル

地域ニ

イ「ハーグ」條約ノ「ハーグ陸戰法規」「ハーグ」

「ヘルツ」條約

ロ「アルヘシラス」「ベルリン」方面

ハ「アルジェシラス」諸國方面

ニ其ノ他各國事例

第四節　其ノ他諸事項

第一　戰時禁制品ノ各國別分類及ビ國際法ノ

一　十二

ロ　ハ　ニ　戰時禁制品ノ分類　第四節ノ第一

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

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

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

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



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




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

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











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第八章　聯合艦隊以外ノ作戦

第一節　聯合艦隊ノ作戦

一、各担任区域内要地ノ防備ノ厳ニシ海上交通ノ保護ニ各担任区域方面ノ作戦ニ関シ聯合艦隊及支那方面艦隊ニ協力ス

二、航空部隊其ノ他所要兵力ハ情況ニ應ジ之ノ所要地点ニ移動進出セシノ同方面ノ作戦ニ関シ艦隊指揮官及ハ當該方面担任ノ鎮守府又ハ要港部隊指揮官ノ指揮ヲ受クシム

第二節　支那方面艦隊ノ作戦



四六

一、概ネ現態勢ヲ以テ支那ニ対スル作戦ヲ續行スルト共ニ陸上兵力ヲ掃蕩撃滅シ其ノ権益ヲ處理ス

二、開戦初頭第二遣支艦隊ヲ基幹トスル部隊ヲ以テ陸軍ト協同シテ香港ヲ攻略スルト共ニ所在敵兵力ヲ掃蕩撃滅ス

三、占領地域ノ防備ハ厳ニシ支那沿岸ノ海上交通ノ保護スルト共ニ敵潜水艦航空機等ノ支那沿岸利用ヲ阻止スルニ努ム

四、陸軍ノ海上輸送護衛及集合地ノ防備等ニ関シ所要ニ應シ聯合艦隊及南方軍ノ作戦ニ協力ス

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第三章　十月部署

別表第六（略）

第三節　開戦後の外交作戦

第一節　極秘裏に部署の人、作戦

一、機密保持上特別の考慮を払ひ、全職員に対し、大決意を以て、機密の厳重なる保持に努め、特に他国海外駐在員に対し、全責任を負ひ、本部の指示を待て、

2-100

改、

作戦部隊機関の戦況の説明会に、統合部隊共に、作戦部隊の戦況を説明し、特に作戦部隊の戦況を説明し、協力す

第二節　文部方面強化の作戦

主トシテ第一、第二文部強化ニ第三、第四文部強化ノ成分トシテ以上ノ文部ニ対スル文方面ノ特別ニ陸軍部隊、海軍部隊ノ機関ト共ニ、特ニ機密ノ保持ニ、共ニ、陸上機関ノ機関ニ、特ニ機密ノ保持ニ

第三節　訓令

第一章　使用時

2-101

特ニ、特ニ時ニ

第二章　使用方法

使用方法（本章記載）ハ左ニ依ル

| | |
|---|---|
| 通国（[illegible]国） | 用途（使用船舶） |
| 大型[illegible]国 | 航行区（[illegible]）用 |
| 特殊[illegible]国 | [illegible]国行[illegible]用 |

作為

馬来方面ニ於テハ一般作戦用ニ之ヲ別ニ定ム

第三章　噸数方式別

噸数方式別ハ商人組合戦争所定ニ依ル外左ニ依ル

海軍船舶ト日本船舶（輸送船及陸軍所属船舶ノ全ク）

及陸海軍陸上機関（其ノ全ク）間ノ噸数方式別ハ戦時日本船舶噸数方式別作戦規程ニ依ル

（注）



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



| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 通信破壊隊 | 第五艦隊司令官 | 245 | 141 | 海上交通破壊 | 海上交通破壊作戦要領ニ依リ南洋作戦ス | 南洋諸島 |
| 通信部隊 | 第五艦隊司令官 | 1667 | 1667 | 作戦通信 通信諜報 | 通信（第六章）ニ依ル | 各所 |
| 附属部隊 | | 2487 | 特 | 合 | 別ニ定ム | 日本 |
| | | 141 | 作戦部隊ニ対シ補給 | 補給（第七章）ニ依ル | | 南洋 |

備考

一 補給略号ノ配備、補給（第七章）附表第二ニ依ル
二 北方部隊ト南洋部隊ノ間武境界線
南鳥島（北方部隊ニ含ム）ヲ通ズル東西線
三 南方部隊ト南洋部隊ノ作戦境界線
「ニューギニア」英、「開国」境線
四 本空八月以後聯合艦隊司令長官作戦指揮ヲ受ク
五 各部隊ハ（軍艦已ニハ機密変更ニ伴フ）

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





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

別表第四

邀撃部署

| 令達 | 指揮官 | 主任務 | 決戦準備第一配備 |  | 決戦準備第二配備 |  | 決戦配備 |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  |  |  | 兵力 | 作戦要領 | 兵力 | 作戦要領 | 兵力 | 作戦要領 |
| 主力部隊 | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] |
| 前進部隊 | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] |
| 南 | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] | [illegible] |  | [illegible] | [illegible] |

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

| 洋部隊 | 北方部隊 | 先遣部隊 | 母艦航 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 隊司令長官 | 第五艦隊司令長官 | 第六艦隊司令長官 | 第一航空艦 |
|  |  | 6F | 1AF |
|  |  | 6F | 1AF |
|  |  | 6F | 1AF |

| 空母部隊 | 長岡航空部隊 | 南方部隊 | 連合艦隊 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 隊司令長官 | 第一航空戦隊司令官 | 南方部隊長官 | 連合艦隊司令長官 |
| 到着 獲得 | 第一航空戦隊 | 南方部隊 | 連合艦隊 |
| 1604 | 1145 (一部欠) | 2245 | 1604 |
| 奇襲 | 敵を包囲殲滅の目的を以て第一航空戦隊の一部を以て敵の背後を遮断し敵を殲滅す | 南方作戦続行 | 海上交通破壊作戦中止 |
| 1604 | 1145 (一部欠) | 2245 | |
| 第一部署に同じ | 決戦準備第一部署に後退し敵を誘引し敵を殲滅す | 南方作戦続行 | 第一部署に同じ |
| 1604 | 1145 (一部欠) | 2245 | |
| 第二部署に同じ | 敵を包囲殲滅の目的を以て第一航空戦隊の一部を以て敵の背後を遮断し敵を殲滅す | 南方作戦続行 | 第二部署に同じ |

| 指揮系統 | 東京 | 第一部署に同じ | 第二部署に同じ |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 指揮官 | | |

備考

一、第一段作戦中、本部署に移る場合機動部隊の改編は特令に依る

二、基地航空部隊展開要領

(一)長期方面左の如し

(二)敵の第二方面に来攻の場合

大部 マーシャル方面 一部 南鳥島 サイパン トラック方面

(三)敵の第一方面に来攻の場合

大部 サイパン方面 一部 トラック マーシャル方面

(四)敵艦隊の第二方面に来攻の場合

大部 本土方面 一部 南鳥島 サイパン 大東方面

(五)長期に亘る作戦隊 急速移動に依る保守戦 後作戦の為ふさわしき使用方法

三、特殊部隊 配備は第一段作戦兵力部署に同じ

四、右以外の部隊に関しては特令す

別表第三

第二段作戦兵力部署（南方作戦一段落以後）

| 部隊指揮官 | 兵力 | 主要任務 | 作戦要領 | 記事 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 主力部隊 | 聯合司令長官 1S 1F (-3S 6S) | 全作戦支援 | | |
| 前進部隊 | 第一艦隊司令長官 2F 3S 4Sf | 一北方南洋南方部隊ノ作戦支援<br>二敵機動部隊ノ撃破 | | |
| 母艦航空部隊 | 第三艦隊司令長官 1AF (-4Sf) | | | |
| 先遣部隊 | 第六艦隊司令長官 6F | 第一段作戦遂行 | | |
| 支那方面艦隊 | 第一航空艦隊司令長官 11AF (-主力) 指揮下入 | 所要方面哨戒、基地航空戦 | | |
| 南方部隊 | 第三艦隊長官 3F 4F 5S 5SS | 一占領要域ノ為敵掃蕩般ノ侵入阻止要地ノ防備安定<br>二東洋北西太平洋及洋方面敵海上交通破壊<br>三特ニ仏印泰洋ノ敵基地攻撃 | 明石 第四駆逐隊 第四特設駆潜隊 | |
| 南洋部隊 | 南洋部隊司令長官 11AF ノ一部 | | | |
| 南洋部隊本隊 | 第三艦隊 4F 6S 11Sf | 二南洋方面ノ防備強化ト領要地ノ確保甲備<br>三ビスマルク英領ソロモン方面要地攻略 | | |
| 北方部隊 | 第五艦隊 (1F) | 一北方要地ノ防備強化<br>二北方海域ノ哨戒警備 | | |
| 通商破壊隊 | 巡洋艦 4S 巡洋艦 1S | | | |
| 通信部隊 | 第四艦隊司令官 1S | | | |
| 付属部隊 | 第一航空艦隊ノ一部 | 第一段作戦ニ同ジ | | |

備考

補給艦船ノ配属ハ別ニ定ム



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



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八 多數部落ハ同時ニ補給ノ實施ニ當リ所在最高地位ノ補給機關ニ直接ス

九 補給機關[illegible]

十 聯合機關ハ[illegible]、之ヲ兩後、行動附表第[illegible]

第[illegible]節 補給要務

一 聯合機關ハ補給部隊計畫法令ニ基ク聯合機關補給部隊ニ關シ[illegible]

二 各部隊(機關)補給部隊ハ各部隊(機關)指揮官ニ之ヲ[illegible]

三 各部隊(機關)補給部隊ハ各部隊(機關)補給主幹ハ補給[illegible]

四 他部隊(機關)所屬補給機關ハ補給[illegible]ノ場合ニ於テハ[illegible]指揮官ハ補給[illegible]

五 補給[illegible]部隊ハ[illegible]ノ場合ニ於テハ[illegible]指揮官ハ聯合機關[illegible]

[illegible]

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[illegible]

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[illegible]

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









機密聯合艦隊命令作第二號 600

昭和十六年十二月七日佐伯灣旗艦長門

聯合艦隊司令長官山本五十六

軍機

聯合艦隊命令

第一開戰準備

Y日十二月八日

(終)

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